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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Business restructuring generally means the cross-border restructuring of 
multinational enterprises’ risks, functions and/or assets. In practice, it means 
that existing commercial relations between associated companies are 
reorganized within a multinational group to implement new business 
strategies. Although the phenomenon is not entirely new, it has become a 
particularly topical tax law related question only in recent years, leading to the 
OECD adopting Chapter IX (Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business 
Restructurings) to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 2010. 
Nevertheless, the tax and transfer pricing treatment of business restructurings 
is seldom expressly regulated on a national level.   
 
This research deals with the transfer pricing treatment of business 
restructurings from the perspective of Russian, Finnish and U.S. tax law. 
Transfer pricing can be defined as pricing of transactions that are conducted 
between related companies. The guiding principle of transfer pricing — the 
arm’s length principle — requires that the pricing of a related party transaction 
must ultimately conform to prices used between independent parties in 
similar transactions under similar circumstances. The main topic of this study 
is further divided into two primary research questions. First, this study 
examines to what extent business restructurings may become objects of 
transfer pricing under the national transfer pricing regulations in Russia, 
Finland and the USA. This includes the evaluation of whether the types of 
assets and something of value, which are usually transferred in business 
restructurings between associated parties, fall within the scope of application 
of the national transfer pricing regulations. The second research question is 
how the arm’s length transfer prices should be determined for transfers of such 
assets/something of value that are deemed to be in the scope of the national 
transfer pricing rules in business restructurings. Further analysis is presented 
in connection with the examination of both research questions regarding 
whether the prevailing national transfer pricing regulations follow efficiently 
the arm’s length principle and whether the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
could currently be used as an international standard in transfer pricing of 
business restructurings that should also be adopted to domestic transfer 
pricing rules.  
 
This study aims to clarify the position of business restructurings as a legal 
phenomenon in the set of legal norms regulating transfer pricing. This 
research approach is known as a legal dogmatic approach or method, where 
the content of existing law is interpreted and the existing legal situation 
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concerning a specific question (i.e. business restructurings) is clarified. As the 
research objective is to examine the current legal state concerning transfer 
pricing of business restructurings in Russia, Finland and the USA, the results 
derived from the aforementioned jurisdictions are compared with each other. 
Thus, the second research method in this study is the comparative method or 
approach.  
 
This research reveals that, as a result of the narrow scope of application of the 
Russian transfer pricing rules and the lack of clarifying interpretations of 
legally binding nature, only transfers of tangible property and intellectual 
properties fall within the scope of the Russian transfer pricing rules in the 
business restructuring context. Thus transfers of other assets of commercial 
value as well as premature terminations or renegotiations of agreements are 
likely to fall outside the scope of the Russian transfer pricing rules. 
Furthermore, no legal support can be found for the view that 
contemporaneous transfers of interrelated assets and functions could be 
identified and valued on an aggregate basis (i.e. as a going concern). The 
existing situation is not in line with the approach taken by the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and is troublesome especially from the perspective of the 
arm’s length principle.  
 
Quite the contrary, business restructurings fall more effectively within the 
scope of application of the national transfer pricing rules and regulations in 
Finland and the USA. Although certain partial issues remain ambiguous (in 
particular, the transfer pricing treatment of goodwill and going concern value 
in the USA), the assets/items-of-value that are typically transferred in 
business restructurings fall well within the scope of the national transfer 
pricing rules. This means that intangible assets transferred between related 
parties are also generally objects of transfer pricing (i.e. subject to the arm’s 
length principle) had unrelated parties compensated transfers of such assets 
in corresponding situations. Moreover, related parties are required to examine 
on a case-by-case basis whether premature terminations or renegotiations of 
existing agreements should potentially be compensated in a business 
restructuring and whether the restructuring should be regarded as a transfer 
of a going concern and thus examined as a whole.  
 
Consequently, the compliance with the arm’s length principle is primarily 
required and followed effectively in business restructurings pursuant to 
Finnish and U.S. tax law. However, in one respect, concerns from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle may arise. Although intangible assets 
generally fall within the scope of the Finnish and U.S. transfer pricing rules, 
the broad concept of intangible property in transfer pricing is not entirely clear 
and straightforward. In consequence, the question of to what extent 
intangibles fall within the scope of the transfer pricing rules in business 
restructurings may cause interpretive problems in cases where it is not self-
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evident whether certain items or assets should be regarded as intangible 
assets. This kind of vagueness is, in the end, against the aim of the arm’s length 
principle. 
 
This study also reveals that the determination of arm’s length compensations 
for transfers of something of value occurring during a business restructuring 
may be challenging. This culminates especially in determining arm’s length 
compensations for transactions that involve purely transfers of intangibles or 
transfers of a going concern. Although the regulated transfer pricing methods, 
especially profit-based methods, may be applied to transactions involving 
intangibles in certain cases, they may not always provide sufficient tools for 
determining arm’s length compensations, for instance, due to that reliable 
comparable uncontrolled transactions cannot be found for the related party 
transaction in question, or that the application of the methods in a given case 
is otherwise troublesome. Furthermore, traditional transfer pricing methods 
can poorly be applied to transfers of a going concern or business units, and 
clarifying and detailed guidance in this respect is missing.  
 
Nevertheless, all the target countries also allow taxpayers to use other 
unspecified valuation methods and techniques than specifically regulated 
transfer pricing methods, provided that such methods bring the most reliable 
arm’s length results in such situations. In valuing intangibles, the income 
based methods are especially important, such as the discounted cash flow 
method, as they are commonly used in practice in the direct valuation of 
intangibles in transactions between independent parties, and therefore they 
will more likely provide a more reliable arm’s length result. Similarly, the cash 
flow/income based methods, especially the above-mentioned discounted cash 
flow method and its variations, have also been widely approved and 
considered reliable and appropriate in determining the value for a going 
concern. As these kinds of valuation techniques are generally applied in 
practice by independent parties in the business valuation too, they will likely 
provide the best results in terms of the arm’s length principle also in 
transactions between related parties.   
 
The application of such methods to business restructurings is, however, not an 
easy and straightforward task, as it often involves the projection of future 
income streams/cash flows and the determination of an appropriate discount 
rate. In addition, tax authorities have not clarified how such unspecified 
methods should be applied specifically in the transfer pricing and/or business 
restructuring context. In conclusion, several uncertainty factors relate to the 
transfer pricing of business restructurings in Russia, Finland and the USA. It 
is not entirely clear in all cases, inter alia, to what extent transfers of intangible 
assets fall within the scope of application of the national transfer pricing 
regulations, what the most appropriate transfer pricing method in a given case 
is, and how to apply the chosen method in practice.  
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As the aforementioned concerns in relation to the compliance with the arm’s 
length principle have not been addressed in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines either, the guidelines cannot, in their present form, be used 
efficiently as the international transfer pricing standard that could be adopted 
to domestic transfer pricing rules to comply with the arm’s length principle in 
business restructurings. Usually, the best solution to address the existing 
uncertainties is the conclusion of advance pricing agreements (APAs) with tax 
authorities. Once an APA has been concluded, the tax authorities must follow 
it. Nonetheless, the use of APAs is not uncomplicated especially in Russia, 
where bilateral/multilateral APAs cannot yet be concluded. As the unilateral 
APAs are not binding on foreign tax authorities in a similar manner as the 
multilateral APAs, they may not currently be used effectively in cross-border 
business restructurings to tackle uncertainties related to transfer pricing. On 
the contrary, the current legal situation in Finland and the USA enables the 
conclusion of both unilateral and bilateral/multilateral APAs, and therefore 
APAs may be used as an effective tool to eliminate at least some uncertainties 
and ambiguities related to the transfer pricing issues arising out of business 
restructurings.  
 
In addition to APAs, the compliance with the general transfer pricing 
documentation and reporting requirements as well as taxpayers’ self-initiated 
transfer pricing adjustments may lead to potential transfer pricing disputes 
with tax authorities being avoided. Lastly, apart from analyzing whether 
related parties have complied with the arm’s length principle during business 
restructurings, the anti-avoidance rules prohibiting unjustified tax benefits 
must be borne in mind in the decision-making regarding business 
restructurings.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BUSINESS RESTRUCTURING AS A PHENOMENON 
The restructuring of companies’ business models, business restructuring, 
generally means the cross-border restructuring of multinational enterprises’ 
risks, functions and/or assets. In other words, it can be described as a cross-
border reorganization of commercial or financial relations between associated 
companies.1 This may mean, for example, that associated companies located 
in different countries allocate certain functions, assets and risks within the 
group of companies for the purpose of adopting the group’s new business 
model. The definition itself is broad and may concern simple and 
straightforward changes as well as multidimensional and complex changes; 
business restructurings may also result in the closing down of a whole business 
unit. A universally approved or a legal definition of business restructuring does 
not exist.2 
 
The business models of multinational enterprises have usually been designed 
to follow certain business strategies. A group of companies may aim to place 
its group companies in different countries due to logistical reasons, availability 
of factors of production and location of market.3 Over the last few decades, the 
trend has especially been to amend the business models of group companies 
located in different countries by transferring parts of their functions in a 
controlled way to only one group company, often a parent company. In 
practice, this means that the companies which have been operating fairly 
independently in different countries, transfer parts of their tangible and 
intangible assets, as well as expertise used in their business activities, to a 
receiving group company, which locates in another country.4 
 
Various aims may trigger business restructurings: the execution of the group’s 
global business plan to maximize synergies, the streamlining and optimizing 
the administrative functions of business units as well as increasing the 
efficiency of the supply chains.5 Synergies may be, for instance, cost synergies 
or functional synergies. Cost synergies relate to reducing the multinational 
company’s expenses, which arise from business activities; one measure to 
achieve such synergies is to eliminate certain functions or tasks, which may be 
                                                 
 
1 Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 20; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.1–9.2.  
2 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.1. 
3 Engblom et al. 2010, p. 545. 
4 Newby – Sarson – Preshaw – Cummings – Skaletsky 2008, p. 17. 
5 Owens 2007, p. 4. 
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considered duplicative within the group of companies. Functional synergies, 
on the other hand, may be reached by centralizing some of the group’s 
functions (e.g. human resources) in a specific group company. The 
centralization helps the group to achieve savings and concentrate on providing 
services of better quality.6 
 
The business restructuring of a multinational enterprise is often closely linked 
to supply chain management. Supply chain management can be defined as the 
management of the procurement and movement of raw materials within a 
group, the manufacturing of products of such raw materials as well as 
transferring of the finished products from the group to the customers. In 
supply chain management, the multinational group places functions, assets 
and risks in different countries in a way that minimizes its costs and expenses 
and maximizes operational efficiency. In particular, the opening of national 
markets, technological innovations and contractual freedom have made the 
transfers of functions, assets and risks from one company to another easier 
than ever and, at the same time, have contributed to creating new business 
models.7 A business restructuring may relate to the improvement of the supply 
chain management of a multinational enterprise. For example, the enterprise 
may aim at fast deliveries towards customers and quantitative deliveries, and 
therefore amends its business models to meet such goals.8   
 
Although the phenomenon of business restructurings is not entirely new, as it 
has its roots in the mid-1990s,9 it has become a particularly topical tax law 
related question only in recent years. The OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
published in 2008 draft transfer pricing guidelines dealing specifically with 
business restructurings. Finally, in 2010 the OECD adopted a new chapter, 
Chapter IX (Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings), to the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which was based on the said draft. The 
principles introduced in Chapter IX discuss issues in detail regarding the 
transfer pricing treatment of cross-border business restructurings. 
Nevertheless, the guidelines are not legally binding by nature and are 
primarily directed at the OECD member states.10 The tax treatment of business 
                                                 
 
6 Stuffer – Hiller 2009, pp. 4–5.  Many other reasons may be behind business restructurings, such as 
governmental requirements, availability of specialists in certain countries, post-actions of mergers and 
acquisitions and demands for products; see Stuffer – Hiller 2009, pp. 7–8.  
7 Russo 2007, p. 183. 
8 Stuffer – Hiller 2009, p. 6. 
9 Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 20. 
10 See article 5 of the OECD Convention. See also e.g. Bullen 2011, pp. 33–34. Nevertheless, the possibility 
to regard the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the commentaries to the OECD Model Tax 
Convention as binding law has been discussed in the legal literature. Inter alia, it has been reviewed 
whether they could considered binding customary international law. The requirements for such a 
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restructurings is thus, in the end, a matter of national legislators and tax 
authorities. As only a few countries have expressly regulated transfer pricing 
of business restructurings in national legislation,11 these guidelines play a vital 
role in practice in many OECD member states.12  
 
 
1.2 SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH AND LIMITATIONS 
This research deals with the transfer pricing treatment of business 
restructurings under Russian, Finnish and U.S. tax law. Transfer pricing can 
be defined as pricing of business transactions which are executed between 
related corporate parties, in general companies within the same group of 
companies.13 Transfer pricing legislation and the guiding transfer pricing 
principle — the arm’s length principle — require that the pricing of a 
transaction between related parties must take the market forces into account 
and conform to prices used between independent parties in similar 
transactions. Otherwise, the profits of these companies will be adjusted by tax 
authorities by establishing the terms and conditions for the transaction, which 
could be expected in similar transactions between independent parties under 
similar conditions.14 Hence, business restructurings are considered in this 
research as transactions conducted between related companies, i.e. companies 
within the same group of companies. This approach can be justified by transfer 
pricing’s importance and economic significance in today’s corporate life.15  
                                                 
 
conclusion, however, have not usually been considered fulfilled, and therefore such a view has not gained 
wide support; see e.g. Wittendorff 2010a, pp. 123–124, Engelen 2006, p. 106, Erasmus-Koen – Douma 
2007, p. 342 and Pijl 2008, p. 98. 
11 For example, Germany is one of the countries, which has regulated particularly transfer pricing of 
business restructurings in its national legislation. The provisions are included in the tax act concerning 
foreign transactions (Außensteuergesetz). See more about the provisions and the relationship between 
the provision and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in Wilmanns – Wellens – de Preter 2009, pp. 
658–664. See also Menninger – Wellens 2011, pp. 233–235. 
12 See e.g. Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 23. Nevertheless, the legislative approach to the taxation and transfer 
pricing of business restructurings varies considerably around the world. In addition, the taxation 
practices of national authorities in relation to business restructurings have been inconsistent; see more 
about tax authorities’ practices in certain countries in KPMG 2011, pp. 9–27. 
13 Myrsky – Linnakangas 2009, p. 269; Wittendorff 2010a, p. 3. 
14 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.1 and 1.3. When the pricing of related party transaction 
conforms to the arm’s length principle, the prices are considered arm’s length. The concept of transfer 
pricing and the arm’s length principle are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.2.1 of this research. 
15 Transfer pricing has been considered by multinational enterprises’ tax experts as one of the most 
important tax issues in corporations, see e.g. Karjalainen– Raunio 2007, p. 11. It has been estimated that 
more than half of the world trade is carried between related companies, see e.g. preliminary works for 
the AAP, HE 107/2006 vp, p. 11. 
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The main topic of this study is divided into two primary research questions. 
First, this study examines to what extent business restructurings may become 
objects of transfer pricing under the national transfer pricing regulations in 
Russia, Finland and the USA. This research question includes the evaluation 
of whether the types of assets and something of value, which are frequently 
transferred in business restructurings between associated parties, fall within 
the scope of application of national transfer pricing regulations. Consequently, 
the so-called post-restructuring transactions, i.e. transactions that are 
conducted between associated companies after the execution of a business 
restructuring using the group’s new business models, are not dealt with in this 
research. The second main research question is how the arm’s length transfer 
prices should be determined for the transfers of something of value (e.g. 
assets, risk and/or functions), which occur in the business restructuring 
context and are deemed to be in the scope of national transfer pricing rules. 
This question comprises the analysis of how such transfers should be valued 
from the perspective of existing transfer pricing legislation and what transfer 
pricing and valuation methods the existing transfer pricing rules may provide 
in this respect. A detailed analysis of the technical application of such 
methods, having no legal nature, is excluded from the scope of this research.   
 
In connection with the examination of both the aforementioned primary 
research questions, it is also analyzed whether the prevailing national 
transfer pricing regulations follow the arm’s length principle, which should 
be the guiding principle in transfer pricing, efficiently in business 
restructurings. First, it is reviewed whether the existing transfer pricing rules 
and guidance require and enable the observance of the arm’s length principle 
efficiently and thoroughly in business restructurings when the primary 
research questions are considered. Second, it is examined how to achieve the 
best result from the perspective of the arm’s length principle in business 
restructurings on the basis of experiences from the target countries and what 
potential concerns may currently relate to the compliance with the arm’s 
length principle.   
 
In addition, as the OECD has published particular guidance with regard to 
transfer pricing of business restructurings, such guidance cannot be ignored 
when the aforementioned primary research questions are examined in more 
detail. Although the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are not legally binding 
upon member states as such, national authorities are encouraged to follow 
them.16 They constitute an international standard that is used by the member 
states in their tax treaties and domestic legislation, resulting in that they are 
                                                 
 
16 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Preface, 15–17.  
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also broadly followed in practice.17 More importantly, they are even considered 
as the guiding source in interpreting the arm’s length principle in some 
countries.18 As both Finland and the USA are OECD member states, and given 
the practical relevance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as the guiding 
source in transfer pricing, the applicable OECD guidance is reviewed and 
analyzed in connection with the examination of the aforesaid primary research 
questions. This includes the presentation of the guidance and viewpoints 
provided by the OECD on the discussed questions and an analysis of whether 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines could be applied as such in the target 
countries, or used in the interpretation of the domestic transfer pricing 
regulations. In particular, it is also analyzed whether the OECD’s approach to 
transfer pricing business restructurings could be used as a guiding 
international standard that could be adopted efficiently to domestic transfer 
pricing rules for the purpose of achieving the best arm’s length result in 
business restructurings. 
 
From a tax law perspective, however, business restructurings not only raise 
questions with regard to transfer pricing and direct taxation, but as a 
multidimensional phenomenon they may also raise issues related to, inter alia, 
customs law and value added taxation.19 For example, the determination of a 
correct value for goods in cross-border transactions is also of great relevance 
in customs law.20 On the other hand, business restructurings may also realize 
several VAT issues; for instance, as a result of a business restructuring, a group 
company may be obliged to pay non-deductible VAT, which leads to higher 
costs of services or products acquired in the restructuring.21  Although these 
questions are important and should be taken into account when a 
multinational enterprise is planning to amend its global business models, they 
are excluded from the scope of this research.22 
 
Questions regarding permanent establishments may also arise in connection 
with business restructurings. For instance, when a part of a manufacturing 
                                                 
 
17 Calderón 2007, pp. 4–5; Bullen 2011, pp. 39–42. 
18 This is the case in Finland; see Finnish Tax Administration: Statement A177/200/2015. See also Bullen 
2011, pp. 41–42.   
19 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.8; Kroppen – Silva 2011, pp. 21–22. 
20 See e.g. Fabio 2009, pp. 195–197. The transfer pricing value and customs value of goods is not 
necessarily the same, see Fabio 2009, p. 197. About the relationship between transfer pricing and 
customs law in general, see Bakker, Anuschka – Obuoforibo, Belema (edit.): Transfer Pricing and 
Customs Valuation: Two Worlds to Tax as One. IBFD 2009. 
21 See e.g. Cordova – Mitra – Newman – Reams – Shanda – Shapiro 2012, p. 59; van der Paardt – van 
der Tempel 2009, p. 159.  
22 About customs law and VAT questions in more detail, see e.g. Nordlund – Kallio – Kurkioja 2002, pp. 
293–314. See also Mehtonen 2001a, p. 195; Kasatkin 2004, p. 2. 
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company’s business activities is transferred to another group company located 
in a different country, the latter company may be deemed to have a permanent 
establishment in the former company’s location country, for example, on the 
basis of the sale of products or other business activities performed in the 
former company’s jurisdiction after the restructuring. The revenue of this 
activity may become an object of taxation at source.  
 
The attribution of profits to permanent establishment is regulated in the 
OECD Model Tax Convention as its own question separate from Article 9 of 
the OECD Model Tax Convention, which deals with transactions between 
associated parties subject to transfer pricing.23 Therefore, the business 
restructurings’ possible impacts on permanent establishments or the 
formation thereof are not covered in this research.24 Multinational enterprises 
cannot, nevertheless, ignore this issue since they may not achieve the potential 
financial savings they seek to achieve in business restructurings, if the result 
of the restructuring is the creation of a new permanent establishment in 
another country.25 
 
Furthermore, it must be observed that the study focuses only on cross-border 
business restructurings and therefore, for example, restructuring transactions 
conducted only between domestic associated companies situated in Finland, 
Russia or the USA fall outside its scope. The term “business restructuring” 
used in this research thus refers to cross-border business restructurings also 
in cases where the word “cross-border” has been left out. In addition, the 
concept of business restructurings is limited to outbound business 
restructurings. This means that business restructurings are understood in this 
study as business restructuring arrangements, which involve outbound 
transfers of assets and/or something of value from a Russian, Finnish or U.S. 
group company to a foreign associated company. This approach can be 
described as an exit country perspective, while the opposite approach — entry 
country perspective — examines inbound transactions.26 Usually the exit 
country perspective is of great interest to the tax authorities, as they are willing 
to intervene in arrangements where assets and something of value is 
transferred from their jurisdiction to foreign companies. The transferor is in 
such cases commonly entitled to a remuneration in accordance with the arm’s 
                                                 
 
23 See Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
24 Similarly, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have excluded this question from Chapter IX; see 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.7. 
25 See e.g. Cooper – Law 2010, pp. 249–256; Burgers 2009, pp. 145–158. 
26 See Kroppen – Silva 2011, pp. 32–34. 
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length principle. Moreover, in the legal literature the exit country perspective 
has been considered more topical.27  
 
Lastly, it should be underlined that the concept of business restructuring in 
this research is separated from the so-called reorganizations, such as mergers, 
divisions and exchanges of shares. The reorganizations deviate from the 
aforementioned concept of business restructurings by their nature; besides, 
they are regulated under specific income tax provisions and may in some cases 
be tax neutral pursuant to applicable national tax law provisions of Russia, 
Finland and the USA.28 Thus, they primarily fall outside the scope of this 
study. 
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, METHODS AND CHOICE 
OF COUNTRIES  
The objective of this research is to clarify the current legal state with regard to 
the transfer pricing of business restructurings under Russian, Finnish and U.S. 
law in the above-mentioned sense to answer the main research questions: 
namely, to what extent cross-border business restructurings may fall within 
the scope of national transfer pricing regulations, and what methods should 
be used in determining the arm’s length transfer prices in such cases. For this 
purpose, this study aims to identify the legal sources and legal norms that 
should be taken into account in the transfer pricing of business restructurings. 
This means that, in particular, the national transfer pricing regulations and 
other sources of law containing legal norms concerning transfer pricing in 
Russia, Finland and the USA are reviewed. 
 
More importantly, the objective of this research is to interpret such transfer 
pricing provisions in order to determine applicability thereof to business 
restructurings and to clarify to what extent restructurings may fall within the 
scope of national transfer pricing regulations, and in this way be objects of 
transfer pricing. Furthermore, the study aims to provide information on 
potential methods and other measures that could be used in the determination 
                                                 
 
27 See e.g. Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 32; Zollo 2011, p. 757; Laaksonen 2006, pp. 429–430; De Robertis – 
Matthias – Damian 2006, pp. 17–22; Juusela – Tuominen 2011, pp. 315–316. 
28 For instance, § 52 a – 52 f of the Finnish Act on the Taxation of Business Profits and Income from 
Professional Activities (Laki elinkeinotulon verottamisesta, 360/1968) regulate tax neutral mergers, 
divisions, transfers of assets and exchange of shares. These arrangements do not have immediate tax 
consequences, but the taxation is postponed until the moment, when the assets/business in question 
are/is transferred further. In addition, both Russian and U.S. tax legislation have similar provisions, see 
e.g. Article 277 of the Russian Tax Code and Section 368 of the IRC.  
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of arm’s length compensations for such transfers of something of value 
occurred in business restructurings that are considered to be within the scope 
of transfer pricing regulations.  
 
The research aims to clarify the position of business restructurings as a legal 
phenomenon in the set of legal norms regulating transfer pricing in the 
aforementioned manner. The approach is known in the legal research 
methodology as a legal dogmatic approach (method)29, which is thus used as 
the main research method in this study. The legal dogmatic approach 
interprets the content of existing law and in general clarifies the existing legal 
situation (the interpretive task). In addition, the legal dogmatic approach 
systematizes, i.e. structures, the existing legal norms further. In this sense, it 
continues the work of the legislator (the systematization task).30 In practice, 
the legal dogmatic approach examines in particular, what is the existing law’s 
position on a certain problematic question at hand.31 Therefore, a legal 
interpretation of an issue in a legal dogmatic research is made by interpreting 
sources of law;32 in this study, this means sources containing existing legal 
norms on transfer pricing.   
 
As discussed, the research objective is to examine the current legal state 
concerning transfer pricing of business restructurings in Russia, Finland and 
the USA. So that the results of the study may be efficiently used in decision-
making in corporate life, it is of great importance to compare the results 
derived from the aforementioned jurisdictions with each other. This approach 
is defined as a comparative approach33, which is thus used as the second 
research method in this study. The comparative approach is methodologically 
close to the legal dogmatic approach. In the comparative approach, at least two 
countries’ legal norms and phenomena are examined and compared to each 
other.34 In this research, this means that the existing legal situation as to 
transfer pricing of business restructurings is explored and compared to each 
other from the perspective of Russian, Finnish and U.S. law in the above-
mentioned sense. 
 
The choices made with regard to the methods of this research — the legal 
dogmatic and the comparative approach — can be justified by referring to the 
fact that these methods are generally acceptable legal methods in Finnish tax 
                                                 
 
29 Alternatively known as doctrinal or black letter method. In Finnish oikeusdogmaattinen or 
lainopillinen näkökulma (metodi). 
30 Aarnio 1998, pp. 989–990; Hirvonen 2011, p. 22; Myrsky 2003, pp. 277–278. 
31 Myrsky – Ossa 2008, pp. 27–28. 
32 Aarnio 1989, p. 195. 
33 In Finnish oikeusvertaileva näkökulma. 
34 Aarnio 1989, p. 50. 
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law research.35 The legal dogmatic approach is the most frequently used 
method in tax law. The main reason for this is the need for information in the 
society regarding the existing law. Especially tax law and its regulations are 
constantly changing, and therefore in such an environment there is a demand 
for research aiming to clarify the current situation of existing law as to certain 
questions. In addition, the research tradition speaks in favor of the use of the 
legal dogmatic research.36 
 
On the other hand, in recent years the importance of other approaches has also 
grown in tax law research, including the comparative approach. The 
comparative approach is useful in tax law research, for instance, in order to 
recognize possible problems, which may arise from the interpretation of tax 
legislation, on the basis of experiences in other jurisdictions.37 Hence, the legal 
dogmatic approach accompanied by the judicial comparative perspective bring 
the best results in terms of clarifying transfer pricing regulations in relation to 
business restructurings in this research.  
 
When the second research question — the determination of arm’s length 
compensations for transfers of assets/items of value in business restructurings 
— is discussed, also methods used in scientific research in the field of 
economics and accounting, or those that combine legal and economics, could 
be considered.38 However, this research question is, in the above-discussed 
manner, limited to the examination of how transfers of something of value 
occurring in business restructurings should be valued from the perspective of 
existing transfer pricing laws. In this context, the types of transfer pricing and 
valuation methods and techniques that are provided by the national transfer 
pricing sources and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are discussed. 
While this includes brief presentations of the content of such methods, the 
analysis has a clear legal dogmatic approach.39 The detailed analysis of the 
application of such transfer pricing and valuation methods, comprising 
                                                 
 
35 Myrsky – Ossa 2008, p. 28. 
36 Myrsky 2009, pp. 60, 65; Myrsky – Ossa 2008, p. 28. 
37 Myrsky 2003, pp. 277; Myrsky – Ossa 2008, pp. 28–29. It must be noted that also other kinds of 
approaches can be applied in tax law research. Such perspectives include, inter alia, tax law history, tax 
policy and basic research. Furthermore, also non-judicial perspectives may be included in a tax law 
research, such as approaches related to economics or political science; see more in Myrsky 2003, pp. 
277–284 and Myrsky – Ossa 2008, pp. 28–30. 
38 An example of the latter is the so-called law and economics, which, in short, means an economic 
analysis of existing law; see Timonen 1998, p. 100. 
39 This view has also been shared in the legal literature. Knuutinen has stated that, although economic 
factors should be taken into account when the legislated transfer pricing provision is interpreted and, 
consequently, it is reviewed whether the pricing of a related party transaction is arm’s length, a legal 
dogmatic approach is still used in such an analysis; see Knuutinen 2014b, pp. 87–88.   
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technical calculations of parameters and figures related thereto, is not in the 
scope of this research. As the economic nature relates to the latter, no other 
research methods or approaches are applied in this study.  
 
Despite the fact that this research discusses an internationally important legal 
phenomenon, which usually has cross-border impacts and is thus topical in 
many jurisdictions, the number of countries examined in the scope of this 
study is limited in the above-discussed manner. For the purpose of ensuring 
that the similarities and differences of the laws of the chosen target countries 
can be examined, compared and analyzed sufficiently in the study, also taking 
into account that the maximum number of pages of doctoral dissertations is 
limited, the countries subject to comparison within the scope of this research 
are restricted to the aforementioned three countries: Russia, Finland and the 
USA. 
 
One of the main academic justifications behind the choice of the target 
countries to be considered is whether the chosen countries are able to provide 
different and opposing views on the discussed research questions, which are 
also of great interest and relevance.40 From the scholarly point of view, 
Russian tax law can be regarded as an interesting country, as it has particularly 
new transfer pricing legislation that has not been examined broadly in 
international tax law research. More importantly, Russia is not an OECD 
member state, resulting in that, at least in the first place, its national transfer 
pricing rules may contain peculiarities or deviations from the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines. Also, one of the goals of this work is to provide information 
on the transfer pricing treatment of business restructurings, specifically from 
the point of view of Russian law, to Finnish and other Western companies 
operating in Russia,41 which is why this jurisdiction is one of the target 
countries of this study. For example, the presence of Finnish companies in 
Russia has increased significantly in recent years,42 and the Finnish companies 
operating in Russia are of the opinion that especially taxation is an unclear 
issue in Russia, which hinders business operations to the extent that the use 
of local consultants’ help is very common.43 For the sake of understanding the 
observations and results with regard to Russian law, the comparison between 
Russian law and laws of other countries is necessary. 
 
                                                 
 
40 See e.g. Van Hoecke 2015, p. 4. 
41 Especially in Russia the business restructurings have been very topical in the last few years, see e.g. 
Hansen 2008, pp. 65–68. 
42 Some Finnish companies’ Russian subsidiaries have had and currently have several economically 
important projects especially in St. Petersburg and Moscow. See about some of the projects e.g. in 
Shlyamin 2008, pp. 266–273. 
43  KTM 2005, p. 55. 
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As the importance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines cannot be ignored 
in this study, it has academically been considered valuable to choose as one of 
the target countries a country that follows the transfer pricing guidance of the 
OECD, i.e. Finland.44 As discussed, the OECD’s guidance is currently a subject 
of great interest in transfer pricing. By choosing Finland as the second target 
country of this research, the OECD’s sources and positions on transfer pricing 
issues will fall within the scope of this study. Moreover, as Finland is an EU 
member state, in addition to domestic transfer pricing sources of law and the 
OECD’s guidance, also applicable sources of EU law will be in the scope of 
research, which may provide other interesting viewpoints in this research.45  
 
The third jurisdiction subject to a comparative treatment in this study, the 
USA, is considered as one of the pioneer countries in terms of developing 
transfer pricing legislation and rules. It is usually on the front line when tax 
provisions and regulations are developed to tackle new issues in the field of 
international tax law. Having detailed and advanced transfer pricing 
regulations that seek to cover all possible scenarios in the area of transfer 
pricing, the USA is an interesting country for scientific research in transfer 
pricing. U.S. tax law has also, in general, global impacts on multinational 
enterprises, as usually more developed legal norms — such as transfer pricing 
rules — must also be followed by the enterprises willing to practice trade with 
U.S. group companies.46 Consequently, the U.S. law perspective cannot be 
disregarded in this research. 
 
It must be observed that one country that could be considered as potential 
target country in an international tax research that deals with the transfer 
pricing aspects of business restructurings is Germany. It has regulated the 
transfer pricing treatment of business restructurings specifically in its 
legislation.47 Therefore, the examination of the German transfer pricing rules 
could provide interesting points of view on the research questions, especially 
when taking into account that business restructurings are less frequently 
                                                 
 
44 In practice, Finland follows the principles set out in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to a great 
degree, see e.g. Finnish Tax Administration: Statement A177/200/2015. This will be dealt with in the 
following chapters of this study. 
45 Furthermore, regardless of the cross-border nature of business restructurings and the research 
questions being in nature universal, one point of interest in an international tax law research conducted 
in Finland should be the domestic legislation and provisions; hence, the choice of Finnish law can also 
be validated from this perspective. 
46 See e.g. Markham 2005, pp. 4–5. In addition, the USA is also a member state of the OECD, as already 
mentioned. 
47 See supra note 11. The provisions are included in the tax act concerning foreign transactions 
(Außensteuergesetz). 
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regulated directly in national legislation. However, as discussed, the number 
of target countries is limited in this study on the mentioned grounds.  
 
Also, already one of the chosen countries in this research – the USA – has 
comprehensive transfer pricing regulations that are similarly of academic 
relevance, although specific transfer pricing rules with regard to business 
restructurings have not (yet) been introduced. U.S. law with its common law 
features provides opposing and/or interesting views on the matter more likely 
than the German civil law based legal system.  
 
Lastly, the U.S. transfer pricing rules are of great international interest taking 
into consideration the USA’s role as a forerunner in transfer pricing law. 
Hence, despite that there could exist academically justifiable reasons to 
include the perspective of German law in the scope of this research, Germany 
has not been chosen as one of the target countries of this study.  
 
 
1.4 REFERENCES AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
As previously mentioned, the sources of law form the object of the study, when 
the existing law is examined in relation to certain interpretive problems under 
a legal dogmatic approach. As this research concentrates on the transfer 
pricing aspects of business restructurings, the earlier mentioned international 
principle guiding transfer pricing — the arm’s length principle — is the primary 
focus of this study. Hence, the national legislation and regulations concerning 
the arm’s length principle in Russia, Finland the USA are dealt with in this 
research, in particular, from the perspective of business restructurings and 
form the basis for the research.48  
 
In addition, case law, preliminary works and administrative guidance are also 
regarded, although to a different extent, as sources of law in Russia, Finland 
and the USA.49 Therefore, such sources of law are reviewed in this study when 
they are relevant to constitute interpretations of the existing legal situation in 
respect of transfer pricing of business restructurings. It has been also viewed 
appropriate to interview Russian tax practitioners in this research for the 
purposes of providing insights into the existing legal situation in Russia, as the 
current situation with respect to the research topic may be regarded there as 
exceptionally ambiguous.  
 
                                                 
 
48 The changes in the national legislation and regulations have been followed in this research until 10 
July 2017. 
49 This is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 2 of this work. 
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The arm’s length principle is based on Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention50 and has been discussed extensively in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines. As both Finland and the USA are OECD member states, 
and taking into account that especially in Finland the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines are of practical relevance when the national transfer pricing 
regulations are interpreted,51 the OECD Model Tax Convention and 
particularly the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are also significant sources 
of law in this study. As discussed, the guidelines are also globally followed in 
practice and even considered as the guiding source in interpreting the arm’s 
length principle,52 which is why they should not be ignored also from this 
perspective. Furthermore, as the OECD has published guidance expressly with 
regard to the transfer pricing treatment of business restructurings, it is 
necessary to discuss Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as 
well as other OECD guidance affecting business restructurings in detail.53 
 
The research topic can be considered particularly timely as the OECD just 
recently — on 10 July 2017 — published the newest edition of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Before that, on 4 July 2016, it had published fairly 
new conforming amendments to Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines54 in connection with its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 
(BEPS Project).55 These amendments were introduced as a result of the final 
reports of the BEPS Project, which adopted several substantial amendments 
to principles set out in Chapters I, V, VI, VII and VIII of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines dealing with, inter alia, comparability analysis, transfer 
pricing treatment of intangibles and transfer pricing documentation.56 The 
2017 edition of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is primarily a 
consolidated version of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines that 
incorporated the conforming amendments to Chapter IX together with the 
aforementioned substantial amendments to other chapters of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines that were first introduced by the said final reports 
of the BEPS Project.  
 
Although the OECD did not revisit the actual guidance provided in Chapter IX 
with regard to transfer pricing of business restructurings, it considered that 
                                                 
 
50 See the OECD Model Tax Convention Commentary, p. 141. 
51 See e.g. Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, p. 18. 
52 Calderón 2007, pp. 4–5; Bullen 2011, pp. 39–42. 
53 The changes in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and other guidance published by the OECD have 
been followed in this research until 10 July 2017. 
54 See OECD Conforming Amendments to Chapter IX. 
55 See more about the OECD’s BEPS Project in OECD: Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 
OECD Publishing 2013. 
56 See OECD BEPS Actions 8–10; OECD BEPS Action 13. 
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conforming amendments to Chapter IX were necessary in order to avoid 
inconsistencies between the revised chapters and Chapter IX. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the latter contains several references to other chapters of 
the guidelines.57 As no publications have yet been published in the legal 
literature with regard to business restructurings from the perspective of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in its newest form, this study provides new 
information in this respect. 
 
International research on the transfer pricing aspects of business 
restructurings has been insufficient, which has resulted in ambiguity in 
business restructurings’ tax treatment. In addition, as national legislation and 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are constantly subject to changes, legal 
literature becomes outdated rapidly. One of the publications, where questions 
concerning transfer pricing treatment of business restructurings have been 
previously dealt with, is the IFA’s Cahiers de droit fiscal international: Cross-
border business restructuring (IFA, Vol. 96a, 2011). In the publication, the 
transfer pricing of business restructurings has been discussed from the 
perspective of national laws, also containing country reports from Russia, 
Finland and the USA. However, the chapter containing observations about the 
Russian transfer pricing regulations’ applicability to business restructurings is 
predominantly outdated, as it was based on the former Russian transfer 
pricing legislation, rather than on the most recent transfer pricing rules.58 The 
newest Russian transfer pricing regulations came into force on 1 January 2012 
and replaced the older transfer pricing regulations for the most part.59 This 
research aims to provide clarification on the transfer pricing treatment of 
business restructuring from the point of view of the latest Russian transfer 
pricing provisions. 
 
On the other hand, the IFA’s publication provides useful information on the 
existing situation in Finland and the USA, especially in terms of applying the 
arm’s length principle to transfers of certain assets and functions during 
business restructurings, which may not be disregarded in this study.60 
However, in some respects the presented views on the applicability of the 
Finnish and the U.S. transfer pricing regulations to business restructurings 
can be considered very limited or must even be treated with caution. For 
instance, the branch reports fail to analyze, almost at all, the applicability of 
different transfer pricing methods in the business restructuring context. In 
addition, the relationship between the national provisions and Chapter IX of 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is not discussed. Besides, as was the 
                                                 
 
57 OECD Conforming Amendments to Chapter IX, pp. 1–2. 
58 See Evdokimov – Konnov 2011, pp. 629–635. 
59 See Federal'nyj zakon ot 27.07.2010 N 227-FZ. 
60 See Juusela – Tuominen 2011, pp. 309–323; Zollo 2011, pp. 757–778. 
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case with Russia, the chapters concerning Finland and the USA contain in 
some parts outdated interpretations of existing law.61 Finally, the IFA’s 
publication is not by nature a legal comparative study, as the branch reports 
dealing with the existing situations in Russia, Finland and the USA are 
separated from each other and in principle form only individual chapters of 
the publication, except for the general report.62  With reference to the above 
stated, this study strives to cover the highlighted issues and provide a coherent 
legal dogmatic and comparative analysis of business restructurings from the 
perspective of the existing transfer pricing regulations of Russia, Finland and 
the USA.  
 
In addition to the aforementioned IFA’s publication, another publication 
where the transfer pricing treatment of business restructurings have been 
reviewed from the perspective of Russian law is my own article To What Extent 
Business Restructurings Fall within the Scope of Transfer Pricing 
Regulations in Russia? (Intertax Vol. 43, Issue 11, 2015, pp. 742–755). The 
article explores the extent to which business restructurings may fall within the 
scope of application of the newest Russian transfer pricing regulations. The 
article analyzes on an asset-by-asset basis whether assets and other something 
of value, which are often transferred in business restructurings between 
related parties, fall within the scope of the national transfer pricing rules. 
Especially Chapter 3 of this research contains parts of this article where the 
existing legal situation in Russia is reviewed.63 
 
Otherwise, the tax consequences of business restructurings in Russia have not 
been dealt with in Russian or English legal literature. The research topic can 
also be considered particularly timely because of the above discussed Russia’s 
new transfer pricing rules. These rules can be regarded as partly unclear, and 
since the studies in the legal literature have just scratched the surface of the 
rules, an in-depth legal analysis of them is still missing.64 Therefore, this study 
                                                 
 
61 For example, the U.S. branch report states that outbound transfers of goodwill and going concern value 
are not subject to tax and consequently do not fall within the scope of transfer pricing in business 
restructurings; see Zollo 2011, pp. 762, 768. However, this is not necessarily anymore the case; see 
Chapter 3.6.5 of this study. 
62 The general report provides conclusions on the transfer pricing of business restructurings on the basis 
of all 40 branch reports published in the publication. 
63 Reprinted with permission of Kluwer Law International, when applicable. However, several 
amendments, updates and additions have been made to the original article; in addition, the article 
discusses only Russian perspective, while this study deals also with the Finnish and U.S. tax law aspects. 
Apart from Chapter 3, also Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 may contain small parts of the said article. 
64 Examples of the Russian legal research on the newest transfer pricing regulations, see e.g. Kaftannikov, 
A. A.: Transfertnoe cenoobrazovanie: kommentarij izmenenij Nalogovogo kodeksa RF. Chelyabinsk 
2011; Grundel, Larisa: Sravnitel'naya kharakteristika primeneniya metodov transfertnogo 
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aims to provide a new kind of information on how business restructurings may 
be treated in Russia from a transfer pricing perspective. The research provides 
an up-to-date analysis of the newest transfer pricing regulations, covering 
such issues as the arm’s length principle, comparability analysis, transfer 
pricing methods and the transfer pricing documentation requirements in 
general. 
 
The Finnish legal literature has provided more perspective on the transfer 
pricing aspects of business restructurings in comparison with the Russian 
legal literature. However, the publications have usually only dealt with certain 
specific questions regarding transfer pricing in the business restructuring 
context.65 Perhaps the most rewarding article, where a business restructuring 
has been considered as a whole, is Sami Laaksonen’s Konserniverotuksen 
ennakkotietoja: Liiketoimintamallin muutos ja siirtohinnoittelu (Verotus 
4/2006, pp. 428–437), where the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office’s 
preliminary ruling practice was analyzed regarding transfer pricing of 
business restructurings. It should, however, be noted that the article was 
published many years before the publication of Chapter IX of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. On the other hand, Merja Raunio and Elina Gerdt 
have discussed in their article Liiketoimintamallin uudelleenjärjestely 
siirtohinnoittelun näkökulmasta (Verotus 4/2011, pp. 420–428) the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ Chapter IX, but sadly the article mainly just 
provides an overview of Chapter IX, and does not concentrate on its 
applicability to the current legal situation in Finland. In addition, Pekka 
Mehtonen’s dissertation Siirtohinnoittelu, tuloverotus ja konsernistrategiat 
(Helsinki 2005) must be highlighted, as the publication discusses business 
strategies of a group of companies also from the perspective of transfer pricing. 
Nonetheless, transfer pricing questions for actual controlled transfers of 
something of value performed during the execution of business strategy 
amendments are not considered.  
 
There have also been articles where certain topical issues arising out of 
business restructurings have been examined in a more concrete manner. For 
example, Reijo Knuutinen has dealt with whether controlled transactions 
conducted during business restructurings relating to intangibles may be 
                                                 
 
tsenoobrazovaniya v Rossii i za rubezhom. Ekhonomika Nalogi Pravo, 1/2014, pp. 114–121; and 
Lermontov, Yu. M.: Postаtejnyj kommentаrij k rаzdelu V.1 "Vzаimozаvisimye litsа. Obshhie polozheniya 
o cenаkh i nаlogooblozhenii. Nаlogovyj kontrol' v svyazi s soversheniem sdelok mezhdu 
vzаimozаvisimymi litsаmi. Soglаshenie o tsenoobrаzovаnii" Chаsti pervoj nаlogovogo kodeksа 
Rossijskoj Federаtsii. ConsultantPlus 2011. The new rules have also been discussed in some English 
commentaries, see e.g. Hellevig, Jon – Usov, Artem – Kabakov, Anton: Awara Russian Tax Guide. Awara 
Group 2014, pp. 213–243. 
65 Except for the earlier mentioned IFA’s publication containing a Finnish branch report.  
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recharacterized on the basis of the transfer pricing regulations.66 Linnanvirta 
and Leppänen have, on the other hand, discussed the tax effects of dissolutions 
of companies and certain dividend questions, particularly in the business 
restructuring context, by comparing national income tax legislation to the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.67 Nordlund, Kallio and Kurkioja have 
discussed different kinds of business models of a group of companies from the 
perspective of transfer pricing, VAT and customs law, but the observations on 
transfer pricing are largely outdated as the article was published already in 
2002.68 In addition, articles concerning transfer pricing of intangibles, such as 
trademarks,69 provide useful insights in this study due to the fact that business 
restructurings commonly involve controlled transfers of intangibles within the 
group.  
 
In the U.S. legal literature, apart from the above-mentioned IFA’s publication, 
there are also other publications which have dealt with the transfer pricing 
aspects of business restructurings at least to some extent. Transfer pricing 
and business restructurings: Streamlining all the way (IBFD 2009, edited by 
Anuschka Bakker) contains a chapter where the research topic is examined 
from the perspective of the U.S. transfer pricing regulations.70 The chapter 
offers a view of the application of the arm’s length principle to business 
restructurings at that time. Therefore, while it contains a lot of useful 
information, some of the observations are based on regulations in force in 
2009. Furthermore, while the chapter covers many interesting questions in 
relation to the transfer pricing treatment of business restructurings — such as 
the treatment of the business restructuring expenses, permanent 
establishment questions and post-restructuring issues — it provides very little 
information about to what extent business restructuring could fall within the 
                                                 
 
66 See Knuutinen, Reijo: Liiketoiminnan kansainväliset uudelleenjärjestelyt, aineeton omaisuus ja 
verotus: transaktion tunnistamista vai uudelleenluonnehdintaa? Defensor Legis 6/2015, pp. 1054–1068. 
Knuutinen has also studied intangible asset transfers in business restructurings from the point of view 
of taxation policy, see Knuutinen, Reijo: Aineeton omaisuus, liiketoiminnan uudelleenjärjestely ja 
verotus: veropoliittisia tarkastelukulmia. Verotus 1/2016, pp. 5–20. 
67 Linnanvirta, Reima – Leppänen, Hannu-Tapani: Liiketoiminnan uudelleenjärjestelyt EVL:n ja 
OECD:n siirtohinnoitteluohjeiden valossa. Verotus 2/2011, pp. 201–207.  
68 Nordlund, Marika – Kallio, Mika – Kurkioja, Kari: Kansainvälisen konsernin liiketoimintamalli 
siirtohinnoittelun, arvonlisäverotuksen ja tullikysymysten näkökulmasta. Verotus 3/2002, pp. 293–314. 
69 See e.g. Pankakoski, Katriina: Tavaramerkin arvonmääritys siirtohinnoittelussa. Verotus 3/2015, pp. 
283–295; and Linnanvirta, Reima – Rapo, Petteri: Aineettoman omaisuuden tunnistamisesta ja 
arvostamisesta siirtohinnoittelussa. Verotus 3/2012, pp. 272–279.  
70 See Amerkhail – Granwell 2009, pp. 399–448. The book also provides in its other chapters useful 
information, inter alia, on business models and business restructurings in general as well as on 
permanent establishment and VAT aspects of business restructurings, see Stuffer – Hiller 2009, pp. 3–
12; Burgers 2009 pp. 145–158; van der Paardt – van der Tempel 2009, pp. 159–176. 
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scope of application of the U.S. transfer pricing regulations. In addition, 
possible methods for determining arm’s length compensations in the business 
restructuring context have been mainly left outside the scope of the content 
presented.  
 
The tax treatment of business restructurings has also been discussed to some 
extent in certain articles. MacGregor, for instance, has dealt with some general 
transfer pricing questions in the business restructuring context, but as the 
article is only two pages long, it just scratches the surface of the topic.71 On the 
other hand, Cordova, Mitra, Newman, Reams, Shanda and Shapiro have 
discussed business restructurings in their article in a more comprehensive 
manner, especially from the point of view of intellectual property. As the 
article also contains transfer pricing considerations, it provides useful views 
when the role of intangible assets is examined in business restructurings.72 
Another interesting article is Wright’s and Keates’ Comments on the OECD 
Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings 
(International Transfer Pricing Journal, March/April 2009, pp. 115–122), 
where the discussion draft of Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines was evaluated and compared to the U.S. transfer pricing 
regulations in force at that time.73  
 
In the U.S. legal literature, supply chain management has also been an object 
of tax law research. As business restructuring are related to supply chain 
management in the aforesaid manner, articles dealing with the tax effects of 
supply chain management must be observed.74 Lastly, transfer pricing aspects 
of certain assets, particularly intangible assets, have been of great interest in 
the U.S. tax and transfer pricing law literature. For example, Wittendorff has 
reviewed transfer pricing methods and other valuations methods suitable for 
controlled transfers of intangible property in the article Valuation of 
intangibles under income-based methods – part I (International Transfer 
Pricing Journal, September/October 2010, pp. 323–335.). Such articles 
                                                 
 
71 MacGregor, Enrique: United States. An Analysis of Transfer Pricing Issues in US Business 
Restructurings. Transfer Pricing International Journal, Vol. 15, No. 9, September 2014, pp. 2–3. 
72 Cordova, David – Mitra, Arin – Newman, Andrew – Reams, Keith – Shanda, Larry – Shapiro, Alan: 
Business restructuring and the role of intellectual property. International Tax Review, January 2012, pp. 
47–59. 
73 Levey, Gerdes and Mansfield have discussed in a similar manner to the relationship between the 
current U.S. transfer pricing rules and the OECD’s new transfer pricing guidance introduced as a result 
of the BEPS Project, see Levey, Marc M. – Gerdes, Imke – Mansfield, Aliss: The Key BEPS Action Items 
Causing Discussion in the United States. Intertax, Vol. 44, Issue 5, 2016, pp. 399–405. 
74 See e.g. Irving, Dan – Kilponen, Gary – Markarian, Raffi – Klitgaard, Mark: A tax-aligned approach to 
SCM. Supply Chain Management Review, April 2005, pp. 57–61; Wright, Deloris: United States: Supply 
chain management. International Transfer Pricing Journal, July/August 2006, pp. 202–207. 
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cannot be disregarded in this study, as usually intangibles have a pivotal role 
in business restructurings.   
 
This research seeks to offer a view of the current application of the existing 
transfer pricing regulations in Russia, Finland and the USA to cross-border 
business restructurings, which have not yet been studied in a comprehensive 
manner from a legal dogmatic and comparative perspective. As Finland and 
the USA are also member states of the OECD, the study provides information 
on the applicability of the latest OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to business 
restructurings, which have not been studied in the legal literature either.  
 
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF STUDY 
The first chapter of this research defines the concept of business restructuring 
and presents the research questions. The study’s objectives and methodology, 
in addition to the main references and previous legal research on business 
restructurings in the field of transfer pricing and tax law in general, are 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 2 of this study examines the transfer pricing regulations in Russia, 
Finland and the USA. First, it offers an introduction to Russian, Finnish and 
U.S. tax law by exploring such general issues as prevailing tax legislation, the 
position of case law and the structure of tax administration. Subsequently, the 
subject of the review is the national regulation of the arm’s length principle 
and transfer pricing in the target countries. This comprises the examination of 
the national sources of law regulating transfer pricing and the main transfer 
pricing provisions regulated therein. Such an examination also provides the 
basis for the review of the research questions in more detail in the following 
chapters.  
 
The third chapter discusses in detail the first research question, i.e. to what 
extent business restructurings may fall within the scope of application of the 
national transfer pricing regulations. At first, different examples of amending 
multinational enterprises’ business models are dealt with in order to 
demonstrate what kinds of assets may be transferred in cross-border business 
restructurings from one jurisdiction to another. After exploring such 
examples, it will be reviewed whether a business restructuring, which involves 
a transfer of a functioning business unit (going concern), may become an 
object of transfer pricing on an aggregate basis pursuant to the Russian, 
Finnish and U.S. transfer pricing provisions. This will be followed by an 
analysis of whether — and to what extent — transfers of tangible assets, 
intangible property and risks as well as premature terminations or 
renegotiations of existing agreements may become objects of transfer pricing 
separately. Especially transfers of intangible assets are examined thoroughly, 
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as there has been a great amount of interest and discussion in this regard in 
recent years.75 The choice to discuss the applicability of the transfer pricing 
rules to the mentioned transfers of something of value, that could hence be 
regarded as objects of transfer pricing in business restructurings, is largely 
based on Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the 
discussed topics therein.  
 
Chapter 4 of the research discusses the second main research question, i.e. the 
determination of the arm’s length compensation for such subjects of 
something of value, which fall within the scope of transfer pricing regulations 
in accordance with the national transfer pricing regulations. The 
comparability analysis, applicable transfer pricing methods and other 
valuation techniques, as well as the arm’s length range, are dealt with from the 
perspective of the target countries. 
 
The fifth chapter examines certain means of eliminating uncertainty factors 
relating to transfer pricing of business restructuring, since wrongly carried 
transfer pricing may cause transfer pricing adjustments and even penalties. In 
this respect, advance pricing agreements, transfer pricing documentation and 
reporting requirements, voluntary self-initiated adjustments of transfer prices 
and the compliance with general anti-avoidance rules are explored. Finally, 
Chapter 6 summarizes the observations made in the previous chapters and 
provides reasoned conclusions on the research.   
  
                                                 
 
75 For instance, the OECD’s BEPS Project, more specifically Actions 8–10, published revised guidance 
regarding transfer pricing of intangibles as a result of this discussion; see OECD BEPS Actions 8–10. 
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2 TRANSFER PRICING REGULATIONS  
2.1 INTRODUCTION TO TAX LAW IN RUSSIA, FINLAND 
AND THE USA 
2.1.1 TAX LEGISLATION AND TAX TREATIES 
Pursuant to Article 75 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
(Konstitutsiya Rossijskoj Federatsii, 12 December 1993), the tax system and 
the general principles regarding taxation and tax collection must be regulated 
under federal acts.76 At present, the Russian tax legislation is mainly compiled 
into one comprehensive code — the Tax Code (Nalogovyj kodeks Rossijskoj 
Federatsii, chast 'Pervaya ot 31 iyulya 1998 g. N 146-FZ i chast' Vtoraya ot 5 
avgusta 2000 g. N 117-FZ).77 The Tax Code has two parts and is a result of an 
extensive tax reform, which stems from the years 1996 – 1997, when the 
Russian Ministry of Finance (Ministerstvo finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii, 
hereinafter referred to as the Minfin) presented to the State Duma a large 
number of proposals for amendments in the Russian tax legislation. The first 
part of the Tax Code came into force on 1 January 1999 and the second part on 
1 January 2001.78 The Tax Code holds the leading position in the hierarchy of 
legal sources relating to Russian tax law.79 
 
The first part of the Tax Code includes, among other things, the definitions of 
the key concepts of taxation, a list of taxes levied in Russia as well as the 
provisions of, inter alia, the relationship between taxpayers and the tax 
authority, the notification obligations, the implementation of taxation as well 
as tax law violations, penalties and appeals related thereto. The second part of 
the Tax Code comprises detailed provisions in relation to specific taxes — such 
as VAT, excise tax and income tax — as well as provisions concerning 
particular tax procedures. The study’s main focus is on the transfer pricing 
rules, which are primarily situated in the first part of the Tax Code. 
                                                 
 
76 The Constitution of Russia can be found as an official publication at http://constitution.kremlin.ru/ 
constitution.pdf. 
77 The prevailing version of the Tax Code can be found in the Russian language, for example, at 
http://base.garant.ru/10900200/. 
78 Penttiä – Suhonen – Heino – Matilainen 2003, pp. 11–13. The aim of the reform has been, inter alia, 
the reduction of companies’ tax burden, the increase of the predictability of taxation, to boost the 
attraction for foreign investments in Russia and generally strengthen the position of taxpayers, see 
Karhu 2007, p. 29. It has been considered that the state’s attempt to manage natural resources had also 
an impact on the tax reform; see about this Bosquet 2002, pp. 34–39. 
79 Krokhina 2011, p. 66. 
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Taxes must also be regulated by acts in Finland. According to § 81 of the 
Constitution of Finland (Suomen perustuslaki, 731/1999), a state tax is 
governed by an act which must include provisions concerning the grounds for 
tax liability and the amount of the tax as well as provisions regarding legal 
remedies available to taxpayers. Unlike in Russia, the Finnish tax legislation 
is divided into several specific acts. The most important acts include, inter alia, 
the Income Tax Act (Tuloverolaki, 1535/1992), the Act on the Taxation of 
Business Profits and Income from Professional Activities (Laki elinkeinotulon 
verottamisesta, 360/1968), the Act on the Taxation of Farm Income 
(Maatilatalouden tuloverolaki, 543/1967), the Act on Municipal Tax on Real 
Property (Kiinteistöverolaki, 654/1992), the Value-added Tax Act 
(Arvonlisäverolaki, 1501/1993), the Prepayment Act (Ennakkoperintälaki, 
1118/1996) and the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act (Perintö- ja lahjaverolaki, 
378/1940).80  
 
It must be noted that general provisions in relation to, inter alia, tax return, 
tax procedures, tax assessment as well as appeal are regulated in the Act on 
Assessment Procedure (Verotusmenettelystä annettu laki, 1558/1995, 
hereinafter referred to as the AAP). Most importantly, transfer pricing is 
regulated under § 31 of the AAP.  
 
Similar to Russian and Finnish law, the legal basis for U.S. tax legislation can 
be found in the Constitution of the United States of America (as amended).81 
Pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, “the Congress shall have 
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; 
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States.” In addition, the 16th Amendment to the Constitution states that “the 
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without 
regard to any census or enumeration.”  
 
Given the above information, the U.S. Congress has, for the purposes 
mentioned in the Constitution, enacted several acts which deal with questions 
in relation to taxation. The most important tax act is the Internal Revenue 
                                                 
 
80 See more about the taxation and tax system in Finland in Niskakangas, Heikki: Johdatus Suomen 
verojärjestelmään. Talentum 2014. The Ministry of Finance of Finland has also published a guide as 
regards Finnish taxation in English, see Taxation in Finland 2009. Ministry of Finance publications, 
7/2009. 
81 The ratification of the actual Constitution was completed on 21 June 1788. Later, there have been 27 
amendments to the Constitution, which have been ratified. See more about the amendments in Rodgers 
2011, p. 110. 
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Code of 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the IRC). The IRC has been published 
as separate chapter or code — Title 26 — in the Code of Laws of the United 
States of America (hereinafter referred to as the U.S. Code), which compiles 
federal statutes of the USA.82  
 
The IRC collectively regulates different kinds of taxes, such as income taxes, 
estate and gift taxes, employment taxes and excise taxes. In addition, the IRC 
has overall regulations in relation to tax returns, tax administration and tax 
assessment. Transfer pricing is also regulated in the IRC, the most important 
relevant provision being Section 482.  
 
There can be seen similarities in the Russian and U.S. tax legislation as in both 
countries tax regulations have been codified into a legal code to a great extent. 
This approach differs from the approach taken in Finland, where tax 
legislation is divided into several separate tax acts. It should also be observed 
that the preliminary works of the above-mentioned Finnish tax acts usually 
provide interpretations or clarifications of the legislated provisions, and they 
are even legally binding to some extent.83 This is not the case in Russia nor the 
USA.84 
 
It should be mentioned that, in addition to the national tax legislation, tax 
provisions affecting taxation in the mentioned countries can also be found 
from international sources of law. Tax treaties have traditionally been of great 
importance in ensuring the states’ rights to levy taxes and preventing the 
double taxation between the states. Consequently, Russia, Finland and the 
USA have all concluded a large amount of tax treaties with other countries, 
and usually these treaties have a straight impact on the taxation in the 
jurisdictions of the contracting parties.85 In general, the OECD Model Tax 
Convention has a significant influence on tax treaties; for instance, the 
majority of the articles of tax treaties concluded by Finland follow the OECD 
                                                 
 
82 Moreover, the IRC has also been published in the United States Statutes at Large as Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986. This version and the version codified into the U.S. Code are in principle identical. 
83 See e.g. Aarnio 1989, pp. 220–221 and Koskinen – Virta 1996, p. 1. 
84 See e.g. Orlov 2010, p. 17 and Sawyers – Raabe – Whittenburg – Gill 2015, p. 150. 
85 For instance, alone Russia has concluded circa 50 tax treaties for the purposes of preventing double 
taxation, see Perov – Tolkushkin 2005, p. 104. The tax treaties take precedent over national provisions 
in Finland, if the tax treaties do not increase the tax liabilities of taxpayers, see e.g. Mysky – Linnakangas 
2011, pp. 88–90. Tax treaties have a similar priority also under Russian tax law; see Article 7 of the Tax 
Code and Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. This is not necessarily the case in the 
USA, where U.S. law may ‘override’ tax treaties, see e.g. Avi-Yonah 2006, pp. 65–79. On the other hand, 
usually provisions adopted later in time override the provision under the other source of law, see Sawyers 
– Raabe – Whittenburg – Gill 2015, pp. 90–91. 
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Model Tax Convention’s articles.86 However, tax treaties to which Russia is a 
party differ in this respect as the majority of the provisions of these tax treaties 
may not completely correspond to the provisions of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, although similarities can also usually be found.87 On the other 
hand, the USA has its own model tax convention, the U.S. Treasury 
Department’s U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, which is generally the 
starting point for drafting the tax treaties to which the USA is a party.88 
Overall, tax treaties and the mentioned model tax conventions are important 
sources of law and therefore should be taken into account, especially in cross-
border situations involving two or more countries.  
 
It should also be noted that, as an EU member state, Finland has an obligation 
to follow legal norms regulated in the EU treaties and other sources of EU law; 
some of which may regulate tax questions, which have not been regulated in 
the national tax legislation at all.89  
 
2.1.2 OTHER LEGISLATION HAVING IMPACT ON TAXATION 
When making decisions with regard to taxation in a foreign state, in addition 
to the general tax provisions, one must take into consideration other possible 
legal norms that are not necessarily regulated in specific tax acts but may 
nevertheless have a direct or indirect effect on tax issues of a multinational 
group. Therefore, this chapter deals briefly with certain acts of civil, criminal, 
company and private international law, which are or may closely be linked to 
taxation and which may hence have an impact, at least remotely, on business 
restructurings from a tax law perspective. The sole purpose is to raise 
examples of other legislation, which may be useful to take into consideration 
when decisions in relation to transfer pricing or taxation are made in the 
business restructuring context, not to provide an all-embracing analysis of 
such acts or provisions.  
 
First of all, pursuant to Articles 11 and 19 of the Tax Code, the terminology, 
concepts and institutions of Russian civil law used in the provisions of Russian 
Tax Code must, in principle, be understood similarly as in the Russian civil law 
                                                 
 
86 Mehtonen 2001b, p. 43; Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, p. 18. 
87 Guglyuvatyy 2011, p. 340. 
88 See e.g. Avi-Yonah – Tittle 2007, pp. 224–234. 
89 The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) has articles regarding taxation, e.g. indirect taxation 
and co-operation in tax matters, see Articles 113–115. The EU treaties may also have an indirect effect on 
the EU member states and their tax legislation, see in more detail e.g. Helminen 2012, pp. 30–31. When 
there a conflict exists between national and EU law, the latter prevails over the former; see Ojanen 2007, 
p. 31. 
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legislation. The legal norms relating to Russian civil law are, as was the case 
with the tax law provisions, codified into one collection of provisions: the Civil 
Code of the Russian Federation (Grazhdanskij kodeks Rossijskoj 
Federatsii90). Thus, when the Tax Code’s provisions are applied in practice, on 
some occasions the provisions of the Civil Code must also be taken into 
account in the aforementioned manner.  
 
This is not entirely the case in Finland. As it was stated above, the Finnish tax 
legislation is divided into several acts. These acts contain generally specific 
chapters, which define the terms and concepts used in the act in question.91 
Therefore, without a particular reference to terms and concepts defined in 
other acts, there is usually no need to examine definitions regulated in other 
acts while applying provisions of a certain tax act. On the other hand, the 
situation in the USA deviates to some extent from both approaches. While § 
7701 of the IRC contains an extensive list of definitions used in the application 
of the provisions of the IRC, some of the definitions have references to 
definitions regulated in other acts.92 The list does not, nonetheless, have a 
general reference to the terms and concepts used in civil law, perhaps because 
of the fact that the civil legislation is not, generally, contrary to the situation in 
Russia, codified into one code in the USA. 
 
In general, tax liability can be either criminal or administrative liability (also 
called civil liability or penalty). Criminal liability in Russia is governed by 
Articles 198 and 199 of the Russian Criminal Code (Ugolovnyj kodeks 
Rossijskoj Federatsii, ot 13.06.1996 N 63-FZ), which deal with criminal 
sanctions for tax offences. The provisions correspond to the tax fraud 
provisions regulated in Chapter 29 the Finnish Criminal Code (Rikoslaki, 
19.12.1889/39) to the following extent: the tax crimes regulated by the Russian 
Criminal Code will become applicable only when a taxpayer has failed to pay 
to tax authorities a certain, quite large amount specified in the Russian 
Criminal Code, while the applicability of the Finnish tax fraud provision does 
not require a certain monetary amount. In addition, the threshold for 
considering something as a tax fraud is lower in Finland than the threshold for 
tax offence in Russia, as an attempt at tax fraud is comparable to an actual act 
in Finland, whereas in Russia an attempt is not a criminal offense and remains 
unpunished. It is also noteworthy that, unlike in Finland, a person performing 
acts regarded as a criminal tax offence in Russia is considered to be a person 
                                                 
 
90 Chast' pervaya ot 30 noyabrya 1994 g. N 51-F3, chast' vtoraya ot 26 yanvarya 1996 g. N 14-FZ, chast' 
tret'ya ot 26 noyabrya 2001 g. N 146-FZ, chast' chetvertaya ot 18 dekabrya 2006 g. N 230-FZ. 
91 See e.g. Chapter 2 of the Income Tax Act. 
92 The IRC contains also other lists of definitions, see e.g. § 6664 of the IRC. 
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who formally has performed the acts instead of the person who performed the 
acts de facto.93  
 
Minor omissions, violations and neglects, which fall outside the scope of 
provisions regarding criminal tax offence, are regulated in the Tax Code and 
the Code of Administrative Offences of Russia (Kodeks Rossijskoj Federatsii 
ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniyakh Nos 30 dekabrya 2001 g. N 195-
FZ). The codes regulate, inter alia, the fines issued in situations where a 
taxpayer has neglected to provide requested information for tax control 
purposes on time94 or when taxes have not been fully or partially paid95. These 
consequences resulting from administrative liability are to a major extent 
equivalent to the punitive tax increase consequence in Finland regulated 
under § 32 of the AAP. These administrative sanctions shall be considered as 
alternatives for criminal sanctions in both Russia and Finland. Thus, the 
principle of ne bis in idem is existent in both countries, when potential tax 
consequences are determined. However, this has not been the case in Finland 
until recent years.96 
 
                                                 
 
93 Koistinen 2012, p. 356. See also Volzhenkin 2007, p. 708. In addition to accountants, inter alia, 
managers, whose duties include taking care of the full payment of a company’s taxes, may be considered 
to be guilty of tax offence in Russia. This should be borne in mind, for instance, when the management 
of a consolidated enterprise makes decision with regard to transfer pricing strategies. The Russian 
Supreme Court's plenary session has also defined persons, who may become responsible in this respect, 
see Postanovlenie Plenuma Verhovnogo suda Rossijskoj Federacii ot 28 dekabrja 2006 g. N 64 ”O 
praktike primenenija sudami ugolovnogo zakonodatel’stva ob otvetstvennosti za nalogovye prestup-
lenija”. About extending the liability to the CEO of a company, see the Supreme Court’s decision 
Opredelenie Verhovnogo suda Rossijskoj Federacii N 5-D05-299 ot 27.4.2006. Sudebnaja kollegija po 
ugolovnym delam, nadzor.” 
94 Article 119 of the Tax Code; Article 15.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences of Russia.  
95 Article 122 of the Tax Code. 
96 Koistinen 2012, pp. 369–370. Pursuant to the previously established legal praxis in Finland, punitive 
tax increase decisions have not prevented from separate criminal proceedings. However, the Supreme 
Court of Finland changed this legal praxis so that the commencement of a criminal proceeding would 
not be longer possible after a tax increase decision has become final in relation to the same matter, see 
e.g. KKO 2010:45, 2010:46 and 2010:82. Nowadays, the relationship between the administrative and 
criminal sanctions in cases where punitive tax increase is or could be applied has been defined in a more 
precise way in the Supreme Court’s decision KKO 2013:59 and Act on Surtaxes And Increased Customs 
Duties Imposed by a Separate Decision (Laki erillisellä päätöksellä määrättävästä veron- tai 
tullinkorotuksesta, 781/2013). According to the decision and the act, even criminal investigation cannot 
be conducted anymore if a decision has been made in the tax procedure on whether or not to impose a 
tax increase. See also the statements by the Finnish Committee for Constitutional Law, PeVL 9/2012 and 
PeVL 12/2013 vp. 
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The mentioned provisions relating to tax liability in Russia and Finland are 
thus at least partly regulated elsewhere than in the actual tax legislation. In 
this regard, the current legal situation in the USA differs from the situation in 
Russia and Finland. Apart from the earlier mentioned general tax questions, 
the main source of U.S. tax legislation — the IRC — also regulates tax liabilities 
and sanctions related thereto. The civil tax liability is regulated in Chapter 68 
of the IRC and the criminal liability in Chapter 75 of the IRC, and therefore 
primarily there is no need to examine other possible legislative acts for the 
purpose of assessing liabilities regarding taxation. The comparison between 
the provisions of the IRC and the Russian and Finnish tax liability provisions 
is troublesome as the IRC’s legal norms in this respect are much more detailed, 
and violations of tax law may result in a wide range of different kinds of 
penalties. The IRC regulates over 200 civil penalties alone.97 However, similar 
penalty types can also be seen in the IRC. For example, it recognizes an 
addition to the tax98 as one type of civil penalty and fraud99 as one form of a 
criminal offense. On the other hand, at least one major difference can also be 
found between the tax liability regulations of the target countries. The 
concurrent application of both administrative and criminal liability provisions 
was impossible in Finland and Russia, mainly due to the principle of ne bis in 
idem. The IRC’s civil and criminal liability provisions, on the contrary, may 
under certain circumstances be applied to the same breach of law causing both 
criminal and administrative penalties. The U.S. equivalent of the ne bis in 
idem principle, the so-called double jeopardy clause,100 allows in principle 
conviction of both criminal and administrative sanctions for the same 
breach.101 
 
When examining tax aspects of business activities, it may be useful or even 
necessary to also take into consideration certain provisions of corporate law. 
Especially the decision-making with regard to business restructurings usually 
also involves the examination of questions regarding company law and 
                                                 
 
97 The penalties can be categorized into different categories, see e.g. Marvel 1988, pp. 2–3. The criminal 
penalties have been traditionally applied in the courts only on rare occasions, see Holmes 1992, p. 1436. 
98 See § 6651 of the IRC. 
99 See § 7206 of the IRC. 
100 The double jeopardy clause is regulated in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the USA, 
pursuant to which “ --- [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb ---.” 
101 See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997) and Watson 2016, pp. 371–372. See also Section 
9.5.13 (“Civil Considerations”) of the Internal Revenue Manual. According to Section 9.5.13.2 of the 
Internal Revenue Manual, “both civil and criminal sanctions may be imposed for the same offense.” See 
also Section 4.10.6.8.1, according to which “a criminal conviction for tax evasion (under Section 7201) 
usually conclusively establishes liability for the civil fraud penalty.” See about the criticism regarding the 
relationship between civil and criminal tax fraud provisions in Ise 1971, pp. 1176–1199. 
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accounting, which may in turn also affect tax considerations. In Russia, the 
general provisions of corporate law are regulated under the Civil Code102, and 
thus the Civil Code is also an important source of law in this respect. Other 
relevant acts include, inter alia, the Federal Act on Limited Liability 
Companies (Federаl'nyj zаkon ob obshhestvаkh s ogrаnichennoj 
otvetstvennost'yu" (ob OOO) ot 08.02.1998 n 14-FZ) and the Federal Act on 
Accounting (Federal'nyy zakon ot 06.12.2011 N 402-FZ "O bukhgalterskom 
uchete"). In Finland, amongst the most important acts in this field are the 
Limited Liability Companies Act (Osakeyhtiölaki, 624/2006), the Accounting 
Act (Kirjanpitolaki, 1336/1997) and the Accounting Ordinance 
(Kirjanpitoasetus, 1339/1997). There are no general federal acts in relation to 
corporate matters in the USA, and therefore corporate questions are primarily 
regulated by the states. The most used state act in this regard is the Delaware 
General Corporation Law.103 In terms of accounting provisions, the most 
important source is the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. 
GAAP) issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 
 
2.1.3 CASE LAW 
The interpretation of Russian law and overall judicial discretion and the 
application of law in Russia are in principle based only on its legislation’s legal 
norms. Case law and legal theory are not traditionally considered as sources of 
law, in contrast to, for instance, Finnish law. Nevertheless, the highest courts 
have achieved a strengthened position in recent years, and the decisions of the 
Supreme Court (Verkhovnyj Sud Rossijskoj Federatsii) and the Supreme 
Commercial Court (Vysshij Аrbitrazhnyj Sud Rossijskoj Federatsii) have been 
taken into account in the legal practice of lower courts; a certain degree of 
binding force and frequency has also been characteristic for them.104 The 
highest courts have the power to act as the last appellate instance, harmonize 
the legal practice of the courts under their supervision and provide 
clarifications with regard to the interpretation of legal norms. In particular, 
the decisions of the plenary sessions and the presidiums of these courts may 
often contain guidance on the application and interpretation of particular legal 
provisions, which lower courts are obliged to take into consideration in their 
decision-making.105  
                                                 
 
102 See especially Part 1 of the Civil Code. 
103 Title 8, Chapter 1 of the Delaware Code. More than half of the Fortune 500 companies are 
incorporated in Delaware, see Black Jr 2007, p. 1. 
104 Orlov 2010, p. 17. See also Neshаtаevа 2004, pp. 66–67 and Marchenko 2008, pp. 385–403. 
105 See Article 126 of the Constitution of Russia; Articles 2, 5 and 7 of the Act on Russian Supreme Court 
(Federal'nyj konstitutsionnyj zakon ot 05.02.2014 N 3-FKZ (red. ot 04.11.2014) "O Verkhovnom Sude 
Rossijskoj Federatsii") and already repealed Articles 9–16 of the Act on Commercial Courts of Russian 
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Therefore, relevant legal praxis in relation to taxation and transfer pricing 
should be taken into account in Russia at least in cases where tax legislation 
provides no straight answers to certain interpretive questions and previous 
court decisions of the highest courts exist in this regard. In particular, the 
previous decision practice of the Supreme Commercial Court may be useful, 
as the court dealt before with commercial questions, including taxation, and 
had the right to give the aforementioned clarifications to lower courts in terms 
of applying and interpreting specific tax law provisions. The Supreme 
Commercial Court has also played an important role in the development of 
principles, concepts and definitions of tax law,106 which cannot be disregarded 
when making decisions relating to taxation in practice. 
 
At present, the highest courts of Russia have merged, and there is only one 
court of highest instance — the Supreme Court. All the matters that used to fall 
under the jurisdiction of both of the highest courts fall nowadays under the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, including questions regarding taxation. 
Thus, in addition to the previous decisions of the Supreme Commercial Court, 
the decisions of the Supreme Court may as of 6 August 2014 play a pivotal role 
in Russian tax law.107 Furthermore, it should be observed that the 
Constitutional Court of Russian Federation (Konstitutsionnyj Sud Rossijskoj 
                                                 
 
Federation (Federal'nyj konstitutsionnyj zakon ot 28.04.1995 N 1-FKZ (red. ot 22.12.2014) "Ob 
arbitrazhnykh sudakh v Rossijskoj Federatsii"). See also the Supreme Commercial Court’s decision on 
approving the rules of procedure for commercial courts (Postanovlenie Plenuma Vysshego 
Аrbitrazhnogo Suda RF ot 5 iyunya 1996 g. N 7 "Ob utverzhdenii Reglamenta arbitrazhnykh sudov"), 
items 49–92; Orlov 2001, p. 3; and Orlov 2010, p. 17. In the legal literature, it has been considered that 
the rulings of the highest courts may have to a certain degree a constitutive effect – notwithstanding the 
above stated fact that only legislated legal norms are traditionally considered official sources of law; see 
about this in Sedukina 2004, p. 15.  
106 Such as the principle of unjustified tax benefit, which is dealt with in more detail in Section 5.5 of this 
study. The establishment of commercial courts in Russia can be regarded as one of the most important 
achievements of the court system reform from the perspective of foreign companies, see in more detail 
Lee 2001, pp. 718–719. 
107 See law No. 2-FKZ of 5 February 2014. It should be noted that the Supreme Commercial Court’s 
former legal praxis, especially the presidium’s and plenary session’s decisions with regard to providing 
clarifications on tax law provisions, is still effective and must be followed by the lower commercial courts, 
unless the Supreme Court overrules it by giving new rulings on the same matter; see Article 170 of the 
Russian Commercial Procedure Code (Аrbitrazhnyj protsessual'nyj kodeks Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 
24.07.2002 N 95-FZ (red. ot 30.12.2015)). More about the reform of the highest courts of Russian 
Federation especially from the point of view of commercial courts, see Hanninen 2015a, pp. 924–938.  
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Federatsii) has given rulings also in relation to taxation, and therefore its 
decisions may be of practical relevance on certain occasions.108 
 
In Finland, court decisions are regarded as poorly binding source of law. 
Consequently, the ignorance of court decisions does not result in misconduct 
in office, although court decisions must be taken into account in decision-
making, and deviations from legal praxis must be validated.109 Especially the 
precedents made by the highest courts, the Supreme Court of Finland (Korkein 
oikeus) and the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland (Korkein hallinto-
oikeus), must be noted in practice.  
 
The Supreme Administrative Court of Finland has decided, and decides, to a 
great extent on matters relating to taxation and is therefore a very remarkable 
source of law in the field of tax law.110 Even though the precedents of the 
Supreme Administrative Court of Finland are not strongly binding on tax 
authorities and lower courts, they may feel obliged to follow the court praxis 
of the Supreme Administrative Court, if it has made decisions regarding the 
same or even similar tax matters. If tax authorities or lower courts make 
decisions contrary to the legal praxis of the Supreme Administrative Court, 
there might be a risk that a taxpayer appeals against such decisions, after 
which it is also likely that the Supreme Administrative Court decides such 
cases in favor of the taxpayer in accordance with its previous decision practice. 
The decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court may sometimes also have 
a constitutive effect, which means that some concepts and principles of tax law 
have been established in its decision-making practice before they have been 
                                                 
 
108 It has the power to deviate from literal interpretation of legal norms when it supervises the compliance 
with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. It has decided, among other things, that ambiguous 
legal provisions should be interpreted in favor of taxpayers and that the tax authorities may not carry 
out tax audits after tax decisions have become final, see the Constitutional Court decisions Postanovlenie 
Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF ot 15.07.1999 g. N 11-P ”Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti otdel'nykh 
polozhenij Zakona RSFSR ”O Gosudarstvennoj nalogovoj sluzhbe RSFSR” i Zakonov Rossijskoj 
Federatsii ”Ob osnovakh nalogovoj sistemy v Rossijskoj Federatsii" i "O federal'nykh organakh nalogovoj 
politsii”) and Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF ot 17.03.2009 N 5-P ”Po delu o proverke 
konstitutsionnosti polozheniya, soderzhashhegosya v abzatsakh chetvertom i pyatom punkta 10 stat'i 89 
Nalogovogo kodeksa RF, v svyazi s zhaloboj obshhestva s ogranichennoj otvetstvennost'yu "Varm".” The 
former principle is today regulated in the Tax Code, see Article 3 of the Tax Code. See also Orlov 2011, 
pp. 87–88. 
109 The sources of law are divided in Finland into strongly binding (acts and custom), poorly binding 
(legislature’s intention and court decisions) and permitted (jurisprudence and legal principles) sources 
of law, see Aarnio 1989, pp. 220–221 and Koskinen – Virta 1996, p. 1. 
110 Andersson 2014, p. 12.  
31 
 
regulated in the tax legislation.111 Thus, taken together, taxpayers cannot 
ignore the applicable legal decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court in 
practice.  
 
Compared to Russian law, Finnish law gives more weight to case law as a legal 
source. Nevertheless, as the decisions of the highest courts have been followed 
in Russia in practice, and they have even been considered legally binding to a 
certain extent, there are no major differences between Russian and Finnish 
law in this regard.112 Hence, the decisions of the highest courts may provide 
useful interpretive help in tax matters in both countries. 
 
U.S. law does not bring significant differences in this respect. Contrary to the 
situations in Finland and especially in Russia, there is no ambiguity in 
considering courts decisions as legal sources in the USA. Case law is regarded 
as one of the primary sources of law. Case law has been described in the USA 
as rules of law announced through court decisions. These kinds of rules 
interpret provisions of the Constitution of the USA and statutes as well as 
regulations of the administrative agencies.113  
 
A full print copy of the IRC comprises approximately 3,500 pages, and 
therefore it is no surprise that there have been many court decisions dealing 
with the interpretation of the IRC’s provisions.114 In the field of taxation, the 
trial courts (i.e. the courts of first instance) are the U.S. Tax Court, the U.S. 
District Court and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The decisions of the trial 
courts may be appealed to the appellate courts, which are the U.S. Court of 
Appeals, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court.115  
 
The legal praxis of the U.S. courts may thus play a pivotal role, when the IRC’s 
provisions and regulations of the tax authorities are interpreted. Nevertheless, 
when examining particularly decisions of the Tax Court, it must be observed 
that its decisions may contain different conclusions even in similar cases. This 
is due to the fact that the Tax Court follows in its decision-making the 
precedents of that appellate court, which has the jurisdiction over the taxpayer 
                                                 
 
111 Myrsky 2011, p. 57 and Myrsky – Linnakangas 2006, pp. 14–15. See e.g. decisions KHO 1987 T 2036–
2037 and KHO 2010 T 3711, in which the Supreme Administrative Court has established different 
concepts of tax law. 
112 Case law regarding taxation has been considered in the legal literature to have even more important 
role in Russia than in Finland, see Matilainen 2007, p. 252. 
113 Clarkson – Miller – Cross 2010, pp. 4–5. 
114 Sawyers – Raabe – Whittenburg – Gill 2015, p. 151. 
115 Ibid pp. 150–151, Wittendorff 2010a, pp. 30–31 and Lederman 2012b, pp. 902–903. In addition, see 
Geier 1986, pp. 427–456. 
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in the given case (the so-called Golsen Rule116). Therefore, the Tax Court may 
reach contradictory conclusions, even in cases where the facts of the cases are 
identical, if the appellate courts have decided differently on certain tax 
issues.117 
 
2.1.4 TAX ADMINISTRATION AND GUIDANCE  
The tax bodies of the Russian Federation form a coherent ensemble, which 
oversees the observance of the provisions of Russian tax legislation. Such 
bodies of the Russian tax administration are the Federal Tax Service 
(Federal'naya nalogovaya sluzhba, hereinafter referred to as the FTS) — 
which has the power to, inter alia, monitor and control taxes and tax collection 
— and its regional offices. On the other hand, the FTS itself acts under the 
control of the Minfin.118 It is noteworthy to observe that, pursuant to Article 
105.17 of the Tax Code, the FTS also exercises control over the compliance with 
transfer pricing regulations.  
 
Both the FTS and the Minfin have published useful guidance in relation to the 
interpretation of the Russian tax provisions. According to Article 34.2 of the 
Tax Code, the Minfin has the authority to give written clarifications or letters 
(pis'mennye raz "yasneniya) concerning the interpretation of the Tax Code’s 
provisions. Written clarifications do not, however, form legal norms or 
amend/revoke existing legal provisions. In addition, the Minfin’s written 
clarifications are not legally binding but rather informative and clarifying in 
nature. Taxpayers and tax authorities are not obligated to comply with written 
clarifications.119 As a result, it may be difficult for taxpayers to predict when 
the tax authorities are willing to follow the principles and positions set out in 
written clarifications and when they disregard them. In any case, as the 
Minfin’s written clarifications may provide useful interpretive help in 
                                                 
 
116 Golsen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, U.S Tax Court 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 
985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). 
117 Sawyers – Raabe – Whittenburg – Gill 2015, p. 157. 
118 Article 30 of the Tax Code; Butler 2009, p. 586; Krokhina 2011, p. 135.  
119 See the Minfin’s letter Ministerstvo Finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii: Pis'mo ot 7 avgusta 2007 g. N 03-
02-07/2-138 (Raz"yasneniya polozhenij nalogovogo zakonodatel'stva v chasti stat'i 34.2 Nalogovogo 
kodeksa RF). The letter provides more detailed information in relation to Article 34.2 of the Tax Code 
and the Minfin’s right to publish written clarifications. See more about the written clarifications’ non-
binding nature in the Supreme Commercial Court’s plenum decision Postanovlenie Prezidiuma VАS RF 
ot 16.01.2007 N 12547/06 "Ob ostavlenii bez izmeneniya opredeleniya VАS RF ot 24.08.2006 N 
8519/06, kotorym bylo prekrashheno proizvodstvo po delu o priznanii nedejstvuyushhimi pisem 
Minfina RF ot 05.08.2004 N 01-02-01/03-1625, ot 22.03.2006 N MM-6-21/304@." Lermontov has also 
dealt with the matter, see Lermontov 2006, p. 25.  
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particular in situations where the content of tax provisions is unclear, it is 
recommended that such clarifications are followed by taxpayers.120 
 
Furthermore, according to Article 32 of the Tax Code, tax authorities are 
obliged to provide written information to taxpayers and tax agents on, inter 
alia, existing taxes, tax legislation and their rights and liabilities. In this regard, 
the FTS may provide both public information, such as letters published on its 
website, and private, individual guidance.121 The legal status of the written 
information corresponds to the legal status of the Minfin’s written 
clarifications. The FTS’s information, such as the letters published in public, 
are not legally binding in nature as they are not considered legal norms and 
they do not amend or revoke existing tax provisions.122 On the other hand, 
even though the written information given by the FTS is not legally binding, it 
may provide useful interpretations of ambiguous provisions of tax legislation 
and thus should be followed by taxpayers in general.  
  
In Finland, taxation is, similar to the situation in Russia, administrated by one 
body which acts directly under the Ministry of Finance of Finland 
                                                 
 
120 It should also be noted that the Minfin may give orders (prikaz), which have the status of a source of 
law, contrary to the written clarifications. They are by nature legal norms, and therefore they do not as 
such interpret other legal norms in a similar manner to written clarifications. Minfin may give orders on 
matters, which are within its competence, see more in Chapter 5 of the Minfin’s order concerning its 
rules of procedure Prikaz Minfina Rossii ot 15.06.2012 N 82n (red. ot 29.11.2013) "Ob utverzhdenii 
Reglamenta Ministerstva finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii" and the resolution of the Government of the 
Russian Federation Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva RF ot 13.08.1997 N 1009 (red. ot 11.12.2014) "Ob 
utverzhdenii Pravil podgotovki normativnykh pravovykh aktov federal'nykh organov ispolnitel'noj vlasti 
i ikh gosudarstvennoj registratsii." The Minfin’s orders concern to a great degree technical or procedural 
issues, and it has not discussed in its orders, for example, transfer pricing. Therefore, written 
clarifications that contain interpretations of existing tax and transfer pricing law are from the perspective 
of this research more relevant. 
121 See more about the FTS’s obligation in Minfin’s order Prikaz Minfina ot 2 iyulya 2012 g. N 99n "Ob 
utverzhdenii аdministrаtivnogo reglаmentа Federаl'noj nаlogovoj sluzhby po predostаvleniyu 
gosudаrstvennoj uslugi po besplаtnomu informirovаniyu (v tom chisle v pis'mennoj forme) 
nаlogoplаtel'shhikov, plаtel'shhikov sborov i nаlogovykh аgentov o dejstvuyushhikh nаlogаkh i sborаkh, 
zаkonodаtel'stve o nаlogаkh i sborаkh i prinyatykh v sootvetstvii s nim normаtivnykh prаvovykh аktаkh, 
poryadke ischisleniya i uplаty nаlogov i sborov, prаvаkh i obyazаnnostyakh nаlogoplаtel'shhikov, 
plаtel'shhikov sborov i nаlogovykh аgentov, polnomochiyakh nаlogovykh orgаnov i ikh dolzhnostnykh 
lits, а tаkzhe po priemu nаlogovykh deklаrаtsij (rаschetov)." The FTS has published its letters on its 
website at http://www.nalog.ru/rn77/ about_fts/about_nalog/. 
122 See the Minfin’s letter Pis'mo Minfina RF ot 1 dekabrya 2009 g. N 03-05-05-05/11 and order Prikaz 
Minfina Rossii ot 15.06.2012 N 82n (red. ot 29.11.2013) "Ob utverzhdenii Reglamenta Ministerstva 
finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii". See about taxpayers’ right to receive correct and comprehensive 
information about tax matters in Smirnykh 2009, pp. 99–103. 
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(Valtiovarainministeriö) — the Finnish Tax Administration (Verohallinto). 
The Finnish Tax Administration has several regional and local offices. The 
main duty of the Finnish Tax Administration is to secure the tax collection and 
remit the tax revenue to tax recipients, who take care of the maintenance of 
the society; such tax recipients include, inter alia, the state, the municipalities 
and the Social Insurance Institution (Kansaneläkelaitos).123 Pursuant to § 2.1 
of the Finnish Act on Tax Administration (Laki Verohallinnosta, 
11.6.2010/503), the Finnish Tax Administration’s duty is also to, among other 
things, practice tax control, administrate taxation and safeguard the tax 
recipients’ interest. As of 2012, all transfer pricing issues have been taken care 
of by the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office (Konserniverokeskus), which is part 
of the Finnish Tax Administration. The Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office has a 
specific transfer pricing unit, which deals with the questions in relation to 
transfer pricing.124   
 
According to § 2.2 of the Finnish Act on Tax Administration, the Finnish Tax 
Administration must contribute to the correct and uniform taxation and 
develop the Tax Administration's service abilities. For this purpose, the 
Finnish Tax Administration has published and publishes different kinds of 
guidelines concerning taxation. Regardless of not being legally binding in 
nature, the guidance may offer remarkable value in practice. Lower-tier 
authorities generally follow such guidelines and comply with them as if they 
were legally binding on them. Some of the guidelines may provide 
recommendations for interpretations of tax law provisions, and in this way, 
the Tax Administration may take a stand on the interpretation of certain 
problematic tax questions.125  
 
It should also be observed that, in addition to the above-mentioned tasks of 
the Finnish Tax Administration, the Finnish Central Tax Board 
(Keskusverolautakunta) and the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office, both being 
part of the Finnish Tax Administration, may give preliminary rulings on 
various taxation issues.126 Although the said authorities are not courts, their 
preliminary rulings can have the value of precedent, in which case the 
decisions may correspond to the decisions of the Supreme Administrative 
                                                 
 
123 Myrsky – Räbinä 2011, p. 12. 
124 See e.g. Waal – Pykönen 2014, p. 555; Finnish Tax Administration: Client Event 2014, pp. 2, 5–8; 
Finnish Tax Administration: Transfer Pricing. 
125 Myrsky – Linnakangas 2006, pp. 15–16; Myrsky 2011, pp. 44–45, 52–53. See also Kontkanen 2002, 
p. 219. The Finnish Tax Administration publishes its guidelines on its website (http://www.vero.fi).   
126 See Chapter 8 of the AAP. See also the Finnish Tax Administration’s guidelines A15/200/2013 in this 
respect. 
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Court of Finland.127 Therefore, the decision practice of the Finnish Central Tax 
Board and the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office cannot also be disregarded. 
 
The organization of tax administration in Finland, as well as its duties and 
tasks, largely correspond to the situation in Russia. Both countries’ tax 
authorities may provide additional information and guidance on taxation 
issues, which are not legally binding, but may give helpful interpretations of 
tax provisions and are broadly followed in practice. The most visible difference 
between the countries’ tax administrations is that the Ministry of Finance of 
Finland itself does not provide additional guidance as actively as the Minfin in 
Russia and the fact that, contrary to the Russian authorities, the Finnish 
authorities may give preliminary rulings, which may even in some cases have 
the value of a precedent. 
 
Taxation is administered in the USA by the Internal Revenue Service 
(hereinafter referred to as the IRS), which is a bureau of the U.S. Treasury 
Department. The latter resembles the Minfin and the Ministry of Finance of 
Finland. The IRS is responsible for, inter alia, auditing tax returns, collecting 
taxes and enforcing the tax laws of the USA.128 It works under the supervision 
of the Commissioner of the IRS. It must be observed that the IRS controls over 
the transfer pricing issues in the USA.  
 
Tax authorities may provide taxpayers with a wide range of different kinds of 
guidance in relation to the tax laws of the USA and interpretation thereof. The 
administrative regulations and rulings provided by the tax authorities are 
considered as one of the primary sources of U.S. tax law. More importantly, 
the administrative interpretations of the IRC should always be examined first, 
and only if the administrative pronouncements fail to provide answers. For 
example, with regard to interpreting certain provisions of the IRC, the judicial 
interpretations (i.e. decisions of the courts) should be taken into account.129 
Hence, it reasonable to discuss the most important administrative sources in 
more detail below.  
 
First, the U.S. Treasury Department may publish the so-called Treasury 
Regulations, which contain interpretations of the IRC’s provisions. According 
to Section 7805 of the IRC, “except where such authority is expressly given by 
this title to any person other than an officer or employee of the U.S. Treasury 
Department, the Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for 
the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be 
necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.” In 
                                                 
 
127 Myrsky 2011, pp. 8 and 109. 
128 Sawyers – Raabe – Whittenburg – Gill 2015, p. 118. 
129 Sawyers – Raabe – Whittenburg – Gill 2015, p. 150. 
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addition to this provision dealing with a general authority, the IRC includes 
provisions according to which the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department 
has been granted to issue regulations on certain matters for the purposes 
specified in such provisions.130 The Treasury Regulations based on the general 
authority (Section 7805) have been traditionally called interpretive 
regulations, and regulations issued under specific IRC provisions have been 
called legislative regulations.131 Treasury Regulations can be divided into 
three different categories: proposed regulations, final regulations and 
temporary regulations.132 The final and temporary regulations are codified in 
Title 26 (“Internal Revenue”) of the Code of Federal Regulations (hereinafter 
referred to as CFR).133  
 
The Treasury Regulations cannot be ignored by the taxpayers. Especially the 
final regulations may have the effect of law and should be followed by the 
courts, if the U.S. Congress, as the legislator, has not addressed certain specific 
questions, and the Treasury Regulation, which addresses such questions, is 
not “arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute” (test 
introduced in Chevron134). Furthermore, pursuant to Section 553(b) – (c) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, to be legally effective, the public 
should have also been given a notice and an opportunity to comment on such 
Treasury Regulations.135 As the final regulations usually meet the mentioned 
requirements, both the courts and taxpayers must follow them in practice. 
                                                 
 
130 See e.g. Sections 108 (c)(5) and 6103 of the IRC. 
131 Lederman 2012a, pp. 647, 654–655 and Bankman – Griffith – Pratt 2008, pp. 24–25.  
132 Treasury Regulations are usually first proposed regulations, which provide the U.S. Treasury 
Department’s interpretations of certain IRC provisions. Taxpayers and the public may comment on the 
proposed regulations. After the public hearing, and possible amendments to the proposed regulations, 
they become final regulations and will be published as Treasury Decisions in the Federal Register. When 
tax law (provisions) or interpretation thereof has been changed due to congressional or judicial 
amendments, the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department may publish temporary regulations, which 
are effective immediately and in force for no more than three years after the date of issuance of such 
regulations. The purpose of the temporary regulations is to provide instant assistance for the taxpayers 
in relation to applying newly adopted tax law provisions; see Section 7805 of the IRC; Section 
4.10.7.2.3.3 of the Internal Revenue Manual; Bankman – Griffith – Pratt 2008, p. 25; and Sawyers – 
Raabe – Whittenburg – Gill 2015, pp. 119–120. 
133 26 CFR 1.482. 
134 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
135 Lederman 2012a, pp. 659–664. The legal effects of the Treasury Regulations were earlier decided on 
the basis of whether the regulations were interpretive or legislative, but after such cases as United States 
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) and Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. 
Ct. 704, 713 (2011), the distinction between interpretive regulations and legislative regulations is not any 
more relevant, and both types of regulations should receive judicial deference to a same degree if 
regulations fulfill the mentioned requirements introduced in Chevron.  
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Temporary regulations are subject to the same requirements and may have 
legal effect up to a maximum of three years,136 although in the legal literature 
there has been doubts as to whether such regulations fulfill both 
requirements.137 It should be observed that, because the final, temporary and 
even proposed regulations represent the position of the IRS in relation to 
certain IRC provisions, the IRS itself has an obligation to follow the Treasury 
Regulations.138 Overall, it must be highlighted that the Treasury Regulations 
provide useful information for taxpayers with regard to ambiguous IRC 
provisions, and quite often taxpayers and courts as well as the tax authorities 
are also obligated to follow them. Even in cases where Treasury Regulations 
lack legally binding character, taxpayers can justify their actions by relying on 
them as they could rely on the actual IRC provisions.139  
 
Treasury Regulations are not the only administrative sources of tax law that 
should be taken into account when taxpayers make decisions concerning 
taxation and transfer pricing in the USA. In addition to Treasury Regulations, 
the IRS provides various pronouncements in relation to the tax law provisions 
and interpretation thereof. Especially the IRS’s revenue rulings are of great 
importance when the provisions of the IRC are interpreted. The revenue 
rulings represent the IRS’s official interpretations of how particular IRC 
provisions and/or Treasury Regulations should be applied to a given case 
under its specific circumstances. The case has been usually submitted by a 
taxpayer.140 The revenue rulings lack the same status and legal effect as the 
Treasury Regulations. Nevertheless, they can be used as precedents and 
taxpayers may rely on them, if in their cases “the facts and circumstances are 
substantially the same.” When taxpayers apply such revenue rulings to their 
cases, they must also take into consideration subsequent legislation, 
regulations, court decisions, rulings and procedures.141 Other useful 
administrative guidelines and pronouncements of the IRS include Revenue 
Procedures, private letter rulings, notices, General Counsel Memoranda and 
the IRS’s internally used Internal Revenue Manual.142  
                                                 
 
136 Wittendorff 2010a, p. 26. 
137 It has been stated in the legal literature that the temporary regulations have not usually undergone 
the notice-and-comment procedure, which is why it is not completely clear whether temporary 
regulations can be legally binding due to Chevron, see Lederman – Mazza 2011, pp. 1–2. See also 
Hickman (2013), pp. 492–502.  
138 Section 4.10.7.2.3.4 of the Internal Revenue Manual. 
139 Rogovin – Korb 2008, pp. 328–329. 
140 Sawyers – Raabe – Whittenburg – Gill 2015, pp. 123–124; Lederman 2012a, pp. 664–665. Revenue 
rulings are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. 
141 Section 1.2.16.1.11 and 4.10.7.2.6.1 of the Internal Revenue Manual; Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2). 
142 Revenue Procedures are pronouncements by the IRS in relation to its internal procedures and 
administration of tax laws. They provide taxpayers with information regarding e.g. compliance with the 
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These administrative sources may lack the same weight as a legal source as the 
revenue rulings or the Treasury Regulations, but they may still provide useful 
information for taxpayers, when tax law provisions are interpreted. In contrast 
to Russian and Finnish tax law, the administrative sources of law are of greater 
importance in U.S. tax law. As mentioned above, certain tax administration’s 
publications — in particular, the Treasury Regulations — have even more 
weight as a source of tax law than the court decisions in the USA. Even though 
the administrative sources should be taken into consideration in Russia and 
Finland, the current legal state in the USA deviates remarkably in this respect. 
 
2.2 SOURCES REGULATING TRANSFER PRICING AND 
THE ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE 
2.2.1 CONCEPT OF TRANSFER PRICING AND THE ARM’S LENGTH 
PRINCIPLE 
As discussed, transfer pricing can be defined as a tax law phenomenon 
concerning the pricing or other commercial conditions of business 
transactions that are executed between related corporate parties, in general 
companies within the same group of companies. Market forces have no impact 
on transactions between these kinds of associated parties to the same extent 
as on transactions between totally independent parties.143 Transactions 
between related parties, such as the companies within the same group, are 
usually affected by the group’s common interests.144 Transfer pricing may 
motivate the group to transfer part of its profits to jurisdictions with lower 
                                                 
 
procedural issues of tax returns. Revenue Procedures are also published in the Internal Revenue 
Bulletin. In private letter rulings, the IRS takes a stand on tax effects of a specific transaction or other 
issue planned by a taxpayer, who has requested for a private letter ruling. A private letter ruling is not 
officially published, but only issued to the taxpayer who requested for the ruling and it is only binding 
between the IRS and the taxpayer. Although private letter rulings lack precedential value, they may 
provide useful information about possible tax treatment of certain type of transactions. The General 
Counsel Memoranda are memoranda prepared by the office of the IRS’s Chief Counsel for internal use 
of the IRS, in general for the purpose of providing assistance in drafting revenue rulings and private 
letter rulings. The notices are public statements, which may provide guidance on the interpretation of 
the IRC’s provisions, see Sawyers – Raabe – Whittenburg – Gill 2015, pp. 125–129, 134; Wittendorff 
2010a, pp. 23, 29; and Section 4.10.7.2.6 of the Internal Revenue Manual. Internal Revenue Manual 
provides official guidelines for the personnel of the IRS, but it does not constitute law, and the IRS is not 
bound by it, see e.g. decision United States v. Horne 714 F.2d 206 (1st Cir. 1983) (per curiam). 
143 Myrsky – Linnakangas 2009, p. 269; Wittendorff 2010a, p. 3. 
144 Helminen 2012, p. 217. 
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income tax rates, for instance, by using exorbitant prices or underprices in its 
internal transactions, such as the sale of goods or services.145 The prices or 
other commercial terms that do not correspond to actual costs may lead to a 
situation where taxable income fails to accrue equally between the countries 
in question. Consequently, all the involved countries may not be able to use 
their right to levy taxes within their territory.146 The concept of transfer pricing 
is universal and has therefore the same meaning also under Russian, Finnish 
and U.S. law.147 
 
The arm's length principle (in Russian princip vytyanutoj ruki, in Finnish 
markkinaehtoperiaate) is an international principle guiding transfer pricing, 
and the most important sources regulating it (in addition to national sources) 
are Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention and the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines.148 Pursuant to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, “where conditions are made or imposed between the two 
[associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ 
from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any 
profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the 
enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.” The provision 
under the mentioned Article 9 represents the arm’s length principle.149  
 
The arm’s length principle under Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
states in principle that, in their transactions, associated parties must use 
conditions used by independent parties under similar circumstances or 
otherwise the profits, which should have been accrued to one of the parties as 
a result of the transaction, will be added to the profits of that company for the 
purpose of (income) taxation. According to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, arm’s length principle is an international standard of transfer 
pricing, which should be followed by multinational enterprises and tax 
                                                 
 
145 Helminen 2009, p. 211. 
146 Rohatgi 2002, p. 412. 
147 See e.g. Engblom et al. 2010, pp. 521–523; Levey – Wrappe – Chung 2006, p. 11; Nepesov 2007, pp. 
3–4. In the Russian legal literature, however, there has been differing opinions and understandings of 
the exact meaning of transfer pricing or its application environment, see in more detail in Vasil'eva 2009, 
pp. 1–6. 
148 These transfer pricing guidelines are based on already in 1979 published first transfer pricing report 
by the OECD (Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises). See more in Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, 
pp. 14–15.  
149 OECD Model Tax Convention commentary, p. 185. See also similar provision in Article 9 of the United 
Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries. 
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administrations for taxation purposes in the OECD member countries.150 If the 
transfer pricing of a transaction between related parties fails to take into 
account the market forces and the arm’s length principle, the profits of these 
companies can be adjusted by establishing that kinds of terms and conditions 
for the transaction, which could be expected by the OECD member states in 
similar transactions between independent parties under similar conditions.151 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines also provide guidance for the 
application of arm’s length principle in various situations; especially the 
chapter dealing with the transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings, 
Chapter IX, is important given the topic of this research. 
 
2.2.2 NATIONAL SOURCES OF TRANSFER PRICING AND 
APPLICABILITY OF THE OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES 
Prior to the introduction of the transfer pricing regulations in force at the 
moment, the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions could be considered 
restricted and ineffective. Due to the lack of their clarity, the Russian tax 
authorities frequently lost transfer pricing cases in courts.152 Therefore, it was 
in the state’s interest to enact new functioning transfer pricing provisions153 by 
Federal Law No 227-FZ (N 227-ФЗ), which was signed by Dmitry Medvedev, 
the prevailing president at that time, in July 2011. Russia started applying its 
newest transfer pricing rules regulated in Chapter V.1 of the Tax Code at the 
beginning of 2012. The new provisions are sensational and progressive, and 
their introduction has been described as the biggest reform in Russian tax law 
after enacting the actual Tax Code. They are also very comprehensive, as they 
cover almost everything relating to general transfer pricing concepts and 
definitions, transfer pricing methods, documentation requirements as well as 
transfer pricing audit. It should also be observed that they are widely based on 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.154  
 
The reform introduced several changes in Russian tax law, the most significant 
from the transfer pricing perspective being, inter alia, the application of the 
                                                 
 
150 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.1. The OECD overall has an important role in international tax 
law; see more in Ellingsworth 2009, pp. 273–279. 
151 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.3. 
152 Matilainen Edilex 2010. Since 2001, the tax authorities had lost approximately 90 per cent of transfer 
pricing disputes against taxpayers in the commercial courts of Russia; see Blagov 2009, pp. 115–116. 
153 See Articles 105.1–105.25 of the Tax Code. The newest provisions have been largely ignored by legal 
commentaries that Russian lawyers read in conjunction with the provisions of laws. See one of the few 
commentaries, Lermontov 2011.  
154 Kaftannikov 2011, p. 9; Overchuk 2012, p. 1. 
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arm's length principle in general in Russian transfer pricing and taxpayers’ 
possibility to conclude advance pricing agreements (hereinafter referred to as 
APAs; in Russian soglashenie o tsenoobrazovanii dlya tselej 
nalogooblozheniya). Another particularly noteworthy issue is that the so-
called safe-harbor provision was removed from the Tax Code.155 Article 40 of 
the Tax Code regulated previously that the authorities had the right to 
intervene in related parties’ transactions only if the contract price was at least 
20 per cent higher or lower than the market price in similar transactions 
executed under similar circumstances; this resulted in that related companies 
were entitled to use in their transactions transfer prices which deviated to 
some extent from the market prices as long as they did not deviate by more 
than 20 per cent.156 Moreover, the reform was designed to eliminate the 
prevailing ambiguousness of provisions, make tax control more efficient and 
minimize risks relating to transfer pricing.157  
 
Although the provisions are extensive, they are not all-embracing. Many 
interesting and timely issues from the transfer pricing perspective remain 
unsolved in the Tax Code. For instance, business restructuring has been left 
without any attention in Chapter V.1 of the Tax Code. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the overall judicial discretion in Russian law is basically based only on its 
legislation’s legal norms, the possible court decisions158 as well as the Minfin’s 
and the FTS’s guidance must be taken into consideration, when the Tax Code’s 
transfer pricing provisions are interpreted – despite the fact that they are not 
legally binding in the above-mentioned manner. Especially the Minfin’s and 
the FTS’s letters and written clarifications provide interpretive help in many 
transfer pricing questions; they have published guidance, for instance, relating 
to the transfer pricing notification and documentation liability159, APA 
                                                 
 
155 A safe-harbor rule is a provision, which defines the conditions for circumstances in which tax 
authorities do not interfere in certain transactions’ transfer pricing issues. In such cases, it is possible 
that simplified procedures are applied to particular transactions, or that some specific transactions may 
be left entirely outside of the scope of transfer pricing regulations; see Helminen 2009, p. 248. 
156 The provision was prone to criticism and was criticized, inter alia, by the OECD, see Blagov 2008, p. 
288. It was not considered fully successful from the state’s and tax authorities’ perspective either, see 
Kasatkin – Frolov 2005, pp. 248–249.  
157 Blagov 2009, p. 115. 
158 There have not yet been published remarkable court decisions where the highest courts (nowadays 
the Supreme Court) would have specifically interpreted some of the Tax Code’s new transfer pricing 
provisions. On the other hand, the court decisions regarding the Tax Code’s former transfer pricing 
provisions may still be important and bring clarity at least in some cases. 
159 See e.g. Pis'mo FNS Rossii ot 02.07.2013 N OА-4-13/11860@ “O zapolnenii uvedomlenij o 
kontroliruemykh sdelkakh” and Prikaz FNS Rossii ot 16.11.2012 N MMV-7-13/877@ (red. ot 28.10.2014) 
"O vnesenii izmenenij v Prikaz FNS Rossii ot 10.05.2012 N MMV-7-13/298@." 
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procedure160 and the scope of application of the Tax Code’s transfer pricing 
regulations161.   
 
Nonetheless, the transfer pricing provisions of the Tax Code are quite widely 
consistent with the OECD’s transfer pricing rules, despite their own 
peculiarities.162 In addition, while the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions 
are quite new, they lack specific rules relating to business restructurings in 
comparison with Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The key 
question therefore is, could the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines be used as 
interpretive help in business restructurings in Russia at least in situations 
where the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions remain silent?  
 
Russia is not a member of the OECD, and hence the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, which are not legally binding even on its member states, cannot be 
binding on Russia. Nonetheless, Russia has been planning to join the OECD 
already for several years.163 When — and if — it finally becomes a member of 
the OECD, it will be in a similar position as Finland, the USA and other OECD 
member states, i.e. the national authorities and courts are encouraged to 
follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,164 resulting in that they should 
also be, at least to some extent, followed in practice. As mentioned earlier, the 
new Russian transfer pricing provisions are already widely based on the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Among other things, the Tax Code’s transfer 
pricing methods are equivalent to the methods specified in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines. It is also worth mentioning that Russian legal 
commentaries have taken as a starting point that the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines could be used as interpretive help when the Tax Code’s transfer 
pricing provisions are interpreted and applied in practice.165 The FTS’s 
representatives have also made unofficial statements, according to which the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may be helpful when interpreting the Tax 
Code’s transfer pricing provisions.166  
                                                 
 
160 Pis'mo Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby Rossii ot 12.01.2012 N OА-4-13/85@ ”O zaklyuchenii 
soglashenij o tsenoobrazovanii dlya tselej nalogooblozheniya.” 
161 Pis'mo Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby ot 6 marta 2014 g. N ZN-3-13/878@ O primenenii polozhenij 
razdela V.I NK RF. 
162 See about peculiarities in e.g. Gregory 2012, p. 870. In this study, the differences between the 
provisions of the Tax Code and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are discussed in the following 
chapters, when specific transfer pricing questions are reviewed in more detail. 
163 Bell 2012, p. 818. 
164 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Preface, 15–17.  
165 See e.g. Kaftannikov 2011, p. 9. 
166 Russian tax authorities were interviewed by legal portal Garant.ru. Interview can be found here: 
http://www.garant.ru/action/interview/369396/ (Novye pravila transfertnogo tsenoobrazovaniya: 
plyusy i minusy. Internet-interv'yu s nachal'nikom Upravleniya transfertnogo tsenoobrazovaniya i 
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In light of the above-mentioned considerations, it is justified to state that the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines cannot be entirely ignored in Russia and 
can — at least to some extent — be used as interpretive help in situations where 
the application of the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions results in 
ambiguous conclusions, provided that that the wording, content or scope of 
the provision is not actually broadened. This requirement stems from the 
legislated legal norms’ superior position in the hierarchy of sources of law in 
Russia. Also, tax practitioners share this view and consider this conclusion 
justified.167   
 
In Finland, transfer pricing is not regulated in the tax legislation as widely as 
in the Tax Code in Russia, where it has been regulated extremely extensively. 
The only specific transfer pricing provisions can be found in § 31 of the AAP, 
which concerns transfer pricing adjustment,168 and in § 14 a – § 14 e of the 
AAP, which deals with the transfer pricing documentation requirements, and 
even these provisions do not provide much information. The transfer pricing 
adjustment provision came into force on 1 January 2007, and it — in 
conjunction with the former transfer pricing documentation provisions — has 
generally been regarded as the first real transfer pricing regulation in 
Finland.169 Before introducing these transfer pricing rules, the most relevant 
provision, which was applied to transfer pricing issues more or less, was the 
AAP’s former, already repealed, § 31 regulating the international hidden 
dividend distribution.  
 
As was the case in Russia, the arm’s length principle has also been regulated 
in the Finnish transfer pricing provisions. According to the preliminary works 
of the AAP (HE 107/2006 vp), the objective of imposing the above-discussed 
transfer pricing regulations in Finland was to avoid lagging behind other 
countries in the international development of transfer pricing. In addition, the 
preliminary works state that OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines worked as a 
model in many respects when the AAP’s provisions were drafted, and therefore 
the transfer pricing regulations of the AAP are in principle equivalent to the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.170 As the AAP provides taxpayers and tax 
authorities only with very restricted transfer pricing regulations in terms of 
                                                 
 
mezhdunarodnogo sotrudnichestva FNS Rossii). Published on 21 December 2011. Accessed 10 February 
2013. 
167 Expert Interview 2012. 
168 For tonnage tax purposes, similar provision can be found in the Finnish Tonnage Tax Act 
(tonnistoverolaki, 5.6.2002/476), see § 16. 
169 Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, pp. 11–16 and the Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 
1471/37/2007, p. 3. 
170 HE 107/2006 vp, pp. 3, 10–11, 14–18. 
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the actual content, other sources of law become important in Finland. In 
addition to the mentioned preliminary works, particularly the guidelines 
provided by the Finnish Tax Administration and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines play a significant role.  
 
Especially the Finnish Tax Administration’s memorandum regarding the 
documentation of transfer pricing (Siirtohinnoittelun dokumentointi, 
1471/37/2007)171 is of great importance in this respect providing detailed 
information on, inter alia, performing functional and comparability analyses 
in the course of preparing transfer pricing documentation as well as on 
transfer pricing methods. Regardless of not being legally binding (as 
administrative sources in general, as mentioned earlier), it gives helpful 
interpretations of the arm’s length principle regulated in § 31 of the AAP and 
guidance, in particular, on how to comply with the principle in Finland; hence, 
it is broadly followed in practice.  
 
The relevance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in Finland is also 
discussed in the memorandum. According to the memorandum, the arm’s 
length principle should be interpreted in accordance with the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and that the transfer pricing methods to be used in the 
determination of arm’s length compensations are the same methods that are 
regulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.172 Although the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines are not legally binding even on the OECD member 
states, the Finnish Tax Administration is thus of the opinion that the principles 
set out in the guidelines must be followed in practice to a great degree, when 
the arm’s length principle is applied. In its 2015 statement, the Finnish Tax 
Administration again confirmed the importance of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines as a guiding source in interpreting the arm’s length principle — § 
31 of the AAP — in Finland.173  
 
It has also been acknowledged in the legal literature that the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines’ — as well as the OECD Model Tax Convention’s — impact 
on the Finnish judicial system is significant and that they cannot be ignored in 
practice when national provisions are applied.174 More importantly, the 
                                                 
 
171 The memorandum is set to be updated in the nearest future to reflect, inter alia, the OECD’s latest 
guidance. During the finalization of this research, the 2007 version was still in force. 
172 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 4 and 36.  
173 The Finnish Tax Administration’s statement A177/200/2015 about the use of OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and updates thereof as a source for interpretation (Finnish Tax Administration: Statement 
A177/200/2015). 
174 Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, p. 18. Mehtonen is of the opinion that the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and the OECD Model Tax Convention are in practice strongly binding sources of law in 
Finland, see Mehtonen 2005, p. 50. The aforementioned preliminary works of the AAP contain also 
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Supreme Administrative Court of Finland has further confirmed that the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines should be considered as a remarkable 
source when the arm’s length principle regulated in § 31 of the AAP is 
interpreted and applied in practice. However, the application of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and/or the OECD Model Tax Convention cannot 
result in that the wording or content of a national tax provision or tax 
convention provision is broadened against the legislator’s intention, especially 
in a way that broadens the liabilities of taxpayers in tandem.175  
 
Consequently, legal praxis and prejudices also cannot be disregarded, when 
the Finnish transfer pricing questions are reviewed. As discussed earlier, court 
decisions are to a certain degree legally binding under Finnish law. Especially 
the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland should be taken 
into consideration, as they may bring clarifications to questions relating to 
transfer pricing, as seen above. The court has been particularly active in 
transfer pricing matters in recent years,176 and it has, in addition to confirming 
the applicability of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in general, 
confirmed expressly that the principles and regulations of Chapter IX of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may be applied in Finland when the arm’s 
length principle is interpreted.177 Apart from the decisions of the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Finland, the aforementioned preliminary rulings of 
the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office should be taken into account. Despite the 
fact that the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office is not a court, its rulings may 
provide useful interpretations of legal provisions, and such rulings may be 
even considered precedents. The Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office specializes 
especially in transfer pricing questions as all the Finnish Tax Administration’s 
tasks relating to transfer pricing have been within its competence as of the 
                                                 
 
several references to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the OECD Model Tax Convention, see 
HE 107/2006 vp, pp. 3, 14–19 and 21. In addition, the said OECD sources were often referred to in the 
Finnish legal practice already many years before drafting § 31 of the AAP in its present form, see 
Karjalainen – Laaksonen 2002, p. 316. 
175 See decision KHO 2014:119 of the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland. The case concerned in 
particular recharacterization of a transaction. The court was of the opinion that, as the Finnish transfer 
pricing adjustment provision (§ 31 of the AAP) does not specifically express the possibility of 
recharacterizing transactions, paragraph 1.65 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which previously 
dealt with the recharacterization of transactions, cannot be applied in Finland. See also Helminen 2014a, 
pp. 90–93; Helminen 2014b, pp. 15–27; Lehtonen 2014, pp. 183–193; and Laaksonen 2014b, pp. 3–5. 
176 See decisions KHO 2014:33 and the aforementioned KHO 2014:119. See more about the Supreme 
Administrative Court’s recent decisions in Penttilä 2015, pp. 120–140.  See also decisions KHO 2010:73 
and KHO 2009:70, which also deal with transfer pricing questions. See about transfer pricing cases in 
the Administrative Court of Helsinki in Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 40–42. 
177 See KHO 2013:36. The case concerned the so-called locations savings. The case has been discussed 
also in the English legal literature; see e.g. Hoy 2013, p. 1137. 
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beginning of 2012. This has resulted in a constant increase in the number of 
preliminary rulings concerning transfer pricing issues in recent years.178   
 
Finland as an EU member state must follow EU legislation. In the field of 
transfer pricing, no mandatory EU law has been published that would have an 
immediate effect on transfer pricing in practice. However, there are some 
sources that deal with transfer pricing questions and are therefore worth 
mentioning. First, on 27 June 2006, the Council of the EU and the member 
states published a resolution on a code of conduct with regard to transfer 
pricing documentation for related parties in the EU.179 The Finnish pricing 
provisions on transfer pricing documentations are based on the said resolution 
and therefore they may be useful in the application of the AAP’s provisions.180 
Second, the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee has published a communication on 
the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in the field of dispute 
avoidance and resolution procedures and on Guidelines for Advance Pricing 
Agreements within the EU.181 The purpose of the communication is to get 
group companies and national authorities to agree on transfer pricing issues 
in advance thus avoiding the possible transfer pricing disputes. Lastly, the EU 
member states have concluded an intergovernmental convention on the 
elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of 
associated enterprises.182 The convention sets a procedure for the EU member 
states to eliminate possible double taxation resulting from adjustments of 
profits.183  
 
The actual transfer pricing legislation in the USA is, similar to the situation in 
Finland, content-wise very limited. Transfer pricing is regulated in Section 
482 of the IRC, which is in principle the only provision that specifically 
                                                 
 
178 Waal – Pykönen 2014, p. 555.   
179 Resolution of the Council and of the representatives of the governments of the member states, meeting 
within the Council, of 27 June 2006 on a code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for 
associated enterprises in the European Union (2006/C 176/01). 
180 See HE 107/2006 vp, pp. 11, 13, 14, 17 and 19. 
181 COM (2007) 71: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and 
the European Economic and Social Committee on the work of the EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum in 
the field of dispute avoidance and resolution procedures and on Guidelines for Advance Pricing 
Agreements within the EU (SEC(2007) 246), 26 February 2007. 
182 Convention 90/436/EEC on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of 
profits of associated enterprises, 23 July 1990; Protocol 1999/C 202/01 amending the Convention of 23 
July 1990 on the elimination of double taxation in connection with the adjustment of profits of associated 
enterprises, 25 May 1999. 
183 See more about the mentioned sources of EU law in Helminen 2012, pp. 219–258. See also 
Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, pp. 42–44. 
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regulates transfer pricing in the US legislation;184 it is also a narrow provision 
containing just a few sentences. The section deals with the IRS’s right to 
interfere in related party transactions in order to prevent tax evasion or to 
ensure that the profits between parties reflect the real situation. Although 
Section 482 does not contain a direct mention of the arm’s length principle, in 
Treasury Regulations it has been interpreted to represent the so-called arm’s 
length standard.185 
 
Regardless of the fact that the actual transfer pricing legislation is very 
restricted, the USA has been the forerunner in regulating transfer pricing 
questions. Section 482 of the IRC was first introduced already in 1917, when 
the USA enacted first corporate income tax legislation. The content of the 
provision has remained almost the same since 1928. Only in 1986, a mention 
in relation to transactions involving intangible assets was added to the end of 
the section.186 Notwithstanding that there have been discussions over the years 
in relation to possibly amending or updating the section, it has remained 
unchanged.187 
 
As the actual transfer pricing rules provided in the legislation are not extensive 
and lack content, the administrative sources have had, and still have, an 
important role in providing information on how to apply transfer pricing rules 
and interpret them in practice. Especially the Treasury Regulations must be 
mentioned, when dealing with transfer pricing questions in the USA; they can 
even be described as the most significant source of law in U.S. transfer pricing. 
Treasury Regulations interpret the IRC’s narrow regulations and in this way 
provide specific interpretations and rules on how to apply arm’s length 
principle to different kinds of transactions/issues and what methods should 
be used for determining arm’s length compensations in such cases. In 
addition, the Treasury Regulations provide general concepts and principles 
with regard to transfer pricing, rules to be applied specifically to transactions 
concerning intangible property and guidance on transfer pricing penalties.188 
The Treasury Regulations have been amended and updated many times to 
                                                 
 
184 In addition to Section 482 of the IRC, the IRC contains also a section, which regulates the transfer 
pricing penalties; see Section 6662(e) of the IRC.  
185 Levey – Wrappe – Chung 2006, p. 11. Arm’s length standard is the U.S. equivalent of the arm’s length 
principle, see e.g. Bronson – Johnson – Sullivan 2014, p. 6. 
186 Levey – Wrappe – Chung 2006, p. 6 and Eden 1998, p. 384. See also King, 2004, pp. 9–56; 
Wittendorff 2010a, pp. 31–53. 
187 Eden 1998, pp. 386–387. 
188 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1–1.482-9, § 1.6662-6. 
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reflect constantly changing business environments.189 As stated earlier, the 
IRS must in practice follow the Treasury Regulations, and the final Treasury 
Regulations usually have legal effect, which means that the courts and 
taxpayers must comply with them in practice. It can be stated that the IRC’s 
transfer pricing provisions and the related Treasury Regulations thereto form 
the main transfer pricing rules of U.S. tax law. 
 
Moreover, there are also other administrative sources, which provide help in 
interpreting the IRC’s narrow transfer pricing provisions, although they are 
not legally binding in nature. The IRS has published, for instance, several 
Revenue Procedures, which for example deal with the conclusion of APAs and 
taxpayer’s voluntary adjustments in relation to taxable income, guidance in 
the Internal Revenue Manual as well as notices and the so-called Transfer 
Pricing Audit Roadmap regarding the procedure of transfer pricing 
examination and audit.190 Overall, these kinds of administrative sources 
cannot be ignored, as they may provide helpful interpretations of Section 482 
of the IRC on issues, which have not been covered at all by other sources, such 
as the Treasury Regulations. 
  
Case law, as discussed above, plays an important role in U.S. tax law. Major 
cases have dealt with transfer pricing questions, and thus applicable court 
decisions must be taken into consideration, when transfer pricing provisions 
and regulations are applied in practice. Most cases have concerned disputes 
between the IRS and taxpayers. For example, the court decisions have taken a 
stand on the applicability of certain transfer pricing methods191 and transfer 
pricing of intangibles192. 
 
The USA is a member state of the OECD. The transfer pricing provisions of 
U.S. tax law (both the IRC’s provisions and the Treasury Regulations) are 
mainly consistent with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. For instance, 
they both have, to a great extent, similar transfer pricing methods and 
recognize the arm’s length range. Nonetheless, they also deviate in some 
respects from each other, and the U.S. transfer pricing rules are remarkably 
more detailed, which means that they regulate many questions that have not 
                                                 
 
189 See more about the transfer pricing regulation history and how Treasury Regulations have been 
amended in the course of time in Levey – Wrappe – Chung 2006, p. 6 and PwC 2015, pp. 1057–1059, 
where the latter has more of an informative nature.  
190 See e.g. Revenue Procedures 2008-31, 2006-9, 99-32 and 96-53; Section 4.61.3 of the Internal 
Revenue Manual; notice 98-65. The Transfer Pricing Audit Roadmap can be accessed at 
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Transfer-Pricing-Audit-Roadmap-Now-Available. 
Accessed 21 February 2016. 
191 GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. No. 1 (2001). 
192 Veritas Software Corporation v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 297 (2009). 
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been discussed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines at all.193 As there are 
disparities between the guidelines and the national transfer pricing rules, the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may have less impact on the national law 
in the USA in comparison with the current legal state in Finland. However, 
when there is no discrepancy between the U.S. and the OECD transfer pricing 
rules, the OECD’s guidance may prove to be useful in terms of providing 
possible interpretations of certain transfer pricing issues also in the USA, 
despite its non-binding character.194 
 
The following sections deal with certain transfer pricing provisions in more 
detail and to the extent necessary for examining the research object, the 
transfer pricing of business restructurings. The provisions will form the basis 
for the forthcoming sections discussing the question whether, and to what 
extent, business restructurings may fall within the scope of transfer pricing 
regulations in Russia, Finland and the USA.  
 
2.2.3 TRANSACTION TYPES FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF 
TRANSFER PRICING PROVISIONS 
National transfer pricing provisions may define the transaction types that fall 
within the scope of transfer pricing rules, which must therefore comply with 
the requirements of the arm’s length principle. According to Article 105.14 of 
the Russian Tax Code, the transfer pricing provisions shall be applied 
primarily to controlled transactions (in Russian: kontroliruemye sdelki), 
defined as transactions conducted between related parties. Such controlled 
transactions, i.e. related party transactions, may be cross-border transactions 
as well as intrastate, domestic transactions, although the transfer pricing 
provisions shall be applied to the latter only if the total amount of profits 
derived from domestic transactions exceeds one billion rubles during the 
financial year or if other specific conditions are met.195 The most noteworthy 
issue is that, according to the Tax Code, the transfer pricing rules shall be 
applied only to controlled transactions involving transfers of commodities, 
services and/or work. The Tax Code does not mention, for example, loans and 
intangibles at all. Pursuant to Article 105.14 of the Tax Code, inter alia, cross-
border transactions involving goods traded on foreign commodities 
                                                 
 
193 Madrian – Weise 2014, pp. 756–759; Zollo 2011, p. 760; Feinschreiber 2004, p. 206. See also 
Wittendorff 2011, p. 227. 
194 As discussed, in general, the OECD member states are encouraged to follow the guidelines, although 
they are not legally binding; see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Preface, 15–17, and e.g. Gelin – 
Lubick – Ossard-Quintaine 2014, pp. 70–71. 
195 See Article 105.14 of the Tax Code in more detail. 
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exchanges,196 as well as transactions with residents of the so-called black-listed 
jurisdictions (as defined by the Minfin), are comparable to the controlled 
transactions under certain circumstances, although such transactions have 
been executed by independent parties.  
 
As was the case in Russia, the Finnish transfer pricing provisions are applied 
to related party transactions, which may by nature be strictly domestic or 
cross-border transactions.197 Nevertheless, the approach taken by the Tax 
Code differs from the approach taken by Finnish law, as pursuant to § 31 of the 
AAP, the transfer pricing provisions shall be applied to all type of transactions 
performed between related parties, without imposing any special conditions 
on the nature of the transactions or objects thereof.198 These kinds of 
transactions may be general sale and purchase activities as well as, inter alia, 
transfers of intangible assets and gratuitous arrangements.199   
 
In the USA, the transfer pricing rules are similarly applied to related party 
transactions, which are either domestic or cross-border transactions. The 
types of transactions, which fall within the scope of U.S. transfer pricing 
regulations, have not been limited to a particular type of transaction (e.g. 
concerning only tangible assets, services etc.).  According to Section 482 of the 
IRC, “-- the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, 
deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such [controlled] 
organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, 
apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes 
or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or 
businesses --.” On the other hand, Section 482 specifically mentions transfers 
(or licenses) of intangible properties as objects falling within its scope. 
Nevertheless, Section 482 is considered applicable to all kinds of related party 
transactions; Treasury Regulations, for example, specifically regulate the 
transfers of tangible and intangible assets as well as transfers of services.200  
 
In contrast to the Russian transfer pricing provisions, the scope of application 
of the transfer pricing provisions is broader in Finland and the USA. This 
difference may seem insignificant, but it turns out to be a great problematic 
question in the business restructuring context, as restructurings commonly 
involve, in addition to transfers of goods and services, transfers of intangible 
assets between controlled parties. As the Tax Code is silent in this regard, it is 
not entirely clear if Russian transfer pricing provisions should be applied to, 
                                                 
 
196 For instance, transactions involving oil, oil products as well as ferrous and non-ferrous metals.  
197 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. 
198 Similarly has been regulated in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
199 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. 
200 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3, § 1.482-4 and § 1.482-9. 
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for instance, transfers of intellectual property rights or goodwill in the course 
of business restructurings. Fortunately, the Minfin and the FTS have provided 
additional guidance in this regard, which will be dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 3 of this study. 
 
2.2.4 RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 
As it was mentioned above, the transactions falling within the scope of 
application of the transfer pricing rules must be the so-called related party 
transactions (or controlled transactions), or otherwise they fall outside the 
scope.201 Therefore, how the concept of related parties is defined by the 
national laws of Russia, Finland and the USA must be discussed. 
 
Article 105.1 of the Russian Tax Code comprehensively regulates conditions 
under which companies are considered related parties (in Russian: 
vzaimozavisimye lica).202 As a general rule, the parties are regarded as related 
parties, when the relationship between the parties has specific features which 
may affect the terms and conditions of the transaction or the commercial result 
of the transaction. For instance, the parties are considered related parties, 
when one party holds, directly or indirectly, more than 25 per cent of the 
capital of another party (company). In addition, a transaction is deemed to be 
a related party transaction, when a mutual parent company owns, directly or 
indirectly, more than 25 per cent of the capital of both parties to the 
transaction. 
 
Pursuant to Article 105.1 of the Tax Code, other related party transaction types 
are, inter alia, transactions between two parties, where one party has the 
power to appoint the managing director or at least 50 per cent of another 
party's members of the board of directors or the supervisory board; where the 
same (third) party has appointed the managing director of both parties or at 
least 50 per cent of both parties’ members of the board of directors or the 
supervisory board; or where more than 50 per cent of the members of the 
board of directors or the supervisory board of both parties consists of the same 
individuals or their close relatives. It is particularly important to note that a 
court may also deem parties to be related parties on other grounds than those 
listed in Article 105.1 of the Tax Code, provided that the relationship between 
                                                 
 
201 Except for transactions defined in more detail in the Tax Code, involving transfers of certain 
commodities (e.g. oil) or performed under certain exceptional circumstances, as mentioned in the 
previous section.   
202 The article contains in total over ten different examples of circumstances, in which parties to a 
transaction are deemed to be related parties. Only the most relevant situations are discussed herein. 
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the parties has such specific features that may have an effect on the terms or 
the result of the transaction.  
 
The Tax Code’s provision is largely comparable to the Finnish provision 
regulated under § 31.2 of the AAP, but the former provision is more detailed 
and has a broader scope of application. According to § 31.2 of the AAP, the 
parties to a transaction are regarded as related parties if one party has control 
over another party or if a third party, alone or together with related 
entities/parties, has control over both parties. Pursuant to § 31.2 of the AAP, a 
party may have control over another party, when: (i) it holds, directly or 
indirectly, more than 50 per cent of the capital of another party; (ii) it has, 
directly or indirectly, more than 50 per cent of the total number of votes 
generated by all the shares of another party; (iii) it has, directly or indirectly, 
the right to appoint more than 50 per cent of the members of the board of 
directors of another party or similar organ; or (iv) a party has control over 
another party through joint control with a third party or other type of actual 
control.   
 
Section 482 of the IRC concerns controlled organizations, trades and 
businesses (i.e. taxpayers).203 The controlled transactions, in other words 
related party transactions, require that two or more parties participating in the 
transaction are owned or controlled by the same interests. The term 
“controlled” is defined very broadly, as it covers any kind of control, both direct 
and indirect control, “-- whether legally enforceable or not, and however 
exercisable or exercised, including control resulting from the actions of two or 
more taxpayers acting in concert or with a common goal or purpose --.” The 
form of the control is not crucial, when the existence of control is examined; 
the reality of the control matters the most. In addition, the Treasury 
Regulations contain an assumption of control in situations where income or 
deductions have been “arbitrarily shifted.”204 When two group companies 
execute a transaction, and one of the companies is wholly owned by the other 
party — parent company — or both parties are wholly owned by the same 
parent company, there is no ambiguity in whether the transaction is a 
controlled transaction.205 In case law, transactions have often been deemed 
controlled transactions if a party has owned the majority or at least 50 per cent 
                                                 
 
203 These concepts have been defined in the Treasury Regulations, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(1)–(2). 
See also Wittendorff 2010a, pp. 63–64. 
204 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(i)(4). 
205 Levey – Wrappe – Chung 2006, p. 4. 
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of the stock of another party, although this has not been satisfactory in some 
cases.206 
 
Pursuant to Russian law, parties to a transaction are considered related 
parties, and the transactions correspondingly as controlled/related party 
transactions, already when one party holds directly or indirectly more than 25 
per cent of the capital of another party, whereas the corresponding 
requirement for the share under Finnish law is more than 50 per cent. The 
legal situation in the USA is in this respect more similar to the situation in 
Finland than Russia; although the concept of control has been defined more 
broadly in the Treasury Regulations, case law has in practice required 
ownership of at least 50 per cent in another party. From this perspective, the 
threshold for considering transactions as related party transactions is lower in 
Russia when compared to the current legal situations in Finland and the USA. 
Consequently, transactions conducted between group companies fall more 
likely within the scope of transfer pricing regulations in Russia. 
 
2.2.5 ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE  
As discussed, the arm's length principle is nowadays regulated in the Tax Code 
and is therefore the guiding principle in Russian transfer pricing. According to 
Article 105.3 of the Tax Code, if related parties use in their transactions 
commercial or financial terms and conditions, which differ from the terms and 
conditions used by non-related parties in comparable transactions under 
similar conditions, a related party’s tax base may be increased for income 
taxation purposes. The arm’s length principle regulated in Article 105.3 of the 
Tax Code is to a great degree equivalent to the earlier discussed Article 9 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention. 
 
The arm’s length principle is regulated in Finland under § 31 of the AAP. 
Pursuant to § 31 of the AAP, in case in a transaction between a taxpayer and a 
related party has been agreed on or imposed terms that deviate from the terms 
that would have been agreed on between independent parties and, as a result, 
the taxpayer’s income subject to taxation is less or the taxpayer’s loss is more 
than what it would have otherwise been, an amount, which would have 
accrued if the parties would have used the terms and condition independent 
parties would have used, shall be added to the taxable income. According to 
the preliminary works, the provision embodies the arm’s length principle.207 
                                                 
 
206 See B. Foreman Co. Inc. v. Commissioner, 72-1 USTC 9182, 453 F. 2d 1144 (2nd Cir. 1972) and R.T. 
French Co. v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 836 (1973). See more about the concept of controlled parties and 
related case law in Gazur 1994, pp. 17–73. 
207 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. 
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Pursuant to the Finnish Tax Administration’s guidance, the provision must be 
interpreted in accordance with the principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines.208 Therefore, it is safe to state that the arm’s length principle under 
Finnish law corresponds to the arm’s length principle regulated by the OECD 
in its Model Tax Convention and the guidelines. 
 
The arm’s length principle is understood as the concept of arm’s length 
standard in the USA. The primary sources of the arm’s length standard are 
Section 482 of the IRC and the related Treasury Regulations. As mentioned 
above, pursuant to Section 482 of the IRC, “-- the Secretary may distribute, 
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances 
between or among such [controlled] organizations, trades, or businesses, if he 
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary 
in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of 
such organizations, trades, or businesses --.” In comparison with the similar 
provisions of Russian and Finnish law, Section 482 does not set the terms and 
conditions of a related party transaction against the terms and condition of 
transactions conducted between uncontrolled parties.  
 
On the other hand, the Treasury Regulations bring clarity in this regard. 
According to the Treasury Regulations, the arm’s length standard is used in 
determining a true taxable income of a taxpayer. The arm’s length standard is 
met by the taxpayer, if the results of the controlled transaction are in line with 
the results that would have realized if uncontrolled parties would have 
conducted the same transaction under the same conditions.209 As it is often 
almost impossible to find the exactly same transactions to which the taxpayer 
could refer, the examination of whether the results of the related party 
transaction are arm’s length can be done by comparing the results to the 
results of comparable uncontrolled transactions under similar conditions.210 
 
All in all, the concept of the arm’s length principle — or the arm’s length 
standard — is to a large extent regulated comparably in Russia, Finland and 
the USA. Nevertheless, the national provisions relating to the application of 
the arm’s length principle in practice, for instance the regulations concerning 
the transfer pricing methods as well as documentation and notification 
requirements, also have their own peculiarities. These regulations and 
differences will be discussed in more detail in the forthcoming chapters of this 
research.   
                                                 
 
208 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 4. 
209 When the results meet the requirements of the arm’s length standard, the results are called arm’s 
length results. 
210 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). 
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3 OBJECTS OF TRANSFER PRICING IN 
BUSINESS RESTRUCTURINGS 
3.1 GENERAL 
Business restructurings usually involve transfers of something of value, such 
as tangible and intangible assets, from one controlled party to another. If such 
items of commercial value would be transferred in transactions conducted 
between independent parties, a market based compensation would be paid for 
their transfer. The arm’s length principle requires that related parties should, 
in a similar manner, compensate such transfers at arm’s length, i.e. using 
similar commercial and market based terms that independent parties would 
use under similar conditions, provided that the national transfer pricing rules 
are applicable to such transfers. 
 
The transfer pricing of business restructurings may be considered a two-step 
process. The first step involves the above-mentioned identification of 
something of value that is/are transferred during a business restructuring 
between related parties and the examination of whether transfers of such 
assets and other items of commercial value (something of value) will fall within 
the scope of application of the national transfer pricing provisions. For 
example, some national transfer pricing rules may limit the scope of 
transactions to which the transfer pricing rules — including the arm’s length 
principle — may be applied, as was the case with the Russian Tax Code 
discussed briefly above. The determination of arm’s length compensations for 
transfers falling within the scope of national transfer pricing rules in the 
business restructuring context forms the second step.  
 
In this chapter, the aforementioned first step is explored in detail, examining 
to what extent business restructurings may be subject to transfer pricing 
pursuant to the Russian, Finnish and U.S. transfer pricing regulations. In 
particular, whether the types of assets and something of value, which are 
frequently transferred in business restructurings, fall within the scope of 
application of the transfer pricing provisions of Russia, Finland and the USA 
in the above-mentioned manner is discussed. Hence, this chapter primarily 
reviews the first primary research question, i.e. what are the objects of transfer 
pricing in cross-border business restructurings. In the beginning of this 
chapter, examples of business restructurings are explored in order to 
demonstrate what kinds of assets and other items of commercial value may be 
transferred in business restructuring in general, after which possible objects 
of transfer pricing are dealt with on a case-by-case (or an asset-by-asset) basis. 
The second research question — how to determine actual arm’s length 
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compensations for transactions occurring in the course of business 
restructurings — will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
The choice to examine the applicability of the transfer pricing rules to transfers 
of certain items of value and, consequently, to examine them as possible 
objects of transfer pricing herein is largely based on Chapter IX of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the discussed topics therein. As typical 
transfers of something of value in business restructurings, the guidelines 
mention individual transfers of tangible assets and intangible assets as well as 
transfers of an ongoing concern.211 Furthermore, the guidelines discuss, in this 
connection, the reallocation of risks (and related profit potential) and possible 
termination or renegotiation of existing agreements during business 
restructurings.212 As the following examples of business restructurings show, 
these kinds of transfers of something of value also generally occur in business 
restructurings, which supports this approach. Hence, taking also into 
consideration the remarkability of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in 
practice, it is reasonable and validated to follow the guidelines in this 
respect.213 Moreover, this approach allows the examination of whether 
transfers of assets/items of value can be analyzed and valued on an aggregate 
basis (i.e. as a going concern) in transfer pricing of business restructuring or 
whether such an analysis must be conducted only on an asset-by-asset basis. 
The question is of great interest in business restructurings, since not all 
countries allow the aggregation of related party transactions in this sense.214 
 
                                                 
 
211 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.48. 
212 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.43 and 9.75. It is noteworthy to observe that the OECD also very 
briefly mentions the question of “outsourcing” in connection with its analysis of compensating transfers 
of something of value in business restructurings, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.74. Given the 
limited presentation of the question also by the OECD and that outsourcing as such cannot likely be 
regarded as an object of transfer pricing (see the mentioned paragraph), it has also been excluded from 
the scope of this research. This view is also justified from the perspective of that one of the main 
questions that may arise in outsourcing is the allocation of the so-called location savings; see OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.140–1.143, 9.74. As they are usually taken into account in a comparability 
analysis (not as objects of transfer pricing), and in business restructurings they concern post-
restructuring transactions (which are not in the scope of this research), the aforementioned approach is 
validated also from this perspective; see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.126–9.131. See also KHO 
2013:36. 
213 This can be validated also with a reference to legal literature where the mentioned asset types/items 
of value have similarly been reviewed in connection with business restructurings; see e.g. Kroppen – 
Silva 2011, pp. 32–49.   
214 See Kroppen – Silva 2011, pp. 42–45. 
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3.2 EXAMPLES OF BUSINESS RESTRUCTURINGS  
Traditionally, business restructurings have involved different types of changes 
in a multinational enterprise’s manufacturing, distribution or IPR-related 
activities. In recent years, these traditional ways of changing business models 
have been followed by more complex variations and alternatives. 
 
A group's manufacturing operations can be enhanced by moving from 
conventional manufacturing into contract manufacturing. When a group 
company is engaged in traditional manufacturing operations, the company 
owns the fixed assets used in the manufacturing, as well as the raw materials 
and the finished commodities. It also coordinates of the procurement of raw 
materials, manufacturing of the products and sending the finished products to 
the distribution entities. Consequently, it is responsible for various risks, 
including inventory, guarantee, exchange rate and credit risks.215 The group 
company basically bears all the risks involved in the manufacturing process, 
which is why it is usually called a fully-fledged manufacturer.  
 
Contract manufacturers make a product for a principal company pursuant to 
a specific agreement concluded between the parties. A contract manufacturer 
primarily owns the raw materials and fixed assets used in manufacturing as 
well as bears the risks related thereto as well as to manufacturing activities. In 
general, the contract manufacturer takes the title to the finished products and 
bears the associated risks, although sometimes these may be allocated to the 
principal; nevertheless, the principal does not bear the risks relating to the 
actual manufacturing of products. The purest form of contract manufacturing 
is toll manufacturing, where the principal has also the title to raw materials 
and assumes risks associated with such raw materials, meaning that the 
manufacturing company takes care only of the manufacturing process itself.216 
 
Manufacturing activities of group companies have been conventionally located 
in countries, which have a high tax rate. When a traditional manufacturing 
business model based on a fully-fledged manufacturer is amended to a 
contract manufacturing model, the principal company will usually be based in 
a country with a low effective tax rate and a contract manufacturer will be left 
with only minimal risks in the country with a higher tax rate. In such a 
conversion, the principal bears the majority of the risks involved in the 
manufacturing and the contract manufacturer’s compensation is reduced to 
the level appropriate for low-risk manufacturing activities, which results in 
                                                 
 
215 Engblom et al. 2010, p. 548 and Russo 2007, pp. 183–184.  For instance, the inventory risk refers to 
the risk that stored products are damaged or lost from a company’s warehouse; see e.g. Finnish Tax 
Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 25. 
216 Van Herksen 2009, pp. 19–24; Russo 2007, p. 184. 
58 
 
that only a part of the income will be subject to taxation in a country with a 
high tax rate. Consequently, more profits will be taxed in the country with a 
lower rate, i.e. where the principal is located.217 
 
When the aforesaid conversion from a fully-fledged manufacturer to a contract 
or toll manufacturer is made, something of value may be transferred from one 
jurisdiction to another. For instance, the raw material and fixed assets, such 
as machinery, may be transferred to the new manufacturer located in another 
jurisdiction. This may also involve risks associated with the restructured 
manufacturing activities and even whole functions are transferred and 
reallocated between group companies.218 From the transfer pricing 
perspective, in such business restructurings it must be examined whether 
transfers of these kinds of items of commercial value may be objects of transfer 
pricing pursuant to the national transfer pricing regulations. 
 
Changing the conventional manufacturing model into a contract or toll 
manufacturing model is not always sufficient, when a multinational enterprise 
is aiming at improving overall performance within the group. The 
development of the group’s distribution functions may also be one of the 
objectives behind business restructurings. When a distributor acts as a fully-
fledged distributor, in addition to taking care of all usual distribution activities 
— such as, importing, advertising, managing of the inventory as well as 
delivering and selling the products — it bears all the risks associated with such 
functions. The risks comprise, among other things, inventory risk, market risk, 
exchange rate risk and credit risk. The fully-fledged distributor potentially 
earns a (higher) remuneration, which corresponds to the high level of risks it 
assumes.219  
 
When business restructurings are targeted at making the distribution models 
more tax efficient, this usually means that a fully-fledged distributor is 
changed into a limited-risk distributor. In a limited-risk distributor model, the 
distributor concentrates on its main task, selling the products to customers, 
then some of the tasks and risks of a traditional distributor are assumed by a 
principal company located in another country. In this model, the distributor 
may, among other things, buy the products from the principal just before 
selling them to customers, or the principal may be liable to buy the products 
back from the distributor at certain cost if there has not been great demand for 
the products. One form of a limited risk distribution model is a traditional buy-
                                                 
 
217 Miall 2007, p. 15; Russo 2007, pp. 184–186; Engblom et al. 2010, pp. 550–551.  
218 Van Herksen 2009, pp. 41–42; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.49–9.51. 
219 Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 54; Miall 2007, p. 17; Russo 2007, p. 194; Engblom et al. 2010, p. 566. Market 
risk, for example, means that a company is not able to sell the finished products at a profit – or at all, see 
e.g. Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 25.  
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sell model, where a group company acting as a distributor buys the 
commodities from another group company and sells them to local customers. 
Although the classic buy-sell distributor usually has the title to the products to 
be sold, some core functions and risks — such as, the inventory of products 
and risks thereof — have been removed from the buy-sell distributor. This 
arrangement leads to the low-risk distributor receiving a remarkably lower 
profit than it would have received as a fully-fledged distributor due to the fact 
that it does not bear all the relevant risks involved in the distribution 
activities.220 When a principal company is located in a country with a low tax 
rate and a low-risk distributor is located in a country with a high tax rate, the 
change from a traditional fully-fledged distribution model to low-risk model 
forms a tax efficient end result. 
 
A fully-fledged distribution model may also be converted to an agency model 
or commissionaire model. In the agency model, a local distributor works as an 
agent for a foreign group company and sells the products to customers on 
behalf of the foreign principal. As the agent does not have the title to the 
products, it bears only moderate risks, while the foreign group company bears 
the majority of the risks. In a commissionaire model, a distributor acting as a 
commissionaire has similarly concluded an agency agreement with a foreign 
group company. However, when the commissionaire concludes sales 
agreements with customers, it does so under its own name, not on behalf of 
the foreign principal. This means that the principal and the customer have no 
contractual obligations towards each other. Nevertheless, like in the agency 
model, the products are actually sold for the benefit of the undisclosed 
principal, which, for instance, holds the stock of commodities as well as 
assumes the main risks relating to the distribution, while the commissionaire 
bears only minimal risks. Both models enable multinational groups to plan 
that the majority of the profits derived from the distribution activities are 
realized in jurisdictions with a low effective tax rate.221 
 
The conversions from a fully-fledged distribution model to low-risk 
distribution models may in practice involve that some assets, for example 
inventories of goods, are transferred between group companies to execute the 
new distribution model. Furthermore, certain functions and associated risks 
are likely to be transferred in such cases in the above-mentioned manner.222 
As the transfers are conducted between related parties, the arm’s length 
principle must primarily be applied to such transfers, provided that they fall 
within the scope of application of transfer pricing provisions. 
 
                                                 
 
220 Hopkins 2007, p. 7; Russo 2007, pp. 195–196; Van Herksen 2009, pp. 29–31. 
221 Engblom et al. 2010, pp. 567–568; Russo 2007, pp. 195, 197–200.  
222 Van Herksen 2009, pp. 43–44. 
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Apart from manufacturing and distribution activities, a business restructuring 
may be aimed at amending a multinational group’s centralized functions and 
activities related to, inter alia, intellectual property rights. Traditionally a 
company, which is involved in intellectual property rights development, 
carries out the research and development (R & D) work related to its business 
as well as bears all the expenses and risks associated with it. On the other hand, 
such a company will hold the title to the intellectual property rights that will 
arise from such R & D activities. In particular, the business restructuring’s 
objective may be the centralization of the group’s intellectual property rights 
in one group company, i.e. “IP company”. For example in a contract R & D 
model, all the intangible assets of a group are set to be owned by a particular 
IP company, which in turn concludes agreements with subsidiaries regarding 
R & D activities. Such subsidiaries perform R & D activities on behalf of the IP 
company against a fee, while the IP company assumes the economic risks in 
relation to R & D activities, e.g. unsuccessfulness of the R & D work, and 
receives the ownership to the possible end results of the R & D activities. As 
the IP company bears the main financial risks, the R & D company is not 
entitled to a significant margin from its R & D work.223 
 
Other variant may be that both intellectual property rights and R & D activities 
are centralized in one group company. This IP company will own all the 
present intellectual property rights and intangibles of the group as well as any 
future intellectual property rights and intangibles, which arise from its own R 
& D activities. In this arrangement, the IP company enters into licensing 
agreements with other group companies. As the subsidiaries are granted the 
right to use the IP company’s intellectual property rights, the IP company is 
entitled to royalties.224  
 
In general, it is usually more tax efficient that the group’s intellectual property 
rights and other intangibles are located in a jurisdiction with a low effective 
tax rate; in that case, the profits generated through intellectual property rights 
would be subject to low income tax. However, one issue, which may also have 
an effect in this regard, is the maximization of the deductibility of the expenses 
resulting from the R & D activities. If the intellectual property rights will be 
owned by a company located in a low tax rate country, the deductibility for the 
expenses will also be at the same low rate; vice versa, if intellectual property 
is owned in a jurisdiction with a high effective tax rate, the expenses can also 
be deducted at a higher rate. In addition, many non-taxation related issues 
                                                 
 
223 Russo 2007, p. 172; Engblom et al. 2010, p. 562. See also Vardaman 1998, pp. 28–30 and Lev 2001, 
pp. 55–62. Especially the latter deals with contract R & D model in more detail. 
224 Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 57. 
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may also have an impact on where the intellectual property rights would be 
rational to locate.225  
 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of transfer pricing, business 
restructurings consisting of conversions of intellectual property strategies of 
multinational enterprises very likely result in cross-border transfers of 
intangible assets between group companies. Consequently, as intangible asset 
transfers are generally remunerated in transactions between unrelated parties, 
such transfers should be remunerated also in related party transactions in 
accordance with the arm’s length principle provided that such intangible asset 
types are in the scope of national transfer pricing regulations. 
 
In addition to the above-mentioned ways of changing a multinational 
enterprise’s business models (i.e. amendments concerning manufacturing and 
distribution activities as well as intellectual property rights management), 
business restructurings may be directed at other, perhaps more specifically 
restricted, business sectors of the group. For example, restructurings may 
relate to establishing specific procurement companies, which manage the 
procurement of raw materials within the whole group instead that the 
manufacturing companies or contract manufacturers would take care of it 
independently.226 Furthermore, the newest types of business models involve 
the centralization of particular services of the group in one specific group 
company. This may mean that, among other things, the marketing, IT support 
or HR services of the group companies are located in one group company, 
which also assumes all the liabilities and risks related to such activities.227 By 
implementing these kinds of business model changes, multinational 
enterprises may achieve remarkable tax and other savings. On the other hand, 
such amendments usually lead to something of value (such as, intangible 
property) being transferred within the group, in which case it must be 
examined should the transfer pricing provisions be applied — and to what 
extent — to such transfers. 
 
The aforementioned types of amending business models provide examples of 
how business restructuring may be executed in practice and what kinds of 
assets and something of value may be transferred between controlled parties 
in the business restructuring context. The purpose was not to provide an all-
embracing description of all the possible means of amending a group’s 
business models, as the business restructurings often have their own 
peculiarities, which must be taken into consideration. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
 
225 Russo 2007, pp. 171–174. One of the non-taxation considerations is how well the intellectual property 
rights are legally protected in the country in question.  
226 Irving – Kilponen – Markarian – Klitgaard 2005, p. 59; Webber 2011, pp. 163–165. 
227 Wright 2006, p. 202. 
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conditions under which business restructuring are implemented usually 
vary.228 
 
3.3 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In order to examine to what extent business restructurings fall within the 
scope of transfer pricing rules in Russia, Finland and the USA, how different 
types of transfers of assets and something of value occurring in the course of a 
business restructuring could be identified for transfer pricing purposes must 
be discussed. The identification of transfers of assets and something of value 
in business restructurings relates to identifying the actual transactions 
executed during a business restructuring. For example, according to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the accurate delineation of the transactions 
performed during the business restructuring is an essential part of the transfer 
pricing process of business restructurings as it precedes the aforementioned 
second step, the determination of the arm’s length compensation, which shall 
be paid to a related party as a result of transferring something of value in the 
business restructuring. The accurate delineation of related party transactions 
occurred in the business restructuring comprises the performance of a 
functional analysis, which aims to identify all the “economically significant 
activities and responsibilities undertaken, assets used or contributed, and 
risks assumed” by the restructured entity and other group companies involved 
in the business restructuring, both before and after the restructuring.229 The 
functional analysis helps the parties to understand the whole structure of the 
business restructuring and, in particular, what kinds of transactions have been 
performed in the course of a business restructuring.  
 
The above-mentioned accurate delineation of transactions as well as the 
identification and analysis of transactions and activities of related parties by 
performing a functional analysis are not limited only to the transfer pricing of 
business restructurings, but must be in general performed in all transfer 
pricing cases.230 Hence, it is no surprise that the functional analysis and 
performance thereof is often regulated also in national transfer pricing 
legislation and rules. As these general functional analysis provisions are 
applied to all transfer pricing issues, they must also be naturally applied to 
business restructuring transactions.  
                                                 
 
228 For instance, in Russia, the transfer pricing aspects of business restructuring may become a 
particularly topical question for companies operating in the oil and gas industry, as such companies form 
the majority of companies dealing with transfer pricing questions in practice in Russia, see more in 
Kasatkin 2004, p. 8. 
229 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.15–9.18. 
230 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.15, 9.18 and Section D.1 of Chapter I. 
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In Russia, the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions regulating the functional 
analysis (in Russian funktsional'nyj analiz) are included in the section, which 
deals with the comparability analysis. The comparability analysis in principle 
means the comparison of the terms and conditions of a controlled transaction 
to the terms and conditions of a comparable transaction conducted between 
independent parties under similar circumstances in order to examine whether 
the controlled transaction complies with the arm’s length principle (i.e. 
whether the compensation paid in the controlled transaction is arm’s 
length).231 According to the Tax Code, when deciding whether transactions are 
comparable and/or whether the pricing used in a controlled transaction must 
be adjusted, it must be analyzed what kinds of functions the parties to a 
controlled transaction have performed; what kinds of assets they have possibly 
used in the transaction; whether the parties have assumed any risks in the 
transaction; how the liabilities have been allocated between the parties; as well 
as any other similar terms and conditions of the transaction. Such an analysis 
forms the functional analysis.232  
 
The functional analysis must be documented by taxpayers as it forms a part of 
the transfer pricing documentation. The FTS has published a letter concerning 
the requirements of transfer pricing documentation, which also includes 
recommendations on the documentation of the functional analysis.233 
According to the letter, the FTS recommends characterizing the function 
types/profiles of the companies participating in the related party transaction, 
i.e. whether the companies are, by nature, commissionaires, fully-fledged 
distributors or limited-risk distributors.234 The characterization of such 
business types with different risks before and after controlled transactions 
helps related parties to understand what has occurred in the transactions. 
Despite the fact that business restructurings have not been specifically 
mentioned in the Tax Code’s provisions, it is evident that Article 105.5 of the 
Tax Code must also be applied to business restructurings due to its general 
nature. 
 
In Finland, the functional analysis (in Finnish toimintoarviointi) is also a part 
of the transfer pricing documentation, which must be prepared on an annual 
basis by the related parties having concluded controlled transactions, and 
                                                 
 
231 As discussed, the determination of arm’s length compensation in the business restructuring context, 
including the comparability analysis, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 of this study. 
232 Article 105.5 of the Tax Code. 
233 Pis'mo Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby Rossii ot 30.08.2012 N OА-4-13/14433@ ”O podgotovke i 
predstavlenii dokumentatsii v tselyakh nalogovogo kontrolya.” 
234 It must be observed that the letter introduced and recognized for the first time in Russian tax law the 
characterization of companies by their functions and risks.  
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which must be presented to the tax authorities on their request.235 The 
functional analysis has not been regulated in detail in the Finnish legislation; 
§ 14 b of the AAP simply states that the transfer pricing documentation must 
comprise, among other things, a functional analysis on transactions 
performed between related parties as well as between a company and its 
permanent establishment.  
 
According to the preliminary works, the concept of functional analysis referred 
to in § 14 b of the AAP relates to the concept of functional analysis regulated 
in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, meaning a description and analysis 
of the functions of related parties taking into account the assets used and the 
risks assumed. The functional analysis should be prepared for both of the 
parties to a related party transaction.236 As the functional analysis should be 
understood with the same meaning as discussed in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, more detailed guidance with regard to performing the functional 
analysis can be found from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Pursuant 
to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the functional analysis as such 
means, in the above-mentioned sense, the examination of functions that have 
been performed (taking into consideration also the assets used and risks 
borne) in a controlled transaction. The functional analysis aims at identifying 
the activities of economic importance as well as responsibilities undertaken, 
assets used or contributed and risks assumed by the related parties. The 
functional analysis is insufficient, if the material risks assumed by the parties 
have not been identified and described in the analysis.237 The functional 
analysis is one of the five factors to be considered, when performing a 
comparability analysis.238 
 
The Finnish Tax Administration has similarly confirmed in its memorandum 
that the functions performed in a related party transaction must be described 
in the functional analysis, also taking into account the assets used and the risks 
assumed. Interestingly, the Finnish Tax Administration specifically mentions 
that the functional analysis is of great relevance in business restructurings. 
Business restructurings usually result in that functions and/or assets and risks 
of a group company are transferred to another group entity. Therefore, the 
                                                 
 
235 § 14 a–14 c of the AAP. See also Section 5.3 of this research, where the transfer pricing documentation 
requirements are discussed in more detail. 
236 HE 142/2016 vp, p. 10; HE 107/2006 vp, p 15.  
237 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.51–1.52, 1.56. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ provisions 
regarding functional analysis (Chapter I, Section D.1.2) are quite new as Chapter I, Section D of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines was deleted in its entirety and replaced by totally new provisions as a 
result of the OECD’s BEPS Project. Especially the importance of risks is highlighted in the new 
provisions; see OECD BEPS Actions 8–10, pp. 13–14.  
238 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.36. 
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functional analysis means in the business restructuring context that the 
following must be described: what kinds of changes have occurred in the 
performed functions of the related parties taking into consideration the assets 
used and risks assumed in such functions. The functional analysis must be 
performed before and after the execution of the business restructuring.239  
 
Nonetheless, Russia is not an OECD member state, the functional analysis as 
a concept as well as its content are to a great degree equivalent to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing guidelines and hence Finnish law. Under both countries’ laws, 
the functional analysis consists of an evaluation of the functions of related 
parties in a controlled transaction, covering also the assets used and risks 
assumed by the parties in connection with the transaction. Both countries have 
also specifically published guidance in relation to characterizing changes in 
different business function types (Russia) or even in the business restructuring 
context (Finland), which provides useful help to understand business 
restructurings and identify transfers of something of value occurred therein.  
 
The functional analysis under U.S. tax law is regulated in the Treasury 
Regulations. As was the case with Russian law and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, the functional analysis forms a part of the comparability analysis 
also in the U.S. transfer pricing. According to § 1.482-1(d)(1) of the Treasury 
Regulations, “whether a controlled transaction produces an arm's length result 
is generally evaluated by comparing the results of that transaction to results 
realized by uncontrolled taxpayers engaged in comparable transactions under 
comparable circumstances.” One of the comparability factors to be taken into 
consideration in the comparability analysis is functions.240  
 
Pursuant to § 1.482-1(d)(3)(i) of the Treasury Regulations, the functional 
analysis under U.S. law relates to determining the comparability between 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions by comparing the functions 
performed, and associated resources used, by parties to such transactions. The 
functional analysis “identifies and compares the economically significant 
activities undertaken, or to be undertaken, by the taxpayers in both controlled 
and uncontrolled transactions.” In this sense, the functional analysis should 
contain a consideration of the resources employed, or to be employed, in 
connection with such activities, comprising a consideration of the types of 
assets that are used (e.g. intangibles). The Treasury Regulations expressly 
identify certain functions that may need to be accounted for in the functional 
analysis. These functions include, among other things, R & D, manufacturing, 
                                                 
 
239 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 23 and 25–26.  
240 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(1) and § 1.482-1(d)(3).  
66 
 
production and process engineering, as well as marketing and distribution 
functions.241  
 
The Treasury Regulations do not directly state that the functional analysis 
should also include a description of risks assumed by the parties in connection 
with the functions and activities. However, risks form one of the comparability 
factors, which means that they must be taken into account separately in the 
comparability analysis.242 The Treasury Regulations thus deviate from the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines — as well as from the Finnish and Russian 
transfer pricing rules — in this respect. Nevertheless, the difference has been 
regarded as strictly formal and technical.243 In addition, according to the IRS’s 
Internal Revenue Manual, a risk analysis should be performed in conjunction 
with the functional analysis.244 As the functional analysis under U.S. law 
concentrates on the examination of the functions performed (or to be 
performed) by the parties, taking into account resources and assets employed, 
it is broadly consistent with the Finnish and Russian provisions and the 
principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. It must also be observed 
that, similar to the FTS’s guidance as regards functional analysis in Russia, the 
Treasury Regulations identify different kinds of functions or activity types that 
should be considered when performing the functional analysis. 
 
The functional analysis may be generally perceived by taxpayers as a great 
burden related to complying with the transfer pricing documentation 
requirements. Nonetheless, as the functional analysis involves the 
examination of the changes in the related companies' functions as well as 
associated assets and risks, it forms an excellent tool to identify transactions 
and – more importantly – transfers of something of value occurred in related 
party transactions. It must be highlighted that in business restructurings the 
functional analysis is especially of practical importance, as it is generally very 
ambiguous to what extent a business restructuring may fall within the scope 
of the national transfer pricing regulations and be an object of transfer pricing. 
As the functional analysis helps related parties to identify the controlled 
transfers of assets and something of value also in the business restructuring 
context, a functional analysis should always be done thoroughly and in a 
diligent manner in business restructurings both before and after the 
restructuring. A successfully performed functional analysis is one step closer 
to a successful transfer pricing of a business restructuring. 
 
                                                 
 
241 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(i).  
242 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii).  
243 Feinschreiber 2004, p. 212. 
244 Section 4.61.3.5.3 of the Internal Revenue Manual. 
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3.4 GOING CONCERN  
In order to discuss to what extent business restructurings may fall within the 
scope of application of national transfer pricing provisions, it should first be 
examined how business restructurings should be reviewed from a transfer 
pricing perspective in Russia, Finland and the USA, if a business restructuring 
involves a transfer of a whole business unit. In general, two different 
approaches to analyze transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings can 
be seen in this regard, as mentioned earlier. The first, rather traditional, 
approach is that each asset and/or something of value transferred in a business 
restructuring shall be reviewed and valued separately, meaning that related 
companies must identify all the assets and/or something of value that fall 
within the scope of national transfer pricing regulations, after which they must 
remunerate each transfer of an asset and/or something of value separately in 
accordance with the arm’s length principle. The functional analysis discussed 
in the previous section helps taxpayers to identify the transfers of assets 
and/or something of value occurring in the course of a business restructuring. 
 
The second — newer and more advanced — approach is to regard a business 
restructuring as a transfer of a going concern, in which case only one arm’s 
length compensation shall be determined — the compensation for the transfer 
of a business as a going concern.245 This approach requires that a functioning 
business unit, a going concern246, is transferred in the course of a business 
restructuring from one related party to another. If the business restructuring 
involves only transfers of certain assets and/or risks, which do not constitute 
a functioning business as such, a going concern is not transferred in that case. 
The aforementioned traditional approach shall be applied to such situations: 
all the transfers of assets and/or something of value shall be identified and 
valued separately. 
 
The advantage of regarding business restructurings as transfers of a going 
concern is that there is no need to examine separately in the aforesaid manner, 
which of the transferring assets/something of value fall within the scope of 
national transfer pricing regulations in the business restructuring, and which 
do not. Instead of determining an arm’s length compensation for each asset 
transfer, which may be burdensome, only one transfer price shall be 
determined for the transferred business unit. This transfer price, usually based 
on the future earnings stream of the transferred business, shall cover the 
                                                 
 
245 De Robertis – Matthias – Damian 2006, p. 18.  
246 A going concern has been described as a “functioning organizational unit” and the value of a going 
concern is therefore higher than the values of separate assets, which belong to this unit, see more in 
Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 43. A going concern value as a form of intangible property possibly transferred 
in a business restructuring is discussed in Section 3.6.5. 
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transfers of all of the assets and something of value related to the transferred 
business unit.247 If possible, tax authorities try to allege that a going concern 
has been transferred in a business restructuring, as it generally results in that 
a higher value is subject to (exit) taxation and thus to transfer pricing.248 On 
the other hand, treating a business restructuring as a transfer of a going 
concern in such situations might also lead to a more reliable arm’s length 
result, as independent parties would likely value a functioning business unit 
on an aggregate basis in similar transactions.249 Few countries have expressly 
regulated that business restructurings may be considered transfers of a going 
concern for transfer pricing purposes.250  
 
Thus, in order to discuss the main question of this chapter — to what extent 
business restructurings become objects of national transfer pricing regulations 
— it should be examined whether it is possible to regard business 
restructurings as transfers of a going concern in Russia, Finland and the USA 
or should transfers of assets and/or something of value occurring in the course 
of a business restructuring always be reviewed separately. In this section, it is 
therefore discussed whether business restructurings may be objects of transfer 
pricing as transfers of a going concern in the target countries. 
 
Before analyzing whether business restructurings may be considered transfers 
of a going concern pursuant to the national sources of law of Russia, Finland 
and the USA, it must be highlighted that the OECD has acknowledged the 
concept of a going concern in its guidelines (the OECD uses the concept of an 
ongoing concern to describe the same phenomenon). The OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines’ starting point is that the arm's length principle should be 
applied “on a transaction-by-transaction basis.” However, if there are many 
separate transactions, which are conducted together or otherwise closely 
linked with each other, the main rule could be ignored and such transactions 
could be reviewed on an aggregate basis.251 In business restructurings, the 
OECD has recognized the possibility of the latter and has expressly taken a 
                                                 
 
247 On the other hand, the determination of a transfer price for a going concern is not an easy task either. 
This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
248 Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 42; Hopkins 2007, pp. 7–8. 
249 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.69. 
250 As discussed, Germany has regulated the transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings. German 
transfer pricing provisions are included in the tax act concerning foreign transactions 
(Außensteuergesetz). See more in Van Herksen – Levey – Fletcher 2008, p. 16. According to the German 
provisions, in business restructurings, among other things, the company’s functions, risks and profit 
potential related to a business are transferred as a whole, and only one arm’s length compensations shall 
be determined for such a transfer. 
251 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 3.9. 
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stand on considering business restructurings as transfers of a going concern. 
According to the guidelines,  
 
“Business restructurings sometimes involve the transfer of an ongoing 
concern, i.e. a functioning, economically integrated business unit. The 
transfer of an ongoing concern in this context means the transfer of 
assets, bundled with the ability to perform certain functions and bear 
certain risks. --- The valuation of a transfer of an ongoing concern 
should reflect all the valuable elements that would be remunerated 
between independent parties in comparable circumstances. --- For 
example, in the case of a business restructuring that involves the 
transfer of a business unit that includes, among other things, research 
facilities staffed with an experienced research team, the valuation of 
such ongoing concern should reflect, among other things, the value of 
the facility and the impact (e.g. time and expense savings) of the 
assembled workforce on the arm's length price. ---”252 
 
Thus, according to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, if the business 
restructuring comprises simultaneous transfers of assets, risks or functions, 
which constitute a functioning and economically integrated business unit, it 
may be preferable to value the transfers on an aggregate basis, rather than 
separately. This also means that the arm’s length compensation for this kind 
of transfer of an ongoing concern may not be absolutely equivalent to the 
aggregate sum of separately valued assets, risks and/or functions transferred 
in the course of a business restructuring. Pursuant to the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, 
 
“The determination of the arm’s length compensation for a transfer of 
an ongoing concern does not necessarily amount to the sum of the 
separate valuations of each separate element that comprises the 
aggregate transfer. In particular, if the transfer of an ongoing concern 
comprises multiple contemporaneous transfers of interrelated assets, 
risks, or functions, valuation of those transfers on an aggregate basis 
may be necessary to achieve the most reliable measure of the arm’s 
length price for the ongoing concern. Valuation techniques that are 
used, in acquisition deals, between independent parties may prove 
useful to valuing the transfer of an ongoing concern between associated 
enterprises. ---”253 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines therefore suggest that the arm’s length 
price for a transfer of an ongoing concern could be determined by using 
                                                 
 
252 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68. 
253 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.69. 
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valuation methods that are generally used in corporate acquisitions by 
independent parties. By applying this approach, there would be no need to 
separately examine which of the transferring assets (and transfers of 
something of value) would fall within the scope of national transfer pricing 
regulations in a business restructuring, and which would not, as the arm’s 
length compensation would be paid for the whole functioning business unit. 
Thus, the compensation would not be based on the sum of the separate 
valuations of each transferred asset. It should be observed that taxpayers 
might also be obliged to apply this approach, if it is in the aforementioned 
manner “necessary to achieve the most reliable measure of the arm’s length 
price.” 
 
Could business restructurings be considered transfers of a going concern also 
under Russian law, which would lead to taxpayers avoiding to identify all the 
transfers of assets and something of value occurring in business 
restructurings, when a functioning business unit is transferred? Very little 
support can be found for such a view from the main sources of Russian transfer 
pricing and tax law. The Tax Code regulates the transaction types in a precise 
manner, which fall within the scope of the Russian transfer pricing rules, and 
transfers of business units on an aggregate basis have not been mentioned in 
the Tax Code at all. According to the Tax Code, only transfers of commodities, 
services and work fall within the scope of transfer pricing regulations.254  
 
Alternatively, the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions do not expressly state 
that transactions falling within the scope of transfer pricing rules should 
always be reviewed separately or that multiple contemporaneous transactions 
could not be reviewed as a whole for transfer pricing purposes. However, if the 
aggregation of interrelated transactions would be considered acceptable from 
this perspective, another problem would arise: the Tax Code does not contain 
specific provisions, which would regulate the possibility to value simultaneous 
transfers of assets and/or functions on an aggregate basis. Thus, it would be 
unclear, for instance, how the arm’s length compensation would be 
determined in such situations.  
 
Moreover, it must be observed that, as discussed earlier, the interpretation of 
Russian law and overall judicial discretion under Russian law are basically 
based only on written legal norms.255 From this perspective, it may be 
extremely difficult to find justification for a view according to which assets and 
functions transferred in the course of a business restructuring would not be 
identified and valued separately, but on an aggregate basis, if no support is 
evident for such a view in the Tax Code. In the current situation, the transfer 
                                                 
 
254 Article 105.14 of the Tax Code. 
255 Orlov 2010, p. 17.  
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pricing of contemporaneous transfers of assets and/or something of value as a 
going concern has not been dealt with in the Russian case law nor other 
sources of Russian tax law, including the Minfin’s or the FTS’s clarifications 
and other administrative guidance. Hence, other acceptable sources of 
Russian tax law that can be used in the interpretation of the Tax Code’s 
provisions also remain silent in this respect. Therefore, at least strictly from 
the perspective of the current Russian national transfer pricing provisions and 
regulations, it is likely that business restructurings should always be examined 
in a traditional way. This would mean that all the transfers of assets and 
something of value occurring in a business restructuring should be identified 
and valued separately in accordance with the Tax Code’s transfer pricing rules, 
regardless of whether such assets and something of value would constitute a 
functioning business unit as a whole.  
 
On the other hand, as Russian law does not itself provide a straightforward 
answer to the question, whether business restructurings could be regarded as 
transfers of a going concern for transfer pricing purposes, could the OECD’s 
approach be applied to business restructurings purely on the basis of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines? As mentioned earlier, Russia is not a 
member of the OECD and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are not 
legally binding even on its member states. Nevertheless, the representatives of 
the Russian tax authorities have publicly stated that the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines can be used at least as interpretive help, when Chapter V.1 
of the Tax Code is applied in practice. This is due to the fact that Chapter V.1’s 
transfer pricing provisions were largely based on the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and correspond to them to a great degree.256 It was also previously 
discussed that that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines cannot be entirely 
ignored in Russia and should be used as interpretive help, at least in situations 
where the applicable Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions are in line with the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ corresponding provisions. 
 
Although the transfer pricing rules regulated in the Tax Code are quite widely 
consistent with the OECD’s transfer pricing rules, they also have their own 
peculiarities. The most important difference between the Tax Code and the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is that the arm’s length principle regulated 
in the Tax Code is not applicable to controlled transactions, where intangible 
assets are transferred between related parties, while the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines have regulated very broadly and in detail the applicability 
of the arm’s length principle to transfers of intangibles in Chapter VI of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. In addition, while the Minfin has 
published written clarifications in relation to the scope of application of the 
Tax Code’s transfer pricing regulations, according to which transfers of 
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intellectual property rights may be subject to transfer pricing regulations, 
support cannot be found for a view that other intangible assets could fall 
within the scope of application of Russian transfer pricing rules.257  
 
Therefore, as particular Tax Code’s provisions regulating the actual scope of 
application of transfer pricing rules are not in line with the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, it is highly unlikely that the provisions could be interpreted 
in a way, which would allow business restructurings — which often involve 
transfers of various intangibles — to be regarded as transfers of a going 
concern resulting in that the restructuring would be valued on an aggregate 
basis. Otherwise, the Tax Code would be interpreted contrary to the actual 
wording of the provision, and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines would not 
be used only as interpretive help, but as a tool to amend existing legal norms 
of the Tax Code: the wording, content and scope of the transfer pricing 
provisions would actually be broadened.  
 
Article 268.1 of the Tax Code regulates the taxation of a transfer of an 
enterprise.258 An enterprise is defined as a complex of assets used to practice 
business activities, which includes e.g. tangible and intangible assets as well as 
liabilities and risks related thereto.259 In this sense, the said concept of 
enterprise resembles the concept of a going concern, although the latter does 
not necessarily have to be a whole enterprise, but it may also be a separately 
functioning business unit. The article has been applied in practice only in very 
rare cases because of its very strict formalities and registration requirements 
set by the authorities.260 Besides, the article requires that an enterprise must 
be transferred with all of its assets and functions to another company. This is 
not the case in the majority of business restructurings, as group companies are 
more likely willing to transfer only some of their business activities/units to 
another group company. More importantly, the article does not have any 
mention about its applicability to transfer pricing issues. It is not even placed 
in Chapter V.1 of the Tax Code, which primarily includes the Russian transfer 
                                                 
 
257 See Raz"yasneniya Ministerstva Finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii po voprosam primeneniya razdela V.I 
Nalogovogo kodeksa Rossijskoj Federatsii. The applicability of the Russian transfer pricing regulations 
to transfers of intangibles will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.6. 
258 Pursuant to the article, when an enterprise is transferred, the difference between the actual purchase 
price and the net asset value of the enterprise will be regarded as taxable profit or deductible loss of the 
buyer. It must be noted that the transfer of an enterprise under this article may not include transfers of 
licenses (authorizations) and other statutory permits nevertheless. See Dontsov – Anichkin – Syrbe 
2009, pp. 13–14. See also Article 158 of the Tax Code, which regulates the tax base of transferred 
enterprises.  
259 Article 132 of the Russian Civil Code. 
260 Kalinov – Drobilko 2010, p. 437; Evdokimov – Konnov 2011, p. 633; Dontsov – Anichkin – Syrbe 
2009, p. 14 . 
73 
 
pricing rules in force. Thus, apart from that it may be poorly applied to 
business restructurings in general, it is very unlikely that the article could be 
applied to transfer pricing issues at all. 
 
Taking into consideration the above states observations, it is hard to find 
grounds for the view that business restructurings could be regarded as 
transfers of a going concern in Russia from the transfer pricing perspective, 
even when a restructuring would involve a transfer of a functioning business 
unit. Consequently, the question of whether and to what extent business 
restructurings may fall within the scope of the transfer pricing regulations in 
Russia must be thus approached by analyzing different types of transfers of 
assets and something of value on a transaction-by-transaction basis, which 
may generally occur in the course of business restructurings. Russian transfer 
pricing experts have assumed this kind of approach in practice too.261 In 
principle, this means that in order to consider certain assets as objects of 
transfer pricing in business restructuring in Russia, they must be 
distinguishable from other transferred assets in the restructuring (i.e. 
identifiable), they have to have value that would be compensated in 
transactions between independent parties under similar conditions and they 
should be regulated under Russian tax law as asset types subject to transfer 
pricing. 
 
The aforementioned approach is nevertheless problematic. The arm’s length 
principle requires ultimately that transactions between related parties 
conform in terms of commercial conditions to transactions conducted between 
unrelated parties in comparable circumstances. Thus, if independent parties 
would treat several simultaneous transfers of assets and other valuable items 
as a transfer of a functioning business unit, where such transfers would be 
reviewed and remunerated as a whole,262 this should be the starting point also 
in business restructurings. The existing transfer pricing rules and the 
interpretation thereof do not allow such a conclusion in the aforesaid manner. 
In the worst-case scenario, this leads to a situation where the sum of separate 
compensations paid in the restructuring for controlled transfers of 
assets/something of value may deviate remarkably from the aggregate 
valuation of such assets/something of value. In such cases, the compensation 
paid in the restructuring would thus differ considerably from what should be 
considered the arm’s length result in such situations (i.e. what independent 
                                                 
 
261 Expert Interview 2012. According to the interviewees, they have not seen in practice that separate 
assets associated with a certain business would have been transferred as a whole in a related party 
transaction. This is not also recommended as it may be in the interest of tax authorities to intervene in 
such transactions afterwards.   
262 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.69. This is usually the case in business acquisitions also 
in Russia; see e.g. Popkov – Evstaf'eva 2007, pp. 84–85. 
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parties would regard as appropriate compensation). In this sense, the purpose 
of the arm’s length principle, which should be the guiding principle behind the 
national transfer pricing provisions also in Russia, is not necessarily 
completely realized in this particular transfer pricing question. Hence, the 
existing transfer pricing rules should be amended de lege ferenda to better 
meet the aims of the arm’s length principle in this respect.  
 
In the Finnish tax legislation, there are no specific provisions regulating the 
transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings. The general transfer 
pricing rules are thus the starting point, when the transfer pricing of business 
restructurings is reviewed. § 31 of the AAP does not restrict the scope of 
application of the transfer pricing rules only to particular types of transactions 
conducted between related parties in comparison with the corresponding 
Russian rules; no special conditions on the nature of the controlled 
transactions are imposed, as discussed earlier. This results in that the general 
requirement of complying with the arm’s length principle primarily applies 
also to business restructurings.263  
 
As § 31 of the AAP provides insufficient information in relation to applying the 
arm’s length principle in practice, the question of whether business 
restructurings may be regarded as transfers of a going concern for transfer 
pricing purposes must be examined from other sources of Finnish tax law. 
According to the preliminary works of the AAP, § 31 of the AAP must be 
interpreted broadly; it states that controlled transactions falling within the 
scope of transfer pricing provisions may be, for example, ordinary sale and 
purchase activities as well as transfers of intangible assets.264 Pursuant to the 
preliminary works of the AAP, the transfer pricing provisions of the AAP are 
widely based on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and the preliminary 
works contain several references to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.265 
As the scope of application of the Finnish transfer pricing provisions is in line 
with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and they are also to a large extent 
based on the said guidelines, it could mean that the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines’ approach to business restructurings, including the possibility of 
regarding business restructurings as transfers of a going concern, could also 
be applied to business restructurings in Finland. 
 
As stated earlier, in addition to the preliminary works, the guidance provided 
by the Finnish Tax Administration plays a pivotal role in the Finnish transfer 
pricing. According to the Finnish Tax Administration’s memorandum, § 31 of 
the AAP must be interpreted in accordance with the principles of the OECD 
                                                 
 
263 Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 251. 
264 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. 
265 HE 107/2006 vp, pp. 3, 10–11, 14–18. 
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Transfer Pricing Guidelines.266 The memorandum also deals with business 
restructurings in particular. Pursuant to the memorandum, a functional 
analysis should contain information about business restructurings and other 
changes in the business models of a company, if applicable. Such changes may 
involve transfers of functions as well as transfers of assets and risks related to 
such functions. It is especially noteworthy to observe that, according to the 
memorandum, changes (e.g. business restructurings) must be reviewed as a 
whole.267 In the legal literature, it has been viewed that the concept and 
meaning of business restructuring under the memorandum may be deemed to 
be equivalent to the concept and meaning of business restructuring regulated 
in Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.268 More recently, the 
Finnish Tax Administration has also publicly stated on its website as a 
guidance for taxpayers that business restructurings must be treated as 
transfers of a going concern, when a functioning business is transferred in the 
restructuring.269 From this point of view, it is thus self-evident that the Finnish 
Tax Administration views that business restructurings may — and should — 
be regarded as transfers of a going concern in Finland, in accordance with the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, when a functioning and economically 
integrated business unit is transferred in a business restructuring. 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ relevance in Finland cannot be 
overemphasized in business restructuring cases. The Supreme Administrative 
Court has specifically stated that, when Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines was introduced in 2010, it did not bring any material 
amendments to the practice with regard to the interpretation of the arm’s 
length principle, but rather brought clarification to the application of the arm’s 
length principle in new kinds of environments.270 More importantly, it ruled 
that the principles and regulations of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
can be used in their present form (including Chapter IX) as a guide for the 
application of the arm’s length principle in Finland.271 Despite the fact that, in 
the case, the Supreme Administrative Court did not specifically address the 
possibility of regarding business restructurings as transfers of a going concern, 
this statement in conjunction with the express references to Chapter IX of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines supports the view that business 
restructurings could be considered transfers of a going concern in situations 
                                                 
 
266 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 4. 
267 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 25–26. 
268 Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 251. 
269 Finnish Tax Administration: Transfer Pricing in Business Restructurings. 
270 See KHO 2013:36. For instance, the application of the arm’s length compensation to situations 
involving location savings. 
271 Ibid. 
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where a functional business unit is transferred in the sense set out in the 
provisions of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.  
 
It should also be observed that the preliminary rulings practice of the Finnish 
Large Taxpayers’ Office supports the aforementioned view. In its preliminary 
rulings, the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office has taken as a starting point that 
business restructurings may be regarded as transfers of a going concern for 
transfer pricing purposes, when a functional business unit is transferred from 
one related party to another. In such cases, the arm’s length compensation 
shall be determined solely for the transferred unit, and there is no need to 
separately value, for instance, intangibles that belong to such a unit. This 
approach is thus similar to acquisition deals conducted between independent 
parties, which concern transfers of businesses.272 As mentioned earlier, 
despite the fact that the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office is not a court, its 
rulings provide useful interpretations of legal provisions, which should always 
be taken into consideration.  
 
Given that the Finnish legal literature has also viewed that business 
restructurings may be examined as transfers of a going concern for transfer 
pricing purposes,273 it is justified to state that Finnish law follows the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ approach to business restructurings in this regard 
and deviates from the approach of Russian law. When a business restructuring 
involves a transfer of a functioning, economically integrated business unit (i.e. 
going concern), it may be required that contemporaneous transfers of assets, 
risks, and/or functions executed between related parties in the course of such 
a business restructuring shall be reviewed and valued in Finland on an 
aggregate basis, not separately. This results in that the determination of the 
arm’s length compensation in such cases could be made by using the valuation 
techniques that are commonly used in business acquisition deals between 
independent parties,274 and the determinations of separate arm’s length 
compensations for each asset transfers occurring in the business restructuring 
would not be necessary.  
 
In comparison with the prevailing legal situation in Russia, similar 
interpretive problems are avoided in Finland. Although the written provisions 
are strongly binding law, also other sources of law — such as court decisions, 
preliminary works and jurisprudence — are permitted sources of law in 
Finland. Therefore, all such sources may be used in the interpretation of the 
legislated transfer pricing rules in the above-mentioned sense more 
extensively than in Russia. Moreover, more weight has been given in general 
                                                 
 
272 Laaksonen 2006, p. 435. 
273 Juusela – Tuominen 2011, pp. 317–319. 
274 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68–9.69. 
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to other sources than the actual transfer pricing provision (§ 31 of the AAP), 
when the actual content of the arm’s length principle pursuant to Finnish law 
is discussed and interpreted. The treatment of business restructurings as 
transfers of a going concern has been recognized by the said sources in a 
similar manner as in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the Finnish transfer pricing provisions is heavily based on the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in such sources, and the position of the 
OECD’s guidance as a guiding source in the Finnish transfer pricing has been 
confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court and the Finnish Tax 
Administration. Therefore, there is no similar lack of clarity in the existing 
situation as in Russia with respect to the possibility of considering 
contemporaneous transfers of assets/something of value as transfers of a 
going concern for transfer pricing purposes.  
 
In consequence, the requirements of the arm’s length principle are also met in 
this particular question: if independent parties would consider in comparable 
circumstances contemporaneous transfers of assets/something of value as a 
transfer of a going concern and determine a single transfer pricing for such 
transfers on an aggregate basis, such an approach should also be applied by 
related parties pursuant to the Finnish legal sources. Due to the different 
hierarchy of laws and judicial systems, no similar amendments to the existing 
provisions are required de lege ferenda in Finland as compared to Russia.   
 
Naturally, when a business restructuring involves only transfers of specific 
assets/something of value, which do not constitute a functioning business 
unit, Finnish and Russian law are in line with each other. In such situations, 
all transfers of assets and/or something of value occurring in the course of a 
business restructuring must be identified and valued separately, if they fall 
within the scope of application of national transfer pricing provisions. 
 
In U.S. transfer pricing, the possibility to consider business restructurings as 
transfers of a going concern for transfer pricing purposes must be examined 
from the main sources of law regulating transfer pricing — Section 482 of the 
IRC and the Treasury Regulations related thereto.275 Section 482 does not 
regulate business restructurings or transfers of going concerns/business units 
as such and is thus not very helpful in this respect. For instance, it lacks any 
rules according to which specific exit taxes are imposed on outbound transfers 
of functions in the course of business restructurings.276 On the other hand, 
                                                 
 
275 A going concern or business is in general defined in U.S. tax law as “a specific unified group of 
activities that constitute (or could constitute) an independent economic enterprise carried on for profit,” 
see Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)–2T(b)(2). Thus, the concept is understood in a similar way as in Russian and 
Finnish law. 
276 MacGregor 2014, p. 2. 
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Section 482 does not explicitly restrict the scope of application of the transfer 
pricing rules only to particular types of transactions conducted between 
related parties, and in this regard it resembles more the Finnish transfer 
pricing provisions than the Tax Code’s rules. The Treasury Regulations, which 
interpret Section 482, are therefore valuable in examining the question of 
whether business restructurings may be treated as transfers of a going concern 
for transfer pricing purposes under U.S. law. 
 
The so-called best method rule defined under § 1.482-1(c) of the Treasury 
Regulations regulates the application of transfer pricing methods to controlled 
transactions in order to obtain the best and most reliable result from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle. Pursuant to the regulation, “the 
arm's length result of a controlled transaction must be determined under the 
method that, under the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable 
measure of an arm's length result. Thus, there is no strict priority of methods, 
and no method will invariably be considered to be more reliable than others.” 
The best method rule is naturally also the starting point, when considering 
whether a business restructuring may be regarded as a transfer of a going 
concern for transfer pricing purposes. The best method rule could be basically 
interpreted in the business restructuring context that it may be possible to 
regard business restructurings as transfers of a going concern, if it would result 
in the most reliable end result in terms of the arm’s length principle.  
 
This view can be supported by the fact that the Treasury Regulations also 
contain particular regulations according to which the best method rule may 
require that separate, but contemporaneous, transactions are analyzed on an 
aggregate basis. On 14 September 2015, the IRS and the U.S. Treasury 
Department published temporary regulations, which amended the former 
final regulations dealing with the question of the aggregated arm’s length 
analysis of interrelated controlled transactions. According to the regulations,   
  
“The combined effect of two or more separate transactions (whether 
before, during, or after the year under review), including for purposes 
of an analysis under multiple provisions of the Code [= the IRC] or 
regulations, may be considered if the transactions, taken as a whole, are 
so interrelated that an aggregate analysis of the transactions provides 
the most reliable measure of an arm's length result determined under 
the best method rule of § 1.482-1(c). Whether two or more transactions 
are evaluated separately or in the aggregate depends on the extent to 
which the transactions are economically interrelated and on the relative 
reliability of the measure of an arm's length result provided by an 
aggregate analysis of the transactions as compared to a separate 
analysis of each transaction. For example, consideration of the 
combined effect of two or more transactions may be appropriate to 
determine whether the overall compensation in the transactions is 
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consistent with the value provided, including any synergies among 
items and services provided.”277 
 
In addition, the temporary regulations contain provisions on the so-called 
coordinated best method analysis: “A coordinated best method analysis and 
evaluation of two or more controlled transactions to which one or more 
provisions of the Code [= the IRC] or regulations apply may be necessary to 
ensure that the overall value provided, including any synergies, is properly 
taken into account.” The coordinated best method analysis requires a 
consistent consideration of the facts of the functions performed, resources 
used and risks assumed in the controlled transactions as well as a consistent 
measure of the arm's length results.278  
 
These Treasury Regulations provide a solid support for the aforementioned 
view that business restructurings could be treated as transfers of a going 
concern under U.S. law, at least in some cases, as it allows the IRS and 
taxpayers to analyze two or more interrelated transactions as a whole for 
transfer pricing purposes. As previously dealt with, the administrative sources 
— especially the Treasury Regulations — interpret the IRC’s narrow 
regulations, and they must be followed in practice by the IRS and taxpayers. 
The Treasury Regulations refer to transactions, which are economically 
interrelated. When a business restructuring involves a transfer of a going 
concern, it usually means that several contemporaneous transactions, wherein 
assets/something of value, risks and/or functions are transferred within a 
group, occur. As these assets/something of value, risks and/or functions 
should constitute an integrated and functioning business unit in order to be 
regarded as a going concern, such transactions can be considered 
economically interrelated in the above-mentioned sense.  
 
In addition to the requirement of being to a sufficient extent economically 
interrelated, the evaluation of the transactions on an aggregate basis in a 
business restructuring pursuant to the aforesaid regulations would require 
that the arm's length results in that case could be measured in a relatively 
reliable way as compared to a separate analysis of each transaction in the 
restructuring. In this respect, the combined effect of two or more transactions, 
such as synergies, must be taken into account. A going concern is a complex of 
assets/something of value forming a functioning and integrated business unit, 
which is able to carry out business activities (and assume liabilities related 
thereto) independently, as discussed earlier. Assets and something of value 
belonging to such a unit together constitute additional values, like synergies, 
                                                 
 
277 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(f)(2)(i)(B). 
278 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(f)(2)(i)(C). 
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in addition to their separate valuations.279 If a transfer of a going concern 
would be analyzed and valued on an asset-by-asset/transaction-by-
transaction basis, there might be a risk that such additional values would not 
be reflected in the separate valuations of assets/something of value 
sufficiently. The combined effect of two or more controlled transactions would 
thus not be taken into consideration as required by the aforementioned 
provisions of the Treasury Regulations. The most reliable measure in terms of 
the arm’s length result would therefore be achieved more likely by analyzing 
and valuing the interrelated transactions, wherein the assets/something of 
value belonging to a going concern are transferred, on an aggregate basis. 
 
The Treasury Regulations thus clearly indicate the possibility of analyzing 
several simultaneous transactions occurred in the course of business 
restructurings as a whole under circumstances similar to the OECD’s 
guidance. In practice, this means that if a business restructuring involves 
several contemporaneous transfers of assets and something of value, it should 
be examined whether the transfers are economically so interrelated that an 
aggregate analysis of the transactions provides the most reliable measure of 
the arm's length result in accordance with the best method rule.280 Transfers 
of a going concern are very likely to meet the requirements of the regulations 
in the above-discussed manner, although the wordings of the provisions do 
not expressly require that the assets/something of value transferred 
simultaneously should together constitute a functioning business unit. 
 
It must also be observed that the aggregation of interrelated transactions has 
not been questioned in the U.S. case law nor legal literature. Courts have 
recognized in their rulings the possibility of analyzing interrelated 
transactions on an aggregate basis.281 In addition, in the legal literature, it has 
                                                 
 
279 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68–9.69. 
280 It must be noted that the above-discussed Treasury Regulations are temporary in nature, which 
means that a lack of clarity exists in relation to whether they are factually legally binding; see e.g. 
Lederman – Mazza 2011, pp. 1–2. However, in practice, temporary regulations are followed by tax 
authorities and in general also by taxpayers as of their publication (as it was discussed earlier, temporary 
regulations become effective immediately as of the date of their issuance; in this case, as of 14 September 
2015) and thus have in principle legal effect. In addition, the former final regulations, which were 
amended by the newest temporary regulations, recognized the same possibility of analyzing interrelated 
controlled transactions on an aggregate basis, if that would lead to the most reliable result from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle as required by the best method rule; see former Treas. Reg. § 
1.482-1(f)(2)(i)(A). 
281 Despite not questioning the possibility of the aggregation of transactions in general, courts have more 
often decided that the aggregation has not been possible in the specific case; see e.g. Kraft Foods Co. v. 
Commissioner, 21 T.C. 513 (1954), Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Commissioner, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991), 
Claymont Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2005-254 (2005) and Veritas Software 
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been viewed that the aggregation of several related party transactions may be 
possible, especially when there can be found a business relation between such 
transactions. In particular, when the case concerns several separate 
transactions involving transfers of intangibles, the business perspective, i.e. 
whether intangible assets are interrelated through a business connection, 
becomes important.282 The most noteworthy issue to observe is that the 
possibility of regarding particularly business restructurings as transfers of a 
going concern for transfer pricing purposes has been considered possible also 
in the U.S. legal literature.283  
 
Taking into account the aforementioned observations, business restructurings 
can — and should — be very likely regarded as transfers of a going concern for 
transfer pricing purposes in the USA in the event that the requirements set out 
in the Treasury Regulations are met. Thus, U.S. and Finnish law — as well as 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines — have taken largely similar 
approaches in this respect. Although the Treasury Regulations lacked specific 
provisions in terms of evaluating transactions as a whole especially in the 
business restructuring context, the application of the general regulations 
regarding the aggregation of transactions conform to the above-discussed 
provisions of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Pursuant to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines — which are followed to a great degree in Finland 
in this question — when a business restructuring involves a transfer of a 
functioning business unit, several contemporaneous transfers of interrelated 
assets, risks and functions may be examined and valued as a whole, when it is 
“necessary to achieve the most reliable measure of the arm’s length price for 
the ongoing concern.” Correspondingly, in the USA, the economically 
interrelated transactions may be evaluated on an aggregate basis, when the 
aggregation of transactions provides “the most reliable measure of an arm's 
length result” in accordance with the best method rule.284  
 
Consequently, as was the case in Finland, the existing situation in the USA 
effectively requires compliance with the arm’s length standard also in business 
restructurings, which involve transfers of a functioning business unit (going 
concern). If a business restructuring involves several contemporaneous and 
                                                 
 
Corporation v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 297 (2009). See also Guidant LLC v. Commissioner, 146 T.C. No. 
5 (2016), where the Tax Court confirmed the IRS’s right to analyze contemporaneous transactions on an 
aggregate basis pursuant to the Treasury Regulations. 
282 Wittendorff 2010a, p. 344. It has also been stated that the aggregation of interrelated transactions 
may be topical in situations where transactions involve products falling within a marketed portfolio of 
products or the products have been divided into separate product lines; see Levey – Wrappe – Chung 
2006, p. 19. 
283 Zollo 2011, pp. 769–770. 
284 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68–9.69; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(f)(2)(i)(B). 
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interrelated transactions under which tangible and intangible assets, risks and 
functions are transferred between related parties, it must be considered 
whether business restructurings should be regarded as transfers of a going 
concern for transfer pricing purposes to achieve the best arm’s length result. 
This means that transactions occurred therein should be valued on an 
aggregate basis, if the aggregation of such transactions would lead to the best 
result from the perspective of the arm’s length. In this respect, no similar 
amendments to the existing provisions are required as compared to the 
Russian Tax Code.  
 
The difference between U.S. and Russian law for this question can be 
explained in a similar manner as for Finland with reference to the different 
hierarchy of laws and judicial systems. The administrative sources — 
especially the Treasury Regulations — provide interpretations of the IRC’s 
narrow transfer pricing provision, and they must be followed in practice by the 
IRS and taxpayers in order to achieve the best arm’s length result. As the 
Treasury Regulations require the aggregation of interrelated transactions in 
the aforesaid manner under certain circumstances, business restructurings 
should be correspondingly regarded as transfers of a going concern in such 
circumstances in order to meet the requirements of the arm’s length standard. 
  
In conclusion, the approach taken by Finnish and U.S. law cannot be applied 
in Russia, as no legal support can be found for such a view. Business 
restructurings must always be examined in Russia on a transaction-by-
transaction basis, when it comes to transfer pricing. All the assets and/or 
something of value transferred in the course of a business restructuring need 
to be analyzed and valued separately. This means that group companies must 
identify all transfers of assets and/or something of value that fall within the 
scope of application of the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions, after which 
they must determine an arm’s length compensation for each such transfer. As 
discussed, the general requirements of the arm’s length principle, which 
should be the guiding principle behind the Tax Code’s transfer pricing 
provisions, are not necessarily met in this transfer pricing question if 
unrelated parties would in comparable situations review several interrelated 
transactions on an aggregate basis. Hence, in contrast to the Finnish and U.S. 
transfer pricing rules, the existing Russian transfer pricing rules should be 
amended de lege ferenda to better meet the aims of the arm’s length principle 
in this respect.  
 
Conversely, it must be noted that if a business restructuring involves only 
transfers of certain assets, which do not constitute a functioning business unit, 
a going concern is not transferred in the business restructuring. In that case, 
transfers of assets, such as transfers of tangible and intangible assets, must 
primarily be valued on a transaction-by-transaction basis also in Finland and 
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the USA. Thus, the laws of the target countries conform to each other in such 
situations.  
 
Next, it will be discussed on an asset-by-asset basis, what kinds of assets and 
something of value may fall within the scope of transfer pricing regulations in 
Russia, Finland and the USA separately, when business restructurings do not 
involve a transfer of a functioning business unit, i.e. going concern. In 
particular, it will be explored to what extent certain types of assets may become 
objects of transfer pricing. Tangible assets will be dealt with first briefly, after 
which transfers of intangible assets will be discussed more extensively as being 
a question of great importance in transfer pricing at present. Lastly, it will be 
examined whether transfers of risks or premature 
terminations/renegotiations of agreements may be subject to transfer pricing 
alone in business restructurings. 
 
3.5 TANGIBLE ASSETS 
The question of whether tangible assets may become objects of transfer pricing 
in business restructurings is generally quite unproblematic. A business 
restructuring may involve a transfer of tangible assets from a group company 
to a foreign related company. For instance, business restructurings may result 
in changes in a multinational enterprise’s manufacturing activities. A group 
company may operate as a fully-fledged manufacturer before a business 
restructuring. As previously discussed, this means that the company acquires 
raw materials, manufactures products, takes care of its marketing activities 
and sells the finished products to third parties. When the group company, as a 
result of the business restructuring, starts operating as a toll-manufacturer, it 
focuses only on the manufacturing of products, and a related company, which 
e.g. has been established in connection with the restructuring, now owns raw 
materials and takes care of the marketing and sales activities. In this business 
restructuring example, raw materials and intangible assets used in marketing 
and sales activities are transferred in a related party transaction from one 
group company to another.285 In addition to raw materials, other tangible 
assets, which may be transferred in the course of a business restructuring 
between related parties, are finished products and production machinery used 
in the manufacturing of goods from raw materials. The question with regard 
to transfers of tangible assets in business restructurings has not been regarded 
as a particularly difficult question from the transfer pricing perspective.286  
                                                 
 
285 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.49–9.51. See also e.g. Russo 2007, pp. 184–186. 
286 See e.g. former paragraph 9.75 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. On the other hand, the 
determination of the arm’s length compensation for inventories transferred in a business restructuring 
may be troublesome, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.49–9.54. 
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As business restructuring may involve transfers of tangible assets, the next 
question is, whether they may become objects of transfer pricing as separate 
items pursuant to the Russian, Finnish and U.S. transfer pricing provisions. 
This means that, in order to consider tangible assets as being subject to 
transfer pricing in a business restructuring separately, they must be 
distinguishable from other transferred assets in the restructuring (i.e. 
identifiable from other possible transfers of something of value occurring in a 
business restructuring). Naturally, they must also have value, which would 
usually be compensated in similar transactions conducted between 
independent parties under similar conditions. Finally, tangible assets should 
also be regulated under national tax laws as asset types subject to transfer 
pricing and the arm’s length principle.  
 
Tangible assets, such as raw materials, used in business activities are usually 
easy to distinguish from other possible assets and/or something of value 
transferred in a business restructuring. For example, transfers of machinery 
can be generally separated from transfers of intangibles. In addition, tangible 
assets clearly have value, which would be compensated in similar transactions 
between independent parties, as normally independent parties would 
remunerate transfers of raw materials or finished products. Thus, the question 
of whether tangible assets may become objects of transfer pricing separately 
in business restructurings must be ultimately examined from the national 
transfer pricing provisions. 
 
In Russia, the Tax Code specifically mentions transfers of commodities287 as 
objects of transfer pricing.288 Thus, there is no ambiguity in whether transfers 
of tangible assets fall within the scope of application of Russian transfer 
pricing regulations, if a business restructuring involves transfers of them. The 
arm’s length principle is hence followed in this regard, and no such 
interpretive problems arise as from transfers of a going concern. 
 
On the contrary, the legislated Finnish transfer pricing provisions do not 
mention whether tangible assets fall within the scope of application of the 
transfer pricing rules. However, they also do not restrict the scope of 
application of the transfer pricing rules to specific types of transactions 
conducted between related parties, and thus no special conditions on the 
nature of controlled transactions has been regulated.289 As discussed earlier, 
                                                 
 
287 Russian term used in the legislation, tovary, can also be understood as goods or products. In general, 
it means a physical property. The Tax Code refers to it as any kind of property, which is sold/transferred 
or to be sold/transferred, see Article 38 of the Tax Code.   
288 Article 105.14 of the Tax Code. 
289 § 31 of the AAP. 
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the transfer pricing regulations of the AAP are widely based on the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and the preliminary works contain several 
references to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.290 In addition to the 
preliminary works, the Finnish Tax Administration and the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Finland have stated that § 31 of the AAP must be 
interpreted in accordance with the principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines.291 Pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, transfers of 
tangible assets are subject to transfer pricing, when such transfers occur in 
business restructurings.292 Furthermore, the preliminary works of the AAP 
have expressly stated that related party transactions may generally concern, 
among other things, the sale and purchase of goods between controlled 
parties.293 Moreover, in the Finnish legal literature it has been considered self-
evident that transfers of tangible assets are subject to transfer pricing.294 It is 
thus justified to state that tangible assets fall within the scope of application of 
the Finnish transfer pricing rules, if they are transferred between related 
parties in a business restructuring. 
 
Similarly, the legislated U.S. transfer pricing provision, Section 482 of the IRC, 
does not directly regulate transfers of tangible assets. As was the case in 
Finland, Section 482 does not limit the application of transfer pricing rules 
only to certain types of controlled transactions.295 The Treasury Regulations 
provide more information in terms of transfer pricing of tangible assets. The 
regulations comprise provisions on the transfer pricing methods applicable to 
transfers of tangible property in controlled transactions.296 As the Treasury 
Regulations have these kinds of particular provisions targeted at transfer 
pricing of tangible assets, this is a clear indication that transfers of tangible 
assets fall generally within the scope of the U.S. transfer pricing provisions. 
This has been considered unproblematic in the legal literature297 as well as in 
                                                 
 
290 HE 107/2006 vp, pp. 3, 10–11, 14–18. 
291 See Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 4; KHO 2013:36. 
292 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.49–9.54. 
293 HE 107/2006 vp, pp. 15 and 20. 
294 Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 141. 
295 Although it specifically mentions transfers of intangible assets as transaction types falling in the scope 
of application. This will be discussed in more detail in the following section.  
296 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3, which deal with methods in relation to determining taxable income in 
connection with a transfer of tangible property and which is specifically applied to controlled transfers 
of tangible property. 
297 See e.g. King 2004, p. 3; Madrian – Weise 2014, pp. 765–766. 
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case law298, which is why the transfer pricing rules should be generally applied 
to controlled transfers of tangible assets.299  
 
However, the IRC also contains specific provisions on the so-called non-
recognition rules for outbound transactions, under which particular assets 
may be transferred free of tax from a U.S. company to a foreign company under 
certain exceptional circumstances. If transfers of specific assets could qualify 
for such a non-tax treatment, they may correspondingly not be subject to 
transfer pricing either. Under a general rule, domestic transfers of assets may 
be tax-free, if such transfers are conducted in connection with an exchange for 
stock or securities of a company in situations where the company is 
incorporated, liquidated or reorganized.300 This non-recognition rule is not 
primarily applicable to cross-border, outbound transactions: if a U.S. 
company transfers assets to a foreign company in connection with such 
exchanges, a gain must be recognized in such assets.301 Nonetheless, there is 
also an exception, which allows the application of the non-recognition rule to 
outbound transfers of assets: if certain assets are transferred from a U.S. 
company to a foreign corporation “for use by such foreign corporation in the 
active conduct of a trade or business outside of the United States,” such 
outbound transfers of assets may qualify for the tax-free treatment similar to 
domestic transactions. Pursuant to the Treasury Regulations, this exception 
may be applied, inter alia, to transfers of tangible property.302  
 
Nevertheless, not all the tangible assets are eligible for this exception. For 
instance, inventories as well as depreciated tangible properties, which have 
been used in the USA, are not entitled to the tax-free treatment.303 As business 
restructurings usually involve cross-border transfers of inventories, as well as 
depreciable machinery and other tangible property, it is unlikely that these 
provisions could be applied widely to cross-border business restructurings. In 
addition, the discussed exceptions are applicable only to transactions 
involving exchanges in the event of reorganization, liquidation or 
incorporation, and therefore they can be poorly applied to actual business 
restructurings. Besides, as discussed earlier, the concept of business 
                                                 
 
298 See e.g. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). 
299 Transfers of tangible assets from the transfer pricing perspective have not been discussed in the legal 
literature that broadly, apart from the methods with regard to determining the arm’s length 
compensation for such transfers in accordance with the aforementioned Treasury Regulations, which 
will be dealt with in Chapter 4 of this study. 
300 See e.g. Section 351 and 361 of the IRC. Reorganizations may mean, for instance, mergers; see Section 
368 of the IRC.  
301 Section 367(a)(1). 
302 Section 367(a)(3) of the IRC; Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)–2(a)-(b). 
303 Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)–2(c). See also Sections 4.61.11.1–4.61.11.3 of the Internal Revenue Manual. 
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restructuring in this research is separated from the so-called reorganizations, 
such as mergers, divisions and exchanges of shares. Hence, such non-
recognition rules may not be ultimately applied to transfers of tangible 
property in business restructurings in this study’s scope, and interpretive 
problems are respectively avoided.  
 
The starting point is therefore that, if cross-border business restructurings 
involve transfers of tangible assets, they will fall within the scope of application 
of the U.S. transfer pricing rules. Consequently, Russian, Finnish and U.S. law 
have approached the question similarly and do not deviate from each other in 
this regard. The arm’s length principle is thus followed by the target countries 
in terms of controlled transfers of tangible property in the business 
restructuring context. 
 
3.6 INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
3.6.1 GENERAL REMARKS 
In addition to transfers of tangible property, a business restructuring may 
often involve transfers of intangible assets. For instance, a previously fully-
fledged manufacturer may transfer intangible assets used in its former 
marketing and sales activities, such as trademarks, to a foreign associated 
company, when it starts operating as a toll-manufacturer after the business 
restructuring. It is also possible that a business restructuring aims at 
centralizing all the intellectual properties and R & D activities of a 
multinational group of companies in one group company, as discussed earlier. 
This IP company will own all the current intellectual property rights and 
intangibles of the group, as well as any future intellectual property rights and 
intangibles arising out of the R & D activities. Such a business restructuring 
thus involves transfers of the present intangible assets of the group companies 
to one specific group company operating as an IP company.304  
 
The question of whether, and to what extent, transfers of intangible assets in 
business restructurings shall be subject to transfer pricing regulation is 
complex. First of all, the concept of intangible asset or property has a broad 
meaning as it may cover several types of assets. For instance, the concept may 
refer to the so-called intellectual property rights, like trademarks and patents, 
but it may also refer to more ambiguous terms, such as goodwill and going 
concern value. Furthermore, the concept may be understood in various ways 
in different countries, which may lead to some assets not be considered as 
intangibles falling within the scope of application of the national transfer 
                                                 
 
304 Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 57. 
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pricing provisions in some countries. In other countries, the same assets may 
be regarded as intangible properties, to which transfer pricing rules should be 
applied.     
 
Second, some intangible assets lack the ability of being distinguished from 
other (intangible) assets, and therefore it is unclear whether they can be 
transferred in a business restructuring separately at all, if the restructuring 
does not involve a transfer of a functioning business unit, a going concern. This 
can be the case, for example, when the potential transfer of goodwill during 
the business restructuring is explored.305 
 
The OECD has recently paid increasing attention to related party transactions 
involving transfers of intangible assets in general. Chapter VI of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which deals with the transfer pricing aspects of 
intangibles, was in the past often criticized and considered outdated, as the 
guidelines failed to mention, for a long time, goodwill and going concern value 
as intangible assets subject to transfer pricing, for instance.306 Now, Chapter 
VI has undergone several amendments as a result of the BEPS Project, and the 
concept of intangible asset has been extended to meet the today’s needs in the 
transfer pricing context.307 These changes, especially the updated concept of 
intangible asset, will be discussed more closely later on.  
 
As discussed, Finnish law follows the OECD’s transfer pricing guidance to a 
great extent and has not restricted the application of transfer pricing 
provisions to certain types of transactions; pursuant to the preliminary works 
and the Finnish Tax Administration’s guidance, intangible assets fall generally 
within the scope of national transfer pricing provisions.308 Likewise, the U.S. 
transfer pricing provisions are applicable to controlled transfers of intangible 
property as the only legislated transfer pricing provision, Section 482 of the 
IRC, expressly mentions transfers of intangibles as a transaction type subject 
to transfer pricing, and the Treasury Regulations contain extensive provisions 
as regards transfer pricing of intangibles.309 Although intangible assets fall 
                                                 
 
305 Cordova – Mitra – Newman – Reams – Shanda – Shapiro 2012, p. 47. Transfers of goodwill will be 
discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.5. 
306 See more about the criticism in Silberztein 2011, pp. 1–6. 
307 See more about the project in the OECD Scope of the OECD Intangibles Project, OECD Revised 
Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles and OECD Action Plan on BEPS. The newest 
OECD guidance in relation to the transfer pricing of intangibles was introduced in 2015 in the OECD 
BEPS Actions 8–10. 
308 See HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. See also Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 
24 and 37. Similar views have also been presented in the legal literature; see e.g. Laaksonen 2014a, pp. 
163–181, Linnanvirta – Rapo 2012, pp. 272–279. 
309 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b). 
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generally within the scope of the Finnish and the U.S. transfer pricing rules, 
the concept of intangible property in transfer pricing is not entirely clear and 
straightforward. Consequently, the question of to what extent intangibles fall 
within the scope of the transfer pricing rules (especially in business 
restructurings) is thus at least to some extent ambiguous and may cause 
interpretive problems. This question will be dealt with in more detail in this 
chapter.  
 
The question of whether transfers of intangibles are objects of transfer pricing 
is considerably more problematic in Russia. According to the Tax Code, 
transfer pricing regulations are applied only to related party transactions 
where commodities, services and/or work are transferred from one related 
party to another. As the interpretation of Russian law is based on legislated 
legal norms in essence in the earlier mentioned manner, it is very difficult to 
validate an argument according to which transfers of intangible assets would 
in general fall within the scope of the Russian transfer pricing regulations.  
 
On the other hand, when the Tax Code’s new transfer pricing rules were 
introduced, the Minfin published written clarifications as to the interpretation 
and application thereof in practice. According to the written clarifications, 
transfers of intellectual properties are subject to transfer pricing 
regulations.310 As mentioned above, the Minfin’s clarifications are not legally 
binding but rather informative and clarifying by nature. Taxpayers and tax 
authorities are not obliged to obey the written clarifications.311 Furthermore, 
it is worth to mention that the former transfer pricing rules and the practice 
related to their application did not authorize the authorities to intervene in the 
pricing of transfers of intangibles, as the scope of transfer pricing provisions 
was deemed to concern only transactions involving transfers of work, 
commodities and services312 — as also regulated in the newest provisions of 
the Tax Code.  
 
                                                 
 
310 Raz"yasneniya Ministerstva Finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii po voprosam primeneniya razdela V.I 
Nalogovogo kodeksa Rossijskoj Federatsii. The current written clarifications can be found at 
http://www.nalog.ru/rn77/taxation/transfer_pricing/minfin_v1/.  
311 Article 34.2 of the Tax Code. See also the Minfin’s letter Pis'mo ot 7 avgusta 2007 g. N 03-02-07/2-
138 Raz"yasneniya polozhenij nalogovogo zakonodatel'stva v chasti stat'i 34.2 Nalogovogo kodeksa RF 
and the Supreme Commercial Court’s decision Postanovlenie Prezidiuma VАS RF ot 16.01.2007 N 
12547/06 "Ob ostavlenii bez izmeneniya opredeleniya VАS RF ot 24.08.2006 N 8519/06, kotorym bylo 
prekrashheno proizvodstvo po delu o priznanii nedejstvuyushhimi pisem Minfina RF ot 05.08.2004 N 
01-02-01/03-1625, ot 22.03.2006 N MM-6-21/304@." 
312 See e.g. Postanovlenie FАS Volgo-Vyatskogo okruga N А79-806/2005 ot 19.09.2005. See also Wright 
T. 2007a, p. 90. 
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Nevertheless, the written clarifications can be very useful in practice as they 
usually provide interpretive help in relation to the Tax Code’s sometimes very 
complicated regulations. Usually, it is reasonable for taxpayers to comply with 
the written clarifications, as it is not easy to forecast when the authorities are 
willing to follow the clarifications and vice versa. From this perspective, it 
would be rational to interpret the Russian transfer pricing rules in a way, 
which would result in that at least transfers of intellectual property rights 
would be subject to transfer pricing in business restructurings. This approach 
has been supported by several commentaries of Chapter V.1 of the Tax Code.313 
In addition, tax practitioners are of the opinion that the newest transfer pricing 
regulations should be applied to transfers of intellectual property rights.314  
 
Finally, the FTS has also shared the Minfin’s interpretation in its letter dated 
6 March 2014,315 and therefore it is now beyond dispute that the FTS itself 
interprets the transfer pricing provisions so that controlled transfers of 
intellectual properties fall within the scope of the Russian transfer pricing 
regulations. Hence, it is also reasonable for taxpayers to follow the aforesaid 
Minfin’s and the FTS’s guidance in this regard (i.e. to treat transfers of 
intellectual properties as objects of transfer pricing) to avoid potential 
disputes with the tax authorities. This view can also be justified when taking 
into account the above-discussed considerations and that no conflicting 
interpretations have been published on the question by Russian courts or 
other relevant sources. This interpretation can be, in the end, also validated by 
referring to the arm’s length principle: It is self-evident that independent 
parties would compensate the sale and purchase of intellectual properties, 
such as patents and trademarks. When controlled transfers of intellectual 
property fall in the above-mentioned manner, also within the scope of the Tax 
Code’s transfer pricing provisions, related parties are put commercially in the 
same position as independent parties. 
 
Yet, it is problematic that such an essential question as the applicability of the 
transfer pricing rules to transfers of certain intangibles has been disregarded 
in the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions entirely and is subject to 
                                                 
 
313 See e.g. Vasutin – Kosheleva 2012, p. 1; Kaftannikov 2011, pp. 15–16. It should be noted that some 
commentaries have not even regarded the narrow wording of the scope of application of transfer pricing 
rules troublesome, and controlled transfers of intangible assets have been deemed to be targets of 
transfer pricing in general (not limited to transfers of intellectual properties), see e.g. Hellevig – Usov – 
Kabakov 2014, p. 215. This approach is nonetheless troublesome due to the lack of support from the 
legislated provisions as well as the Minfin’s and the FTS’s written clarifications and letters. 
314 Expert Interview 2012. 
315 Pis'mo Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby ot 6 marta 2014 g. N ZN-3-13/878@ O primenenii polozhenij 
razdela V.I NK RF. The FTS mentions as examples of properties subject to transfer pricing patents, 
trademarks, licenses and copyrights.   
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interpretation. As the interpretation of Russian law should primarily be based 
on legal norms, such a relevant issue as the transfer pricing of intellectual 
properties should be in the first place dealt with in the Tax Code’s provisions. 
Furthermore, regardless of the fact that Article 32 of the Tax Code gives the 
tax authorities the right to publish written information on tax legislation and 
rights and liabilities arising thereof, the legal status of such written 
information corresponds to the legal status of the Minfin’s written 
clarifications. The FTS’s letters are thus not legally binding in nature, although 
they may provide useful interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the tax 
legislation. Importantly, since the FTS’s letters are not considered legal norms, 
they do not amend or revoke existing tax provisions.316 This means that the 
Minfin’s and the FTS’s prevailing interpretation (i.e. intellectual properties are 
considered objects of transfer pricing) must be ultimately incorporated into 
the Tax Code. 
 
Why the Minfin and the FTS have only dealt with the applicability of the 
transfer pricing rules to controlled transfers of intellectual properties and not 
to intangible assets in general may also be criticized. In light of the current 
Tax Code’s provisions, no reasons are evident why the authorities have come 
to the conclusion that controlled transfers of intellectual properties fall within 
the scope of the Tax Code’s transfer pricing rules, while the applicability of the 
rules to transfers of intangibles generally remain unconsidered and 
undiscussed. As the newest transfer pricing rules are widely based on the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, it is unclear why the Minfin and the FTS 
have taken such an approach, where they only partly follow the guidelines 
(instead following entirely or not following at all). As a result, a certain degree 
of ambiguity exists regarding whether intangibles other than intellectual 
properties may be subject to transfer pricing in Russia. As the Minfin and the 
FTS have only discussed transfers of intellectual properties, and when also 
taking into consideration the above-mentioned other considerations, transfers 
of other intangibles than intellectual property seem to fall outside the scope of 
the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions. This, in turn, creates problems from 
the perspective of the arm’s length principle, as other intangibles may also 
have commercial value that would be compensated in transactions between 
independent parties. Consequently, related and independent parties could be 
treated differently, which is contrary to the whole purpose of the arm’s length 
principle. 
 
Overall, from a business restructuring perspective, the above stated 
interpretation — which should be taken as the starting point in this study — 
                                                 
 
316 The Minfin’s letter Pis'mo Minfina RF ot 1 dekabrya 2009 g. N 03-05-05-05/11 and order Prikaz 
Minfina Rossii ot 15.06.2012 N 82n (red. ot 29.11.2013) "Ob utverzhdenii Reglamenta Ministerstva 
finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii." 
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means that at least transfers of intellectual properties occurring in the course 
of a business restructuring fall within the scope of application of the Russian 
transfer pricing rules. This requires that such transfers can also be separated 
from other possible transfers in the restructuring and that these kinds of 
transfers would be compensated in transactions performed between 
independent parties. Conversely, the current situation regarding whether 
transfers of other intangible assets may become objects of transfer pricing in 
the business restructuring context in Russia is unclear. As it is very common 
in business restructurings that also other types of intangible assets — not only 
intellectual property rights — are transferred between group companies, the 
current legal situation is very troublesome. 
 
Subsequently, the question of to what extent intangible assets may fall within 
the scope of application of the transfer pricing rules in Russia, Finland and the 
USA as separate asset transfers will be dealt with in more detail. Before 
discussing transfers of intangibles on an asset-by-asset basis, it is useful to 
examine briefly how the ownership of intangible assets is determined pursuant 
to the national laws of the target countries.  
 
3.6.2 OWNERSHIP OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
It is important to understand which related party owns the transferred 
intangible asset in a controlled transaction and is ultimately entitled to an 
arm’s length compensation. It is rarely difficult to determine the owner of a 
tangible property due to the physical nature of the property. For intangible 
assets, the situation is quite the contrary. The ownership of an intangible 
property cannot be identified in such a straightforward way, thus it may also 
be difficult to identify possible transfers of intangibles in a related party 
transaction. Hence, it is no wonder that in the transfer pricing practice, three 
different forms of owning intangible assets have been developed, which are 
used in the determination of ownership of intangibles in controlled 
transactions for transfer pricing purposes. 
 
The question of how to determine the ownership of an intangible property can 
be first examined strictly from the legal perspective. The legal owner of an 
intangible asset is the company, which has been defined as the owner of the 
intangible asset pursuant to the national legislation. Usually, the legal owner 
is the company to which the asset, for example a trademark, is registered. The 
economic owner, on the other hand, is the company that has invested the most 
in the creation of an intangible property and carried the most risks involved in 
its development.317 The third form of ownership relates to the exploitation of 
                                                 
 
317 Markham 2005, p. 45. 
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an intangible property and the general benefits arising from it. In that case, 
the owner is called the beneficial owner of an intangible asset, which is usually 
the company that receives the most benefits attributable to the intangible 
asset. It may be the same company, which is regarded as the legal owner, or it 
can be another company that is able to benefit from the property, for example, 
through a license agreement.318 
 
Because the intangible assets have not been subject to transfer pricing in the 
past in Russia, the questions in relation to the ownership or the identification 
of intangible assets in the transfer pricing context have not been particularly 
topical in the legal literature.319 For the purposes of identifying the owner of 
an intangible asset, the approach based on the legal ownership seems to be the 
most appropriate in Russian transfer pricing. This is due to the fact that the 
right to achieve legal protection for intellectual properties is quite extensively 
regulated in the legislation in Chapter IV of the Russian Civil Code. 
Furthermore, the legal protection for most of the intellectual properties may 
be usually achieved in Russia only by registering the assets in the national 
register. For example, trademarks and patents, as well as many other 
intellectual property rights, should primarily be registered in the state-owned 
register in order to gain legal protection.320 The register is maintained by the 
Federal Service for Intellectual Property ROSPATENT (hereinafter the 
“Rospatent”).321   
 
This view is justified from the perspective of the dominant position of written 
legislated provisions in the hierarchy of the sources of Russian law. As legal 
questions are generally approached by interpreting and applying legislated 
provisions, legal facts cannot usually be ignored by referring to special 
conditions of a certain case, if such conditions have not been regulated in the 
legislation. For instance, it is very unlikely to have legal grounds for 
considering a company as the actual owner of an intangible asset on the basis 
of that the company has invested in the development process of the asset or 
that the company receives benefits attributable to the intangible asset, if 
another company has been registered as the legal owner of the intangible 
property in the Rospatent’s registers pursuant to the legislated provisions. 
Hence, in business restructurings, the starting point should be the 
examination of whether the restructured entity is the (registered) legal owner 
                                                 
 
318 Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, pp. 163–165. 
319 The problems related to identifying the owners of such assets have been recognized in some Russian 
publications, but concrete proposals for solving the problems have not been presented, see e.g. Azgaldov 
– Karpova 2006, p. 31. 
320 Articles 1393 and 1503 of the Russian Civil Code. See also Article 1232 of the Civil Code, which is the 
general article regulating the registration of intellectual property rights under Russian law. 
321 Orlov 2010, pp. 295 and 299. 
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of certain intellectual properties, which could be used in its restructured 
business activities, and whether it has transferred some of the assets as a result 
of the restructuring to another group company. For this purpose, it may be 
useful to review, whether any kinds of intangibles have been registered in the 
Rospatent’s registers in the name of the company in question. 
 
Also in Finland, the basis for determining the ownership of intangibles is, at 
least in some cases, regulated in the legislation. Intellectual property rights — 
such as trademarks, patents and utility models — have their own acts under 
which the legal protection and the exclusive rights for such properties are 
regulated. As a general rule, intellectual property rights must often be 
registered in the national registers in order to receive exclusive rights and gain 
legal protection.322 In this regard, Finnish law is in line with Russian law. 
 
However, the concept of intangible asset or property also covers other kinds of 
assets than intellectual property. Such assets (and their protection) may not 
always be legislated under particular acts, and therefore the legal ownership 
thereof may not be determined on the basis of legislated provisions. In such 
situations, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines become relevant. The OECD 
has dealt with the transfer pricing aspects of intangible assets, which are by 
nature hard to identify or separate from other (intangible) assets. More 
importantly, in 2015, as a result of the BEPS Project, it published new guidance 
in relation to the identification of ownership of intangibles for transfer pricing 
purposes. Pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
 
“The legal owner will be considered to be the owner of the intangible for 
transfer pricing purposes. If no legal owner of the intangible is identified 
under applicable law or governing contracts, then the member of the 
MNE group that, based on the facts and circumstances, controls 
decisions concerning the exploitation of the intangible and has the 
practical capacity to restrict others from using the intangible will be 
considered the legal owner of the intangible for transfer pricing 
purposes.”323 
 
It seems that the OECD proposes that the determination of the ownership of 
intangibles in cases, where the ownership is not legislated and/or agreed in a 
contract, will be conducted on the basis of the utilization right and general 
control over the intangible asset in question. On the other hand, the guidelines 
                                                 
 
322 See e.g. Chapter 2 of the Finnish Trademarks Act (Tavaramerkkilaki, 7/1964), § 20 of the Finnish 
Patents Act (Patenttilaki, 550/1967) and § 17 of the Finnish Act on Utility Model Rights (Laki 
hyödyllisyysmallioikeudesta, 800/1991). This has been noted also in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines; see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.37. 
323 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.40. 
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also mention the importance of analyzing all the circumstances of a given case. 
According to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, “legal ownership and 
contractual relationships serve simply as reference points for identifying and 
analysing controlled transactions relating to the intangible and for 
determining the appropriate remuneration to members of a controlled group 
with respect to those transactions. Identification of legal ownership, combined 
with the identification and compensation of relevant functions performed, 
assets used, and risks assumed by all contributing members, provides the 
analytical framework for identifying arm’s length prices and other conditions 
for transactions involving intangibles.”324 Thus, the determination of a legal 
owner of intangible assets does not indicate that the legal owner is alone or at 
all entitled to an arm’s length compensation.325 
 
The discussed OECD’s provisions suggest that the ownership of intangible 
assets may be defined on the basis of the legal ownership, i.e. on the basis of 
legislated provision and/or agreements, as a starting point. As the legal 
ownership cannot always be clearly identified due to the lack of legal 
provisions/agreements or the legal ownership does not always bring the best 
result from the transfer pricing perspective, other conditions must be taken 
into account. In that case, it must be examined, which party has the actual 
control over the intangible asset, the exploitation rights arising from the 
intangible asset as well as what functions have been performed and risks 
assumed by the related parties in a transaction involving the intangible asset. 
Consequently, this means that the identification of the economic or beneficial 
owners of intangible assets may be required in some cases for transfer pricing 
purposes, although such concepts have not been expressly used in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
 
As Finland generally follows the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the new 
provisions regulating intangible ownerships are likely to be followed in 
Finland too. This approach is not in conflict with the current legal state in 
Finland. As it was earlier mentioned, the intellectual property rights are to a 
large extent regulated in the Finnish legislation, and therefore the ownership 
of an intellectual property can primarily be identified pursuant to the 
legislated provisions for transfer pricing purposes. In addition, all the three 
forms of intangible ownerships have been recognized in the Finnish legal 
literature, and especially the importance of understanding the economic 
owner of an intangible asset in the transfer pricing context has been 
highlighted.326 Thus, in accordance with the OECD Transfer Pricing 
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Guidelines, the starting point for the determination of ownership of an 
intangible asset should be as follows: at first, the legal ownership should be 
identified, but attention must be paid also to other circumstances of the case 
in question, such as commercial exploitation, control and functions 
performed/risks assumed in the given transaction. If the legal ownership 
cannot be determined or would not bring the best result in terms of the arm’s 
length principle, more weight should be given to the other factors.  
 
The Finnish approach therefore deviates from the Russian approach in this 
respect, as the sources of Russian law do not currently support a view 
according to which other forms of intangible ownerships than the legal 
ownership could be considered possible for transfer pricing purposes. On the 
other hand, when a related party transaction involves transfers of intellectual 
properties, it is likely that the legal ownership is the determining factor also in 
Finland.  
 
As opposed to Finnish and Russian law, the ownership of intangible assets has 
been regulated in the U.S. Treasury Regulations specifically for transfer 
pricing purposes. As was the case in Russia and Finland, the starting point is 
to identify the legal owner of an intangible property; the legal owner of the 
intangible property identified in accordance with applicable intellectual 
property laws, contractual terms or other legal provisions will primarily be 
deemed as the sole owner of the intangible property for the purposes of 
transfer pricing.327 
 
However, the Treasury Regulations also contain exceptions by which this 
assumption may be disregarded. First, if the legal ownership is “inconsistent 
with the economic substance of the underlying transactions,” the legal 
ownership of intangibles may be ignored.328 As such, the contractual terms of 
the transactions in question must be identified and reviewed. In general, when 
the economic substance of a written agreement is under examination, in 
addition to the respective legal rights of the parties, the actual conduct of the 
parties is of great importance. If the contractual terms are inconsistent with 
the economic substance of the transactions, such terms may be disregarded 
and other terms, which are in line with the economic substance of the 
transactions, may be imputed.329 
 
Moreover, in case the legal owner of an intangible asset cannot be identified 
on the basis of intellectual property laws or contractual terms, the related party 
“who has control of the intangible property, based on all the facts and 
                                                 
 
327 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3)(i)(A). 
328 Ibid. 
329 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B). 
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circumstances, will be considered the sole owner of the intangible property” 
for the transfer pricing purposes.330 For instance, where a subsidiary of a 
foreign parent company has developed a list of customers, and neither the 
terms and conditions of the agreement between the subsidiary and the parent 
company, nor the relevant intellectual property law regulate which party can 
be regarded as the owner of the customer list, the subsidiary shall be 
considered the sole owner of the customer list due to the fact that it knows the 
content of the list and has practical control over its use.331 
 
The U.S. provisions dealing with the ownership of intangibles in the transfer 
pricing context seem to have taken a largely similar approach as the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Finnish law. First, it must be examined 
whether the legal owner of intangibles can be identified in a controlled 
transaction. When the identification of the legal owner is possible, the legal 
owner shall be, as a general rule, considered the sole owner of the intangible 
asset. On the other hand, if there are no applicable acts or agreements, under 
which the owner of an intangible asset could be identified, other factors and 
circumstances — in U.S. law, the practical control — will be taken into account 
in the determination of the ownership.  
 
Nonetheless, it must be observed that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
require taxpayers to also identify other factors, in the above-mentioned 
manner, which may affect transfer pricing of transaction — such as functions 
performed and risks assumed by the related parties — even in situations where 
the legal owner of an intangible asset may be identified. Thus, such economic 
factors may result in the legal ownership being ignored, and the economic 
owner that assumes all the risk may be entitled to the arm’s length 
compensation partially or even entirely. On the contrary, the possibility to 
regard economic owners as the sole owners of intangibles for transfer pricing 
purposes under the Treasury Regulations is restricted to situations where the 
legal ownership is inconsistent with the economic substance of the transaction 
involving transfers of intangible assets. Furthermore, other circumstances can 
be taken into account primarily when the legal owner of an intangible asset 
cannot be identified on the basis of intellectual property laws or contractual 
terms. Thus, in contrast to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the 
Treasury Regulations do not contain a similar extensive authorization to 
consider other factors in order to possibly disregard the legal ownership of 
intangibles.332  
                                                 
 
330 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3)(i)(A). 
331 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(f)(3)(ii) Example 1 and Example 2. 
332 It must be noted that the functional analysis and the comparability analysis, however, require that 
other specific circumstances must also be taken into account when analyzing transfer pricing aspects of 
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It is useful to note that pursuant to the former Treasury Regulations, the 
economic ownership was the determining factor when the ownership of 
intangibles was identified for transfer pricing purposes. Due to a great change 
in this respect, the newest provisions that regulate the legal ownership as the 
overriding approach have been criticized. In particular, it has been considered 
ambiguous in the legal literature, how the transfer pricing rules should be 
applied in situations where the legal owner of an intangible property and the 
economic developer are not the same legal person.333 Nevertheless, it is still 
possible under present regulations to regard taxpayers as economic owners of 
intangibles for transfer pricing purposes in the aforementioned manner, and 
therefore the U.S approach is ultimately more similar to the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines (and Finnish law) than Russian law, where the ownership 
of intangible assets for transfer pricing purposes may be basically identified 
solely on the basis of the legal ownership. 
 
3.6.3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Some intangible assets are, to a large extent, universally protected, and 
therefore they may achieve legal protection under both national legislation and 
international treaties. These kinds of intangibles are called intellectual 
property rights, which are traditionally divided into: (i) copyrights and other 
rights related to copyrights; and (ii) industrial property. The former includes 
written and artistic creations, such as novels and paintings, while the latter 
refers to, among other things, patents, trademarks, utility models, designs and 
layout designs (topographies) of integrated circuits.334 It is common that 
intellectual property rights are transferred in the course of business 
restructurings from one related party to another group company.335 Especially 
transfers of industrial property, such as assets used in the manufacturing or 
                                                 
 
controlled transactions of intangibles and determining the arm’s length compensations for the such 
transactions in the USA, see Sections 3.3 and 4.2 of this study.   
333 The former regulations started from the assumption that the owner of intangible assets was the party, 
which has borne the majority of the costs in relation to the development of such intangibles, and thus 
the economic ownership had to be considered primarily for transfer pricing purposes; see e.g. Markham 
2005, p. 49. See also decisions DHL Corp. v. Commissioner, 285 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) and 
GlaxoSmithKline Holdings (Americas) Inc. v. Commissioner, Tax Court Docket Nos. 5750-04 and 6959-
05 (2006), where the economic ownership of the so-called marketing intangible assets was discussed 
and accepted for transfer pricing purposes. See more about the cases in Wittendorff 2010a, p. 639 and 
Levey – Eisen 2009, pp. 557–558. 
334 Haarmann 2014, pp. 3–5; Haarmann – Mansala 2012, pp. 15–17.  
335 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.55. 
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marketing activities (e.g. patents and trademarks) of a restructured entity, 
may become relevant in business restructurings.336 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have provided examples with regard to 
business restructurings, which involve transfers of intellectual property rights. 
A multinational enterprise may have justified business reasons to centralize 
all of the group’s intangibles in one IP company. Before the contemplated 
restructuring, local manufacturing companies may own all the patents used in 
their manufacturing activities in their jurisdictions. In order to centralize the 
management of such patents owned by local companies, the patents need to 
be transferred to the IP company. As a result of the business restructuring, the 
IP company will own and take care of the management of the patents in future, 
while the local manufacturing companies may continue using the patents in 
their manufacturing activities through contractual arrangements, such as 
licensing agreements. Alternatively, a business restructuring may be aimed at 
transferring trademarks, which were initially owned by local companies, to a 
central location.337  
 
As intellectual property rights may be in the aforesaid manner transferred 
from one related party to another in cross-border business restructurings, it 
must be examined whether such transfers may fall within the scope of 
application of the national transfer pricing rules in Russia, Finland and the 
USA. It was previously discussed that the existing Russian transfer pricing 
provisions should be interpreted so that at least controlled transfers of 
intellectual properties should be considered objects of transfer pricing, as set 
out in the Minfin’s and FTS’s guidance. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
legislated Russian transfer pricing provisions do not contain any mention of 
intangible assets or intellectual properties. Furthermore, the Russian Tax 
Code does not even hold a general definition of intangible assets or intellectual 
property in its other chapters, which could be used in determining the concept 
of intellectual property for taxation and especially for transfer pricing 
purposes. Only Article 258 of the Tax Code, which regulates the rules of 
determining the value of amortizable property, contains a list of intangible 
assets, which are in the scope of the said article for its purposes, but it does not 
provide help in determining what intangible assets are recognized as 
intellectual property rights pursuant to Russian tax law.338  
 
                                                 
 
336 Such assets are often transferred also in business transfers conducted between independent parties; 
see e.g. Mehtonen 2001a, p. 185. 
337 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.57–9.58. 
338 The list mentions, inter alia, patent holders’ exclusive rights to inventions, industrial designs and 
utility models; authors’ exclusive rights to computer software and databases; and exclusive rights to 
trademarks, service marks and company names. 
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Consequently, the general rules regulating the intellectual property rights in 
Russia must be examined. The intellectual properties safeguarded by Russian 
law are regulated in Chapter 7 of the Russian Civil Code. According to Article 
1225 of the Civil Code, inter alia, works of science, literature and art, computer 
programs/software, databases, inventions, utility models, industrial designs, 
topologies of internal microcircuits, brands, company names, trademarks, 
service marks and commercial signs are intellectual properties protected by 
law. Moreover, pursuant to the Civil Code, a patent can be applied for 
inventions, utility models and industrial designs.339  
 
The list is considered exhaustive, and intangible properties that have not been 
listed in the said article cannot be regarded as intellectual properties under 
Russian law.340 It must be noted that Russia is also a signatory to international 
treaties regarding the protection of intellectual property rights, such as the 
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO 
Agreement) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).341 The international treaties are binding 
upon Russia, and they have priority over Russian national legislation.342 
Nonetheless, it should be observed that the legal protection of intellectual 
property rights in Russia is extensive and comparable to Western countries. 
Intellectual property rights that are commonly transferred in business 
restructurings — for example, trademarks, copyrights and patents — are also 
recognized and protected as intellectual property rights pursuant to Russian 
law. More importantly, the FTS mentions in the aforementioned letter as 
examples of intellectual properties, which it regards as objects of transfer 
pricing, patents, trademarks, licenses and copyrights.343 Therefore, the FTS’s 
understanding of the concept of intellectual properties for transfer pricing 
purposes is in line with the Civil Code’s provisions.  
 
As stated above, when examining whether certain assets should be considered 
objects of transfer pricing in a business restructuring, it should also be 
reviewed whether transfers of such assets can be identified and separated from 
other potential transfers of assets/something of value conducted in the course 
of a business restructuring.344 Transfers of intellectual property rights can be 
usually identified and separated from other asset transfers as, for instance, 
                                                 
 
339 Article 1345 of the Civil Code. 
340 Borisov 2014, p. 845. 
341 See more in e.g. Moskalev 2009, pp. 34–37. 
342 Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation; Article 7 of the Civil Code. 
343 Pis'mo Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby ot 6 marta 2014 g. N ZN-3-13/878@ O primenenii polozhenij 
razdela V.I NK RF. 
344 This is the case in Russia. Under Finnish and U.S. rules, such assets may also be transferred as a part 
of a functioning business unit, as dealt with earlier.   
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many of the intellectual properties must be registered to achieve legal 
protection in Russia.345 It is relatively easy to obtain information on possible 
intellectual properties owned by the restructured company in question or 
other group companies involved in the restructuring from the registers 
maintained by Rospatent, which in turn will help to identify whether such 
properties have been transferred in the course of the business restructuring. 
 
In addition, in order to become objects of transfer pricing, intellectual 
properties should have commercial value that would be compensated in 
transactions between independent parties. Patents, trademarks, utility models 
and other intellectual property rights clearly have this kind of commercial 
value. Their transfers usually generate profits,346 and therefore intellectual 
properties cannot primarily be transferred without being remunerated.   
 
Thus, taking into account the above, as well as the earlier-mentioned written 
clarifications by the Minfin and the FTS’s letter, if cross-border business 
restructurings involve transfers of intellectual property, such transfers will 
primarily fall within the scope of application of the Russian transfer pricing 
regulations in the current legal state. As mentioned, in this circumstance, the 
concept of intellectual property includes such intangible assets as trademarks, 
designs and patents, which are also universally understood as intellectual 
properties. Albeit this conclusion can be reached quite easily from the 
aforesaid legal sources, the existing transfer pricing rules can be still criticized. 
As previously discussed, the fact that the interpretation of this question is in 
principle based on the FTS’s and Minfin’s written clarifications and guidance 
is problematic. The dominant position of the legislated legal norms in the 
hierarchy of the Russian legal sources requires that the applicability of the 
transfer pricing rules to transfers of intellectual property should be regulated 
in the Tax Code. It would be of great importance also to determine de lege 
ferenda in the legislation, how the concept of intellectual property should be 
understood in the transfer pricing context. This could be implemented, for 
instance, by defining the concept specifically for transfer pricing/tax purposes 
in the Tax Code’s provisions or by referring in the provisions to the Civil Code’s 
respective provisions.  
 
In Finland, the starting point is that intangible assets should in general fall 
within the scope of application of the transfer pricing provisions, as the scope 
is not limited to particular types of assets or transactions in the above-
mentioned manner. The preliminary works specifically mention that related 
party transactions involving transfers of intangibles fall within the scope of § 
                                                 
 
345 As mentioned earlier, among other things, patents and trademarks must be registered in the state 
register, which is maintained by Rospatent.  
346 De Robertis – Matthias – Damian 2006, p. 17; Haarmann – Mansala 2012, pp. 16–17. 
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31 of the AAP.347 Although the preliminary works have not defined the concept 
of intangible asset in this particular paragraph, there is a strong assumption 
that transfers of intellectual property rights should, as being intangible assets 
by nature, be subject to the Finnish transfer pricing rules strictly on these 
grounds. This view may be supported by the fact that the preliminary works 
expressly mention some assets, which are generally considered intellectual 
properties, as forms of intangible assets in other parts of the preliminary 
works. For instance, when the functional analysis is discussed, trademarks, 
patents and designs are specifically mentioned as examples of intangible 
assets.348 This may be naturally applied also to § 31 of the AAP.  
 
In addition, the Finnish Tax Administration’s memorandum regarding the 
transfer pricing documentation clarifies the question greatly. Pursuant to the 
memorandum, trademarks, patents and designs, for example, are forms of 
intangible assets. Moreover, the concept of intangible asset should be 
understood broadly, and therefore it covers also other forms of (intangible) 
assets, which generate profit, although they cannot be registered or they are 
not assignable. Hence, technology, customer lists, distribution channels and 
other similar assets must also be understood as intangible assets for transfer 
pricing purposes.349 As the concept of intangible asset is in this sense defined 
broadly, the intellectual property rights — which can be usually quite easily 
registered and assigned — meet the criteria of the said definition effortlessly. 
From this perspective, the intellectual property rights should be regarded as 
intangible assets subject to the Finnish transfer pricing provisions. 
 
More legal support for the aforementioned view can be found from the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. As the guidelines are followed and applied in the 
Finnish practice to a great extent, Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, which deals with the transfer pricing aspects of intangibles in 
detail, must be reviewed. According to the recently renewed provisions, the 
concept of intangible “is intended to address something which is not a physical 
asset or a financial asset, which is capable of being owned or controlled for use 
in commercial activities, and whose use or transfer would be compensated had 
it occurred in a transaction between independent parties in comparable 
circumstances.”350 The term is thus understood very broadly, and the 
approach is equivalent to the Finnish Tax Administration’s approach. The 
guidelines do not, nonetheless, try to define the concept of intellectual 
property for transfer pricing purposes in more detail, although particular 
intangible assets, which are universally considered intellectual property rights, 
                                                 
 
347 See HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. 
348 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 16. 
349 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 24. 
350 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.6. 
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are mentioned specifically in certain paragraphs of Chapter VI of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. For example, copyrights,351 trademarks and trade 
names352 as well as patents353 have been regarded as intangibles subject to 
transfer pricing and the arm’s length principle.  
 
It should be observed that the concept of intellectual property under Finnish 
law is equivalent to the universal understanding of the concept, as Finland is 
a signatory state to the main international treaties regulating the intellectual 
property rights, similar to Russia.354 Consequently, the intellectual property 
rights mentioned in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, such as patents 
and trademarks, are understood similarly under Finnish law. The intellectual 
property rights and the legal protection thereof are usually legislated in 
national acts, and Finnish law offers no exception. For instance, copyrights,355 
trademarks,356 patents,357 utility models358 and other common intellectual 
property rights gain legal protection through own particular acts in Finland.   
 
Taking into consideration the previously mentioned observations, clear legal 
support can be found for the view that transactions involving transfers of 
intellectual property rights fall within the scope of the Finnish transfer pricing 
provisions. As discussed, apart from falling within the scope of application of 
the national transfer pricing provisions, transfers of intellectual property 
rights can be usually quite easily identified and distinguished from other 
possible transfers occurring in the business restructuring; furthermore, such 
transfers commonly create value that would be remunerated in transactions 
conducted between independent parties in comparable circumstances. As a 
result, when a cross-border business restructuring involves transfers of 
intellectual properties, such transfers are subject to transfer pricing. 
Consequently, such transfers must be compensated in accordance with the 
arm’s length principle separate from other possible asset transfers, when the 
restructuring does not involve a transfer of a going concern.   
 
In this respect, the existing legal situation in Finland conforms to a great 
extent to the situation in Russia. The concept of intellectual property under 
both countries’ laws covers similar assets, and transfers of such assets fall 
within the scope of the national transfer pricing rules in the business 
                                                 
 
351 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.37. 
352 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.21–6.22. 
353 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.19. 
354 Haarmann 2014, pp. 8–22.  
355 The Finnish Copyrights Act (Tekijänoikeuslaki, 404/1961). 
356 The Finnish Trademarks Act (Tavaramerkkilaki, 7/1964). 
357 The Finnish Patents Act (Patenttilaki, 550/1967). 
358 The Finnish Act on Utility Model Rights (Laki hyödyllisyysmallioikeudesta, 800/1991). 
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restructuring context. On the other hand, as business restructurings may be 
regarded as transfers of a going concern in some cases in Finland, intellectual 
properties may not necessarily always be objects of transfer pricing as separate 
items, but as a part of the going concern. This cannot be the case in Russia. 
 
Moreover, similar interpretive problems that exist in Russia are avoided in 
Finland. Pursuant to the Finnish legal sources, it is self-evident that 
intellectual properties can be considered intangible assets, which in turn 
generally fall within the scope of the transfer pricing rules. A broad definition 
of intangible property for transfer pricing purposes, which does not aim at 
determining all the asset types falling within the scope of the concept, brings 
thus good results in terms of the arm’s length principle. In Russia, this 
question is relatively more ambiguous. The approach used in Finland cannot 
currently be applied in Russia, as it seems that only intellectual properties fall 
within the scope of the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions at present, and 
not intangibles in general, it would make more sense to determine in the 
earlier mentioned manner in the transfer pricing provisions de lege ferenda 
the intangible assets that must be understood as intellectual properties for 
transfer pricing purposes. That would bring more clarity to the current state 
in Russia.    
 
Contrary to Russian and Finnish law, intangible properties falling within the 
scope of the U.S. transfer pricing rules are regulated in more detail in the U.S. 
sources of law. Regardless of that Section 482 of the IRC specifically refers to 
transactions concerning transfers of intangible property, it does not provide a 
definition of intangible property for transfer pricing purposes. On the other 
hand, the section contains a reference to Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC as to 
the meaning of term ‘intangible property’, and therefore the definition of 
intangible property in the said section should be followed also for the purposes 
of Section 482 and thus for the purposes of transfer pricing.  
 
Pursuant to Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC, the term “intangible property” 
means, among other things, any patent, invention, design, copyright, literary, 
musical or artistic composition, trademark, trade name or any similar item, 
which has substantial value independent of the services of any individual. 
Although the list is comprehensive, it is not exhaustive. It is important to 
observe that this definition of intangible property is also followed in the 
Treasury Regulations that interpret Section 482 of the IRC.359 
                                                 
 
359 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b). The definition in the Treasury Regulations, however, differs from the 
Section 936(h)(3)(B)’s definition in one small respect: the wording “any similar item” in Section 
936(h)(3)(B) is replaced in the Treasury Regulations with the wording “other similar items,” and an item 
is considered similar for the purposes of Section 482, if “it derives its value not from its physical 
attributes but from its intellectual content or other intangible properties.” 
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The concept of intangible asset for transfer pricing purposes has been hence 
defined specifically in the U.S. tax legislation in the above-discussed manner. 
More importantly, this concept particularly covers such intangible assets, 
which are universally considered intellectual property rights. The concept of 
intellectual property is also understood in U.S. law similarly as in Russia and 
Finland.360 In consequence, it is clear that the U.S. transfer pricing rules must 
be applied in general to controlled transactions involving transfers of 
intellectual property. In this sense, U.S. law has thus taken a more 
straightforward approach as compared to Russian and Finnish law.  
 
From the perspective of business restructurings, this means that the transfers 
of intellectual properties that are commonly transferred in business 
restructurings due to changes in the manufacturing or marketing activities of 
a restructured company — for instance patents, trademarks and designs — 
should fall within the scope of the U.S. transfer pricing rules, as they are 
regulated as intangible properties subject to transfer pricing pursuant to 
Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC and the corresponding Treasury Regulations. 
This view is justified, when also taking into account that such transfers can be 
usually, in the above-mentioned sense, identified and distinguished from 
other possible transfers occurring in the business restructuring. Moreover, 
such transfers are generally compensated in transactions conducted between 
unrelated parties, which is why they should be remunerated also in controlled 
transactions at arm’s length.  
 
On the other hand, also in the USA, intellectual properties may be transferred 
in some business restructurings in conjunction with other interrelated assets 
that form together a functioning business unit; in such cases, they will not 
become objects of transfer pricing separately, but a part of the transferred 
going concern. U.S. law therefore conforms to Finnish law in this regard. 
 
Furthermore, as discussed above, the IRC contains provisions under which 
transfers of certain assets by a U.S. company to a foreign company may 
exceptionally be free of taxes. This may be the case if such assets are 
transferred to a foreign company for the purposes of using them by the foreign 
company in the active conduct of a trade or business outside the USA.361 
However, this exception cannot be applied to transfers of intangible property 
                                                 
 
360 Among other things, patents, trademarks, copyrights and trade names have been considered as 
intellectual property rights when the concept of intangible property for transfer pricing purposes has 
been discussed; see e.g.  Snyder 2005, p. 16 and Bossart 2005, p. 68. The USA is also a signatory state to 
the relevant international treaties as to the protection of intellectual properties, such as the above-
mentioned WIPO and TRIPS Agreements. 
361 Section 367(a)(1) and Section 367(a)(3)(A) of the IRC.  
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(with the meaning of Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC), as they have been 
entirely excluded from the scope of application of the provision.362 As Section 
936(h)(3)(B) covers in the above-mentioned manner intellectual properties to 
a great degree, transfers of intellectual properties from a U.S company to a 
foreign company are generally taxable transactions. Hence, they are also 
subject to the arm’s length principle, when they occur in controlled 
transactions.  
 
On the above-mentioned grounds, it is justified to conclude that transfers of 
intellectual property rights occurred in the course of business restructurings 
are subject to the U.S. transfer pricing rules and the arm’s length principle. 
This means that when a business restructuring does not involve a transfer of a 
going concern, transfers of intellectual property rights shall be examined and 
valued separately from the perspective of the arm’s length standard. U.S. law 
does not therefore deviate from Russian and Finnish law in this regard.  
 
However, when the question is examined in more detail, the U.S. approach 
conforms more to the existing situation in Finland than in Russia. Both 
countries recognize the possibility that transfers of intellectual properties are 
included in the transfer of a going concern when a functioning business unit is 
transferred in the restructuring. This may in certain circumstances lead to a 
more reliable arm’s length result than what would be achieved by valuing 
contemporaneous transfers of interrelated assets separately. As the 
aggregation of transactions is not currently possible in a similar manner in 
Russia, the compensation paid in the restructuring for transfers of intellectual 
property may in some cases differ from what would be considered the arm’s 
length result in such situations in Finland and the USA. As discussed, the 
existing transfer pricing rules in the Tax Code should be amended de lege 
ferenda to better meet the aims of the arm’s length principle in this respect. 
 
In addition, the particular question of whether intellectual properties may be 
objects of transfer pricing has been dealt with by the Finnish and U.S. legal 
sources in a way that does not allow contrary views on the matter. Therefore, 
there are no such needs for amendments to the legislation and other legal 
sources as in Russia, where only non-binding sources have discussed the 
question — although there are no conflicting views on the matter. Nonetheless, 
despite the mentioned differences, all the target countries in the end comply 
with the arm’s length principle, when a business restructuring involves 
transfers of intellectual properties. As such transfers fall within the scope of 
the national transfer pricing regulations, they must be compensated at arm’s 
length. 
                                                 
 
362 Section 367(d) of the IRC. 
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3.6.4 TRADE SECRETS AND KNOW-HOW  
Trade secrets and know-how can be defined as information or a knowledge in 
a company’s possession which benefits the company in its business activities. 
Unlike the intellectual property rights (such as trademarks and patents), trade 
secrets and know-how cannot be registered in order to achieve legal 
protection.363 It is, however, not that uncommon that a group company 
transfers some of its trade secrets and/or know-how to another related 
company during a business restructuring.364 For example, a fully-fledged 
manufacturer may transfer trade secrets concerning the company’s 
manufacturing procedures and techniques to a newly established related 
company, which will start operating as a toll-manufacturer as a result of the 
restructuring. These trade secrets may enable the new manufacturer to 
manufacture products in a more cost-efficient way.  
 
In the legal literature, trade secrets and know-how are usually treated as 
intellectual property rights or as a phenomenon closely linked thereto, but as 
they differ from traditional intellectual property rights in nature, it is 
reasonable to discuss them separately. Therefore, in this section it is examined 
whether controlled transfers of know-how/trade secrets, which occur in the 
course of a business restructuring, may fall within the scope of national 
transfer pricing rules as separate items in Russia, Finland and the USA.  
 
In Russia, trade secrets and know-how have been increasingly regarded as 
synonyms.365 In order that trade secrets and know-how could be considered 
objects of transfer pricing under Russian tax law, they must be first protected 
as intellectual property according to the provisions of the Russian Civil Code. 
This requirement is the consequence of the earlier-discussed Minfin’s written 
clarification and the FTS’s letter, under which transfers of intellectual 
properties were deemed objects of transfer pricing. Pursuant to Article 1225 of 
the Civil Code, trade secrets (know-how) are protected as intellectual 
properties in conjunction with other intellectual properties. Any industrial, 
technical, commercial, organizational or other type of information, which 
concerns the results of intellectual activity in the field of technology and 
science as well as information concerning methods of professional activity, 
may constitute trade secret/know-how. This kind of information can be 
protected as trade secret, if it has real or potential commercial value on 
account of not being known to third parties; the information is not freely 
accessible by third parties pursuant to law; and the holder of such know-how 
                                                 
 
363 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.20. 
364 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.55. 
365 See e.g. Rassolov – Аleksij – Kuzbagarov 2010, p. 336; Moskalev 2009, p. 249. 
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takes all the reasonable steps to keep the information confidential.366 Thus, 
trade secrets/know-how must have commercial value, must be secret and 
must be known only to a restricted group of persons/companies (exclusivity). 
These criteria are consistent with Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement, which 
sets out similar requirements for the protection of undisclosed information.367 
 
As trade secrets/know-how are considered intellectual properties under 
Russian law, they will be subject to transfer pricing regulations also in business 
restructurings, if the transfers of know-how/trade secrets can be distinguished 
from other asset transfers and can be therefore identified as own separate 
items. In addition, such transfers must have value, which would be 
compensated in transactions between independent parties under similar 
conditions. The latter requirement is fulfilled in practice, when know-
how/trade secret meets the above-mentioned requirements set by Russian 
law. In other words, know-how must have commercial value or otherwise it 
cannot be regarded as know-how. Furthermore, trade secrets/know-how can 
be transferred and licensed in accordance with specific provisions of the Civil 
Code,368 which also indicates that they generally have commercial value. 
 
The question concerning the requirement of distinguishing transfers of know-
how and trade secrets from transfers of other assets in a business restructuring 
is far more complex. As it was mentioned above, they cannot be registered in 
a similar way as trademarks or patents, which would be helpful in identifying 
them in transactions and separating transfers thereof from other transfers 
possibly occurring in the business restructuring. In addition, a transfer of 
know-how/trade secrets is usually connected with transfers of tangible or 
intangible assets. Know-how is not very often transferred alone, but more 
likely along with other intangible assets in a package of agreements or with the 
personnel.369 For instance, information that is considered know-how may be 
closely linked to patents that are transferred during a business restructuring 
between group companies. 
 
Nevertheless, it is not necessarily impossible to distinguish the transfers of 
know-how/trade secrets from other potential asset transfers in a business 
restructuring. As discussed, the Civil Code contains particular provisions in 
                                                 
 
366 Article 1465 of the Civil Code. The holder must maintain a regime for the purposes of keeping the 
information confidential. More regulations with regard to trade secrets and regimes can be found in the 
specific act regulating trade secrets, see Federal'nyj zakon "O kommercheskoj tajne" ot 29.07.2004 N 
98-FZ (Federal Act of the Russian Federation on Trade Secrets). 
367 See Niskakangas 1983, p. 13, where the criteria for the protection pursuant to the TRIPS Agreement 
are discussed in more detail. 
368 Articles 1469 and 1469 of the Civil Code. 
369 See e.g. Mehtonen 2005, pp. 222, 288; Haarmann 2001, p. 140.  
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relation to concluding agreements as to transferring the exclusive rights of 
trade secrets/know-how or licensing them.370 These kinds of agreements could 
also be used in business restructurings in order to identify the transfers of 
know-how and trade secrets, and to separate them from other asset transfers 
occurring in restructurings. Also in the Russian legal literature, it has been 
considered possible to distinguish know-how from other intangible assets and 
to determine an individual transfer price alone for know-how.371 The 
importance of performing a functional analysis diligently as part of the 
transfer pricing documentation cannot be thus highlighted in excess, if know-
how is planned to be transferred in the restructuring. It will help companies to 
identify and separate transfers of know-how/trade secrets from other possible 
asset transfers occurring in the business restructuring. 
 
On the basis of the aforesaid, if a business restructuring involves transfers of 
know-how/trade secrets, it seems that such transfers fall within the scope of 
the Russian transfer pricing rules. This is mainly due to the fact that know-
how/trade secrets are intellectual properties pursuant to the existing law. As 
the prevailing transfer pricing provisions should be applied to controlled 
transfers of intellectual properties, that covers also know-how and trade 
secrets. This conclusion is also acceptable from the perspective of the arm’s 
length principle. If independent parties would transfer or license know-how, 
it is very likely that such transactions would be remunerated, taking into 
account that trade secrets/know-how contain in the above-mentioned sense 
commercially valuable information. The arm’s length principle is hence 
followed in this regard. However, as already discussed in the previous chapter, 
the existing transfer pricing rules can still be criticized in one respect. The 
interpretation of this specific question is greatly based on the FTS’s and the 
Minfin’s guidance, which is not legally binding in nature. The prevailing 
interpretation should be thus ultimately regulated in the Tax Code’s transfer 
pricing provisions to eliminate any possible uncertainties on the matter and to 
achieve more authoritative legal support for the current interpretation.  
 
In Finland, the terms “know-how” and “trade secrets” are, likewise, often used 
side by side and regarded to cover each other at least to some extent, although 
the terms are also considered ambiguous.372 Know-how can be broadly 
understood as all the information and experience required for performing 
certain business activities, and such information and experience is valuable for 
                                                 
 
370 See Articles 1468–1469 of the Civil Code. It should be noted that if an agreement with regard to 
transferring exclusive rights of certain know-how/trade secrets do not contain an explicit mention of 
‘exclusive rights’, know-how/trade secrets are deemed to be transferred under such agreement without 
exclusivity; see Borisov 2014, p. 1062. 
371 Shherbakov – Shherbakova 2006, p. 200. 
372 Haarmann 2001, p. 156; Haarmann 2014, pp. 456–457. 
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a company.373 When the information, which is regarded as know-how, is in 
nature confidential, such information may also be considered a trade secret.374 
However, it has been stated in the legal literature that know-how can 
sometimes also be non-confidential in nature, such as general profession skills 
and expertise, in which case the know-how in question cannot be regarded at 
the same time as trade secret.375 Under a broad definition of intellectual 
property rights, regulations regarding unfair competition, including the 
protection of trade secrets, are deemed to be part of intellectual property rights 
under Finnish law.376  
 
The only act in Finland regulating trade secrets and know-how at least to some 
degree is the Finnish Unfair Business Practices Act (Laki sopimattomasta 
menettelystä elinkeinotoiminnassa, 1061/78). Pursuant to § 4 of the Finnish 
Unfair Business Practices Act, trade secrets are protected in four different 
situations: Trade secrets are first protected against business espionage. In 
addition, persons in the service of an entrepreneur may not unjustifiably use 
trade secrets. Similarly, persons acting on behalf of an entrepreneur cannot 
unjustifiably use or reveal such information. Lastly, persons who have received 
trade secrets from other persons, knowing that such information has been 
unjustifiably obtained or revealed, cannot use the trade secrets.377  
 
Although the above-mentioned legislated provisions are not broad, trade 
secrets and know-how achieve legal protection through these provisions. 
Furthermore, as Finland is a signatory state to the TRIPS Agreement, the 
earlier discussed criteria for the protection of undisclosed information 
pursuant to Article 39 (commercial value, secret and exclusivity) are 
applicable also to know-how and trade secrets in Finland. As trade secrets and 
know-how are in the aforementioned manner recognized and protected under 
Finnish law, the next question is whether they may fall within the scope of 
application of the Finnish transfer pricing provisions, when they are 
transferred separately in business restructurings? 
 
As it was discussed earlier, the preliminary works for the AAP specifically 
mention that transactions involving transfers of intangible assets fall within 
the scope of transfer pricing rules.378 Trade secrets and know-how, being 
treated as intangibles and — under a broad definition of intellectual property 
rights — as intellectual properties under Finnish law, should be in the scope of 
                                                 
 
373 HE 114/1978, p. 14. 
374 Vapaavuori 2016, p. 73. 
375 Nyblin 2007, p. 237; Vapaavuori 2016, p. 73. 
376 Vapaavuori 2016, p. 30. 
377 See in more detail in Haarmann 2014, pp. 457–458. 
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§ 31 of the AAP solely for the reason that intangible assets in general fall within 
the scope of application of the Finnish transfer pricing provisions. 
Furthermore, the preliminary works mention knowledge as one example of 
intangible property subject to transfer pricing,379 which also supports this 
view. In addition, the Finnish Tax Administration’s memorandum states that 
term “intangible property” must be understood broadly, as intangible property 
can generate income in transactions even if it cannot be registered or it is not 
transferable. The Tax Administration also explicitly mentions knowledge as 
one form of intangible property.380  
 
The approach taken by the Finnish legal sources above is in line with the 
provisions of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The term “intangible” has 
been left intentionally open in the guidelines in the earlier discussed manner: 
it refers in general to something, which is not a physical or a financial asset, 
which is capable of being owned/controlled, and the use or transfer of which 
would be compensated in transactions between independent parties.381 The 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have specifically mentioned know-how and 
trade secrets as one form of intangible property. The concept of know-how and 
trade secrets under the guidelines is comparable to the definition under 
Finnish law. According to the guidelines,  
 
“know-how and trade secrets are proprietary information or knowledge 
that assist or improve a commercial activity, but that are not registered 
for protection in the manner of a patent or trademark. Know-how and 
trade secrets generally consist of undisclosed information of an 
industrial, commercial or scientific nature arising from previous 
experience, which has practical application in the operation of an 
enterprise. Know-how and trade secrets may relate to manufacturing, 
marketing, research and development, or any other commercial 
activity.---”382 
 
Most importantly, it must be noted that Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines explicitly mentions know-how and trade secrets as 
intangible asset types, which should be taken into account in transfer pricing 
of business restructurings.383 As there is no contradiction between the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Finnish law in terms of the concept of 
intangibles and know-how/trade secrets, the OECD approach should be taken 
                                                 
 
379 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 16. Alternatively, the Finnish word, ‘osaaminen’, may also be translated directly 
into ‘know-how’. 
380 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 24. 
381 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.6. 
382 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.20. 
383 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.55. 
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as the starting point also in Finland. This results from the fact that the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, including Chapter IX, have been confirmed as a 
guiding source, when the arm’s length principle and § 31 of the AAP are 
interpreted and applied in practice.384 
 
Therefore, on the basis of the above said, transfers of know-how and trade 
secrets fall generally within the scope of the Finnish transfer pricing 
provisions. In business restructurings, they may become objects of transfer 
pricing as separate items, if they can also be identified and separated from 
other possible asset transfers occurring in the course of a business 
restructuring and if such transfers would be compensated in transactions 
between independent parties under comparable circumstances. It was earlier 
mentioned that such transfers usually generate profit due to the fact that the 
information/experience, which is protected as trade secret, has commercial 
value, or otherwise it cannot be regarded as trade secret. Even that kind of 
know-how, which cannot be regarded as trade secret under Finnish law, 
because the information in question is non-confidential in nature, usually has 
commercial value.385 In addition, regardless of that know-how and trade 
secrets cannot be easily identified or separated from other assets, it is not 
impossible under Finnish law. As was the case in Russia, also in Finland the 
trade secrets and know-how, including know-how based on non-confidential 
information, can be transferred or licensed under the so-called “know-how 
licenses”. In such situations, the importance of contractual terms becomes 
emphasized.386 By defining the trade secrets/know-how thoroughly in such 
licensing or transfer agreements, they can be separated from other possible 
asset transfers occurring in the business restructuring context.  
 
Hence, it is justified to state that transfers of trade secrets and know-how fall 
within the scope of application of the Finnish transfer pricing rules in business 
restructurings also as separate items. Such transfers must be conducted in a 
diligent way, and special attention must be paid to the contractual terms 
defining the information and knowledge to be transferred. Finnish law does 
not thus deviate from Russian law in terms of this particular question. 
Consequently, both countries follow the arm’s length principle also in this 
situation. On the other hand, contrary to the existing situation in Russia, the 
Finnish legal sources (and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines that are 
followed in this respect) regulate the question in a manner that makes 
conflicting interpretations of the matter impossible. As the corresponding 
Russian sources are more clarifying in nature (not legally binding), it is more 
problematic that the interpretation of the question lacks support from more 
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authoritative legal sources, i.e. the Tax Code’s provisions. In this respect, there 
is thus a need for amendments in Russia.   
 
In the USA, know-how and trade secrets have been traditionally regarded as 
“a set of secret techniques and information, including those of a commercial 
nature, used in an enterprise.”387 As being a signatory state to the TRIPS 
Agreement, trade secrets and know-how must be protected under U.S. law in 
a similar way as they are protected in Russia and Finland. In general, they have 
been conventionally protected under the laws of states. On the other hand, the 
Restatement of Unfair Competition has also been of practical importance, as 
the Supreme Court of the USA has cited its definition of trade secrets in the 
decisions.388 Trade secret has been defined in the Restatement of Unfair 
Competition as follows: “A trade secret is any information that can be used in 
the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable 
and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”389  
 
Nowadays, the majority of the states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act,390 which also contains a definition of trade secret: “Trade secret means 
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, 
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic 
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”391 Pursuant to 
these legislative acts, trade secrets and know-how (when it falls under the 
definition of trade secret) achieve legal protection under U.S. law, if they 
concern information, which is secret, exclusive and has independent 
commercial value.392 That being said, the concept of protectable trade 
secret/know-how is clearly understood in U.S. law similarly as in Russian and 
Finnish law. 
 
As know-how and trade secrets are recognized and protected under U.S. law 
in the above-discussed manner, whether they may fall within the scope of 
application of the U.S. transfer pricing rules as separate items must be 
examined. As with the question of transfer pricing of intellectual property 
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rights, U.S. law is more straightforward, when it comes to transfer pricing of 
know-how and trade secrets. It was mentioned earlier that the concept of 
intangible property for transfer pricing purposes is regulated in Section 
936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC, as well as in the respective Treasury Regulations. 
Pursuant to these provisions, the term “intangible property” also explicitly 
covers know-how for the purposes of Section 482 of the IRC, if it has 
substantial value independent of the services of any individual. In addition to 
the mention of know-how, the section specifically mentions formulas, patterns 
and processes as intangible properties subject to Section 482 of the IRC.393 It 
must be noted that these information types also fall within the definition of 
trade secret pursuant to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Thus, solely from this 
point of view, it is clear that transfers of know-how and trade secrets are in the 
scope of application of the U.S. transfer pricing rules. 
 
It must also be observed that the aforesaid exception rule, under which certain 
transfers of assets by a U.S. company to a foreign company may be free of 
taxes,394 is not applicable to transfers of know-how and trade secrets. It was 
discussed above that this exception cannot be applied to transfers of intangible 
property (with the meaning of Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC). As know-how 
and trade secrets are regarded as intangible properties pursuant to Section 
936(h)(3)(B), they are excluded from the scope of application of the exception 
rule.395 Consequently, transfers of know-how and trade secrets from a U.S. 
company to a foreign company are generally taxable transactions,396 meaning 
that they are also subject to the arm’s length principle in controlled 
transactions. This ultimately supports the view according to which transfers of 
know-how and trade secrets should fall within the scope of transfer pricing 
rules also in cross-border business restructurings. 
 
Moreover, other requirements of becoming an object of transfer pricing in 
business restructurings as a separate item are also met in U.S. law. The 
definition of trade secrets and know-how requires that such assets have 
independent economic value in the above-discussed manner. This has also 
been confirmed in the case law397 and the legal literature398, where it has been 
stated that transfers of such property usually constitute profit, which is subject 
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to taxation. Trade secrets and know-how have hence this kind of commercial 
value, which would be compensated in transactions between independent 
parties.  
 
Furthermore, the wording used in the Treasury Regulations implies that 
know-how as well as formulas, patterns and processes have the ability to be 
separated from other assets. They are listed as own separate asset types to be 
regarded as intangible assets; in addition, they are considered specifically 
intangible properties subject to transfer pricing, when they have “substantial 
value independent of the services of any individual.”399 More importantly, it 
has been confirmed in U.S. court decisions that trade secrets/know-how can 
be transferred alone.400 In addition, in the legal literature it has been viewed 
that trade secrets can be transferred and licensed quite freely as separate 
items. As was the case in Russia and Finland, know-how and trade secret can 
also be licensed or transferred alone in the USA through licensing and transfer 
agreements,401 which indicates that they can also be separated, by using such 
agreements, from other transfers occurring in the business restructuring 
context.  
 
On the basis of the above mentioned, it is justified to state that the transfers of 
trade secrets/know-how will fall within the scope of the U.S. transfer pricing 
rules separately, when a going concern is not transferred in a business 
restructuring. Taking into consideration that the concept of know-how/trade 
secret has been defined to a great extent similarly in Russia, Finland and the 
USA, and that their transfers fall within the scope of the national transfer 
pricing rules in business restructurings in a similar manner, Russian, Finnish 
and U.S. law are in line with each other in this respect.  
 
In the existing legal situation, the arm’s length principle is thus generally 
followed in Russia, Finland and the USA, when cross-border business 
restructurings involve transfers of know-how and trade secrets. As such 
transfers fall within the scope of the national transfer pricing regulations, they 
must be compensated at arm’s length, if unrelated parties would in 
comparable situations also compensate such transfers. Nonetheless, as was 
the case with transfers of intellectual properties in general, more reliable arm’s 
length results may be achieved currently in Finland and the USA, when 
compared to Russia. The former countries recognize the possibility that 
transfers of know-how/trade secrets are included in the transfer of a going 
concern, when a functioning business unit is transferred in the restructuring. 
As discussed, this may in certain circumstances result in a more reliable arm’s 
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length result than what would be achieved by valuing contemporaneous 
transfers of interrelated assets separately. As the simultaneous transfers of 
assets should always be analyzed and valued on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis at present in Russia, amendments to the legislation are needed.  
 
Another difference between Russian law and the laws of Finland and the USA 
is that this particular question (i.e. whether know-how/trade secretes may 
become objects of transfer pricing) is more interpretive question in Russia 
than in Finland and the USA. As with the transfers of intellectual properties, 
it is self-evident from the aforementioned Finnish and U.S. legal sources that 
transfers of know-how/trade secrets should be objects of transfer pricing. In 
Russia, legally authoritative sources have not dealt with the question at all, and 
therefore the aforesaid question is widely interpreted with references to legal 
sources having only clarifying non-binding nature (i.e. the Minfin’s and the 
FTS’s guidance). Therefore, the prevailing interpretation should preferably be 
regulated in the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions to achieve more 
authoritative legal support for the current interpretation. There are no such 
needs for improvements to the legislation de lege ferenda in Finland and the 
USA.  
 
3.6.5 GOODWILL AND GOING CONCERN VALUE 
A group company may also transfer a part of its goodwill to an associated 
company located in another jurisdiction during the process of a cross-border 
business restructuring.402 Goodwill can be defined as a brand value, which is 
based on the customers’ positive feelings and experiences in relation to the 
company's products and services. It arises from the company’s products, 
services and everyday business activities, such as marketing activities. 
Goodwill is closely linked to the company's trade name or trademarks, because 
they usually evoke the said positive feelings in customers.403  
 
Going concern was defined earlier as a “functioning organizational unit.” The 
concept of going concern must be separated from the concept of going concern 
value. In contrast to going concern, going concern value means an increased 
value of a company’s or its business unit’s assets, which results from using 
these company’s assets together in business activities. The aggregate value of 
the assets is in reality higher than if the net values of the assets would be 
totaled up. Going concern value is created by a company’s possibility to 
minimize its costs by using the assets in its possession efficiently in its 
entrepreneurial activities in comparison to a newly established company, 
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which must take care of costs resulting from starting a business. These kinds 
of assets producing going concern value may be, inter alia, results of R & D, 
existing client and credit agreements as well as experienced personnel. Going 
concern value is traditionally considered an intangible asset.404 Also, a 
company’s going concern value may be transferred in the business 
restructuring context.  
 
In this section, it is examined in particular whether transfers of goodwill 
and/or going concern value may be objects of the national transfer pricing 
provisions of Russia, Finland and the USA separately from other possible asset 
transfers in the course of business restructurings. Before reviewing the 
question from the perspective of national laws, it must be highlighted that the 
transfer pricing of goodwill and going concern value is an uneasy question in 
general. Even the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines did not, for a long time, 
mention goodwill and going concern value as intangible assets in Chapter VI 
of the guidelines, although the chapter deals with the transfer pricing aspects 
of intangibles in detail. Until the autumn of 2014, there had not been 
international standards in relation to the transfer pricing of transfers of 
goodwill and going concern value.405 
 
According to the newest provisions of Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, goodwill and going concern value406 can be defined in many 
different ways. The guidelines do not attempt to give them a precise definition; 
in addition, they do not specify when goodwill and going concern value can be 
regarded as intangibles. According to the guidelines, it does not even matter, 
whether the transferred value in a related party transaction is defined as 
goodwill or going concern value:  
 
“If features of a business such as a reputation for producing high quality 
products or providing high quality service allow that business to charge 
higher prices for goods or services than an entity lacking such 
reputation, and such features might be characterised as goodwill or 
ongoing concern value under one or another definition of such terms, 
such features should be taken into account in establishing arm’s length 
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prices for sales of goods or the provision of services between associated 
enterprises whether or not they are characterised as goodwill.”407 
 
The OECD’s approach starts with the premise that, if independent parties 
would compensate value which might be characterized as goodwill or going 
concern value in their transactions, the related parties should compensate this 
value accordingly in their transactions as well.408  
 
Does Russia’s approach to transfer pricing of goodwill and going concern value 
differ from the OECD’s approach then? First, the definition of goodwill (in 
Russian delovaya reputatsiya (yuridicheskogo lica) or gudvil) is understood 
in Russia similar to the above mentioned. Goodwill is regarded as the value, 
which a company has and which stems from (positive) reputation and 
experiences of the company and its products and services.409 Although 
goodwill is not specifically regulated in the Russian legislation, it is recognized 
as an intangible asset by Russian case law and literature410 — and even by the 
Minfin.411  
 
On the contrary, going concern value has not been discussed in the Russian 
legal literature and case law, not to mention legislation. It appears that going 
concern value is often considered as part of goodwill or even as the same (legal) 
phenomenon. For instance, a company’s clientele, existing agreements and 
experienced staff are regarded as assets, which create the company’s 
goodwill.412 These kinds of assets were mentioned above as assets creating a 
company’s going concern value, not goodwill. It seems that Russian legal 
literature — as well as Russian law in general — does not recognize going 
concern value as a separate intangible asset, and therefore it cannot be 
examined further regarding whether it could fall within the scope of transfer 
pricing regulations in Russia as a separate asset. Nonetheless, going concern 
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value can be deemed to be included in the concept of goodwill in the 
aforementioned manner.  
 
Now, in order to review whether at least transfers of goodwill could be objects 
of transfer pricing in business restructurings, they should be distinguishable 
from other assets transferred in a transaction, have commercial value which 
would be compensated in transactions between independent parties and be 
regarded as an asset type subject to transfer pricing pursuant to the Russian 
transfer pricing regulations. As the Tax Code fails to mention transfer pricing 
rules’ possible applicability to transfers of goodwill — and overall lacks 
mentions of goodwill — the last requirement means that goodwill must be 
considered as intellectual property under Russian law, or otherwise it cannot 
fall within the scope of the transfer pricing regulations at all. 
 
The first two requirements already cause difficulties, however. It is generally 
viewed in the legal literature that a company’s goodwill cannot be transferred 
separately. The transfer of goodwill usually requires that the whole business 
unit is transferred simultaneously. Even then, it is very likely that it cannot be 
identified and distinguished from the other transferred assets.413 This view is 
also shared in the Russian literature and supported by IFRS 3, which is also 
applied in Russia.414  
 
In addition, it has been considered that goodwill value, which arises inside a 
company from its profitable business activities in the course of time 
(internally generated goodwill), cannot be recorded as an intangible asset as 
such on the company’s balance sheet, and therefore it cannot be distinguished 
from other assets. In many countries, including Russia, recordable goodwill 
could arise only in business acquisitions.415 Goodwill value would then be the 
difference between the purchase price of the company and the net book value 
of the company’s assets and liabilities. According to the Minfin’s order and 
accounting standard PBU 14/2007, the goodwill may in that case be recorded 
                                                 
 
413 Cordova – Mitra – Newman – Reams – Shanda – Shapiro 2012, p. 47. 
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on the balance sheet only if the acquisition concerns a purchase of a complex 
of assets (a whole company or a part of it).416  
 
It seems that Russian law sets very strict requirements for when goodwill could 
be regarded as an intangible asset on the balance sheet of a company. It can be 
recorded on the balance sheet only after a purchase of a company (or a part of 
it), which also means that only then it can be distinguished from other 
intangible and tangible assets to some extent, and only purely for accounting 
purposes. The problem is that internally generated goodwill may never be 
recorded in this way — and thus be identified. More importantly, goodwill 
cannot be transferred and valued separately in transactions according to 
current Russian law and legal literature. In business restructurings, the above 
mentioned means that there are strong grounds for concluding that a possible 
transfer of goodwill (as well as going concern value) in the course of a business 
restructuring cannot be distinguished from other asset transfers, and 
therefore it cannot also fall within the scope of application of the Russian 
transfer pricing regulations in this context as a separate asset.  
 
This interpretation is also supported by the fact that, ultimately, goodwill 
cannot be regarded as intellectual property under Russian law. Article 1225 of 
the Civil Code does not mention it as one of the intellectual properties 
protected by Russian law. Also, according to the Russian legal literature, 
goodwill is generally considered to be an intangible asset, but not specifically 
an intellectual property safeguarded by the Russian legislation.417 Due to the 
fact that goodwill cannot be not regarded as intellectual property under 
Russian law, it does not fulfill the requirement set by the previously discussed 
Minfin’s written clarifications and the FTS’s letter, and therefore it cannot fall 
within the scope of application of the Tax Code’s transfer pricing rules and be 
subject to transfer pricing. Finally, also tax practitioners have found it 
impossible that the current Russian transfer pricing rules could be applied to 
transactions concerning transfers of goodwill and/or going concern value, and 
hence they have not applied the rules to such transfers either.418 Consequently, 
when cross-border business restructurings involve transfers of goodwill 
and/or going concern value together with other asset transfers, they very likely 
fall outside the scope of application of the Tax Code’s transfer pricing 
provisions, and are not objects of transfer pricing. 
 
                                                 
 
416 Prikaz Minfina Rossii ot 27.12.2007 N 153n (red. ot 16.05.2016) "Ob utverzhdenii Polozheniya po 
bukhgalterskomu uchetu "Uchet nematerial'nykh aktivov" (PBU 14/2007)" (Zaregistrirovano v 
Minyuste Rossii 23.01.2008 N 10975) and PBU 14/2007, Section VIII. 
417 Azgaldov – Karpova 2006, p. 86. 
418 Expert Interview 2012. 
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The existing legal situation in Russia can be heavily criticized from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle. Although goodwill (as well as going 
concern value) cannot be transferred separately from other assets in 
transactions conducted between independent parties, it is clear that such value 
would nevertheless be compensated when a complex of assets or a business 
unit is transferred between unrelated parties. In such situations, independent 
parties would likely compensate such transactions on an aggregate basis, 
which would also cover the transfer of goodwill. As the arm’s length principle 
requires that transactions conducted between related parties should 
ultimately conform to transactions conducted between unrelated parties in 
comparable circumstances in terms of commercial conditions, related parties 
should also compensate transfers of goodwill at least so that its value should 
be included in the aggregate compensation amount of a going 
concern/complex of assets. 
 
As discussed, the current Russian transfer pricing regulations and the 
interpretation thereof does not allow such a conclusion that business 
restructurings could be regarded as transfers of a going concern, even when a 
functioning business unit is transferred. Consequently, related parties should 
review and compensate all transfers of assets that have occurred in the 
restructuring on a transaction-by-transaction basis, if they fall within the 
scope of the transfer pricing rules. This means that transfers of goodwill will 
fall outside the scope of the transfer pricing rules entirely, and therefore they 
do not have to be taken into account in the arm’s length analysis of related 
party transactions involving transfers of them in the business restructuring 
context. The sum of separate compensations paid in a business restructuring 
for transfers of assets/something of value by related parties may thus deviate 
remarkably from the aggregate valuation of such assets/something of value 
applied by independent parties, as the latter approach may also take into 
consideration the value of goodwill. In this sense, the purpose of the arm’s 
length principle, which should be the guiding principle behind the national 
transfer pricing provisions in Russia, is not necessarily completely realized in 
this particular transfer pricing question. Hence, the Tax Code’s transfer 
pricing rules should be amended de lege ferenda to better meet the aims of the 
arm’s length principle in this regard.  
 
In Finland, the concept of goodwill is similarly understood. Goodwill is a value 
stemming from (positive) reputation and brand recognition of a company,419 
and, despite the fact that it has not been specifically defined in the legislation, 
it has been protected in the case law.420 In accounting, goodwill is defined as 
                                                 
 
419 Haarmann – Mansala 2012, p. 174. 
420 See e.g. decisions MAO 121/2012 and MAO 381/2012 of the Finnish Market Court. The basis for the 
legal protection is regulated in § 1 of the Finnish Unfair Business Practices Act, according to which in 
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the difference between the yield value and the net asset value, which arises 
from the fact that the value of a company as a whole is greater than the sum of 
the book values of the individual production factors.421 The concept of going 
concern value, on the other hand, has not been discussed in the Finnish legal 
literature. Usually the factors, which create going concern value for the 
company in the above-discussed manner, such as customer relationships, 
existing agreements and the place of business, are considered to be the basis 
for the creation of goodwill.422 It seems that, as was the case in Russia, the 
concept of going concern value is not separated from the concept of goodwill 
as independent intangible asset type under Finnish law, but is more likely 
included in the latter concept. 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines define the concepts of goodwill and 
going concern value in the aforementioned manner broadly. According to the 
guidelines, it does not even matter whether, or not, certain factors are 
characterized as goodwill or going concern value. These kinds of factors, such 
as a reputation for manufacturing high quality products, must be taken into 
account in determining the arm’s length compensation despite the 
characterization, if such factors would affect the remuneration paid in 
transactions between independent parties.423 As Finnish tax law does not 
provide definitions of goodwill and going concern value for transfer pricing 
purposes, the OECD’s definitions and the aforesaid approach must primarily 
be followed also in Finland.  
 
The Finnish transfer pricing regulations contain no specific mention of 
goodwill or going concern value either, nor potential applicability of § 31 of the 
AAP to transactions involving transfers of them. Pursuant to the preliminary 
works424 and the Tax Administration’s memorandum,425 intangible assets fall 
in general within the scope of application of the Finnish transfer pricing 
provisions. Furthermore, the Tax Administration’s memorandum mentions 
that term “intangible property” must be understood broadly for transfer 
pricing purposes, and it does not matter whether the intangible property is 
                                                 
 
business activities, no practices contrary to good business practice or which could otherwise be unfair to 
other entrepreneurs can be used.  
421 Bergström 2002, p. 463; Kaisanlahti – Jänkälä – Björklund 2009, p. 198. 
422 Mähönen – Villa 2015, p. 256; Kaisanlahti – Jänkälä – Björklund 2009, p. 199. It must be noted that 
in the legal literature the principle of going concern has been recognized as an accounting principle, 
which refers to the continuity of business activities of a company in future. See about this in Kaisanlahti 
– Jänkälä – Björklund 2009, pp. 93–94. 
423 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.28. 
424 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. 
425 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 24. 
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registered or transferable.426 Taking the above into account, and the fact that 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines mention goodwill and going concern 
value as intangible asset types subject to transfer pricing,427 transactions 
involving transfers of goodwill/going concern value should primarily fall 
within the scope of application of the Finnish transfer pricing provisions too, 
if they would be remunerated in transactions performed between unrelated 
parties. 
 
On the other hand, the question of whether transfer of goodwill and/or going 
concern value can be subject to transfer pricing separately in the business 
restructuring context is more troublesome. As mentioned above, goodwill 
generally lacks the ability to be transferred alone.428 This is also the case in 
Finland. Basically, only goodwill arising from corporate acquisition and 
mergers can be recorded as goodwill on the company’s balance sheet.429 The 
difference between the yield value and the net asset value is in this case 
recorded as goodwill.430 In this way, goodwill value can, to some extent, be 
separated solely for accounting purposes. Conversely, it has been stated that 
internally generated goodwill can be never recorded, even for accounting 
purposes, as an intangible asset on the company’s balance sheet,431 and 
therefore it cannot then be distinguished from other assets.  
 
Although goodwill can under some circumstances be recorded on the balance 
sheet of a company, it still lacks the ability to be transferred separately from 
other assets. Goodwill is always closely linked to the valuation of a whole 
company/business unit. This means that goodwill cannot actually be assigned 
and valued separately in transactions, where a functioning business is not 
transferred at the same time. This view has also been shared in the Finnish 
legal literature. It has been stated that, in light of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, it does not seem to be possible or justified that, if a going concern 
(business unit) is not transferred in the course of a business restructuring, the 
goodwill could be taken into account in the valuation.432  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have also confirmed this observation 
in their newest provisions. According to the new provisions, it is “generally 
recognized” that goodwill and going concern values cannot be transferred 
separately but only together with other assets belonging to the company’s 
                                                 
 
426 Ibid. 
427 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.18, 6.27–6.28. 
428 Finan – Launiau 2011, p. 3; Cordova et al. 2012, p. 47. 
429 Mähönen – Villa 2015, p. 256 
430 Bergström 2002, p. 463; Kaisanlahti – Jänkälä – Björklund 2009, p. 198. 
431 See e.g. Bergström 2002, p. 463; Leppiniemi – Kaisanlahti 2016, p. 183. 
432 Knuutinen 2015, p. 1067. 
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business. As such, the guidelines refer to the provisions of Chapter IX of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which generally regulate transfer and 
valuation of a going concern in the business restructuring context.433 This is a 
strong indication that possible transfers of goodwill and/or going concern 
value (whether included in the concept of goodwill or not, and whether 
characterized as goodwill/going concern value or not) in the course of a 
business restructurings may not be conducted at all separately from other 
asset transfers under Finnish law too, but only as part of a going concern, if 
such can be deemed to be transferred in the business restructuring.  
 
Therefore, taking into consideration that the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines must be followed in practice in Finland and that Finnish law does 
not recognize a particular possibility of transferring goodwill/going concern 
value separately in the above-mentioned manner, it is clear that transactions 
involving transfers of goodwill/going concern value may not fall within the 
scope of application of the Finnish transfer pricing provisions as separate 
items in business restructurings. On the other hand, when a business 
restructuring involves a transfer of a going concern, goodwill/going concern 
value should be included in the going concern, and the arm’s length 
compensation shall be determined on an aggregate basis in that case for the 
whole functioning business unit (going concern).434 Ultimately, 
goodwill/going concern value is thus the object of transfer pricing as a part of 
the going concern. Consequently, a major difference is evident between 
Russian and Finnish law in this regard; as the Russian transfer pricing rules 
do not recognize the possibility of transferring a going concern, transfers of 
goodwill/going concern value are never subject to transfer pricing — which is 
troublesome from the perspective of the arm’s length principle.  
 
In contrast, the current legal situation in Finland is in line with the arm’s 
length principle. Goodwill and going concern value lack the ability of being 
separated from other assets. Nevertheless, they clearly have commercial value 
that would be compensated in transactions between independent parties.435 
For instance, when a business is transferred in a business acquisition between 
independent parties, the value paid for the business may exceed the total value 
of the assets belonging to the business unit, and such value may even be 
recorded in the balance sheet as goodwill.436 Therefore, as related parties must 
take into consideration possible transfers of goodwill/going concern value in 
a business restructuring, when a functioning business unit (going concern) is 
                                                 
 
433 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.27.  
434 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.69. 
435 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.27–6.28. 
436 Mähönen – Villa 2015, p. 256; IFRS 3, 32; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68–9.69. 
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transferred, related parties are put in the same position as unrelated parties in 
comparable circumstances.  
 
In the USA, goodwill and going concern value are considered to represent the 
operational value of an on-going business; these intangible assets are the 
attributes that make the value of a business worth more than its individual 
parts altogether.437 Traditionally, goodwill has been defined as “the value of a 
trade or business attributable to the expectancy of continued customer 
patronage. This expectancy may be due to the name or reputation of a trade or 
business or any other factor.”438 As such, the concept of goodwill is understood 
in a similar way as in Russia and Finland, as well as under the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines.  
 
In contrast to Russian and Finnish law, U.S. law has also specifically dealt with 
the concept of going concern value, and it cannot be therefore deemed to be 
included in the concept of goodwill under U.S. law. Going concern value has 
been defined as “the value attributable to the ability of a trade or business (or 
a part of a trade or business) to continue functioning or generating income 
without interruption notwithstanding a change in ownership.”439 In case law, 
going concern value has been defined, inter alia, as an additional value, which 
“attaches to property by reason of its existence an integral part of a going 
concern.”440 These definitions are in line with the general definition of going 
concern value above and with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
 
As it was earlier discussed, the intangible property subject to transfer pricing 
under U.S. tax law is regulated in Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC as well as in 
the corresponding Treasury Regulations under Section 482 of the IRC.441 The 
lists do not specifically mention either goodwill or going concern value as 
intangible property falling within the scope of application of the U.S. transfer 
pricing regulations. Nonetheless, the lists are not exhaustive and refer to 
“other similar items”, which also are regarded as intangible property. For the 
purposes of Section 482 of the IRC, “an item is considered similar to those 
listed in paragraph (b)(1) through (5) of this section if it derives its value not 
from its physical attributes but from its intellectual content or other intangible 
properties.” In the legal literature, there have been discussions about whether 
goodwill and going concern value could be regarded as “other similar items,” 
                                                 
 
437 Darby 2006, pp. 40–41. 
438 Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1(b)(2)(ii). 
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440 VGS Corp. v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 563 (1977). See also e.g. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. United 
States, 444 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1971). See in general about the case law as to going concern value in King 
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but no consensus has been reached on the question.442 The IRS has interpreted 
the issue in its transfer pricing audits so that it considers goodwill and going 
concern value as other similar items falling under the definition of intangible 
property subject to transfer pricing,443 although the issue has remained 
ambiguous.  
 
However, in Veritas444, which dealt with the valuation of intangibles for a buy-
in-transaction of a cost sharing arrangement, the Tax Court finally took a stand 
on the question. Pursuant to the decision, the Tax Court was of the opinion 
that goodwill and going concern value may not be regarded as “other similar 
items” and therefore as intangible property for the purposes of Section 
936(h)(3)(B) and correspondingly for transfer pricing purposes (for the 
purpose of Section 482 of the IRC). Although the IRS did not appeal against 
this decision, it did not nevertheless agree with the Tax Court and did not 
consequently change its interpretation of the issue, as it considered the 
decision erroneous.445 Thus, the decision brought no long-awaited clarity to 
the question.  
 
On the other hand, in this connection, the aforementioned exception rule in 
Section 367 of the IRC regarding tax-free transfers of assets (in connection 
with an exchange) by a U.S. company to a foreign company must also be taken 
into consideration. According to the rule, such transfers may be considered 
free of taxes if the assets will be used in the active conduct of a trade or a 
business of the foreign company outside the USA.446 As it was discussed above, 
pursuant to Section 367(d) of the IRC, this exception cannot be applied to 
transfers of intangible property (with the meaning of Section 936(h)(3)(B) of 
the IRC). This means that outbound transfers of such intangibles are always 
subject to U.S. taxes and therefore also to transfer pricing. As the ambiguity 
with regard to goodwill and going concern value even after Veritas still 
remains (i.e. whether they could be regarded as Section 936(h)(3)(B) 
intangibles), it has been unclear for some time whether the exception rule 
could be applied to outbound transfers involving them. Respectively, it has 
also been thus ambiguous whether they could fall outside the scope of the 
transfer pricing rules at least in the event of the above-mentioned exchanges. 
 
                                                 
 
442 See more about the debate in Aksakal – Femia 2013, p. 3 (especially footnote 16). 
443 MacGregor 2014, p. 2. 
444 Veritas Software Corporation v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 297 (2009). 
445 Silverman – Kidder – Gordon 2014, pp. 226–233; Aksakal – Femia 2013, p. 5; Hoffman – Zollo 2011, 
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446 Section 367(a)(1) and Section 367(a)(3)(A) of the IRC.  
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Nonetheless, it must be observed that the Treasury Regulations interpreting 
Section 367 contained previously, until 16 December 2016, particular 
provisions, according to which outbound transfers of foreign goodwill and 
foreign going concern value447 could — in contrast to intangibles with the 
meaning of Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC — qualify for the tax-free 
treatment.448 Thus, the Treasury Regulations in this sense previously 
confirmed explicitly the applicability of the exception rule to outbound 
transfers of foreign goodwill and going concern value to the extent such 
transfers met the requirements for such a treatment. It was interpreted in the 
legal literature that this exception was correspondingly also applicable to 
outbound transfers of domestic goodwill and going concern value under the 
same circumstances.449 In the transfer pricing context, this meant that at least 
outbound transfers of goodwill and going concern value, which met the 
requirements of the exception rule (active conduct of a trade or a business of 
the foreign company outside the USA), were not in the scope of application of 
the U.S. transfer pricing rules either. As this exception required that the assets 
were also transferred in connection with exchanges for shares in the event of 
liquidation, incorporation or reorganization, such tax-free transfers 
nonetheless ultimately fell outside the concept of business restructurings, at 
least to the extent discussed in this research. 
 
The question with respect to outbound transfers of goodwill and going concern 
value (both domestic and foreign) and the general treatment thereof for tax 
and transfer pricing purposes has become somewhat clearer just recently. The 
U.S. Treasury Department, as well as the U.S. Administration, have in recent 
years focused on preventing possible base erosion resulting in particular from 
outbound transfers of intangibles, including transfers of foreign goodwill and 
going concern value. Especially the Treasury Regulations, which allowed the 
tax-free treatment for outbound transfers of (foreign) goodwill and going 
concern value, when transferred to active foreign businesses, were considered 
troublesome.450 As a result of many years’ preparatory work, the U.S. Treasury 
Department and the IRS published proposed regulations on 14 September 
2015 and final regulations on 16 December 2016 to address their concerns. The 
                                                 
 
447 Foreign goodwill and going concern value was defined in the former § 1.367(a)–1T(d)(5)(iii) of the 
Treasury Regulations as follows: “Foreign goodwill or going concern value is the residual value of a 
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regulations bring clarity to the question concerning the tax treatment of 
outbound transfers of intangible assets, including goodwill and going concern 
value.  
 
Pursuant to the aforesaid final regulations, the exception rule allowing 
outbound transfers of assets free of taxes, if the assets were transferred to a 
foreign company for its use in an active business outside the USA, would no 
longer be applicable to any kind of intangible property whatsoever (not only 
intangibles mentioned in Section 936(h)(3)(B)), therefore also including 
goodwill and going concern value.451 Accordingly, the special treatment of 
foreign goodwill and going concern value has been removed from the 
regulations, and all outbound transfers of intangibles are subject to U.S. tax: 
the intangible assets with the meaning of Section 936(h)(3)(B) under a royalty 
treatment in Section 367(d), other intangibles not listed in Section 
936(h)(3)(B) (such as goodwill and going concern value) either similarly or 
through the gain recognition regulated in Section 367(a)(1).452 The Treasury 
Regulations were validated, among other things, with the need to address the 
current state, where “certain taxpayers attempt to avoid recognizing gain or 
income attributable to high-value intangible property by asserting that an 
inappropriately large share (in many cases, the majority) of the value of the 
property transferred is foreign goodwill or going concern value that is eligible 
for favorable treatment under section 367.’’453 Nevertheless, the regulations 
have been heavily criticized by practitioners, as they have been considered to 
be inconsistent with the legislative history of Section 367.454  
 
From the aforementioned Treasury Regulations results that the transfer 
pricing treatment of outbound transfers of goodwill and going concern value 
could have changed correspondingly. This would mean that such transfers 
would also fall within the scope of the transfer pricing provisions due to the 
fact that they are subject to the income taxation in otherwise tax-free 
transactions (reorganizations etc.). This view may be supported by the fact that 
the new Treasury Regulations discussed above also contain an express 
reference to Section 482. Pursuant to the regulations, “in cases in which a U.S. 
transferor's transfer of property to a foreign corporation [in the Section 367 
context] constitutes a controlled transaction as defined in § 1.482-1(i)(8), the 
value of the property transferred is determined in accordance with section 482 
and the regulations thereunder.”455 This indicates that, if an outbound transfer 
of property subject to tax in accordance with Section 367 is conducted between 
                                                 
 
451 See Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-2(a)(2) and § 1.367(a)-2(b). 
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controlled parties, such transfers are primarily subject to the transfer pricing 
rules and therefore to the arm’s length valuation as regulated in Section 482 
and corresponding regulations. The preamble of the said regulations confirms 
this by referring to the Treasury Regulations of Section 482, which in general 
regulate the coordination of different provisions of the IRC, such as Section 
367 and 482.456  
 
From this perspective, the IRS thus requires that, if something of value subject 
to taxation pursuant to the IRC’s provisions is transferred between related 
parties, such as goodwill or going concern value at present, it must be 
compensated at arm’s length in accordance with Section 482 and the Treasury 
Regulations thereunder. In this sense, the IRS seems to have taken the same 
approach as it has in Veritas,457 although it did not take a stand in the new 
regulations on whether goodwill and going concern value should be regarded 
as intangibles property within the meaning of Section 936(h)(3)(B).458 
 
Hence, as a consequence of the above, it is very likely that outbound transfers 
of both domestic and foreign goodwill/going concern value fall nowadays 
within the scope of Section 482 of the IRC and corresponding Treasury 
Regulations. As all outbound transfers of intangibles are now subject to 
income taxation, and when taking into consideration the IRS’s 
aforementioned Treasury Regulations with references to Section 482 
transactions in this connection, such an approach has strong legal grounds. 
Nonetheless, this interpretation is strict, and also conflicting interpretations 
of the question are possible under the existing law, i.e. transfers of goodwill 
and going concern value would not be subject to transfer pricing and Section 
482 of the IRC at all, mainly due to Veritas. As the findings of the case have 
not yet been overruled, one could still refer to it. However, in order to avoid 
possible disputes with the IRS, it is more reasonable to apply the above-
mentioned approach, according to which controlled transfers of goodwill and 
going concern value fall currently within the scope of the U.S. transfer pricing 
rules. This view is also justified from the perspective of the arm’s length 
principle. As independent parties would usually compensate the value of 
goodwill/going concern value had the transaction involving transfers thereof 
                                                 
 
456 See 81 Fed. Reg. 91013. Pursuant to the referred regulations, “a coordinated best 
method analysis and evaluation of two or more controlled transactions to which one or more provisions 
of the Code or regulations apply may be necessary to ensure that the overall value provided, including 
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Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(f)(2)(i)(A). 
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occurred between them, and when also taking into consideration that 
outbound transfers of such assets are subject to taxation, related parties are 
thus in the same position as unrelated parties. The approach is also in line with 
the Finnish OECD based approach. 
 
Nevertheless, the current situation can be criticized. The existing tax and 
transfer pricing rules cause unnecessary interpretive problems. The transfer 
pricing treatment of this particular transfer pricing question is not foreseeable, 
because of the lack of express mentions of goodwill/going concern value even 
in the newest Treasury Regulations and the fact that Veritas has not been yet 
overruled. Hence, there is a clear need for either new court decisions or 
amendments to the Treasury Regulations to clarify eventually, whether 
goodwill and going concern value may be regarded as intangibles for the 
purpose of Section 482. One alternative could be that goodwill and going 
concern value would be expressly regulated as types of intangible property in 
Section 936(h)(3)(B)) of the IRC and corresponding Treasury Regulations 
interpreting Section 482.   
 
On the other hand, to discuss whether transfers of goodwill and going concern 
value could fall within scope of application of the U.S. transfer pricing rules as 
separate items in business restructurings, they should also be distinguishable 
from other possible asset transfers occurring in the course of a business 
restructuring as well as that they should have separate commercial value, 
which would be compensated in transactions between independent parties. As 
it can be seen from the definitions of the concepts of goodwill and going 
concern value under U.S. law above, they are closely linked to an operational 
value of an on-going business, and in this sense have clearly commercial value. 
However, the value regarded as goodwill and/or going concern value arises 
from the existence of a going concern/business, and therefore it cannot be 
present alone or separately from such a business. It is also generally regarded 
in the legislation and regulations459 as well as the legal literature460 that 
goodwill and going concern value lack the ability to be valued and transferred 
separately from a business. 
 
Thus, although the outbound transfers of goodwill and going concern value 
would be considered to fall within the scope of application of the U.S. transfer 
pricing rules pursuant to the new regulations in the above-discussed manner, 
that would not result in that transfers of goodwill and going concern value 
could be subject to transfer pricing in business restructurings as separate 
items, as they cannot be transferred separately from a business. On the other 
                                                 
 
459 See e.g. Section 1060 of the IRC and Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1(b)(2)(ii). See also former § 1.367(a)–
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hand, when a functioning business unit, going concern, is transferred in a 
business restructuring, goodwill and going concern value should be taken into 
consideration in the transfer pricing analysis as a part of the transferring 
business unit, because the transfer pricing valuation in that case shall be made 
on an aggregate basis. 
 
Despite the lack of clarity on the current legal state, at least to a certain degree, 
U.S. law and Finnish law seem to be in line with each other in terms of transfer 
pricing of goodwill and going concern value. Due to the nature of the assets, 
goodwill and going concern value lack the ability of being transferred 
separately from other assets. As business restructurings can be regarded for 
transfer pricing purposes as transfers of a going concern under both countries’ 
laws, such intangibles should be included in the transfer pricing analysis of a 
going concern. As discussed, this approach is in line with the arm’s length 
principle, as independent parties would also very likely remunerate transfers 
of such assets as a part of business valuation in comparable situations.461 
Nonetheless, as business restructurings may not be considered transfers of a 
going concern under Russian law, transactions involving transfers of 
goodwill/going concern value fall outside the scope of the Russian transfer 
pricing provisions. Thus, related parties are treated differently in comparison 
with independent parties — which is against the whole purpose of the arm’s 
length principle — and therefore new regulation should be adopted in Russia 
in this respect. 
 
3.6.6 OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
Intellectual property rights, know-how and trade secrets as well as goodwill 
and going concern value are not the only intangible assets transferable from a 
group company to another in business restructurings. It is also possible that a 
business restructuring involves transfers of intangibles, which are not legally 
protected by national regulations and/or recorded on a company’s balance 
sheet.462 Nevertheless, transfers of such intangible assets also must be taken 
into consideration when business restructurings are examined from a transfer 
pricing perspective. 
 
IFRS 3 standard, for instance, can be helpful in pointing out intangible assets, 
which may not be recorded on companies’ balance sheets but may still be 
transferred in business restructurings from one group company to another. 
Although IFRS 3 concerns business combinations, not business 
restructurings, the intangible assets transferred in both kinds of transactions 
                                                 
 
461 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.27–6.28, 9.68–9.70. 
462 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.55. 
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may be similar or even the same. IFRS 3 lists, among other things, intangible 
assets related to customers, technology and agreements, such as customer lists 
and relationships, unpatented technologies and construction licenses.463   
 
According to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, in the transfer pricing 
analysis of a business restructuring it is essential to identify all the relevant 
intangible assets or rights in intangibles, which have been transferred in the 
restructuring between related parties, after which it must be examined 
whether independent parties would compensate such transfers in transactions 
under similar circumstances. Provided that these requirements are met, such 
transfers shall be subject to transfer pricing in accordance with the arm’s 
length principle. To name a few, the OECD explicitly mentions customer lists, 
distribution channels and contractual rights as examples of these kinds of 
intangible assets, which could be transferred specifically in the business 
restructuring context.464  
 
As it was discussed earlier, Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines defines the concept of intangible asset broadly for transfer pricing 
purposes, and it may cover a wide range of valuable non-physical assets that 
are used in commercial activities and whose transfer would be remunerated in 
transactions conducted between independent parties. This may include also 
intangibles, which are not recognized as intangible properties in accounting.465 
Thus, apart from the above-mentioned intellectual property rights, goodwill 
and going concern value, such intangibles may also be, inter alia, government 
licenses and concessions.466 Therefore, the intangible assets, which must be 
taken into consideration in the transfer pricing analysis of a business 
restructuring, are not limited only to the assets, which are expressly 
mentioned in Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, but also 
transfers of any other intangible assets falling under the broad definition of 
intangible asset must be taken into account.467 
 
It may be considered highly unlikely that the said intangible assets and 
transfers thereof would currently become objects of transfer pricing in Russia. 
The Minfin’s and the FTS’s interpretations of stretching the scope of 
application of the transfer pricing provisions to transfers of intellectual 
property rights cannot be applied to other intangible assets. Although 
transfers of these kinds of intangible assets could be identified and separated 
                                                 
 
463 IFRS 3, Appendix B, B31–B34. See in more detail e.g. Catty 2010, pp. 244–246. 
464 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.55 and 9.66. 
465 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.6 and 6.7. 
466 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.24. 
467 For this purpose, Chapter IX’s regulations with regard to transferring intangibles in the business 
restructuring context expressly refer to Chapter VI; see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.56. 
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from other transferred assets in business restructurings and they would have 
the kind of commercial value that would be compensated in transactions 
between independent parties under similar conditions, they are not by nature 
intellectual properties under Russian law. That would require that they would 
be defined and protected as intellectual properties in the Civil Code. The 
aforesaid view is supported by the fact that also tax practitioners are of the 
opinion that transfers of such intangible assets do not have to be taken into 
account, when transfer pricing provisions are applied in practice. They have 
validated this approach by referring to the Tax Code’s new transfer pricing 
rules, which do not expressly deal with transfers of these types of assets.468 
Moreover, no contradictory interpretations of the question can be found from 
other legal sources. 
 
Thus, as it stands, transfers of such intangible assets that are not legally 
protected as intellectual properties under Russian law cannot fall within the 
scope of application of the Russian transfer pricing regulations, when 
occurring in the course of business restructurings. The IFRS 3 accounting 
standard, as well as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, therefore provide 
an excellent demonstration of intangible assets, which in general may be 
transferred in business restructurings between related parties, but which also 
very likely fall outside the scope of application of the Russian transfer pricing 
provisions, except for intellectual properties. 
 
It was already previously discussed that the existing situation in Russia in this 
regard is troublesome. One may criticize why the Tax Code has not dealt with 
the transfer pricing aspects of intangibles at all, as the newest transfer pricing 
regulations in general follow the principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. Furthermore, in light of the current Tax Code’s provisions, no 
reasons are evident why the FTS and the Minfin have come to the conclusion 
that controlled transfers of intellectual properties fall within the scope of the 
Tax Code’s transfer pricing rules, while the applicability of the rules to 
transfers of intangibles generally remain unconsidered and undiscussed. This, 
in turn, creates problems from the perspective of the arm’s length principle. 
Other intangibles may also have commercial value that would be compensated 
in transactions between independent parties, such as the above-mentioned 
customer lists and permits. In consequence, related parties and independent 
parties are now treated differently, which is contrary to the whole purpose of 
the arm’s length principle. Hence, there are needs for improvements de lege 
ferenda in the legislation in this respect. 
 
In contrast to Russia, the intangibles falling within the scope of application of 
the Finnish transfer pricing provisions are not limited to legally protected 
                                                 
 
468 Expert Interview 2012. 
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intellectual property rights. As a starting point, transactions involving 
transfers of intangible assets are generally in the scope of the Finnish transfer 
pricing provisions pursuant to the preliminary works of the AAP469 and the 
Tax Administration’s memorandum470. The precise definition of intangible 
asset under Finnish law has been left open for transfer pricing purposes. It is 
noteworthy to observe that, pursuant to the preliminary works, among other 
things, the earlier mentioned customer lists and distribution channels are 
regarded as intangible assets subject to transfer pricing.471 Furthermore, the 
Tax Administration’s memorandum confirms this and also mentions other 
examples of intangible assets, such as production and manufacturing 
networks and other similar assets difficult to determine or define. According 
to the memorandum, the concept of intangible property must be understood 
broadly, and attention must be paid as to whether the asset in question would 
constitute profits in transactions between independent parties. Although the 
asset cannot be registered or lacks transferability, it may be considered an 
intangible asset for transfer pricing purposes.472 Finnish law is thus in line 
with the above-mentioned provisions of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines: the decisive factor is ultimately whether unrelated parties would 
compensate transfers of such assets in corresponding conditions. 
 
As there are no discrepancies between Finnish law and the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines in this respect, the above-discussed Chapter IX’s guidance 
should primarily be followed also in Finland, as it contains specific rules on 
the transfer pricing of intangibles in the business restructuring context. First, 
this means that the concept of intangible asset must be understood broadly for 
transfer pricing purposes, and all transfers of relevant intangibles or rights in 
intangibles must be identified and separated from other possible transfers 
occurring in the course of a business restructuring in order to become separate 
objects of transfer pricing.473 The intangible assets, which could potentially fall 
within the scope of application of the Finnish transfer pricing rules, should not 
be limited to the examples of intangibles provided in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and the Finnish sources of law above.  
 
Second, when all transactions involving transfers of relevant intangible 
properties have been identified in the above-discussed manner, especially of 
great importance is to examine whether independent parties would 
compensate transfers of such intangibles in their transactions under similar 
circumstances. If this is the case, such transfers should primarily fall within 
                                                 
 
469 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. 
470 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 24. 
471 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 16. 
472 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 24. 
473 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.55. 
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the scope of application of the Finnish transfer pricing provisions in the 
business restructuring, and an arm’s length compensation for such transfers 
should be determined accordingly.474 The transfer pricing analysis must be 
therefore done on a transaction-by-transaction/asset-by-asset basis.  
 
A wider range of intangible assets are likely to fall within the scope of 
application of the national transfer pricing rules in cross-border business 
restructurings as separate items under Finnish law as compared to Russian 
law, as the concept of intangibles must be understood broadly. Moreover, it 
must be noted that some intangibles, transfers of which would be remunerated 
in transactions between unrelated parties, may not necessarily be separated 
from a complex of assets, a business unit. Such assets should be taken into 
account correspondingly, when an arm’s length compensation is determined 
for the transfer of a going concern occurred in the business restructuring.475 
Contrary to Russia, the arm’s length principle is hence followed effectively in 
business restructuring cases involving transfers of intangibles in general (not 
only legally protected intangibles or intangibles recorded in the balance sheet). 
This is mainly a result of the broad definition of intangible asset applied in 
Finland for transfer pricing purposes, which always requires the 
aforementioned examination of whether independent parties would 
compensate transfers of such assets in comparable circumstances. 
 
As discussed, the forms of intangible property subject to transfer pricing under 
the U.S. transfer pricing provisions are listed in detail in Section 936(h)(3)(B) 
of the IRC and the corresponding Treasury Regulations.476 In addition to the 
aforementioned intellectual property rights, know-how and information that 
may be regarded as trade secret (formulas, patterns etc.), also other type of 
assets may be considered as intangible property for the purposes of Section 
482. These assets — which conform to a large extent to the examples 
mentioned in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the sources of 
Finnish law above — may be, among other things, franchises, licenses, 
contracts, campaigns, surveys, studies, forecasts, estimates, customer lists and 
technical data.477  
 
It must be noted that the list is not exhaustive, and therefore “other similar 
items” are also regarded as intangible property for the purposes of Section 
482. As it was discussed earlier, an item is considered similar “if it derives its 
value not from its physical attributes but from its intellectual content or other 
                                                 
 
474 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.55. 
475 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68–9.69. 
476 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b). 
477 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b)(4)–(5). 
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intangible properties.”478 In this sense, the concept of intangible property for 
transfer pricing purposes must be understood broadly also under U.S. law. 
Nevertheless, there ambiguity may exist as to whether certain intangible assets 
meet the requirements of being “other similar items” for the purposes of 
Section 482. As was the case with goodwill and going concern value, the IRS 
and the Tax Court may interpret the same issue differently for transfer pricing 
purposes.479 As the outbound transfers of intangible assets are at present 
subject to income taxation even in cases, where transactions would otherwise 
be qualified for a tax-free treatment,480 this strongly indicates that the IRS may 
require that an arm’s length compensation must nowadays be paid in general 
                                                 
 
478 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b)(6). 
479 It must be observed that, in recent years, the transfer pricing treatment of the so-called workforce in 
place has been of great interest in the U.S. transfer pricing. Workforce in place, or assembled workforce, 
includes “the composition of a workforce (for example, the experience, education, or training of a 
workforce), the terms and conditions of employment whether contractual or otherwise, and any other 
value placed on employees or any of their attributes,” see Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(3). Workforce in place 
has not been listed as a form of intangible property under Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC, and therefore 
taxpayers have been of the opinion that it may not be subject to the transfer pricing rules. On the 
contrary, the IRS has regarded workforce in place as “other similar item” and accordingly as intangible 
property subject to U.S. tax and transfer pricing. In Veritas, the Tax Court ruled that goodwill, going 
concern value and workforce in place may not be considered intangible properties within the definition 
set forth in Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC and therefore for transfer pricing purposes. As it was 
discussed earlier, the IRS disagreed with the ruling and regarded it erroneous, and thus there still exists 
to some extent unclarity as to whether workforce in place can be regarded as intangible property for 
transfer pricing purposes; see Fuller – Bassett – Skinner 2007, pp. 16–19; Silverman – Kidder – Gordon 
2014, pp. 226–233; Oates – O’Brien 2013, pp. 6–9; Yoder 2012, p. 4.  
The Obama Administration proposed changes in the legislation that would address the current unclear 
situation by suggesting that workforce in place should be included in the definition of intangible property 
for Section 482 purposes. However, any actual legislative changes have not been yet enacted on the basis 
of the proposal; see Silverman – Kidder – Gordon 2014, pp. 232–233; Anson – Bress – Dubert – Collins 
– Quinn – Lubkin 2009, pp. 1–4. Nevertheless, as goodwill and going concern value do not qualify 
anymore for the exception rule (active business outside the USA) under Section 367 of the IRC, and 
correspondingly outbound transfers of intangible assets are in general subject to taxation at present, this 
may mean that, similar to goodwill and going concern value, also workforce in place may be nowadays 
regarded as a target of transfer pricing – at least by the IRS. In this respective, U.S. law deviates from 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and consequently from Finnish law, as the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines has dealt with assembled workforce only as a factor which must be taken into account in the 
comparability analysis and ultimately in determining the arm’s length value in particular for a transfer 
of a going concern; see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.152–1.153, 6.138, 9.68.  
480 See the earlier discussed Treas. Reg. § 1.367(a)-1(b)(5), § 1.367(a)-2(a)(2), § 1.367(a)-2(b) and § 
1.367(d)-1(c)(3). 
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for controlled transfers of intangibles, provided that such transfers would be 
compensated in transactions executed between independent parties.481  
 
In the business restructuring context, the above mentioned means that, as was 
the case in Finland, taxpayers should first identify all noteworthy transfers of 
intangible property occurring in the course of a business restructuring. In 
particular, if the restructuring involves transfers of intangible property listed 
expressly under Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC and the Treasury Regulations, 
such transfers will primarily fall within the scope of application of the U.S. 
transfer pricing rules, if they would be remunerated between unrelated parties 
in the given circumstances. However, related parties must also identify any 
other transfers of intangibles, which could be regarded as “other similar items” 
in accordance with the Treasury Regulations. This requires that transfers of 
such assets are diligently examined on a transaction-by-transaction basis. 
After the successful identification of such intangible assets, it must be 
reviewed whether independent parties would compensate the transfers of 
these intangible assets in their transactions in similar conditions. If both 
requirements are met, such transfers of intangible property will also likely fall 
within the scope of application of the U.S. transfer pricing rules in that 
particular business restructuring, meaning that such transfers must be 
compensated at arm’s length. Similar to Finland, if such assets having 
commercial value may not be separated from a complex of assets, they should 
be subject to transfer pricing as a part of the going concern transferred in the 
business restructuring. 
 
It seems that a broad definition of intangible property for transfer pricing 
purposes, which does not aim at exhaustively determining all the asset types 
falling within the scope of the concept, brings good results in terms of the arm’s 
length principle. As Finland and the USA apply this approach, the decision on 
whether some intangibles fall within the scope of the transfer pricing rules will 
be made ultimately on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration whether 
independent parties would compensate transfers of such non-physical assets 
in comparable circumstances. That kind of analysis brings a taxpayer closer to 
an arm’s length result in comparison with situations where the intangible 
assets subject to transfer pricing would be listed in the national legislation 
exhaustively. The concept of intangible property is broad; consequently, it is a 
difficult, or even impossible, task to explicitly determine all the intangible 
assets that could be deemed to be objects of transfer pricing.  
                                                 
 
481 The arm’s length standard also requires that the results of a related party transaction are consistent 
with the results that would have been realized if independent parties would have engaged in the same 
transaction under the same circumstances, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). This basically means that an 
arm’s length compensation must be paid as a general rule for transfers, which would be compensated in 
transactions between independent parties.  
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However, like in Finland, certain matters remain subject to interpretation 
when the concept of intangible assets is understood broadly. Especially under 
U.S. law, the reference to “other similar items” in the regulations may prove to 
be troublesome in certain cases, as it can be seen above from the question with 
respect to transfer pricing of goodwill and going concern value. Similar 
interpretive problems may arise in the Finnish, OECD-based, approach, if it is 
unclear in a given case whether transfers of certain items or assets should be 
regarded as intangibles and consequently be compensated at arm’s length. 
Nevertheless, the list of expressly mentioned intangibles in the U.S. 
regulations as well as the examples of the OECD already cover a wide range of 
intangible assets that are usually compensated in transactions between 
independent parties, and therefore this observation is rather theoretical 
(except for the mentioned goodwill and going concern value in the USA).  
 
As, in the current situation, the determination of all asset types falling within 
the scope of the concept of intangible assets is likely impossible, the existing 
Finnish and U.S. transfer pricing rules are largely efficient in terms of the 
arm’s length principle. In order to improve the compliance with the aims of 
the arm’s length principle, the current rules could be amended de lege ferenda 
to address the aforementioned ambiguous situations, if certain measures 
could be found, without unnecessarily limiting the scope of the concept of 
intangible assets. Quite the contrary, the Russian rules do not practically 
require complying with the arm’s length principle in the current situation at 
all, due to the lack of relevant regulations in this regard. Hence, as discussed, 
there are urgent needs for improvements de lege ferenda in Russia in this 
respect. 
 
3.7 TRANSFER OF RISKS 
Business restructuring was earlier defined, inter alia, as a cross-border 
restructuring of a multinational enterprise’s risks, activities and assets. 
Transfer of risks is therefore also a transfer pricing question of great 
importance in business restructurings. Risks often relate to profit generation 
as well as to expected returns on investments.482 When business models and 
strategies are amended, it is not unusual that some of the local activities of a 
multinational enterprise are also converted into low-risk operations. 
Consequently, the local group company’s profit will be relatively low in the 
future, as the entrepreneurial risks are now borne by another group company, 
which is entitled to profit in accordance with the (increased) entrepreneurial 
                                                 
 
482 Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 34. 
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risks.483 In the legal literature, it has been discussed whether transfers of risks 
could fall within the scope of transfer pricing regulations in business 
restructurings, when a group company transfers them and simultaneously 
gives away a part of its future revenue to another company. Furthermore, it 
has been explored whether transfers of risks can alone be subject to transfer 
pricing.484 It should also be noted that risks have been regarded as intangible 
assets in some countries; however, this kind of approach is very exceptional.485 
This section will examine whether transfers of risks may fall within the scope 
of the national transfer pricing provisions in Russia, Finland and the USA as 
separate items on a stand-alone basis in connection with cross-border 
business restructurings, or should they be taken into account in some other 
way in the context of restructurings.486 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines pay special attention to transfers of 
risks between associated companies in the business restructuring context. 
Pursuant to the guidelines, the allocation of risks between related parties 
should be examined and analyzed before and after the business restructuring 
in connection with the functional analysis, as it helps to identify whether any 
economically significant risks, i.e. risks that carry significant profit potential, 
related to the restructured business have been transferred.487 Chapter IX 
provisions specifically refer to the new risk analysis guidance in Section D.1.2.1 
of Chapter I of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which were introduced 
just recently in 2015 as a result of the BEPS Project and which regulate the risk 
analysis in more detail.488  
 
According to the general guidance, by identifying the risks assumed by the 
parties in a controlled transaction, it helps to determine whether the 
compensation paid in the transaction is comparable to compensations paid in 
transactions between independent parties and whether it is thus arm’ 
                                                 
 
483 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.19. 
484 Kroppen – Silva 2011, p. 34. 
485 See PwC 2007, p. 6, which has more of an informative character. 
486 As risks relate to potential profit generation and expected profits in the above-mentioned manner, 
also transfers of such profit potential as part of or in conjunction with transfers of risks will be discussed 
herein. Also, the OECD has discussed the allocation of risks and profit potential together in the context 
of business restructurings, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.39–9.47. Pursuant to the OECD, 
profit potential means expected future profits; see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.40. 
487 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.19–9.20, 9.22. “The significance of a risk will depend on the 
likelihood of the risk materialising and the size of the potential profits or losses arising from the risk,” 
see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.22. 
488 It should be noted that risk is not regarded as intangible asset under the guidelines, but is defined as 
“the effect of uncertainty on the objectives of the business”; see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.71. 
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length.489 The guidelines require that economically significant risks should be 
identified with specificity in related party transactions, in this case, in business 
restructurings, and this must be done both before and after the 
restructuring.490 Both the contractual terms and the conduct of the parties (i.e. 
whether contractual terms are followed by the parties) must be examined in 
order to determine, which controlled party assumes certain risks before and 
after the restructuring.491 Subsequently, it must be reviewed whether the 
related party, which assumes the risks in the particular case on the basis of the 
contractual terms/conduct, “exercises control over the risk and has the 
financial capacity to assume risk.” If the party does not have the actual control 
over the risk or the financial capacity to assume it, the risk must be allocated 
to the party that has the de facto control and financial capacity.492 The actual 
related party transaction in question should, as accurately delineated, be 
ultimately priced in accordance with the arm’s length principle taking into 
consideration the risks assumed and allocated on the basis of the risk analysis. 
The party, which assumes and/or mitigates risks, should be entitled to an 
appropriate remuneration in such a transaction.493 
 
It must be observed that the determination of the economically significant 
risks therefore relates to, in essence, examining how risks may have an impact 
on the pricing of a controlled transaction. The risk analysis helps to determine 
the comparability between a related party transaction and a similar 
transaction (with similar risks) conducted between unrelated parties — and 
ultimately the arm’s length compensation.494 The risk analysis is, as discussed, 
a part of the functional analysis, which is in turn a part of the comparability 
analysis. By identifying the economically significant activities and functions 
performed by the related parties, including the risks assumed, it helps to 
determine whether the controlled transaction is comparable to uncontrolled 
party transactions (and eventually arm’s length), as the compensation 
generally reflects such functions and activities performed.495 
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ starting point is that the transfers of 
risks and profit potential, which is usually transferred along with the risks, 
should be examined as part of the transfers of other assets/going concern or 
as part of the possible termination or renegotiation of existing agreements, 
which could be potentially remunerated in a related party transaction in the 
                                                 
 
489 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.51, 1.56–1.60, 1.73, 1.100, 9.19. 
490 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.60, 1.71–1.72, 9.22. 
491 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.77–1.82, 9.20–9.21. 
492 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.98–1.99, 9.20–9.21. 
493 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.60, 1.100. 
494 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.73, 1.100. 
495 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.33, 1.36, 1.51, 1.56. 
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course of a business restructuring. Risks and profit potential are not thus 
considered objects of transfer pricing separately but they must be taken into 
account in the above-mentioned manner, when arm’s length compensations 
are determined for transfers of assets/going concern or for the termination or 
substantial renegotiation of existing agreements during a business 
restructuring.496 According to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,  
 
“An independent enterprise does not necessarily receive compensation 
when a change in its business arrangements results in a reduction in its 
profit potential or expected future profits. The arm’s length principle 
does not require compensation for a mere decrease in the expectation 
of an entity’s future profits. When applying the arm’s length principle to 
business restructurings, the question is whether there is a transfer of 
something of value (an asset or an ongoing concern) or a termination or 
substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements and that transfer, 
termination or substantial renegotiation would be compensated 
between independent parties in comparable circumstances. ---  
 
--- The notion of “profit potential” is often used for valuation purposes, 
in the determination of an arm’s length compensation for a transfer of 
intangibles or of an ongoing concern, or in the determination of an 
arm’s length indemnification for the termination or substantial 
renegotiation of existing arrangements, once it is found that such 
compensation or indemnification would have taken place between 
independent parties in comparable circumstances.”497 
 
Is the existing legal state in Russia consistent with the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines’ approach, when it comes to the transfer pricing of risks and 
associated profit potential? First, the question of whether the actual transfers 
of risks and possible profit potential may become objects of transfer pricing 
regulations in Russia seems to be unproblematic in terms of interpretation of 
existing law. The risks and profit potential are not protected as intellectual 
properties under the Civil Code;498 in addition, the Tax Code does not include 
specific provisions concerning their transfers. Strictly from this perspective, it 
could be stated that it is very likely that transfers of risks/profit potential do 
not fall within the scope of application of the transfer pricing rules — just like, 
for instance, the previously discussed intangible assets listed in IFRS 3. 
 
This view can be supported by the fact that, in the legal literature, risks have 
not been considered as assets falling within the scope of the transfer pricing 
                                                 
 
496 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.39–9.46. 
497 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.39–9.40. 
498 See Article 1225 of the Civil Code. 
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regulations even during the former transfer pricing legislation.499 As the new 
transfer pricing rules did not bring any substantial changes in this respect, 
there is no reason to change this interpretation. In addition, tax practitioners 
have not considered it appropriate to require an arm’s length compensation in 
situations that involve merely controlled transfers of risks. It has been 
acknowledged that the tax authorities may be willing to intervene in such 
related party transactions concerning transfers of assets, which directly affect 
the amount of income and/or losses of the controlled companies and where 
the authorities also disagree on the allocation of the income. The transfers of 
risks, however, have not been considered to have such a direct effect on the 
taxable income that it should be alone compensated. When also taking into 
account that no legal support can be found from tax law sources in relation to 
applying the arm’s length principle solely to transfers of risks (profit 
potential), they have been left outside the scope of the application of the 
Russian transfer pricing regulations in practice.500 
 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that transfers of risks should not be taken 
into consideration at all in the transfer pricing of business restructurings 
under Russian law. As mentioned, when a business restructuring is examined 
from a transfer pricing perspective, the related parties should analyze and 
identify in the functional analysis transactions, which occur between them in 
the course of the business restructuring. This consists of analyzing and 
identifying, among other things, the risks of the related companies before and 
after the restructuring. In the transfer pricing documentation, it is 
recommended to characterize what type of companies have participated in the 
related party transactions in terms of risks. In that case, related parties can be 
described as, for instance, fully-fledged distributors, limited risk distributors 
and commissionaires.501 The analysis of risks in this sense helps the parties to 
understand the whole structure of the business restructuring and, in 
particular, what kinds of transactions have been performed in the business 
restructuring,502 although transfers of risks and profit potential do not fall 
within the scope of application of the Russian transfer pricing rules as such. 
 
The Tax Code lists different types of risks that may be assumed by controlled 
parties in related party transactions — for instance, inventory risks, foreign 
currency risks, credit risks and environmental risks — and that must therefore 
be taken into consideration in the functional analysis. As the functional 
analysis is a part of the comparability analysis under Russian tax law, these 
                                                 
 
499 See e.g. Evdokimov – Konnov 2011, p. 632. 
500 Expert Interview 2012. 
501 Pis'mo Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby Rossii ot 30.08.2012 N OА-4-13/14433@ “O podgotovke i 
predstavlenii dokumentatsii v tselyakh nalogovogo kontrolya.” 
502 Article 105.5 the Tax Code. 
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kinds of risks should be taken into account in the end, when related party 
transactions are compared to transactions executed between independent 
parties.503 As discussed, in the comparability analysis the related parties must 
compare the commercial conditions of their transaction to the commercial 
conditions of transactions between independent parties under similar 
circumstances. The ultimate purpose of the comparability analysis is to verify 
that the arm’s length compensation in a controlled transaction corresponds to 
transfer prices used in transactions between independent parties under 
similar economic circumstances — which also means under similar risks.  
 
Thus, even though transfers of risks will not, on the above-mentioned grounds, 
become objects of transfer pricing under Russian tax law, they cannot be 
entirely ignored, when business restructurings are examined from a transfer 
pricing perspective. Related parties must identify and analyze possible 
transfers of risks in the course of a business restructuring in order to 
understand the conducted transaction(s) in the functional analysis and to 
perform the comparability analysis with the aim to determine the arm’s length 
compensations for the transfers of assets and something of value in the 
business restructuring. Nonetheless, the current legal status in Russia does not 
deviate much from what has been regulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines. Moreover, Russian law entitles the authorities in general to 
intervene in arrangements in which the form of the transaction does not 
correspond to the real economic substance, which means that they may also 
reallocate the risks between related parties, if parties’ conduct does not 
conform to the contractual terms, similar to the aforesaid provisions of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.504 
 
As Finland follows the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines — including Chapter 
IX — to a great extent in practice, should the above-mentioned guidelines’ 
approach to transfers of risks and associated profit potential be taken as the 
starting point also under Finnish law? This would mean that transfers of risks 
and consequently profit potential would not fall within the scope of application 
of the Finnish transfer pricing rules as separate items in business 
restructurings, but they should be taken into account in determining the arm’s 
length compensation for transfers of assets or going concern and/or the 
                                                 
 
503 Ibid. 
504 The authorities’ actions can be based on the provisions of the Russian Civil Code regulating, for 
example, sham transactions; see Article 170 of the Civil Code. In addition, the tax authorities may refer 
to the so-called principle of unjustified tax benefit developed in the legal praxis of the Supreme 
Commercial Court; see the decisions Postanovlenie Plenuma Vysshego Аrbitrazhnogo suda Rossijskoj 
Federatsii ot 12 oktyabrya 2006 goda N 53 "Ob otsenke arbitrazhnymi sudami obosnovannosti 
polucheniya nalogoplatel'shhikom nalogovoj vygody” and Opredelenie Vysshego Аrbitrazhnogo Suda RF 
ot 11 yanvarya 2009 g. N 16307/08. 
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termination or renegotiation of existing agreements occurred in the course of 
a business restructuring.  
 
This view could be supported by the fact that § 31 of the AAP and related 
preliminary works do not expressly mention transfers of risks or profit 
potential as transaction types subject to the transfer pricing provisions as 
separate items. Pursuant to the preliminary works, § 31 of the AAP should be 
applied to transactions, which are understood in general as commercial 
actions performed in business and other commercial activity, such as typical 
sale and purchase transactions, financial arrangements and transfers of 
intangibles.505 It is unlikely that transfers of risks attached with profit potential 
could alone be regarded as such commercial actions, as it is unusual that solely 
risks are, or even could be, transferred in business activities. This view can also 
be justified by referring to the Finnish Tax Administration’s memorandum, 
which has not discussed the possibility of regarding transfers of risks and 
profit potential as transaction types falling within the scope of application of  
§ 31 of the AAP.506 The preliminary rulings practice of the Finnish Large 
Taxpayers’ Office also supports the aforementioned view, as transfers of risks 
and associated profit potential have not been deemed to be objects of transfer 
pricing separately in the business restructuring context.507 
 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, transfers of intangibles are generally within 
the scope of the Finnish transfer pricing rules. However, risks have not been 
expressly mentioned as intangible properties subject to transfer pricing in the 
preliminary works and the Tax Administration’s memorandum,508 and overall 
no support can be found for the view that risks could be regarded as intangible 
property under Finnish tax law for transfer pricing purposes. As they are not 
regarded as intangibles under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines either,509 
transfers of risks and profit potential cannot not fall within the scope of 
application of the Finnish transfer pricing rules as separate items also from 
this perspective.  
 
The opinions presented in the Finnish legal literature also support the view 
according to which transfers of risks, and related profit potential, may not be 
objects of transfer pricing separately, but must be taken into account in the 
transfer pricing analysis of a business restructuring and in particular in the 
determination of arm’s length compensations for controlled transactions 
performed in the restructuring. It has been considered that potential transfers 
                                                 
 
505 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. 
506 See Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 20. 
507 Laaksonen 2006, pp. 432–433, 436. 
508 See HE 107/2006 vp, p. 16; Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 24. 
509 See the previously mentioned OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.71. 
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of risks occurred in business restructurings must be examined in connection 
with the transferred or amended function, such as manufacturing activities. In 
such cases, it is not sufficient to compensate just a transfer of something of 
value, but also the changes in the risk allocation (and possible profit potential) 
may have an impact on the determination of an arm’s length compensation, 
and therefore they must be taken into consideration, for example, when 
determining compensations for transfers of assets or a going concern.510 
Similarly, it has been viewed that, when a business restructuring involves a 
transfer of a going concern, it is likely that profit potential is included in the 
arm’s length valuation of the whole business unit. On the other hand, if the 
functioning business unit alternatively would not have been transferred, it 
would be unlikely, especially from the perspective of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, that solely a transfer of a profit potential could be an object 
of transfer pricing.511  
 
On the other hand, the Finnish transfer pricing provisions have not ignored 
the relevance of risks in the transfer pricing analysis of transactions entirely. 
Both the AAP and the Finnish Tax Administration’s memorandum 
acknowledge the importance of risks in performing the functional analysis. As 
it was mentioned earlier, the concept of functional analysis referred to in § 14 
b of the AAP means a description and analysis of the functions of related 
parties in a controlled transaction, taking into account the assets used and the 
risks assumed in the transaction. Ultimately, the functional analysis (including 
the risk analysis) relates to examining the comparability of controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions in the comparability analysis as regulated in the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.512  
 
Pursuant to the Finnish Tax Administration’s guidance, the functional analysis 
is of great relevance especially in business restructurings, which leads to the 
fact that the analysis of the allocation of risks also becomes more emphasized 
in business restructurings. More importantly, it has been expressly 
highlighted in the Finnish Tax Administration’s memorandum that potential 
changes in the risks assumed by related parties as a result of the business 
restructuring must be described in the functional analysis. In addition, the Tax 
Administration describes different kinds of business types and related risks, 
which must be taken into account in performing both the functional and 
comparability analyses, such as market risks.513 These risks are consistent with 
                                                 
 
510 Juusela – Tuominen 2011, pp. 316–317, 319, 322. 
511 Knuutinen 2015, pp. 1066–1067. 
512 HE 107/2006 vp, pp 15–16. 
513 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 23 and 25–26. See also HE 107/2006 
vp, p. 16. 
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those risks discussed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.514 Therefore, 
the allocation of risks in business restructurings must be observed in the 
functional and comparability analyses, and must be consequently taken into 
consideration in the determination of an arm’s length compensation for 
transfers of assets/something of value. Hence, Finnish law conforms to the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as well as to Russian law, in this regard. As 
the Tax Administration has stated that the OECD’s new guidance resulting 
from the BEPS Project brings no material changes and therefore may be used 
as a source of reference,515 the new guidance discussed above with regard to 
the risk analysis as well as the reallocation of risks and profit potential is likely 
to also be followed in Finland. 
 
As was the case in Russia, tax authorities may under Finnish law also challenge 
the allocation of risks, if the legal form of the arrangement does not correspond 
to the real intention of the matter. The contractual terms may be disregarded, 
for example, on the basis of § 28 of the AAP. It is noteworthy that it has been 
regarded likely in the legal literature that the tax authorities may be willing to 
interfere in the allocation of risks especially in business restructurings, if they 
are not satisfied with the allocation, by referring to the anti-avoidance 
principles and provisions, such as the aforesaid § 28 of the AAP.516 Hence, 
Finnish law is in line with both Russian law and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines from this perspective.517 
 
Taking into account the above-mentioned observations, it appears that no 
justification can be found for the view that transfers of risks and associated 
profit potential could be transferred alone in business restructurings and 
consequently could fall within the scope of application of the Finnish transfer 
pricing rules as separate items. Nevertheless, transfers of risks must be taken 
into consideration, when an arm’s length compensation is determined for 
transfers of assets/something of value or for termination/renegotiation of 
existing agreements occurred in a business restructuring, as the allocation of 
risks must be examined and taken into account in the functional and 
comparability analyses under Finnish law. In this sense, the Finnish transfer 
pricing rules follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines closely, which also 
means that the earlier discussed provisions of Chapter I and Chapter IX, which 
                                                 
 
514 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.72. 
515 Finnish Tax Administration: Statement A177/200/2015. 
516 Juusela – Tuominen 2011, p. 317. 
517 It must be noted that the Finnish transfer pricing provision, § 31 of the AAP, cannot be interpreted in 
a way which would allow to disregard the legal form of related party transactions, but the provision only 
gives the tax authorities the right to make transfer pricing adjustments. Tax authorities must apply § 28 
of the AAP, which is a special anti-avoidance provision, if they are willing to contest the form or 
characterization of a transaction. More on this topic, see Section 5.5 of this study. 
147 
 
contain more specific guidance in terms of risk analysis as well as risk and 
profit potential reallocation, should primarily be applied in Finland too. In 
addition, no major differences can be found between Finnish and Russian law 
in this respect. 
 
The U.S. transfer pricing rules also lack regulations regarding whether 
transfers of risks (and associated profit potential) could alone fall within 
Section 482 of the IRC and whether they should be consequently compensated 
at arm’s length as separate items. Whether risks could be regarded as 
intangible property for transfer pricing purposes in the USA could first be 
examined. Risks — as well as profit potential — are not listed in the IRC’s 
provisions and the Treasury Regulations as intangible properties, which could 
fall within the scope of application of the U.S. transfer pricing rules.518 It seems 
unlikely that they could also be regarded as “other similar items” to those listed 
in Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the IRC and the related Treasury Regulations and 
in this way could be treated as intangible property for the purposes of Section 
482. No legal support for such a view can be found from case law nor legal 
literature. Quite the contrary, in the legal literature, it has been viewed that 
that a transfer of risks does not constitute an asset that should be remunerated, 
for instance, in the form of an exit tax during a business restructuring.519 More 
importantly, the IRS itself does not consider risks as property or something of 
value. Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Manual, “risk is a position that will 
yield an outcome that is not known at the time the position is taken. Risk 
therefore entails exposure to the possibility of loss. If a company takes on more 
risk, it will have a greater expectation of profit.”520 In addition, in the legal 
literature, it has been argued that no remuneration should be paid alone for 
transfers of risks.521 Furthermore, it must be noted that profit potential, which 
is usually transferred in conjunction with risks, has not been regarded as an 
                                                 
 
518 See Section 936(h)(3)(B) and Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b). 
519 Zollo 2011, p. 775. 
520 Section 4.61.3.5.3 of the Internal Revenue Manual. 
521 Zollo 2011, p. 767. However, Zollo also theoretically argues that in certain exceptional cases the arm’s 
length principle could require that transfer of risks should be compensated: if the expected profits of a 
transferor of risks do not decrease commensurate with the reduction of transferred risks, a compensation 
might be required to be paid to the transferee. In such a scenario, Zollo does not nevertheless imply that 
solely a transfer of risks would result in compensation, and it seems that even in such a scenario risks 
should be transferred in connection with a business or assets, which affect the future profits of the 
transferor. In addition, usually transfers of risks have a corresponding impact on the future profits of a 
transferor, and therefore situations where the expected profits are not in line with the reduction of risks, 
seem to be purely theoretical, or otherwise there might be a risk that such transfers of risks do not 
conform to their real substance.  
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asset in the Treasury Regulations, but more like a feature of an asset, which 
leads to that it cannot be transferred separately from assets.522  
 
Hence, risks and profit potential cannot be treated as assets or another 
separable item in the above-mentioned manner. As the transfer pricing rules 
are primarily applicable to identifiable (intangible) assets, it seems unlikely 
that they could be applied to transactions involving solely transfers of risks 
and/or profit potential. On the other hand, it also appears that risks and profit 
potential can principally be transferred only along with other 
property/something of value. These observations support the view that 
transfers of risks and profit potential cannot fall within the scope of 
application of the U.S. transfer pricing regulations at least as own separate 
items in related party transactions. As a result, it seems that transfers of risks 
and related profit potential may not be objects of transfer pricing separately, 
also in business restructurings.  
 
Nevertheless, the Treasury Regulations have not completely overlooked the 
relevance of risks in the transfer pricing context. According to the Treasury 
Regulations,  
 
“determining the degree of comparability between controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions requires a comparison of the significant risks 
that could affect the prices that would be charged or paid, or the profit 
that would be earned, in the two transactions.”523 
 
The risks thus affect the pricing of related party transactions in the above-
discussed manner. The risk analysis should be conducted as a part of the 
comparability analysis for the purposes of comparing the results of a 
controlled transaction to the results of transactions between independent 
parties under similar circumstances,524 which eventually has an impact on the 
determination of an arm’s length compensation in the controlled transaction 
in question. The Treasury Regulations mention, among other things, market, 
financial, credit and product liability risks as relevant risks to consider, when 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions are compared.525 As discussed 
earlier, the risk analysis is technically separated from the functional analysis, 
as both form their own parts of the comparability analysis.  
                                                 
 
522 See e.g. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(1). 
523 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(A). 
524 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(1). This is a general regulation concerning risk analysis as part of the 
comparability analysis. Economic risks have also been regarded as factors to be considered in 
determining the comparability of transactions involving transfers of intangibles, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(2). 
525 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(A)(1)–(6). 
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The profit potential that is associated with risks may affect the pricing of a 
related party transaction through a comparability analysis. For example, 
pursuant to the Treasury Regulations regarding transfer pricing of intangibles, 
when a related party applies a comparable uncontrolled transaction method in 
order to determine the arm’s length compensation for a transfer of intangible 
property, one comparability factor — when the controlled transaction and 
ultimately the pricing thereof is compared to uncontrolled transactions — is 
the profit potential of the intangible property in question.526  
 
In the business restructuring context, the above mentioned means that risks, 
as well as profit potential, must be taken into account, when the comparability 
analysis is performed for the related party transactions occurring during a 
business restructuring, if such transactions involve transfers of 
assets/something of value subject to transfer pricing pursuant to the U.S. 
transfer pricing rules. Thus, the risk allocation in such transactions must also 
be taken into consideration in the determination of the comparability of 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions and consequently in the 
determination of the arm’s length compensation for transfers of 
assets/something of value.  
 
Furthermore, the Treasury Regulations have paid special attention to the 
identification of the related party that bears the risks in a given case. As a 
general rule, the controlled party that bears the risks in a related party 
transaction is determined on the basis of contractual terms. However, 
pursuant to the regulations, “the allocation of risks specified or implied by the 
taxpayer's contractual terms will generally be respected if it is consistent with 
the economic substance of the transaction. An allocation of risk between 
controlled taxpayers after the outcome of such risk is known or reasonably 
knowable lacks economic substance.”527 Thus, the above mentioned means 
                                                 
 
526 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(1). 
527 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B). The factors with regard to examining the economic substance have 
been regulated in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B) in more detail:  
 
“In considering the economic substance of the transaction, the following facts are relevant:  
 
(1) Whether the pattern of the controlled taxpayer's conduct over time is consistent 
with the purported allocation of risk between the controlled taxpayers; or where the 
pattern is changed, whether the relevant contractual arrangements have been 
modified accordingly; 
 
(2) Whether a controlled taxpayer has the financial capacity to fund losses that might 
be expected to occur as the result of the assumption of a risk, or whether, at arm's 
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that the IRS may disregard the allocation of risks, if it does not conform to the 
economic substance of the transaction. This is naturally also applicable to 
transactions conducted in the course of a business restructuring. In the legal 
literature, the examination of the economic substance of transactions in 
accordance with the Treasury Regulations has been considered of particular 
importance in business restructurings, as it helps to determine how the 
allocation of risks between related parties has changed in the business 
restructuring — or has it changed at all.528 As the U.S. transfer pricing rules 
expressly recognize the possibility that the tax authorities may intervene in the 
allocation of risks between related parties by relying on the anti-avoidance 
principles, U.S. law conforms to Russian and Finnish law as well as to the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to a great degree in this respect. 
 
Overall, it can be stated that the risk allocation between related parties must 
be examined in a business restructuring primarily for the purposes of 
determining the arm’s length compensations for transfers of something of 
value that has occurred in the restructuring that are subject to transfer pricing 
pursuant to law; transfers of risks and associated profit potential may not fall 
within the scope of application of the U.S. transfer pricing provisions as 
separate items. In this regard, U.S. law is in line with the Russian and Finnish 
transfer pricing provisions. On the other hand, the risks should be analyzed 
principally as part of the comparability analysis under the specific risk analysis 
regulations, and in this way U.S. law slightly deviates from Russian and 
Finnish law, where the assumed risks are reviewed as part of the functional 
analysis. Despite this small, rather technical difference, it seems to be equally 
important in Russia, Finland and the USA to analyze the allocation of risks 
between related parties in business restructurings. Such an analysis is 
conducted for the purpose of determining, through functional and/or 
comparability analyses, the comparability of controlled and uncontrolled 
transactions and eventually the arm’s length compensations for transfers of 
assets/something of value subject to transfer pricing pursuant to the national 
regulations.529 
                                                 
 
length, another party to the controlled transaction would ultimately suffer the 
consequences of such losses; and 
 
(3) The extent to which each controlled taxpayer exercises managerial or operational 
control over the business activities that directly influence the amount of income or 
loss realized. In arm's length dealings, parties ordinarily bear a greater share of 
those risks over which they have relatively more control.” 
 
528 Amerkhail – Granwell 2009, p. 405. 
529 It has also been acknowledged in the legal literature that the U.S. rules and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines approach the risk analysis similarly. Under both sources of law, similar risks, such as market 
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If the contractual or other allocation of risks does not conform to the reality in 
business restructurings, the laws of Russia, Finland and the USA (as well as 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines) allow the interference by the tax 
authorities in transactions conducted in the course of a business restructuring 
in the above-discussed manner. Therefore, it is essential for companies to pay 
attention to the risk allocation and to prepare required transfer pricing 
documentation diligently, showing, among other things, the grounds for the 
allocation of risks between the related parties in detail. In such a way, the 
likelihood of potential disagreements with tax authorities may be reduced. 
 
The existing approach taken by the target countries seems to meet the 
requirements of the arm’s length principle efficiently. Risks and profit 
potential clearly lack the ability of being transferred alone, and in this sense it 
is also unlikely that independent parties could transfer risks alone, separately 
from other assets. On the other hand, when risks and associated profit 
potential are transferred together with assets and functions, they must be 
taken into account as one factor affecting the pricing of such transfers — or at 
least their possible effects must be considered. As dealt with above, the 
assumption of risks and overall increase/decrease of risks would likely be 
taken into account in the compensation of transactions conducted between 
independent parties.530 As related parties should consider the allocation of 
risks and compare the circumstances of the given related party transaction, 
inter alia, in terms of assumed risks to transactions conducted between 
independent parties in comparable circumstances, related parties and 
independent parties are treated similarly from this perspective.   
 
3.8 TERMINATION OR RENEGOTIATION OF EXISTING 
AGREEMENTS 
A cross-border business restructuring may involve the termination or 
substantial renegotiation of existing arrangements and agreements of the 
restructured company. For instance, when a company transfers a part of its 
sales activities to another group company, the existing licensing and 
distribution agreements between the parties may no longer be needed. If such 
agreements are being terminated prematurely or contractual rights are 
violated by other means, the restructured company may suffer detriments. In 
                                                 
 
risks and financial risks, must be taken into consideration, and also the actual conduct of the parties and 
the control over the business linked to risks in question are deciding factors in determining which party 
bears the risks; see Wright – Keates 2009, p. 117 and PwC 2015, pp. 1086–1087, where the latter has 
more of an informative nature. 
530 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.60, 1.100. 
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that case, the question of whether it may become necessary to pay an arm’s 
length compensation for such financial loss or detriments suffered by the 
company becomes topical.531  
 
As was the case with the transfers of risks, the termination or renegotiation of 
existing agreements or arrangements of a company may be a problematic 
question in Russia from the transfer pricing perspective. The Tax Code’s 
transfer pricing provisions do not deal with the termination or renegotiation 
of existing agreements — or compensation thereof — at all.532 Since the 
legislation traditionally plays a pivotal role in Russian law, the lack of legal 
norms in this respect causes ambiguity and speaks more for the view that 
terminations or renegotiations of existing agreements may not become objects 
of the Russian transfer pricing rules.  
 
In addition, indemnifications or other compensations paid for detriments 
suffered by the restructured company are not listed in Article 1225 of the Civil 
Code, and therefore may not be considered as intellectual property protected 
under Russian law. Consequently, they cannot fall within the scope of 
application of the Russian transfer pricing regulations in accordance with the 
aforementioned Minfin’s written clarifications and the FTS’s letter either from 
this perspective. It has also been stated in the legal literature that premature 
terminations or renegotiations of contracts cannot per se result in tax 
consequences.533 
 
When taking into account the above-mentioned, it is very unlikely that the 
questions with regard to terminations and/or renegotiations of existing 
agreements should be taken into consideration in transfer pricing of cross-
border business restructurings under Russian law, although a compensation 
for the detriments caused by the premature termination or renegotiation of a 
contract would under similar conditions be paid in transactions between 
independent companies. Tax practitioners have also viewed that, due to the 
fact that Russian law and the interpretation of legal questions in Russia are 
substantially based on legislated legal norms, the premature termination or 
renegotiation of agreements could be in the scope of transfer pricing only, if 
the Tax Code had corresponding provisions. Moreover, given that the Supreme 
Commercial Court and the Minfin have not clarified the existing legal situation 
in this regard, the practitioners have not applied transfer pricing provisions to 
premature terminations or renegotiations of existing agreements in their 
                                                 
 
531 De Robertis – Matthias – Damian 2006, p. 18; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.75. 
532 Cf. Article 58 of the Civil Code, which has general provisions regarding the allocation of liabilities 
between parties in the context of mergers and acquisitions. 
533 Evdokimov – Konnov 2011, p. 633. 
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transfer pricing practices.534 Thus, on these grounds, it seems that the 
termination or renegotiation of existing agreements in the course of business 
restructurings do not fall within the scope of current transfer pricing 
regulations in Russia.   
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that it has been considered in the Russian 
legal literature that the termination or renegotiation of existing agreements 
could be subject to taxation, if it concerns a remission of debt.535 In addition, 
the Minfin has issued written clarifications according to which loans and loan 
interests granted by related companies to each other are within the scope of 
the transfer pricing regulations in Russia, despite the fact that this has not 
been directly regulated in the Tax Code’s transfer pricing provisions.536 Hence, 
in theory, the termination or renegotiation of existing agreements could fall 
within the scope of Russian transfer pricing regulations, if the termination or 
renegotiation could be regarded as a remission of debt or loan. 
 
This view is, however, rather problematic and far-fetched. First, it is very 
unclear to what extent debts are forgiven by related companies in the course 
of business restructurings in general. It is more likely that the agreements, 
which are usually amended or terminated prematurely during the 
restructurings, concern different aspects of multinational enterprise’s 
business activities, such as sales, marketing and manufacturing activities. 
These kinds of agreements cannot be regarded as loan agreements. When such 
agreements are prematurely renegotiated or terminated, it is also a question 
of the loss of the expected income under such agreements rather than debt 
forgiveness. When taking into consideration that also tax advisors are of the 
opinion that the premature termination or renegotiation of existing 
agreements cannot be an object of the Russian transfer pricing regulations in 
any form,537 it is justified to state that the premature termination or 
renegotiation of existing agreements may not fall within the scope of 
application of the Russian transfer pricing rules also from this perspective.  
 
Taxpayers should nonetheless be extremely careful, if they decide to terminate 
existing agreements, or renegotiate them substantially, in Russia during 
business restructurings. Since the transfer pricing provisions do not seem to 
be applicable to the terminations of existing agreements directly, the Russian 
tax authorities may be willing to intervene in the premature terminations or 
                                                 
 
534 Expert Interview 2012. 
535 Evdokimov – Konnov 2011, p. 633. 
536 Raz"yasneniya Ministerstva Finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii po voprosam primeneniya razdela V.I 
Nalogovogo kodeksa Rossijskoj Federatsii; Pis’mo Ministerstva finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 
05.07.2012 N 03-01-18/5-92 "Po voprosu primeneniya otdel'nykh polozhenij rаzd. V.1 NK RF." 
537 Expert Interview 2012. 
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renegotiations of contracts by questioning transactions’ legal forms and by 
seeking to prove that taxpayers have achieved unjustified tax benefit in their 
arrangements.538 This kind of tax authorities' intention to interfere in 
transactions in Russia is always a potential risk, which should be taken into 
account, if legal provisions do not specifically authorize the authorities to 
intervene in arrangements.539 Therefore, it is inevitable to pay specific 
attention to the arguments and documentation used to validate the business 
restructuring, especially in cases where the termination of existing agreements 
is necessary for the effective execution of the business restructuring. 
 
The current situation in Russia can be criticized from the perspective of the 
arm’s length principle. If independent parties would be entitled to a 
remuneration in comparable situations, the principle would require as a 
starting point that such a compensation should be paid also for the premature 
termination of agreements between related parties. As mentioned above, that 
seems unlikely in light of the existing provisions. Conversely, general legal 
provisions, which regulate certain business activities, may not necessarily 
require that a compensation should be paid for the termination or 
renegotiation of agreements of such activity. For instance, although the Civil 
Code regulates the agency activity in detail in Articles 1005–1011 of the Civil 
Code, no requirements are set for the compensation or remuneration of 
terminations of agency arrangements. Nonetheless, this does not indicate that 
independent parties would not compensate such terminations, as such matters 
are likely to be agreed on in the contractual terms of agency agreements. Thus, 
the more important question is whether independent parties would include an 
indemnification clause for the termination of an agreement, and on what 
terms, in comparable circumstances. As the existing Russian transfer pricing 
rules and other sources do not require such an analysis from related parties, 
the arm’s length principle is not followed effectively in this context. Therefore, 
there is a need for new regulations to meet the requirements of the arm’s 
length principle in this particular transfer pricing question.  
 
                                                 
 
538 By relying on anti-avoidance regulations and principles, such as sham transaction under 170 of the 
Civil Code and the principle of unjustified tax benefit introduced in the Supreme Commercial Court’s 
decision Postanovlenie Plenuma Vysshego Аrbitrazhnogo suda Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 12 oktyabrya 
2006 goda N 53 "Ob otsenke arbitrazhnymi sudami obosnovannosti polucheniya nalogoplatel'shhikom 
nalogovoj vygody.” See Section 5.5 of this study for a more detailed analysis. 
539 This can especially be seen in the case law regarding the former transfer pricing rules, where the tax 
authorities used various grounds for justifying their interventions in companies’ transfer pricing. The 
tax authorities’ resolutions, however, were often amended in favor of taxpayers by the Supreme 
Commercial Court; see e.g. Postanovlenie FАS Zapadno-Sibirskogo okruga ot 28.08.2007 N F04-
5904/2006(37326-А27-31) po delu N А27-43916/2005-2. 
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The legal situation in Russia differs in this regard from the standpoint of the 
OECD. According to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the applicability 
of the arm’s length principle must also be considered in situations where an 
existing contractual relationship is terminated or substantially renegotiated 
during a business restructuring. This means that, inter alia, the following three 
conditions must be taken into account when assessing whether an 
indemnification would be warranted at arm’s length in situations where 
existing agreements are terminated or substantially renegotiated:   
 
- “Whether commercial law supports rights to indemnification for the 
restructured entity under the facts of the case as accurately delineated 
---”; 
- “Whether the existence or absence of an indemnification clause or 
similar provisions (as well as the terms of such a clause where it exists) 
under the terms of the arrangement, as accurately delineated, is arm’s 
length ---”; and 
- “Which party should ultimately bear the costs related to the 
indemnification of the party that suffers from the termination or re-
negotiation of the agreement. ---”540   
 
Also in Finland, the termination or renegotiation of existing agreements has 
been left without attention in the legislated transfer pricing provisions. 
Notwithstanding that there are no express mentions of terminations or 
renegotiations of existing agreements or arrangements, according to the 
preliminary works, it should be taken as a starting point that § 31 of the AAP 
should be applied to all kinds of transactions, which can be regarded as 
commercial actions performed in business and other commercial activities.541 
As the definition of transactions subject to transfer pricing is in this sense 
broad, terminations of business agreements — even existing fixed-time 
contracts — could be deemed to fall within the scope of application of § 31 of 
the AAP, as such actions cannot be considered that unusual in everyday 
business life and especially in business restructurings.  
 
Support for such a view can be found from the Finnish Tax Administration’s 
memorandum dealing with the transfer pricing documentation. Pursuant to 
the memorandum, functional analysis must contain, among other things, a 
description of the changes in the related parties’ functions, which may have 
occurred in the course of business restructurings. Such changes may have been 
executed by making amendment to the existing contracts/contractual terms 
or by concluding new agreements.542 Therefore, as the Finnish Tax 
                                                 
 
540 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.79.  
541 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20. 
542 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 25–26. 
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Administration acknowledges the possibility that agreements may be 
renegotiated specifically in the business restructuring context and requires 
that such amendments are documented in the functional analysis, changes in 
the existing contractual arrangements — including the terminations of 
business agreements — must be taken into consideration in the transfer 
pricing analysis of business restructurings pursuant to Finnish law. 
 
In addition, this view has also been shared in the legal literature. It has been 
considered likely that a compensation at arm’s length should be paid for 
transfers of existing arrangements in business restructurings, although no 
legal provisions or decision practice can be found to validate such a 
compensation payment. This can be justified, inter alia, by the fact that 
generally a selling party should be remunerated for transfers of existing 
contractual arrangements in transactions conducted between independent 
parties.543  
 
Taking into account the above-mentioned observations, there should not be 
legal reasons for disregarding terminations or renegotiations of existing 
agreements in the transfer pricing analysis of a business restructuring under 
the Finnish transfer pricing provisions. In practice, this means that related 
parties should examine in business restructurings, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether independent parties would compensate certain terminations or 
renegotiations of existing agreements in similar conditions. If a remuneration 
would be paid between independent parties in such cases, that indicates that 
the termination or renegotiation of the arrangement in question will likely fall 
within the scope of application of the Finnish transfer pricing rules and must 
be remunerated appropriately at arm’s length between related parties. As 
Finnish law conforms to the approach taken by the OECD, and when also 
taking into account that no specific provisions can be found in the Finnish 
transfer pricing provisions in terms of examining the applicability of the arm’s 
length principle to the terminations/renegotiations of existing agreements, 
the more detailed OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines should be followed in this 
respect in Finland.  
 
Pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, there should be no 
assumption according to which all terminations or substantial renegotiations 
of existing agreements should be compensated at arm’ length.544 As stated 
above, three different factors must be taken into account, when determining 
whether an arm’s length compensation shall be paid in a given case.545  
 
                                                 
 
543 Juusela – Tuominen 2011, pp. 319–320. 
544 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.78. 
545 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.79. 
157 
 
First, it must be reviewed in business restructurings whether commercial law, 
i.e. applicable national legislation or case law, would require that the 
termination or renegotiation of an existing agreement would be compensated, 
even though such a remuneration should not be paid pursuant to the 
agreement in question.546 In Finland, the above mentioned must be taken into 
consideration especially in long-term agreements.547 Pursuant to Finnish 
contract law, long-term agreements expire either when the agreement is 
terminated or when a fixed term has ended. A long-term agreement, which is 
in nature a fixed-term agreement, cannot thus be terminated before the expiry 
of the term. On the other hand, agreements in force until further notice may 
be terminated after a certain period of notice. If a long-term agreement is 
terminated unlawfully, a party to the agreement is usually entitled to a 
compensation.548 Thus, in order to comply with the arm’s length principle, 
such a compensation should also be paid at arm’s length in business 
restructurings, if unrelated parties would be entitled to it pursuant to law in 
comparable situations. 
 
In addition, for instance, the Finnish Act on Commercial Representatives and 
Salesmen (417/1992, laki kauppaedustajista ja myyntimiehistä) may require 
that unlawful terminations of agreements relating to sales activities are 
compensated, which must be taken into consideration especially in business 
restructurings, where a multinational enterprise’s sales activities are 
amended.549  
 
Second, whether the contractual terms and the existence or non-existence of 
an indemnification clause can be deemed to be arm’s length must also be 
analyzed. As a starting point, it should be reviewed whether the agreement, 
which is terminated or substantially renegotiated, has been concluded in a 
written form and includes an indemnification clause, pursuant to which a 
compensation must be paid. If the termination or renegotiation clauses of the 
agreement in question — and particularly the indemnification clause — have 
been followed, there should be no need for additional compensations, 
provided that such clauses are arm’s length. On the other hand, if the related 
parties have ignored the contractual terms, it must be examined, among other 
things, whether it has been done in the interest of both parties. Otherwise, this 
could result in that a compensation for such actions should be paid purely for 
                                                 
 
546 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.80. 
547 Long-term agreements are commonly used in business activities between companies, and they are 
usually in force for a longer period than, on the contrary, agreements based on non-recurring 
performance. The latter agreements are used, for instance, in the sale of goods, and they expire on the 
delivery of such items. See more about the difference in Hemmo 2003, pp. 33–34.   
548 Norros 2009, pp. 633–634, 644.  
549 See § 23, § 26 and § 28 of the Act on Commercial Representatives and Salesmen. 
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the reason that independent parties could demand such a compensation in 
similar situations.550 
 
After examining the existence or absence of an indemnification clause in favor 
of the restructured group company, it must be reviewed, inter alia, whether 
independent parties would have concluded under similar circumstances an 
agreement, which comprises (or in the event of absence, does not comprise) 
an indemnification clause in case of early termination or renegotiation of an 
arrangement. In particular, it must be reviewed whether the terms and 
conditions of the indemnification clause, or the absence thereof, is arm’s 
length. If independent parties would have concluded an agreement containing 
a similar indemnification clause, this will support the fact that such a clause is 
arm’s length. On the contrary, if the clause differs from the terms and 
conditions that independent parties would have used, any potential profits 
that would have accrued had the related parties used arm’s length terms and 
conditions should be included in the profits of a related party for tax 
purposes.551 For instance, as mentioned above, the general principles of 
Finnish contract law may require that an unlawful termination of an existing 
long-term agreement should be remunerated. 
 
Third, the analysis of whether the terms and conditions of the termination or 
renegotiation of an existing agreement is arm’s length should also cover the 
examination of which controlled party should ultimately bear the costs with 
regard to the indemnification of the suffering party for such termination or 
renegotiation. In that case, the viewpoints of both the transferor and the 
transferee should be taken into account. For example, a manufacturer could 
be willing to bear the indemnification costs at arm’s length in a situation where 
it terminates an existing manufacturing agreement with a group company in 
order to save on future manufacturing costs through a new manufacturing 
contract with another group company. Thus, under certain circumstances the 
manufacturing company or another group company taking over the 
manufacturing activity may be willing to bear the indemnification costs at 
arm’s length.552 The Finnish Tax Administration has shared this view and 
nowadays requires an analysis of all potential related parties benefiting from 
the business restructuring. This may mean, inter alia, controlled parties that 
benefit from investments made by the suffering company during the term of 
the terminated/renegotiated agreement.553 
 
                                                 
 
550 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.79, 9.81–9.82 
551 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.83–9.92. 
552 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.93–9.97. 
553 Finnish Tax Administration: Transfer Pricing in Business Restructurings. 
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Pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the termination or 
renegotiation of existing agreements in a business restructuring may occur in 
conjunction with transfers of something of value, such as intangibles. In that 
case, the particular guidance as to transfers of something of value (e.g. tangible 
or intangible assets) must be applied to such transfers, and the provisions 
regulating the indemnification for the termination or substantial renegotiation 
of existing agreements should be taken into consideration, when deciding 
whether further remuneration should be warranted for any possible 
detriments arising out of the termination or renegotiation of the existing 
agreements.554 
 
A major difference thus exists between the Finnish and the Russian transfer 
pricing rules in terms of the treatment of the terminations/renegotiations of 
existing agreements between related parties. The terminations or 
renegotiations of agreements and arrangements in business restructurings 
should be determined under Finnish law on a case-by-case basis. It is also very 
likely that an arm’s length compensation should be paid for such 
terminations/renegotiations, at least in some cases, while in Russia they are 
left outside the scope of application of the Tax Code’s transfer pricing rules 
entirely. In this sense, the requirements of the arm’s length principle (i.e. the 
equal treatment of related and independent parties in terms of taxation) are 
met effectively in Finland in this particular question, especially when 
taxpayers must in the discussed manner always ultimately review whether 
independent parties would be entitled to a remuneration pursuant to an 
indemnification clause (and on what terms) in comparable situations. As 
previously mentioned, the existing situation in Russia does not allow such a 
review, and the arm’s length principle is thus not followed in this respect. As 
the OECD’s guidance comprising the aforementioned principles is followed in 
practice already as such in Finland, similar needs to update de lege ferenda 
the prevailing legislation do not exist as in Russia. 
 
On the other hand, in one respect, laws of Russia and Finland conform to each 
other. It has been considered likely in both countries that tax authorities may 
be willing to intervene in arrangements, which result in the termination or 
renegotiation of existing agreements. For instance, in the Finnish legal 
literature, it has been viewed that the tax authorities may be eager to interfere 
in such arrangements expressly in the business restructuring context, 
although related parties may in general prevent such interventions by 
presenting sound business reasons for the terminations or amendments.555 
 
                                                 
 
554 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.77. 
555 Juusela – Tuominen 2011, p. 320. 
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The transfer pricing aspects of terminations or renegotiations of existing 
agreements have not been regulated as such in the U.S. transfer pricing 
sources either. As the scope of application of the U.S. transfer pricing 
provisions has been generally left open, such terminations and/or 
renegotiations should be in the first place reviewed from the perspective of the 
arm’s length standard: if the results of the controlled transaction — in this 
case, terminations or renegotiations of existing arrangements — are in line 
with the results that would have been realized in a transaction between 
independent parties under the same circumstances, the controlled transaction 
meets the requirements of the arm’s length standard.556 
 
The examination of the applicability of Section 482 of the IRC to terminations 
or renegotiations of existing agreements should be started from the 
identification of the contractual terms in question. It must be first observed 
that, pursuant to the Treasury Regulations, the IRS may disregard contractual 
arrangements between controlled parties if the terms of the arrangements are 
inconsistent with the economic substance of the arrangements. When the 
economic substance is evaluated, “greatest weight will be given to the actual 
conduct of the parties and their respective legal rights.”557 Among other things, 
expressly the terms with regard to the termination and renegotiation rights of 
parties shall be reviewed in this connection.558 Therefore, if related parties do 
not act in accordance with the termination or renegotiation clauses of existing 
agreements, the IRS may purely on the basis of the discussed Treasury 
Regulations intervene in such contractual arrangements in business 
restructurings. 
 
When the contractual terms of an existing arrangement between related 
parties have been identified in the above-mentioned manner, it must be 
analyzed whether such terms are arm’s length. Thus, if independent parties in 
the same industry would include in their agreements an 
indemnification/termination clause according to which (premature) 
terminations or renegotiations of the existing agreement should be 
compensated, such a clause should also be incorporated into an agreement 
between related parties. If a compensation for the termination or 
renegotiation of an existing arrangement is not paid in accordance with such 
a clause or if the clause is entirely missing, the IRS may require that the 
suffered party is entitled to a compensation at arm’s length.559 On the other 
                                                 
 
556 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). 
557 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1). If there is no written agreement between the parties, the IRS 
“may impute a contractual agreement between the controlled taxpayers consistent with the economic 
substance of the transaction”; see in detail in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2). 
558 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(A)(5). 
559 Amerkhail – Granwell 2009, pp. 417–418. 
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hand, if the agreement between related parties has been terminated pursuant 
to the terms and conditions of the agreement (i.e. the agreement has expired 
or the requirements of a written notice has been followed), no additional 
remuneration is generally required.560 
 
For example, usually U.S. distribution agreements contain a term of one year. 
If a distribution agreement is terminated in accordance with the one year’s 
notice in the course of a business restructuring, the agreement expires and the 
distributor is not entitled to a remuneration. However, if the distribution 
agreement is terminated immediately contrary to the termination clause, the 
distributor is usually entitled to a remuneration in the amount of foregone 
profits of one year pursuant to the termination and/or indemnification clauses 
of the agreement.561 If similar arrangements are terminated between related 
parties in the business restructuring context in comparable circumstances, it 
is likely that an appropriate indemnification in accordance with the industrial 
practices should also be paid to the suffered related party. Ultimately, this 
means that even in situations where related parties have complied with the 
indemnification clause of a certain agreement and paid a compensation for a 
premature termination of the agreement, the remuneration may not be 
considered arm’s length, if independent parties would have included an 
indemnification clause in their agreement entitling to a higher compensation 
in similar circumstances. 
 
On the other hand, it may also be possible that a compensation must be paid 
for a premature termination or renegotiation of an existing agreement on the 
basis of certain provisions of law. One of the acts, which covers questions as to 
terminations of agreements in commercial activities, at least to some extent, 
is the Uniform Commercial Code. The Uniform Commercial Code regulates 
generally commercial transactions, and it has been adopted by all states in 
some form.562 Pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, “where the contract 
provides for successive performances but is indefinite in duration it is valid for 
a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed may be terminated at any time 
by either party.” More importantly, “termination of a contract by one party 
except on the happening of an agreed event requires that reasonable 
notification be received by the other party and an agreement dispensing with 
notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.”563 The 
aforementioned provisions are somewhat vague and concern particularly 
dealings with goods, but nevertheless provide basic contractual principles, 
which can be used to validate claims for civil damages in situations where 
                                                 
 
560 Wright – Keates 2009, p. 116. 
561 Zollo 2011, p. 771; Wright – Keates 2009, pp. 115–116. 
562 Zollo 2011, pp. 771–772.  
563 Article 2-309 of the Uniform Commercial Code (2002). 
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existing agreements have been terminated unlawfully, i.e. without reasonable 
notification. This is due to the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code also 
contains provisions on remedies, which entitle the suffered party to damages 
for breach of contract.564 If independent parties could achieve remuneration 
by invoking these provisions, it may be required in business restructurings 
that a related party is also correspondingly compensated at arm’s length under 
similar circumstances on the basis of these provisions.  
 
Another, perhaps even more important act, which provides specific guidance 
as regards compensating premature terminations of agreements, is the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). The Restatement deals with the 
concept of the expectation interest, which basically means that suffered party 
should be put into as good position as the party would be had the agreement 
been performed. The concept has also been discussed in the legal literature 
and, more importantly, broadly recognized by the courts.565 Although the 
Restatement is not generally a legally binding source in U.S. law or enacted by 
states in their legislation, it has a persuasive authority, and therefore it is 
followed to a large extent by courts in their decision-making. Courts also have 
cited to it in their rulings as it they would have cited to legal statutes or 
codes.566 According to the Restatement, expectation interest is a promisee’s 
“interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position 
as he would have been in had the contract been performed,”567 and that “the 
injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest.”568 
These provisions should be followed in the business restructuring context, if 
they would be applied under similar conditions to comparable transactions 
between independent parties. In the end, this means that an appropriate arm’s 
length compensation should be paid in such situations to the suffered related 
party for the premature termination of an existing agreement. 
 
It has been viewed in the U.S. legal literature that commercial relationships 
have not been regulated in the USA as extensively as in Europe. Therefore, 
whether a remuneration should be paid for the termination of an existing 
commercial agreement, such as distributorship agreement, shall be more often 
examined from the contractual terms of the specific agreement itself in the 
                                                 
 
564 Articles 2-703 and 2-711 of the Uniform Commercial Code (2002). 
565 See e.g. Landgraf – Arnautovic 2015, pp. 321–322; Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471 (Kan. 1992); 
Metro. Prop. & Cas. v. Harper, 168 Or. App. 358 (2000). 
566 Gutman 2014, p. 118; Klass 2010, p. 46; Maggs 1998, p. 8. In a few U.S. jurisdictions, it is also binding 
law unless other sources of law do not contradict its provisions. This is the case, for example, in the Virgin 
Islands; see Maggs 1998, p. 29. 
567 § 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). 
568 § 347 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). 
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above-mentioned manner.569 It is true that the European legislation may cover 
some questions relating to terminations of contractual arrangements more 
extensively than U.S. law. This can especially be seen from the aforesaid 
Finnish Act on Commercial Representatives and Salesmen, which regulates in 
detail how commercial agents should be compensated for unlawful 
terminations of agency contracts. The act is based on an EU directive,570 which 
in turn provides useful help in determining whether a compensation must be 
paid for terminations or renegotiations of existing agreements in cross-border 
business restructurings also in other EU member states. On the contrary, there 
does not exist federal legislation in the USA regulating indemnification rights 
of sales agents in case of terminations.571 
 
That being said, U.S. law nevertheless conforms to a great degree to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Finnish law in terms of the transfer pricing 
treatment of terminations and renegotiations of existing agreements. The 
termination or renegotiation of an existing arrangement must primarily be 
examined from the perspective of whether independent parties would have 
required a compensation for such a termination or renegotiation under similar 
circumstances, taking into account, among other things, contractual terms 
used by independent parties in such business activities as well as specific 
national legislation and case law providing indemnification rights in such 
situations. The question must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, and 
therefore there should be no assumption that the terminations or 
renegotiations will always be compensated.  
 
In this sense, related and independent parties are treated in a similar manner 
(i.e. the same amount in subject to income taxation), resulting in that the arm’s 
length principle is followed effectively in this particular question both in the 
USA and in Finland. Quite the contrary, as Russian law does not in the above-
mentioned manner recognize the possibility of applying the transfer pricing 
regulations to terminations or renegotiations of existing arrangements at all, 
no arm’s length compensation is required for such terminations or 
renegotiations. Hence, the current Russian approach is troublesome from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle and therefore a need for amendments 
to the legislation de lege ferenda in this respect clearly exists in Russia, as 
opposed to the existing situation in Finland and the USA.   
 
                                                 
 
569 Amerkhail – Granwell 2009, p. 417. 
570 See Council Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the coordination of the laws of the 
member states relating to self-employed commercial agents. 
571 In addition, only few states have exceptionally regulated the rights of sales representatives; see Wise 
2010, pp. 4–5. 
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3.9 CONCLUSION 
3.9.1 CURRENT SITUATION AND DE LEGE FERENDA VIEWS ON 
RUSSIAN, FINNISH AND U.S. TAX LAW 
In conclusion, it can be stated that there currently exists ambiguity in Russian 
tax law in terms of the applicability of the transfer pricing rules to certain 
objects of transfer pricing at least in three aspects. First, the prevailing tax law 
provisions do not recognize the possibility of regarding business 
restructurings as transfers of a going concern in situations where a functioning 
and economically integrated business unit is transferred within the group. 
Second, the transfer pricing rules have not expressly dealt with transfers of 
intangibles and, in particular, whether such transfers are subject to transfer 
pricing. Third, the Tax Code’s provisions also remain silent as regards whether 
an arm’s length compensation should be paid for premature terminations or 
renegotiations of existing agreements. Thus, the Tax Code’s provisions cause 
interpretive problems in business restructurings especially in this regard. 
 
As discussed earlier, the interpretation of Russian law and overall judicial 
discretion under it are basically based only on written legal norms. From this 
perspective, it may be extremely difficult to find justification for a view 
according to which assets and functions transferred in the course of a business 
restructuring would not be identified and valued separately, but on an 
aggregate basis, if no support can be found for such a view in the Tax Code. 
The same applies to transfers of intangibles in general as well as to the 
premature terminations or negotiations of agreements occurring in the course 
of business restructurings. Moreover, other acceptable — although not binding 
— sources of Russian law have not dealt with these questions either. For 
instance, the highest courts, which have achieved a strengthened position in 
recent years resulting in that their decisions could be in practice legally 
binding to a certain degree, have not interpreted the new transfer pricing rules 
in this respect. Also, the Minfin’s or the FTS’s clarifications and other 
administrative guidance have been more of technical nature.  
 
Fortunately, one particular question, which is also of relevance in the business 
restructuring context, constitutes an exception to the above mentioned. Due 
to the previously discussed Minfin’s written clarifications and the FTS’s letter, 
controlled transfers of intellectual properties should be considered to fall 
within the scope of the Russian transfer pricing rules. This view is justified, 
regardless of that such guidance is not legally binding but rather informative 
and clarifying by nature, as no conflicting interpretations have been published 
on the question by Russian courts or other relevant sources. Also, it is 
reasonable for taxpayers to follow the guidance in this regard to avoid 
potential disputes with the tax authorities. Lastly, transfers of intellectual 
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properties clearly have value that would be compensated had such transfers 
occurred between independent parties, and therefore the approach can also be 
validated from the perspective of the arm’s length principle. As similar legal 
support cannot be found for transfers of other intangibles and transfers of a 
going concern (which may include intangibles), they fall outside the scope of 
the transfer pricing rules in business restructurings.  
 
The existing situation in Russia is open to criticism. As a result of the narrow 
scope of application of the transfer pricing rules and the lack of clarifying 
interpretations of legally binding nature in this respect, only transfers of 
tangible property and intellectual properties seem to fall within the scope of 
the transfer pricing rules in the business restructuring context. This leads to 
transfers of other assets of commercial value as well as premature 
terminations or renegotiations of agreements falling outside the scope of the 
Russian transfer pricing rules and ultimately not having to be compensated at 
arm’s length. This is problematic, when taking into consideration that it is self-
evident that also transfers of other type of intangibles than intellectual 
properties are usually remunerated in transactions between independent 
parties; intellectual properties are not the only intangibles that have 
commercial value. Therefore, it is unclear, why the Minfin and the FTS have 
only dealt with the applicability of the transfer pricing rules to controlled 
transfers of intellectual properties and not to intangible assets in general.  
 
Moreover, premature terminations or renegotiations of agreements may be in 
some situations compensated between independent parties, which at present 
is not reflected in the current transfer pricing provisions. Furthermore, the 
lack of legal support for treating transfers of a going concern on an aggregate 
basis for transfer pricing purposes is troublesome; it is likely that, for instance 
in business acquisitions, independent parties would analyze and remunerate 
simultaneous transfers of assets and functions as a whole. The traditional 
approach based on separate valuations of transferred items, which should also 
be applied to transfers of a functioning business unit pursuant to the Russian 
transfer pricing rules, does not take into consideration all the peculiarities 
involved in transfers of a going concern, and therefore the end result may 
deviate largely from that of transfers between independent parties in 
comparable circumstances.  
 
Consequently, the purpose of the arm’s length principle, which should be the 
guiding principle behind the national transfer pricing provisions also in 
Russia, is not realized effectively in business restructurings. As the above-
discussed transaction types are not subject to transfer pricing, related parties 
and unrelated parties are not in the end treated equally for tax purposes, as 
related parties do not have to use arm’s length compensations and other 
commercial terms in their transactions. In addition, it is problematic that such 
an essential question as the applicability of the transfer pricing rules to 
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transfers of intellectual property has also been disregarded in the Tax Code’s 
transfer pricing provisions entirely and is subject to interpretation. As the 
interpretation of Russian law should primarily be based on legal norms, such 
a relevant issue should also be dealt with directly in the Tax Code’s provisions.  
 
Hence, in this regard, it would be important de lege ferenda to revise/update 
the prevailing transfer pricing provisions and other applicable regulations in 
Russia to be in line with the aims of the arm’s length principle, i.e. to include 
the possibility to consider transfers of intangibles and a going concern as well 
as premature terminations or renegotiations of existing agreement as objects 
of transfer pricing, if they would be compensated in transactions between 
independent parties in comparable situations. In addition, it would be of great 
importance also to determine in the legislation, how the concept of intangible 
property should be understood in the transfer pricing context. This could be 
implemented, for instance, by defining the concept specifically for transfer 
pricing and/or tax purposes in the Tax Code’s provisions. As the Civil Code 
regulates only legally protected intellectual properties, and no general 
definition of intangible asset is provided therein, no references can be made to 
the Civil Code for the purpose of defining the concept of intangible property in 
the transfer pricing context. On the other hand, as the existing transfer pricing 
provisions have not dealt with the concept of intellectual property either, it 
could be possible to refer to the Civil Code’s concept of intellectual property in 
this connection, as it covers in the aforementioned sense typical intellectual 
properties. 
 
In comparison with Russian tax law, the aforementioned issues are less 
problematic under Finnish tax law. Correspondingly, such interpretive 
problems with respect to the scope of application of the transfer pricing rules 
do not, at least on a large scale, arise in Finland. The differences between the 
current situation in Russia and Finland could primarily be explained by 
referring to differences in the legal orders and the hierarchy of sources of law 
as well as to the relevance of the OECD’s guidance as a legal source in the 
countries. Regardless of that the Finnish provisions of law concerning transfer 
pricing remain silent in terms of objects of transfer pricing, the preliminary 
works of the AAP and the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court, 
which are also important sources of tax law in Finland, have provided guidance 
in this respect, which should be followed by taxpayers. More importantly, the 
significance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (including any future 
updates and revisions) in the interpretation of the national transfer pricing 
provisions has been confirmed by the said sources. Therefore, as Finland in 
practice follows the OECD’s guidance to a great extent in the interpretation of 
the arm’s length principle, the principles set out, inter alia, in Chapters VI and 
IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines should be applied to business 
restructurings pursuant to Finnish law.  
 
167 
 
The above mentioned results in that, apart from transfers of tangible assets, 
transfers of intangibles, in general, fall within the scope of the transfer pricing 
rules in Finland. Such intangibles may be intellectual properties, goodwill and 
even intangibles that are not specifically legally protected but have commercial 
value that would be compensated between unrelated parties. Similarly, the 
premature terminations or renegotiations of existing agreements may, 
depending on the circumstances of the case, be subject to transfer pricing (i.e. 
must be compensated at arm’s length). As Chapter IX of the OECD Guidelines 
is in the aforementioned manner largely followed in practice, it must also be 
reviewed in business restructurings whether the restructuring in question 
should be considered as a transfer of a going concern for transfer pricing 
purposes, if it involves contemporaneous transfers of interrelated assets. As 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not have a similar legal status in 
Russia, its guidance cannot be used as extensively in the interpretation of the 
arm’s length principle and the national transfer pricing provisions as in 
Finland. 
 
In consequence, as the Finnish transfer pricing rules are applied to transfers 
of such assets/something of value that are commonly transferred in business 
restructurings, the arm’s length principle is in this sense, to a great extent, 
efficiently followed in business restructurings in Finland. If independent 
parties would compensate certain transfers of assets or would remunerate the 
premature terminations of agreements in comparable circumstances, such 
transfers or terminations are also subject to transfer pricing in business 
restructurings between related parties and should ultimately be compensated 
at arm’s length.  
 
In one respect, improvements to the compliance with the arm’s length 
principle could, however, be considered in Finland. Although intangible assets 
generally fall within the scope of the Finnish transfer pricing rules, the broad 
concept of intangible property in transfer pricing is not entirely clear and 
straightforward as stated above. Consequently, the question of to what extent 
intangibles fall within the scope of the transfer pricing rules in business 
restructurings may cause interpretive problems in cases where it is not self-
evident whether certain items or assets should be regarded as intangible assets 
and should thus be taken into account in the transfer pricing analysis of a 
business restructuring. As this kind of vagueness is against the aim of the arm’s 
length principle, it might need to be considered whether such ambiguity 
should be addressed either in the national sources of transfer pricing or under 
the OECD’s guidance to improve the certainty of the transfer pricing treatment 
of such (intangible) items. However, as, in the current situation, the 
determination of all asset types falling within the scope of the concept of 
intangible assets is likely impossible, the existing Finnish (and thus OECD) 
transfer pricing rules are largely efficient in terms of the arm’s length principle 
in the above-mentioned manner. In order to improve the compliance with the 
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arm’s length principle, the current rules could be amended de lege ferenda to 
address the aforementioned ambiguous situations. This should, however, be 
done only, if the sort of measures for this could be found, which do not 
unnecessarily limit the scope of the concept of intangible assets.  
 
The existing legal situation in the USA conforms largely to the situation in 
Finland. However, in contrast to the Finnish OECD-based approach, the 
interpretation of the arm’s length principle in the USA is greatly based on the 
detailed national transfer pricing provisions regulated in the Treasury 
Regulations. In this respect, U.S law also provides a remarkably broad legal 
framework for the analysis of transfer pricing aspects of business 
restructurings, as opposed to Russian law. Pursuant to the regulations, 
transfers of tangible and intangible assets generally fall within the scope of the 
transfer pricing rules and are therefore subject to the arm’s length 
compensation. Also, the aggregation of related party transactions is allowed in 
accordance with the Treasury Regulations, resulting in that business 
restructurings may be regarded as transfers of a going concern for transfer 
pricing purposes. In addition, although the transfer pricing aspects of 
terminations or renegotiations of existing agreements have not been regulated 
explicitly in the U.S. transfer pricing sources, the Treasury Regulations contain 
provisions that support in the aforesaid manner the view that terminations 
and/or renegotiations should be reviewed from the perspective of the arm’s 
length standard. 
 
Nonetheless, as in Finland, U.S. law still leaves certain matters subject to 
interpretation, when it comes to transfer pricing of intangibles. The decision 
on whether some intangibles may fall within the scope of the transfer pricing 
rules should ultimately be done in the USA on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
consideration whether independent parties would compensate transfers of 
such non-physical assets in comparable circumstances (either as separate 
items or as part of complex of assets). This approach can be justified by 
referring to “other similar items” regulated in the Treasury Regulations 
concerning transfer pricing of intangibles. However, the concept of “other 
similar items” may prove to be troublesome in certain cases, as can be seen 
above from the question with respect to transfer pricing of goodwill and going 
concern value.  
 
Although the above-mentioned approach (examination of whether 
independent parties would compensate transfers of such intangible assets) can 
be applied in the aforesaid manner in the USA to a great extent, it cannot 
currently be applied unconditionally, mainly due to the fact that Veritas has 
not been yet overruled. Therefore, there is a need to make clarifying 
amendments to the existing law in terms of transfers of goodwill and going 
concern value. In addition, as was the case in Finland, in order to improve the 
compliance with the aims of the arm’s length principle, it should be considered 
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whether the current rules could be amended de lege ferenda to address the 
aforementioned ambiguous situations where it is unclear, whether certain 
items/assets should be regarded as intangible properties for transfer pricing 
purposes. However, this should be done only, if the sort of measures for this 
could be found, which do not unnecessarily limit the scope of the concept of 
intangible assets. As discussed, the existing transfer pricing rules are 
otherwise largely efficient in terms of the arm’s length principle.  
 
3.9.2 ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ARM’S LENGTH 
PRINCIPLE  
The aforementioned legal comparative analysis of the current situations in 
Russia, Finland and the USA highlights the importance of the possibility of 
treating business restructurings as transfers of a going concern for transfer 
pricing purposes in order to comply with the arm’s length principle in business 
restructurings. If a business restructuring can be regarded and treated as a 
transfer of a going concern under domestic transfer pricing rules in situations 
where a functioning business unit is transferred, the arm’s length result may 
more likely be achieved and, consequently, the domestic transfer pricing rules 
be considered consistent with the arm’s length principle. If domestic transfer 
pricing rules do not recognize such a possibility at all, it is not certain whether 
the arm’s length principle is efficiently followed, i.e. business restructurings 
may not necessarily fall within the scope of the national transfer pricing rules 
and be thus subject to the arm’s length principle to the extent required.    
 
As discussed, the advantage of regarding business restructurings as transfers 
of a going concern is that there is no need to examine separately, which of the 
transferring assets/something of value fall within the scope of national 
transfer pricing regulations in the business restructuring, and which do not. 
Instead of determining an arm’s length compensation for each asset transfer, 
only one transfer price shall be determined for the transferred business unit. 
This transfer price, usually based on the future earnings stream of the 
transferred business, shall cover the transfers of all of the assets and 
something of value related to the transferred business unit.572 This means, in 
practice, that the challenges in relation to determining the extent to which 
business restructurings should fall within the scope of the national transfer 
pricing rules (and be thus subject to the arm’s length principle) in a given case 
may, at least to a great extent, be avoided. More importantly, it is likely that 
the end result is consistent with the arm’s length principle, as independent 
parties would likely analyze and remunerate simultaneous transfers of assets 
                                                 
 
572 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68–9.69. 
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and functions as a whole in similar situations, like business acquisitions.573 
Hence, the domestic transfer pricing rules may more likely be considered 
compatible with the arm’s length principle, if the possibility to regard business 
restructurings as transfers of a going concern is included therein.   
 
On the contrary, the examination of controlled transactions on an asset-by-
asset or a transaction-by-transaction basis may be more problematic from the 
point of view of the arm’s length principle, if a business restructuring involves 
a transfer of a functioning business unit (a going concern). First, if such a 
transfer would be analyzed on an asset-by-asset basis, all transfers of 
something of value should be compensated, if independent parties would 
compensate such transfers in their transactions in comparable situations. In 
practice, this would require that all the items that could have such value should 
be identified in a business restructuring, which alone may be a difficult task.  
 
Second, some assets or items of commercial value cannot be separated from 
other assets by their nature. For instance, it is generally viewed in the legal 
literature that a company’s goodwill cannot be transferred separately. The 
transfer of goodwill usually requires that a whole business unit is transferred 
simultaneously. Even then, it is very likely that it cannot be identified and 
distinguished from the other transferred assets.574 An approach based on an 
asset-by-asset analysis would thus disregard the transfer of a goodwill, 
although it has commercial value that would likely be compensated in 
transactions between independent parties.  
 
Third, even if all the transfers of assets and something of value could in a given 
case be identified and separated from each other, the arm’s length result may 
not necessarily be achieved. As mentioned above, transfer of a going concern 
is usually valued on the basis of future income streams. The aggregate sum of 
separately valued assets, risks and/or functions transferred in the course of a 
business restructuring may not necessarily amount to the sum that 
independent parties would determine in comparable transfers of a going 
concern.575 Hence, the approach based on separate examinations and 
valuations of transferred assets and something of value does not take into 
consideration all the peculiarities involved in transfers of a going concern, and 
therefore the end result may deviate largely from what independent parties 
would have ended up with in comparable circumstances. Ultimately, domestic 
transfer pricing rules can be deemed to be inconsistent with the arm’s length 
principle.  
                                                 
 
573 See e.g. Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 313–321; Breen 2014, p. 1483; Cordova – Mitra – Newman – Reams 
– Shanda – Shapiro 2012, p. 56; Femia – Blair 2008, p. 199. 
574 Cordova – Mitra – Newman – Reams – Shanda – Shapiro 2012, p. 47. 
575 See supra notes 571, 572 and 573. 
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In consequence, the possibility to consider business restructurings as transfers 
of a going concern must primarily be regulated in domestic legislation or 
similar sources of legally binding character for the purpose of ensuring the 
compliance with the arm’s length principle. However, it is not sufficient that 
the possibility thereto alone is regulated. Also, the circumstances in which 
business restructurings may and should be regarded as a going concern should 
be regulated in a clear manner.  
 
As mentioned, specific domestic legislation rarely regulates such a 
possibility.576 In some countries, like Finland, the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines may in practice be used as the guiding source in the interpretation 
of the arm’s length principle regulated in the domestic transfer pricing 
legislation. Therefore, it may be sufficient that a clear and direct reference to 
the applicability of the OECD’s guidance in this respect is made in the 
applicable domestic legal sources. However, the circumstances in which a 
related company should choose the examination of a transfer of a going 
concern on an aggregate basis, instead of analyzing transfers occurring in a 
business restructuring on an asset-by-asset basis, could be regulated more 
clearly in the guidelines, if domestic sources solely rely on the guidelines’ 
guidance in this respect.577  
 
Alternatively, it may be sufficient that domestic transfer pricing rules allow the 
aggregation of related party transactions to the extent that also transfers of a 
going concern may be examined in business restructurings on an aggregate 
basis. This kind of approach has been taken by the U.S. Treasury Regulations. 
Regardless of not directly dealing with transfers of a going concern or referring 
to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in this respect, the Treasury 
Regulations allow the IRS and taxpayers to analyze two or more economically 
interrelated transactions as a whole for transfer pricing purposes in order to 
achieve the most reliable arm’s length result.578 Although the question is thus 
subject to interpretation, the regulations are detailed enough to come to such 
a conclusion.   
 
A more problematic question, from the perspective of the arm’s length 
principle, arises when a business restructuring involves only transfers of 
specific assets/something of value, which do not constitute together a 
functioning business unit (a going concern). In such situations, all transfers of 
assets and/or something of value occurring in the course of a business 
                                                 
 
576 As discussed earlier, Germany is one of the few countries that is often mentioned as an example in 
this regard. See supra notes 11, 47 and 250. 
577 This question will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
578 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1T(f)(2)(i)(C). 
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restructuring should primarily be identified and valued separately, on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis. This means in practice that such 
assets/something of value should also be regulated as objects of transfer 
pricing pursuant to the national transfer pricing rules. While the question of 
whether transfers of tangible assets should fall within the scope of transfer 
pricing rules and be subject to the arm’s length principle is usually clear, 
particularly, the question in relation to transfers of intangible assets is more 
troublesome.  
 
As primarily intangible assets — such as intellectual properties — clearly have 
commercial value that would be compensated in transactions between 
independent parties, the arm’s length principle, as a starting point, requires 
that their transfers should fall within the scope of application of the domestic 
transfer pricing rules. If domestic transfer pricing rules regulate the 
transaction types that are in the scope of application of the transfer pricing 
rules, the above mentioned means that transfers of intangibles should be 
included in the transaction types falling within the scope. As the current 
situation in Russia clearly shows, if the regulated scope of application of the 
domestic transfer pricing rules is narrow and clarifying interpretations of 
legally binding nature lack in this respect, the domestic rules can, perhaps 
unintentionally, leave such assets out of the scope of transfer pricing rules. In 
consequence, such transfer pricing rules should be considered inconsistent 
with the arm’s length principle.  
 
The concept of intangible property is broad. Therefore, it is a difficult, or even 
impossible, task to explicitly identify and list separately all intangible assets 
that should be subject to the arm’s length principle in the scope of domestic 
transfer pricing rules. As discussed, not all intangibles are protected by 
national regulations and/or recorded on a company’s balance sheet. Moreover, 
certain intangibles, such as goodwill and going concern value, cannot 
necessarily be defined in a precise and clear manner. From the perspective of 
the arm’s length principle, the decisive factor should always be whether 
independent parties would compensate transfers of such intangible property 
in similar conditions. This results in that the inability to define or list all 
intangibles in transfer pricing regulations as asset types falling within the 
scope of transfer pricing rules must not lead to certain intangibles falling 
outside the scope of transfer pricing rules (and, consequently, not being 
subject to the arm’s length principle). 
 
Based on the examination of the approaches of Russian, Finnish and U.S. law, 
the best solution to tackle potential problems seems to be to regulate the 
applicability of transfer pricing rules to intangibles generally and to have a 
broad definition of intangible asset in transfer pricing rules and/or other 
related sources that clarify the content of the primary sources. In that case, it 
may be reasonable, from the perspective of the arm’s length principle, to leave 
173 
 
a definition of intangible asset open for transfer pricing purposes and not to 
aim at exhaustively determining all the intangible asset types falling within the 
scope of the concept. When applying such an approach, the decision on 
whether some intangibles fall within the scope of the transfer pricing rules in 
business restructurings should be made ultimately on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into consideration whether independent parties would compensate 
transfers of such non-physical assets in comparable circumstances. This kind 
of analysis brings a taxpayer closer to an arm’s length result in comparison 
with situations where the intangible assets subject to transfer pricing would be 
listed in the national transfer pricing rules exhaustively — as it is unlikely that 
the concept of intangible can be defined to cover all possible intangible assets 
that may have commercial value. 
 
Depending on how the aforementioned approach is adopted in practice, one 
alternative may be preferable over another. Domestic transfer pricing rules 
may comprise a non-exhaustive list of specifically mentioned intangibles with 
a reference to other similar items that should be considered intangible 
properties for transfer pricing purposes,579 or the concept of intangible asset 
may be left entirely open.580 The first alternative may leave room for 
ambiguities more than the latter, as in such situations it must be interpreted 
what such “similar items” may be. As evidenced above, this may be a 
challenging task in practice. The latter thus brings more likely the best arm’s 
length result, as ultimately, it must be analyzed whether independent parties 
would compensate transfers of such non-physical assets in comparable 
circumstances. 
 
Nonetheless, even the approach based on a broad definition of intangible asset 
for transfer pricing purposes may cause challenges from the perspective of the 
arm’s length principle. As the concept is left open to interpretation, the 
uncertainty in relation to transfer pricing of intangible assets increases in 
cases, where it is unclear whether an item should be regarded as an intangible 
asset at all and, if so, whether a transfer thereof would be compensated in 
transactions between independent parties. In the worst-case scenario, this 
may enable both taxpayers and tax authorities to interpret the question of 
whether an arm’s length compensation should be paid for a certain, 
presumably, non-physical item for their own benefit.581  
 
                                                 
 
579 As is the case in the USA, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(b). 
580 As in Finland, see HE 107/2006 vp, p. 20, Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, 
pp. 24 and 37, Finnish Tax Administration: Statement A177/200/2015 and OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, 6.6 and 6.7. 
581 Similar thoughts have been expressed in e.g. Markham 2015, pp. 686–687. 
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Nevertheless, simply from the point of view of ensuring that all (valuable) 
intangible assets fall within the scope of application of transfer pricing rules — 
and thus, are subject to the arm’s length principle — in business 
restructurings, the approach seem to provide the best possible measure in the 
current situation. As discussed, it is unlikely that all intangible items having 
commercial value could be identified in transfer pricing rules. Furthermore, 
no perfect transfer pricing rules exist, as there is always a need to reflect 
constantly changing business environment in transfer pricing rules. As the 
broad concept makes the analysis of such assets on a case-by-case basis (i.e. 
whether such assets would be compensated in uncontrolled transactions in 
comparable situations) possible, related parties and independent parties may, 
in the end, be treated similarly. Also, this approach does not rule out that 
certain tools or measures to tackle the aforementioned unclear situations 
could be adopted to such transfer pricing rules that are based on a broad 
concept of intangible assets. 
 
When transfers of risks and associated profit potential are reviewed in the 
business restructuring context, consideration of such factors in the functional 
and/or comparability analyses seems to meet the requirements of the arm’s 
length principle most efficiently. Risks and profit potential clearly lack the 
ability of being transferred alone, and in this sense it is also unlikely that 
independent parties could transfer them alone, separately from other assets. 
On the other hand, when risks and associated profit potential are transferred 
together with assets and functions, they must be taken into account as one 
factor affecting the pricing of such transfers — or at least their possible effects 
must be considered. As dealt with above, the assumption of risks and overall 
increase/decrease of risks would likely be taken into account in the 
compensation of transactions conducted between independent parties.582 As 
related parties should consider the allocation of risks and compare the 
circumstances of the given related party transaction, inter alia, in terms of 
assumed risks to transactions conducted between independent parties in 
comparable circumstances, related parties and independent parties are 
treated similarly from this perspective.   
 
Lastly, when examining to what extent business restructurings should fall 
within the scope of transfer pricing rules from the perspective of the arm’s 
length principle, domestic transfer pricing rules should include a possibility to 
consider whether premature terminations or renegotiations of existing 
agreements should be compensated at arm’s length. As the examination of the 
question needs to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, such transfer pricing 
rules that are narrow and remain totally silent in this respect, as is the case in 
Russia, are inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. On the contrary, the 
                                                 
 
582 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.60, 1.100. 
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Finnish, OECD-based, approach brings good results in terms of the arm’s 
length principle, as the question is discussed in a detailed and coherent 
manner in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and the possibility to 
analyze the question is not based only on the interpretation of the arm’s length 
standard (as seems to be the case in the USA). 
 
3.9.3 OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES — A STANDARD TO BE 
FOLLOWED UNIVERSALLY? 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines seem to provide, in the aforementioned 
manner, adequate guidance in relation to the compliance with the arm’s length 
principle when the objects of transfer pricing are discussed in the business 
restructuring context. Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
contains a detailed presentation of transfers of something of value that should 
be taken into consideration in the transfer pricing analysis of business 
restructurings. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have generally been 
considered to constitute an international standard in transfer pricing.583 
Hence, should the guidelines, in their present form, be regarded as the guiding 
international standard also in business restructurings? Furthermore, and 
more importantly, should they be adopted in a consistent manner to domestic 
transfer pricing legislation and regulations, when it is reviewed to what extent 
business restructurings should be subject to the arm’s length principle?  
 
As discussed above, the transfer pricing aspects of business restructurings may 
be analyzed both on an aggregate basis and on a transaction-by-transaction 
basis. If a business restructuring can be regarded and treated as a transfer of a 
going concern under domestic transfer pricing rules in situations where a 
functioning business unit is transferred, the arm’s length result may more 
likely be achieved and, consequently, the domestic transfer pricing rules be 
considered consistent with the arm’s length principle. The OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines recognize such a possibility, as they regulate transfers of an 
ongoing concern as one form of transfers (of something of value) subject to the 
arm’s length principle in business restructurings. Pursuant to the guidelines, 
a transfer of this kind of “a functioning, economically integrated business unit” 
may be analyzed and valued on an aggregate basis, if it comprises “multiple 
contemporaneous transfers of interrelated assets, risks, or functions”.584 
 
Furthermore, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines recognize the possibility 
of reviewing transfers of something of value — such as tangible assets and 
intangibles — and potential premature terminations or substantial 
                                                 
 
583 See e.g. Calderón 2007, pp. 4–5. 
584 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68–9.69. 
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renegotiations of existing arrangements separately, when objects of transfer 
pricing are determined in business restructurings.585 Moreover, also the 
allocation of risks and profit potential must be taken into account in the 
transfer pricing analysis of business restructurings, although they are not 
objects of transfer pricing as such.586 
 
As the OECD’s guidance covers the typical objects of transfer pricing in 
business restructurings and enables business restructurings to be regarded as 
transfers of a going concern for the purpose of achieving the best arm’s length 
result, it is consistent with the arm’s length principle. The OECD’s guidance, 
which is largely followed in Finland when the arm’s length principle is 
interpreted in practice, has brought good results in terms of the arm’s length 
principle also in Finland. The extent to which business restructurings fall 
within the scope of the domestic transfer pricing regulations in Finland is 
deemed to be in line with the arm’s length principle to a great degree. 
Therefore, could the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines be a global transfer 
pricing solution to business restructurings that could also be adopted to 
domestic transfer pricing rules? 
 
Although the OECD’s concept of business restructuring for transfer pricing 
purposes is in this sense compatible with the arm’s length principle, few 
observations speak against such a view. First, it can be questioned whether the 
OECD provides sufficient guidance on conditions on which business 
restructurings should be regarded as transfers of a going concern for transfer 
pricing purposes. Although the OECD defines the concept in a definite 
manner, it does not regulate clearly when the examination of 
contemporaneous transfers of assets, risks and functions should be analyzed 
on an aggregate basis. For instance, it mentions that “the determination of the 
arm’s length compensation for a transfer of an ongoing concern does not 
necessarily amount to the sum of the separate valuation” and that “valuation 
of those [contemporaneous] transfers on an aggregate basis may be 
necessary.”587  
 
Second, in connection with the above said, the guidelines do not currently take 
a clear stand on whether the approach based on the examination of 
contemporaneous transfers of assets/something of value as a whole over the 
approach based on separate analyses of related party transaction occurring 
                                                 
 
585 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.48–9.49, 9.55 and 9.75. As mentioned earlier, also 
“outsourcing” is mentioned as potential transfer of something of value, although the presentation of the 
question is very limited and no separate compensation as such is likely to be paid; see OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, 9.74. 
586 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.39–9.46. 
587 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.69. 
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during a business restructuring is preferred.588 Although the OECD states that 
the aggregate valuation may be the best option to achieve the arm’s length 
result, no clear and direct position is expressed in the guidelines. The OECD 
also starts the presentation of transfers of something of value in the guidelines 
with separate analyses of different kinds of assets that could be transferred in 
business restructurings, before discussing the possibility of considering 
business restructuring as a whole, i.e. as transfers of a going concern. Thus, 
although the examination of a business restructuring as a going concern is 
possible pursuant to the existing guidance, the arm’s length principle in the 
aforesaid manner usually requires that such an approach is also prioritized in 
practice, when a functioning business unit is transferred in a business 
restructuring. 
 
Third, the concept of something of value used by the OECD to define objects 
of transfer pricing does not include the termination or substantial 
renegotiation of existing agreements, although they should be taken into 
consideration in the arm’s length analysis of business restructurings.589 For 
the sake of clarity and coherency, the question should be regulated under the 
section dealing with transfers of something of value. 
 
Fourth, the ambiguity that may arise from the broad concept of intangible 
asset cannot be ignored in this context. As stated, the use of the broad concept 
of intangible asset in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines makes possible 
that all such intangible assets that would be compensated in transactions 
between independent parties should correspondingly fall within the scope of 
application of domestic transfer pricing rules — and thus be subject to the 
arm’s length principle — in business restructurings. In the current situation, 
as is it extremely unlikely that all intangible asset types could be defined 
exhaustively in domestic transfer pricing rules, the mentioned approach 
brought good results in terms of the arm’s length principle in Finland; related 
parties must in the end analyze on a-case-by-case basis whether independent 
parties would compensate transfers of such items having intangible nature in 
their transactions.  
 
However, while such an approach seems to be the best option to achieve an 
arm’s length result in the current legal situation in Finland, it is less acceptable 
to have such unclarity in an international standard that would be followed 
                                                 
 
588 Already the discussion draft of Chapter IX was considered ambiguous in this regard, see e.g. Frotscher 
– Oestreicher 2009, p. 381. 
589 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Chapter IX, Sections E and F. 
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broadly by OECD member states and even by non-member states.590 As 
mentioned, as the concept is left open to interpretation, the uncertainty in 
relation to transfer pricing of intangible assets increases in cases where it is 
unclear whether an item should be regarded as an intangible asset and, if so, 
whether a transfer thereof would be compensated in transactions between 
independent parties. This makes the compliance with the arm’s length 
principle more uncertain and unpredictable — which is against the aim of the 
principle. 
 
The above-mentioned concerns in relation to the concept of intangible asset 
have been shared also in the legal literature. The OECD’s broad concept of 
intangibles has been considered to cause uncertainty especially for taxpayers. 
It has been expressed that a vague interpretation benefits tax authorities, 
entitling them to interpret the concept for their benefit. Moreover, the risk of 
double taxation arises, when national authorities try to ensure their share of a 
multinational enterprise’s income.591  
 
On the other hand, the OECD’s BEPS Project on intangibles has even been 
considered to ease the tax avoidance, due to the complexity and ambiguity of 
new rules.592 This view can be approved, as the new guidance may enable also 
taxpayers to interpret the questions in relation to transfer pricing of 
intangibles for their own good. Hence, the broad concept of intangibles 
introduced by the OECD cannot, in its present form, be used as the guiding 
standard currently. The question of how to define intangibles in a more 
concrete manner, covering nevertheless all potential items of value that would 
be compensated in transactions between independent parties, remains to be 
answered.593 
 
On the basis of the above-discussed observations, in order to regard the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines as the guiding international standard that could 
be adopted to the domestic transfer pricing rules to achieve the best possible 
arm’s length result in this context, aforesaid concerns need to be addressed de 
lege ferenda by introducing amendments and/or updates to the current 
guidance of the OECD.  
                                                 
 
590 Due to the fact that the guidelines are widely accepted, also countries that are not OECD member 
states follow to a great extent the guidelines when they enact domestic transfer pricing rules, see Lubic 
– Gelin – Ossard-Quintaine 2014, pp. 70–71. 
591 Markham 2015, pp. 684, 686–687 
592 T’ng 2016, pp. 422, 433. 
593 See about the discussion in relation to the concept of intangible and possible solutions thereto in 
Markham 2015, pp. 673–687. 
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4 DETERMINATION OF ARM’S LENGTH 
COMPENSATION 
4.1 ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE AS A STARTING POINT 
When the controlled transactions, which take place in the course of a business 
restructuring, have been examined, and especially the transfers of assets 
and/or something of value subject to the national transfer pricing regulations 
have been identified in the above-discussed manner, the next step is to 
determine the arm’s length compensations for such transfers. 
Correspondingly, if the business restructuring involves a transfer of a going 
concern, an arm’s length price should be determined for the whole transferred 
going concern. Business restructurings do not form an exception as regards to 
the application of the arm’s length principle, meaning that the transfer prices 
must meet the requirements of the arm’s length principle/arm’s length 
standard, i.e. conform to the prices used between unrelated parties in 
comparable transactions under similar circumstances. 
 
The determination of an arm’s length compensation is a multi-step process, 
which involves performing a comparability analysis and the application of an 
appropriate transfer pricing method. The comparability analysis will be 
discussed first in the following. 
 
4.2 COMPARABILITY ANALYSIS 
As discussed, the comparability analysis in general means the comparison 
between the terms and conditions of a related party transaction and the terms 
and conditions of a comparable unrelated party transaction (comparable 
unrelated party transactions) conducted under similar circumstances. The 
purpose of the comparability analysis is to demonstrate in particular that the 
compensation paid in the controlled transaction conforms to the 
compensations paid between independent parties in comparable transactions 
and is thus arm’s length.594 The comparability analysis is generally a part of 
the transfer pricing documentation required by law.595 The Finnish legislation 
does not have specific regulations with regard to conducting the comparability 
analysis, but the preliminary works require that the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines must be followed in this regard.596 The Tax Code’s provisions 
                                                 
 
594 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.33. 
595 See § 14b of the AAP; Article 105.5 and 105.15 of the Tax Code; Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii)(B).  
596 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 16. 
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regarding the comparability analysis correspond to a great degree to the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ provisions, while the U.S. regulations contain also 
small differences when compared to the guidelines. 
 
In principle, the comparability analysis consists of identifying the conditions 
and economically relevant circumstances of a related party transaction, after 
which it must be examined whether such conditions and economically relevant 
circumstances are in line with the conditions and economically relevant 
circumstances of comparable transactions between unrelated parties.597 The 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions are usually comparable, if there are 
no such differences between the transactions which could affect the 
compensation paid in such transactions or there can be made reasonable 
adjustments to eliminate the effects of possible differences.598 
 
Pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the economically relevant 
factors, which must be taken into account when determining whether such 
transactions are comparable, include  
 
- “the contractual terms of the transaction;”  
- “the functions performed by each of the parties to the 
transaction, taking into account assets used and risks assumed, 
including how those functions relate to the wider generation of 
value by the group to which the parties belong, the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction, and industry 
practices;” 
- “the characteristics of property transferred or services 
provided;” 
- “the economic circumstances of the parties and of the market in 
which the parties operate;” and 
- “the business strategies pursued by the parties.”599 
 
The Russian Tax Code’s provisions regulating the factors to be taken into 
consideration in the comparability analysis are fully compatible with the 
above-mentioned factors.600 Also, under Finnish law the comparability 
analysis consists of the same five factors, and the guidance of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines must be followed in this respect.601 The Treasury 
Regulations, on the other hand, list expressly risks as one factor and fail to 
mention the business strategies as factors to be analyzed in determining the 
                                                 
 
597 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.33–1.34. 
598 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.110; Article 105.5 of the Tax Code; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(2). 
599 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.36. 
600 Article 105.5 of the Tax Code. 
601 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 16. 
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comparability of related and unrelated party transactions, while otherwise the 
listed factors conform to the provisions of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines and the Tax Code.602 This difference is not of great relevance in 
practice, as the risks are dealt with in the risk analysis as part of the functional 
analysis under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and Russian law,603 and 
correspondingly business strategies, such as market share strategy, may also 
be taken into account in the U.S. transfer pricing as a particular circumstance 
pursuant to the Treasury Regulations.604  
 
The comparability analysis, where the said factors are taken into account, must 
also be performed in business restructurings in order to determine whether 
the transactions executed therein are arm’s length.605 Therefore, the group 
companies must find comparable transactions in order to justify the prices 
and/or other commercial terms used in the controlled transactions occurred 
in a business restructuring. In general, such comparable transactions can be 
internal or external comparable transactions. An internal comparable is a 
comparable transaction conducted previously between one of the controlled 
parties in question and an independent party, while an external comparable 
is a comparable transaction conducted purely between independent parties.606 
Usually, the use of internal comparables is easier and more reliable in 
comparison with the external comparables, as the accurate information 
required for the comparability analysis can be found more effortlessly from the 
group’s records.607 It is no surprise thus that the internal comparables are 
preferred over external comparables under Russian, Finnish and U.S. law as 
well as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.608 The information on 
comparable transactions can be obtained from several different sources, such 
as commercial databases, group companies’ own databases and publicly 
available sources. It must be noted that such information must be 
                                                 
 
602 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(1). 
603 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.56, 1.60; Article 105.5 of the Tax Code. 
604 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(4). 
605 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.13. 
606 See e.g. HE 107/2006 vp, p. 17; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 3.24; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
3(c)(3)(ii)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(ii)(A). 
607 See e.g. Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 104; HE 107/2006 vp, p. 17; Hellevig – Usov – Kabakov 2014, p. 222; 
Wittendorff 2010a, p. 397. 
608 See Article 105.6 of the Tax Code; HE 107/2006 vp, p. 17 and Finnish Tax Administration 
Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 32; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(3)(ii)(A) and Section 4.61.3.6 of the 
Internal Revenue Manual; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 3.27–3.29. Prior to the newest transfer 
pricing provisions, internal comparables were not allowed at all under Russian tax law; see 
Informatsionnoe pis'mo Prezidiuma VАS RF ot 17.03.2003 N 71 ”Obzor praktiki razresheniya 
arbitrazhnymi sudami del, svyazannykh s primeneniem otdel'nykh polozhenij chasti pervoj Nalogovogo 
kodeksa Rossijskoj Federatsii.” 
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transferrable to the tax authorities and cannot thus be confidential in 
nature.609 
 
In the business restructuring context, the above mentioned means that such 
comparables must also be found for related party transactions occurred in a 
business restructuring to demonstrate that the prices and/or other 
commercial terms used in the transactions are consistent with the 
prices/commercial terms that would have been used had independent parties 
conducted such transactions. This can be a challenging task, as usually it is 
difficult — or even impossible — to find comparable business restructuring 
transactions610 to validate the compensation paid in a particular business 
restructuring due to the fact that the circumstances and conditions under 
which business restructuring are executed vary from case to case. However, at 
least the following observations can be made. 
 
When a business restructuring involves separate transfers of assets and/or 
something of value, which will fall within the scope of application of national 
transfer pricing provisions, but which will not form together a going concern 
for transfer pricing purposes, the transfer pricing analysis for such transfers 
will be conducted on a transaction-by-transaction basis. In that case, it will be 
examined separately in every related party transaction occurred in a business 
restructuring, whether the commercial terms are in line with comparable 
transactions between unrelated parties under similar circumstances. Finding 
comparable transactions for such controlled transactions separately might be 
an easier task than finding comparables for a transfer of a going concern. For 
example, it is likely not as troublesome to find comparables for transfers of 
certain tangible or intangible property as it may be for a transfer of a whole 
business unit (i.e. going concern). 
 
If the business restructuring involves a transfer of a going concern, it is even 
questionable whether internal comparables can be used in such situations at 
all. As cross-border business restructurings are performed between group 
companies within a multinational enterprise, it may be unlikely that identical 
or even similar cross-border business restructurings have been conducted 
                                                 
 
609 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 32; Article 105.6 of the Tax Code. The 
sources of information, which should be used in conducting a comparability analysis, have been 
regulated in a comprehensive way in the Tax Code, which can be considered progressive. As one of the 
most used commercial databases in Russia can be mentioned SPARK (available at 
www.spark.interfax.ru). In the USA, for instance, Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s databases can be used 
when external comparables are searched for, see Section 4.61.3.6 and Exhibit 4.61.2-6 of the Internal 
Revenue Manual. Also in Finland, the commercial databases are used in search of comparables; see 
Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 32–34. 
610 See e.g. Silberztein 2009, p. 63. 
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previously in the group taken into account the nature of the restructured 
business; the industry and market, where the business in question is carried; 
the combination of assets/something of value, which forms the business unit; 
and other similar features. The use of external comparables in such situations 
does not simplify the task either. The information obtained from transactions 
between independent parties should be detailed enough to assess the 
comparability between the related party transaction (i.e. business 
restructuring) and the unrelated party transaction, such as a business 
acquisition. The more complex the transactions between independent parties 
are, the more difficult it is to get information about such transactions as an 
outsider, especially when the detailed information on business acquisitions 
and similar corporate transactions is in general kept confidential between the 
attended parties and will not be shared in public. 
  
As under the Russian transfer pricing rules business restructurings may be 
never treated as transfers of a going concern, the comparison analysis will be 
performed on a transaction-by-transaction basis even in situations where the 
transfers of interrelated assets have the ability to perform certain business 
functions and would thus form a functioning business unit. From this 
perspective, performing a comparability analysis may be an “easier task” in 
Russia on some occasions, when compared to Finland and the USA, where 
business restructurings must be regarded as transfers of a going concern under 
certain circumstances.  
 
On the other hand, as mentioned above, transfer pricing regulations usually 
acknowledge that it may be sometimes insurmountably difficult to find 
comparables for related party transactions. For instance, pursuant to the 
Treasury Regulations, “because identical transactions can rarely be located, 
whether a transaction produces an arm's length result generally will be 
determined by reference to the results of comparable transactions under 
comparable circumstances.”611 In addition, “in order to be considered 
comparable to a controlled transaction, an uncontrolled transaction need not 
be identical to the controlled transaction, but must be sufficiently similar that 
it provides a reliable measure of an arm's length result. If there are material 
differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, 
adjustments must be made if the effect of such differences on prices or profits 
can be ascertained with sufficient accuracy to improve the reliability of the 
results.”612   Similar provisions can also be found in the Tax Code and the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.613 These provisions can be of practical 
importance especially in Finland and the USA, when identical comparables 
                                                 
 
611 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). 
612 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(2). 
613 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.39–1.40, 1.110; Article 105.5 of the Tax Code. 
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cannot be found for transfers of a going concern or specific intangible assets. 
If related parties can find similar unrelated party transactions, at least by 
making reasonable adjustments to eliminate possible material differences 
between the transactions in the above-mentioned manner, such unrelated 
party transaction can be used as comparables. 
 
Nevertheless, it may be possible that comparable transactions cannot be found 
for transfers of a going concern even after making adjustments to the 
differences between the controlled and potentially comparable transactions. 
Although comparable uncontrolled transactions cannot be found for a 
business restructuring, it does not mean that the business restructuring is not 
arm’s length. In such situations, it is useful to follow the OECD’s guidance in 
Chapter I and IX. Pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, in 
determining the arm’s length conditions of business restructurings, it is 
relevant to identify the commercial or financial relations between the related 
parties by taking the following steps: (i) to accurately delineate the 
transactions comprising the business restructuring (taking into consideration 
the functions, assets and risks before and after the business restructuring); (ii) 
to examine business reasons for and the expected benefits from the 
restructuring (including the role of synergies); and (iii) to examine other 
options realistically available to the parties.614  
 
The first item was discussed already earlier in the section dealing with the 
functional analysis, and its basic idea is to “identify the economically 
significant activities and responsibilities undertaken, assets used or 
contributed, and risks assumed before and after the restructuring by the 
parties involved. Accordingly, the analysis focuses on what the parties actually 
do and the capabilities, as well as the type and nature of assets used or 
contributed by the parties in a pre-restructuring and post-restructuring 
scenarios.”615 The second item seeks to understand the business reasons for 
and the expected benefits from the business restructuring, taking into account 
in particular the synergies. If there group of companies has anticipated 
synergies as one of the main reasons for the business restructuring, such 
synergies may have economic significance in the arm’s length analysis.616 
Finally, other options, which may be realistically available to the related 
parties in the business restructuring, should also be reviewed, as independent 
parties would generally “compare the transaction to the other options 
realistically available to them, and they will only enter into the transaction if 
                                                 
 
614 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.14–9.31. 
615 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.18. See also OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.37. 
616 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.24.  
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they see no alternative that offers a clearly more attractive opportunity to meet 
their commercial objective.”617 
 
Due to the general applicability of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, such 
provisions can be used as interpretive help in determining whether the 
business restructuring meets the requirements of the arm’s length principle in 
Finland, and therefore taxpayers should record the review of such factors 
accurately in their transfer pricing documentation. Although such an option 
has not been regulated in the Treasury Regulations explicitly, such factors can 
also be taken into consideration in U.S. business restructurings to validate the 
commercial terms used in the business restructuring.618   
 
4.3 TRANSFER PRICING METHODS AND OTHER 
VALUATION METHODS 
4.3.1 GENERAL REMARKS 
When related parties have conducted the comparability analysis and have 
found enough comparables for the controlled transaction(s) performed in the 
course of a business restructuring, the next step is to determine the arm’s 
length compensation for the transaction(s) by using the information derived 
from comparable uncontrolled transactions. The arm’s length result of the 
controlled transactions will primarily be tested by using specific transfer 
pricing methods. With transfer pricing methods, the taxpayers are required to 
demonstrate in the transfer pricing documentation that the determination of 
the compensation paid in the transaction is consistent with the arm’s length 
principle. Traditionally, the transfer pricing methods have been divided into 
traditional transactional methods and profit-based methods. According to 
the OECD, traditional transactional methods are the comparable uncontrolled 
price method, the resale price method and the cost plus method. Transactional 
profit methods, on the other hand, are the transactional net margin method 
and the transactional profit split method.619 These transfer pricing methods 
                                                 
 
617 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.27. See also OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.38. 
618 In addition to the first two factors mentioned in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (review of 
transactions taking into account functions, risks etc. and business reasons), the Treasury Regulations 
also specifically regulate that the IRS “may consider the alternatives available to the taxpayer in 
determining whether the terms of the controlled transaction would be acceptable to an uncontrolled 
taxpayer faced with the same alternatives and operating under comparable circumstances”; see Treas. 
Reg. § 1.482-1(f)(2)(ii)(A). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(2)(iii)(A). In this sense, legal support can be 
found for such a view. 
619 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.1. 
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and other methods used to determine the arm’s length compensation as well 
as the applicability thereof in particular to business restructurings will be 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
Transfer pricing methods used under Russian tax law are regulated in detail 
in the Tax Code.620 It is noteworthy to observe that the Russian provisions 
concerning the transfer pricing methods are equivalent to the methods 
regulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and therefore it is likely 
that the guidelines can be used as interpretive help in this respect also in 
Russia.621 The Finnish transfer pricing provisions do not contain specific 
regulations in relation to transfer pricing methods, but pursuant to the 
preliminary works and the Finnish Tax Administration, the transfer pricing 
methods discussed in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are applied as 
such in Finland.622 The Treasury Regulations comprise, similar to the Russian 
Tax Code, detailed provisions on the application of transfer pricing methods 
for the purposes of Section 482 of the IRC.623  
 
Selecting a transfer pricing method may be a difficult task in general and 
especially in business restructurings. Pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, the most appropriate method must be selected for the 
determination of an arm’s length compensation taken into account, among 
other things, “the appropriateness of the method considered in view of the 
nature of the controlled transaction, determined in particular through a 
functional analysis; the availability of reliable information (in particular on 
uncontrolled comparables) needed to apply the selected method and/or other 
methods; and the degree of comparability between controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions, including the reliability of comparability 
adjustments that may be needed to eliminate material differences between 
them.”624 Also, under Russian transfer pricing rules, the starting point is the 
application of the most appropriate method to the controlled transaction in 
question.625 Furthermore, a similar approach has also been taken in the 
Treasury Regulations under the so-called best method rule. Pursuant to the 
rule, “the arm's length result of a controlled transaction must be determined 
under the method that, under the facts and circumstances, provides the most 
                                                 
 
620 See Articles 105.7 and 105.9–105.13 of the Tax Code. 
621 Kaftannikov is also of the same opinion; see Kaftannikov 2011, p. 31. 
622 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 18; Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 36–38. Unless 
otherwise stated, the transfer pricing methods regulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which 
will be dealt with in the following sections in more detail, will be applied as such directly to cross-border 
business restructurings in Finland in the manner to be discussed hereunder.   
623 See e.g. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3, § 1.482-4, § 1.482-9.  
624 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.2. 
625 Article 105.7 of the Tax Code. 
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reliable measure of an arm's length result.” In such a review, the degree of the 
comparability between the related party transaction and comparables as well 
as the quality of the data and assumptions used in the analysis should be taken 
into consideration.626 
 
Regardless of the similar approaches, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
and the Tax Code’s provisions deviate from the U.S. transfer pricing rules 
significantly at least in one respect. Although there does not exist an explicit 
hierarchy of transfer pricing methods, the former sources prefer traditional 
transaction methods, and especially the use of the comparable uncontrolled 
price method (to be discussed below), over profit-based methods.627 The 
Treasury Regulations, on the other hand, do not contain such a preference; in 
contrast, no transfer pricing method will be considered more reliable than 
other transfer pricing methods.628 The preference for transactional methods 
under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Tax Code may lead to 
that the arm’s length results for the similar controlled transactions performed 
in a business restructuring may be different under the best method regulated 
in the Treasury Regulations and the corresponding provisions of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Tax Code. 
 
It must also be observed that the Tax Code and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines recognize the possibility of using transfer pricing methods in 
conjunction with each other in order to reach the best result in terms of the 
arm’s length result,629 while under the Treasury Regulations other transfer 
pricing methods can only be taken into account as an additional factor in 
selecting the transfer pricing method under the best method rule, if they verify 
the (arm’s length) results of the selected and applied transfer pricing 
method.630 
 
Next, the transfer pricing methods applicable to business restructurings are 
dealt with in more detail. First, it will be examined what kinds of methods 
could be possibly used, when a business restructuring concerns only transfers 
of certain tangible/intangible assets or when they are transferred at the same 
time with other type of assets/something of value but such transfers do not 
constitute together a going concern for transfer pricing purposes. After that, it 
                                                 
 
626 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1)–(2). 
627 Article 105.7 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.3 and 2.15. 
628 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(1). 
629 Article 105.7 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.12. 
630 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2)(iii): “If the best method rule does not clearly indicate which method 
should be selected, an additional factor that may be taken into account in selecting a method is whether 
any of the competing methods produce results that are consistent with the results obtained from the 
appropriate application of another method.” 
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will be discussed, which (transfer pricing) methods could be applied to 
transfers of a going concern as well as to terminations or renegotiations of 
existing agreements. It should be noted that these methods are just illustrative 
examples, and the applicability of specific methods is always dependent on the 
nature and circumstances of the controlled transaction in question.  
 
4.3.2 TANGIBLE ASSETS 
When a business restructuring involves transfers of tangible assets, which are 
not transferred as a part of a functioning business unit (i.e. a going concern), 
the transfer pricing method will in that case be chosen merely for the transfers 
of tangible property in question. Pursuant to the Tax Code and the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the comparable uncontrolled price method 
(hereinafter, the CUP method) is preferred over other transfer pricing 
methods, and therefore it should be considered as the primary transfer pricing 
method to transactions involving transfers of tangible assets in business 
restructurings too.631 According to the CUP method, the prices used in a 
related party transaction must conform to the prices used in a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction under comparable circumstances.632 The CUP 
method is understood similarly and regulated as one of the transfer pricing 
methods applicable to transfers of tangible property also under the U.S. 
transfer pricing rules, and therefore it can also be used in the U.S. business 
restructurings, which involve transfers of tangible property.633  
 
The importance of finding sufficiently comparable uncontrolled transactions 
becomes emphasized in the CUP method. There should be no such differences 
between the related party transaction and comparable unrelated party 
transactions, which could materially affect the price used in the transactions. 
Among the economically relevant characteristics to be taken into account in 
this regard are, for example, the nature and quality of the transferred tangibles 
as well as the contractual terms.634 If there are, nevertheless, differences 
between the controlled transaction and comparable transactions, these 
differences should not be major in nature, and reasonable adjustments should 
be made to eliminate the material effects of the differences.635 In practice, it 
may be difficult to use the CUP method to validate the prices used in a related 
                                                 
 
631 See Article 105.7 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.3. 
632 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.14–2.17; Article 105.9 of the Tax Code. 
633 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(b)(1). 
634 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.15–2.22; Article 105.9 of the Tax Code; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
3(b)(2)(ii)(A). 
635 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.14–2.15; Article 105.9 of the Tax Code; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
3(b)(2)(ii)(B). 
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party transaction, as it may not be an easy task to obtain sufficient information 
on comparable transactions, for instance, due to the confidentiality of 
transactions between independent parties or due to geographical reasons.636 
On the other hand, the CUP method may be a reliable method in situations 
where an independent party sells exactly the same commodities as that are 
transferred in a related party transaction, and information on such 
independent party transactions can be obtained.637  
 
Hence, the applicability of the CUP method should be first examined in 
business restructurings in the above-mentioned manner pursuant to Russian 
and Finnish law. If no comparables cannot be found or reasonable 
adjustments to potential material differences affecting the price cannot be 
made, the applicability of other transfer pricing methods should be reviewed. 
While the Treasury Regulations do not expressly have such a preference for 
the CUP method, it has been stated that the CUP method may generally 
provide a more reliable result in term of the arm’s length result,638 which is 
why the applicability of the CUP method is recommended to be analyzed first 
also in the U.S. business restructurings. The use of the CUP method has been 
considered possible, inter alia, in cross-border business restructurings, where 
raw materials and finished products have been transferred between controlled 
parties, provided that the conditions of the comparable uncontrolled 
transactions are comparable to the conditions of the related party transaction 
occurred in the course of the business restructuring.639 
 
The resale price method especially can be used in business restructurings, 
which involve transfers of tangible property in cases, where the tangibles 
transferred therein will be resold to an independent party after the 
restructuring. The resale price method is understood similarly in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the Russian Tax Code and the U.S. Treasury 
Regulations. As mentioned above, the method is in general applied to transfers 
of goods, which will be resold to third parties. Under the method, the 
compensation paid for the transfer of commodities in a controlled transaction 
should be the resale price reduced by an appropriate gross margin, or 
otherwise the compensation is not arm’s length. This gross margin covers the 
expenses of the reseller (selling expenses and other operating expenses) and 
                                                 
 
636 Engblom et al. 2010, p. 532. 
637 Like a certain type of coffee beans, see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.24. 
638 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2)(i), where it is stated that “an analysis under the comparable 
uncontrolled price method will generally be more reliable than analyses obtained under other methods 
if the analysis is based on closely comparable uncontrolled transactions, because such an analysis can be 
expected to achieve a higher degree of comparability and be susceptible to fewer differences than 
analyses under other methods.” 
639 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.52. 
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also includes appropriate profit earned by the reseller from the resale of 
commodities taking into consideration, among other things, the functions 
performed, assets used and risks assumed in connection with the resale 
activity.640  
 
When determining the arm’s length gross margin, it should be first examined 
what kind of gross margin the reseller has earned on goods, which it has 
purchased from and sold to independent parties. If such internal comparables 
cannot be found, it must be reviewed what kind of gross margin is earned by 
independent resellers in comparable uncontrolled transactions.641 It must be 
noted that under Russian law, the resale price method is exceptionally deemed 
to be the primary transfer pricing method for trading companies, which sell 
goods to independent companies, if they do not substantially process them 
before reselling and if they do not own intangibles, which could have a material 
effect on the pricing of such goods.642 It has also been stated in the Treasury 
Regulations and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines that the method is in 
general used in situations where the related party has not added substantial 
value to the goods, for instance, by processing or altering the goods before the 
resale, or where the related party does not use intangible property to add such 
a substantial value to the goods.643 Therefore, Russian and U.S. law as well as 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines seem to correspond to each other in this 
sense. The applicability of the resale price method must thus be taken into 
consideration in these countries especially in the business restructurings 
where tangible property is transferred to a related party that will in turn resell 
the tangible property to an independent party after the related party 
transaction. The resale price method has been regarded possible, for example, 
in business restructurings, which involve the transfer of finished products, 
when, among other things, distribution functions have been transferred to a 
foreign associated party.644 
 
Another alternative method to determine the arm’ length compensation for 
transfers of tangible property in cross-border business restructurings is the 
cost plus method. The cost plus method evaluates in particular the supplier’s 
cost of producing tangible assets, which are subsequently transferred to a 
related party in a controlled transaction. In order to determine an arm’s length 
price for the transfer of tangible assets in the controlled transaction, an 
                                                 
 
640 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.27–2.28; Article 105.10 of the Tax Code; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
3(c)(1)–(3). 
641 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.28; Article 105.10 of the Tax Code; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
3(c)(3)(ii). 
642 Article 105.7 and 105.10 of the Tax Code. 
643 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.35–2.38; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(c)(1). 
644 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.52. 
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appropriate cost plus mark-up is added to this cost. An arm’s length 
compensation thus corresponds to the total amount of the cost of producing 
the tangible assets in question plus an arm’s length mark-up added to the cost. 
Therefore, the cost plus mark-up of the supplier must conform to cost plus 
mark-up used on the market by independent parties. As was the case with the 
CUP method and the resale price method, the cost plus method is regulated to 
a great degree with the same content under the provisions of the Tax Code, the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Treasury Regulations.645 
 
Primarily, the cost plus mark-up of the supplier should be in a related party 
transaction based on the cost plus mark-up earned by the same supplier in 
comparable transactions with third parties. In addition to internal 
comparables, the cost plus mark-up earned by independent parties in 
comparable uncontrolled transactions (external comparables) may be used as 
help in determining the arm’s length price for the related party transaction.646 
As was the case with the resale price method, in order to determine the 
comparability of the related party and unrelated party transactions, special 
attention must be paid to the comparability of the functions performed and 
risks assumed in such transactions as well as to contractual terms.647 The cost 
plus method can specifically be used in cases where raw materials, semi-
finished products and other goods are transferred after manufacturing 
activities from a group company to another,648 and therefore it could be 
applied especially to business restructurings involving changes in the 
manufacturing and distribution activities of a multinational enterprise. The 
cost plus method may be applied in business restructurings, for example, to 
controlled transfers of inventories, provided that the market value of an 
inventory is not too low and an arm’s length profit may thus be added to the 
costs.649 
 
Nevertheless, in situations where internal comparables cannot be found, the 
applicability of the method may be troublesome as obtaining information on 
external comparables may often be difficult due to the sensitive nature of such 
information. For instance, information on the amount of profit/mark-up 
                                                 
 
645 See Article 105.11 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.45; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
3(d)(1)–(2). 
646 Article 105.11 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.45–2.46; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
3(d)(3)(ii)(A). 
647 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(3)(ii)(A); Article 105.11 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
2.47, 2.50–2.51. 
648 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(d)(1); Article 105.11 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.45. 
649 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.52. 
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earned by unrelated companies in similar transactions may not be easily 
accessible.650  
 
As discussed, the aforementioned three transfer pricing methods are 
considered traditional transactional methods pursuant to the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines.651 It should be noted that, in contrast to Western European 
countries applying the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, U.S. practitioners 
do not apply that frequently the resale price method and the cost plus method, 
as the application of these methods in practice is in general regarded 
troublesome. This is due to the fact that internal comparables are not often 
available for the use of the methods, and the use of external comparables is 
considered challenging and unreliable as all the potential differences must be 
accounted for.652 This may have an effect on the use of these methods 
especially in the U.S. business restructurings, although the same 
considerations are present also in business restructurings, where the exist 
country is Russia or Finland. 
 
Also, the so-called profit-based methods can be used in determining the arm’s 
length compensations for transfers of property or services in related party 
transactions,653 and therefore it may be appropriate to consider the application 
of such methods also to transfers of tangible property occurred in the course 
of business restructurings. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines name as 
such profit-based methods654 the transactional net margin method and the 
transactional profit split method.655 These methods are recognized also under 
the Tax Code and the Treasury Regulations as transfer pricing methods 
applicable to controlled transactions, although the transactional net margin 
method is under these sources regulated as the concept of the comparable 
profits method, which also deviates content-wise to some extent from the 
OECD’s corresponding method.656 
 
Therefore, the applicability of such profit-based methods must also be 
examined in business restructuring, when tangible property is transferred in 
intercompany transactions between related parties. As the profit-based 
                                                 
 
650 Kukkonen – Walden 2010, p. 200. 
651 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.13. 
652 Bronson – Johnson – Sullivan 2014, pp. 24–25. 
653 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.4. 
654 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines use the term ‘transactional profit methods’. 
655 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.62. 
656 See Article 105.7 and Articles 105.12–105.13 of the Tax Code; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5 and § 1.482-6. It 
is noteworthy to mention that the Treasury Regulations expressly state that these methods could also be 
applied to intercompany transactions involving transfers of tangible property, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
3(a). 
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methods may be applied to transfers of both tangible and intangible assets, 
the contents of these methods will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section, which deals with the transfer pricing methods applicable to transfers 
of intangible assets. 
 
Nonetheless, in addition to the specified transactional and profit-based 
transfer pricing methods, the Russian and U.S. transfer pricing rules as well 
as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines allow related parties to apply also 
other, unregulated and unspecified methods.657 The use of unspecified 
methods can be justified, if they provide the most appropriate and reliable 
result in terms of the arm’ length principle/the arm’s length standard. The use 
of such methods must be validated in the transfer pricing documentation, and 
they cannot be used in substitution for the above-discussed specified transfer 
pricing methods regulated in the national transfer pricing rules and the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, if the latter methods could be applied to the 
related party transaction in question.658 As in general the transfers of tangible 
assets in the business restructuring context have not been regarded 
troublesome,659 it is likely that at least one of the transactional or profit-based 
transfer pricing methods provides the most reliable measure of an arm’s 
length result in a business restructuring involving transfers of tangible 
property, and therefore unspecified methods can most likely be applied only 
in very exceptional cases. 
 
4.3.3 INTANGIBLE ASSETS: TRANSFER PRICING METHODS 
As discussed earlier, business restructuring may often involve transfers of 
certain intangible assets. On the other hand, it may also be possible that 
particular intangible assets are transferred simultaneously with other assets 
and/or something of value in the course of a business restructuring, but such 
transfers do not form together a functioning business unit, which could be 
treated as a going concern for transfer pricing purposes. In such situations, an 
arm’s length compensation must be determined separately on a case-by-case 
basis for each transfer of intangibles. The intangible assets, which fall within 
the scope of the national transfer pricing rules, are limited to intellectual 
properties under Russian law, while the concept of intangible asset must be 
                                                 
 
657 Article 105.7 of the Tax Code and Hellevig – Usov – Kabakov 2014, p. 226; OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, 2.9; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(e). Under the Tax Code, the determination of an arm’s length price 
by using unspecified methods may be conducted by an independent appraiser. 
658 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.9; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(e)(1). 
659 See e.g. former paragraph 9.75 of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Quite the contrary, the 
transfer pricing aspects of intangible assets in the business restructuring context have been considered 
a problematic question, which is of great importance; see e.g. Kroppen – Silva 2011, pp. 38–39. 
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understood more broadly for transfer pricing purposes under Finnish and U.S. 
tax law. As the nature and characteristics of intangible properties may vary 
greatly, no general rule as to the choice of a correct transfer pricing method is 
situations involving transfers of intangibles can be presented. The unique 
features of intangibles result in that they also constitute profits and create 
future benefits differently, which must be acknowledged in performing the 
comparability analysis and considering the most reliable transfer pricing 
method in a given situation.660 
 
The transactional and profit-based transfer pricing methods regulated in the 
Tax Code and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are applied to all kinds of 
controlled transactions, and therefore they must also be taken as the starting 
point to controlled transactions involving transfers of intangibles.661 The 
Treasury Regulations, on the other hand, regulate specifically the transfer 
pricing methods applicable to intercompany transactions concerning transfers 
of intangible property, which thus must be followed also in cross-border 
business restructurings.662 
 
As discussed, the CUP method is preferred over other transfer pricing methods 
under the Tax Code and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,663 which is 
why its applicability to controlled transactions involving transfers of 
intangibles must be examined as a starting point in Russia and Finland. 
Therefore, if reliable information with regard to comparable uncontrolled 
transactions can be found, the arm’s length compensations for transfers of 
intangibles occurred in the course of a business restructuring should be 
determined on the basis of these comparables, provided that any material 
differences affecting the pricing may be adjusted to eliminate potential 
differences.664  
 
The CUP method is applied only to transfers of tangible property under the 
U.S. transfer pricing rules, but the Treasury Regulations contain a specific 
transfer pricing method applicable to transfers of intangibles, which is 
equivalent to the CUP method — the comparable uncontrolled transaction 
method (the CUT method).665 The CUT method evaluates whether the amount 
                                                 
 
660 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.116. 
661 See Article 105.7 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.131 and 6.136. 
662 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4. 
663 Article 105.7 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.3, 6.137 and 6.146.  
664 Articles 105.7 and 105.9 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.14–2.15, 6.137 and 
6.146. 
665 While the priority of the CUT method has not been regulated in the Treasury Regulations explicitly, 
it is considered the most reliable measure, if sufficient comparables can be found: “If an uncontrolled 
transaction involves the transfer of the same intangible under the same, or substantially the same, 
195 
 
charged for a transfer of intangible property in a related party transaction is 
arm's length by comparing it to the amount charged in a comparable 
uncontrolled transaction. Similar to the CUP method, the amount determined 
using the CUT method may be adjusted appropriately to address any 
differences between the transactions.666 The intangible property shall be 
deemed to be comparable with the intangible property involved in a related 
party transaction, if they are used “in connection with similar products or 
processes within the same general industry or market” and “have similar profit 
potential.”667  
 
As stated above, several types of intangible property may fall within the scope 
of application of the national transfer pricing rules, when they are transferred 
in cross-border business restructurings as separate items between related 
parties. Due to the unique characteristics of intangible assets in general, it may 
be difficult, or even impossible, to find comparable uncontrolled transactions 
for the controlled intangible asset transaction conducted in a business 
restructuring. In addition, intangible assets are often of great value for a 
multinational enterprise in its business activities, and therefore they are more 
frequently transferred within the group, resulting in that it may be difficult for 
third parties to obtain information on such transactions because of the 
confidential nature of such transactions.668  
 
Hence, if a business restructuring involves, for example, transfers of 
trademarks or patents, which were previously used in the distribution or 
manufacturing activities of the restructured group company, it may prove 
difficult to use merely external comparables in the determination of the arm’s 
length compensation for such transfers. The possibility of applying the 
CUP/CUT method to intercompany transfers of intangibles in the business 
restructuring context is likely restricted to cases, where the same or similar 
intangibles have been previously transferred within the group between 
associated parties or between a group company and a third party, i.e. where 
internal comparables can be found for the said transfers. Also, in the U.S. legal 
literature, it has been viewed that the required information for calculating the 
profit potential — which is in the above-mentioned manner one of the 
comparability factors, when deciding the comparability of the intangibles in 
question under the Treasury Regulations — may not be usually available for 
                                                 
 
circumstances as the controlled transaction, the results derived from applying the comparable 
uncontrolled transaction method will generally be the most direct and reliable measure of the arm's 
length result for the controlled transfer of an intangible”; see in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(2)(ii). 
666 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(1), § 1.482-4(c)(2)(ii). 
667 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(2)(iii)(B)(1). 
668 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.138. 
196 
 
companies, unless the company itself or a controlled company within the same 
group is a party to the comparable uncontrolled transaction.669 
 
When the CUP method cannot be applied to the controlled intangible asset 
transaction, it should be first reviewed whether other transactional transfer 
pricing methods could be applied to the transaction in accordance with the 
Russian transfer pricing rules and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The 
CUT method, on the contrary, is the only transaction-based method under the 
U.S. transfer pricing rules, which may be applied to intangible property 
transactions,670 and therefore the resale price method and cost plus method 
may not be even in theory applied to intangible asset transactions occurred in 
the business restructuring context. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that 
these methods could be broadly applied to controlled transactions involving 
transfers of intangible assets under the Russian and Finnish transfer pricing 
provisions either.  
 
The resale price method generally requires that the assets involved in a related 
party transaction are resold to an independent party after the transaction. 
When a business restructuring involves transfers of intangible assets, such 
intangibles are usually transferred to another group company for the purpose 
of practicing certain business activities in future (such as marketing and 
manufacturing activities) in another jurisdiction, and therefore it is unlikely 
that the intangible assets would be resold to independent parties after the 
restructuring in the sense required by the method. In addition, if the intangible 
assets nevertheless would be resold to third parties, it is uncertain whether the 
method could provide the most appropriate result in terms of the arm’s length 
principle. For example, the determination of an appropriate gross margin may 
be difficult especially in cases where the intangibles in question are unique, as 
it may be hard to find comparables for such intangibles. As a result, the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines have even stated that the resale price method is 
not in general a reliable method for directly valuing intangible assets,671 
leading to that it may not be applied that commonly also to intercompany 
transfers of intangible assets in business restructurings.  
 
                                                 
 
669 Markham 2005, p. 96. 
670 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a), § 1.482-4(a); Markham 2005, p. 95. 
671 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.141. It should be noted that this new paragraph was regulated 
as part of the BEPS Project. Previously, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines expressly mentioned that 
the method could be applied to intangible asset transactions, for instance, when a related party sub-
licensed the intangible property in question to third parties, see former OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, 6.23. In this regard, the guidelines deviated previously from the U.S. Treasury Regulations 
quite significantly, as the latter do not recognize the possibility of applying the method to transfers of 
intangibles at all; see more about this in e.g. Markham 2005, p. 100. 
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It is also ambiguous, how the cost plus method could be applied to controlled 
intangible asset transactions in general and especially if such transactions 
have occurred in the business restructuring context. The method requires that 
an appropriate mark-up is added to the costs of a related party supplier in a 
controlled transaction. When intangibles are involved in the transaction, it 
may be difficult to determine such a mark-up especially in cases, where the 
information about the arm’s length mark-ups in comparable uncontrolled 
transactions cannot be obtained. Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines refers to the method mainly in business restructuring transactions 
concerning transfers of tangible assets or services.672 In addition, the newest 
guidance as to transfer pricing of intangibles in Chapter VI does not discuss 
the possibility of applying the method purely to the valuation of intangibles in 
related party transactions, which indicates that it may not be the most reliable 
method in this respect.673 Similarly, in the Tax Code and the Russian legal 
literature the cost plus method has been considered applicable primarily to 
controlled transactions involving performance of work, provision of services 
(such as financial transactions) and sale of raw materials/semi-finished 
products, resulting in that it may not be applied easily to transfers of 
intellectual properties under the Russian transfer pricing rules either.674  
 
Nevertheless, pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the method 
may be applied to intragroup transfers of intangibles at least on one rare 
occasion. The guidelines have referred to the applicability of the cost plus 
method in situations where a group company carries out the contract research 
for another group company. In that case, the latter company owns the 
intangibles developed as well as bears the risks of a failure. Pursuant to the 
guidelines, this is ”a typical setup for applying a cost plus method.”675 
Therefore, the method may be applied to transfers of intangibles at least 
theoretically under such circumstances also in business restructurings. 
However, as the example concerns a provision of services — in the given case, 
contract R & D activities — the method is more applicable to post-
restructuring transactions (e.g. transactions conducted in a newly adopted R 
& D model of a multinational enterprise), not to transactions occurred in the 
course of a business restructuring, which therefore leads to that the method 
                                                 
 
672 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.52. However, it is useful to observe that the cost plus method 
may be applied to such post-restructuring transactions, where the actual restructuring has involved 
transfers of trademarks, trade names or other intangibles; see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.123.  
673 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.198 and 6.205, where it is discussed that the method 
may be applied in transactions involving the use of intangibles in connection with the sale of goods or 
the provisions of services. 
674 Article 105.11 of the Tax Code; Grundel 2014, p. 118. 
675 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.61. 
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cannot probably be applied that extensively to transfers of intangibles in the 
business restructuring context that are within the scope of this research. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned transactional transfer pricing methods, the 
profit-based methods may provide appropriate measures for the 
determination of arm’s length compensations for transfers of intangible assets 
occurred in a business restructuring. In general, the profit-based methods 
examine the profits, which arise from the related party transaction in question, 
and compare them to the profits or the division of the profits in comparable 
uncontrolled transactions.676 As the traditional transactional transfer pricing 
methods, and especially the CUP method, are preferred over the transactional 
profit methods under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the latter 
methods may be used in Finland basically only when they are found to be more 
appropriate than the former methods.677 Similarly, the applicability of the 
profit-based methods may be reviewed only after examining the applicability 
of the CUP method to a particular controlled transaction under the Russian 
transfer pricing rules.678 While such preferences have not been regulated in 
the Treasury Regulations expressly, it is acknowledged that in case the 
sufficient comparables are found, the CUT method is usually the most reliable 
measure of the arm's length result in controlled transactions involving 
transfers of intangibles.679 
 
First, the applicability of the transactional net margin method — regulated 
under the name of the comparable profits method in a similar way in the Tax 
Code and the Treasury Regulations680 — to transfers of intangibles in the 
course of a business restructuring can be discussed. In general, these methods 
review the profitability of a related party in a controlled transaction by 
comparing it to the profits earned by comparable unrelated parties, using 
indicators that measure such a profitability or generated profits. Pursuant to 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the transactional net margin method 
examines “the net profit relative to an appropriate base,” which a related party 
realizes from a related party transaction, and compares it with net profits 
realized by uncontrolled parties from similar transactions. Thus, the method 
measures always the relationship between the net profit and an appropriate 
base (e.g. costs and assets). Primarily, the net profit indicator of the related 
party in the controlled transaction should be constituted by reference to the 
net profit indicator that the same related party earns in comparable 
                                                 
 
676 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.6 and 2.63. 
677 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.3–2.4; Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 
1471/37/2007, pp. 36–37. 
678 Article 105.7 of the Tax Code.  
679 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(c)(2)(ii). 
680 Article 105.12 of the Tax Code; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(a)(2), § 1.482-5. 
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transactions with independent parties. However, if such internal comparables 
cannot be found, external comparables can be used. The relevance of the 
functional analysis in order to examine the comparability of the related and 
unrelated transactions is highlighted in this method.681  
 
Similarly, the comparable profits method under the Tax Code tests profits 
derived by a controlled party from a controlled transaction against specific 
factors (e.g. expenses or sales). This kind of operating profit is compared to the 
operating profit of independent parties taking into account the functions 
performed, assets used and risks assumed. The Tax Code defines the operating 
profit parameters, which should be used to determine the operating profits in 
question and to decide whether the profit is arm’s length. Such parameters 
include the profitability of sales, the profitability of costs, the profitability of 
commercial and administrative expenses and the profitability of assets. In 
addition, any other parameters, which measures the ratio of the functions 
performed, assets used and risks assumed to the level of profits, can be used.682  
 
Both the Tax Code and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines regulate that the 
method is used in similar cases where the resale price and the cost plus 
methods are used. On the other hand, the Tax Code explicitly limits the use of 
the method to situations where there are no sufficient comparables to use the 
resale price method or the cost plus method to a related party transaction.683 
All in all, the comparable profits method regulated in the Tax Code follows 
greatly the transactional net margin method regulated in the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, and the former method is based to a large extent on the 
latter.684 
 
The content of the comparable profits method is understood similarly under 
the U.S. transfer pricing rules. Pursuant to the Treasury Regulations, the 
method reviews “whether the amount charged in a controlled transaction is 
arm's length based on objective measures of profitability (profit level 
indicators) derived from uncontrolled taxpayers that engage in similar 
business activities under similar circumstances.”685 The operating profit of a 
controlled party is arm’s length, if it corresponds to the operating profit of 
uncontrolled parties by using specific profit level indicators. Such profit level 
indicators comprise the rate of return on capital employed, financial ratios 
                                                 
 
681 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.64. 
682 Article 105.12 of the Tax Code; Grundel 2014, p. 119. These parameters conform to the net profit 
indicators regulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines; see OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
2.96–2.105. 
683 Article 105.12 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.64. 
684 Grundel 2014, pp. 116–117. 
685 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(a). 
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(ratio of operating profit to sales and ratio of gross profit to operating 
expenses) and other profit level indicators providing reliable measures.686 As 
was the case with the Russian transfer pricing rules and the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, the examination of the functions performed, resources 
employed and risks assumed plays an important role, when determining the 
comparability.687  
 
Despite the similarities between the methods, the Treasury Regulations’ 
comparable profits method has been sometimes regarded to be inconsistent 
with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. It has been viewed that the 
method does not always bring the best result in terms of comparability and 
reliability, as it allows the aggregation of financial data, such as bundling of 
different type of transactions (where the similarity of functions/products is 
understood broadly), for the purposes of applying the method, which may not 
always lead to that the correct comparables for the controlled transaction are 
found. The transactional net margin method, on the other hand, concentrates 
more on finding exact comparables for the specific controlled transaction in 
question, and the aggregation of transactions must be validated diligently.688 
The OECD has even stated that other profit-based methods than mentioned in 
the guidelines, such as comparable profits methods, are accepted only to the 
extent they are consistent with the guidelines.689 Nevertheless, this difference 
has not been considered of practical significance, especially when taking into 
account the aforementioned similarity of the methods, and both methods may 
produce an appropriate result from the perspective of the arm’s length 
principle, if they are applied properly.690 
 
The transactional net margin method and the comparable profits method may 
be applied to transactions involving intangibles especially when enough 
information on comparable transactions for applying the transactional 
methods cannot be found. This is due to the fact that the net profit 
indicators/profit level indicators are not affected by transactional differences 
to the same extent as, for instance, prices under the CUP method,691 or by the 
similarity of products under the resale price method or the cost plus 
method.692 Information on comparable business activities and profit levels can 
also be obtained more easily than information on comparable uncontrolled 
                                                 
 
686 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(1)–(4). 
687 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(c)(2)(ii). 
688 Madrian – Weise 2014, p. 758; Markham 2005, pp. 109–111, 113. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(i) 
and OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.48, 2.98. 
689 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.62. 
690 Wittendorff 2010a, pp. 737–738; Markham 2005, p. 115. 
691 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.68. 
692 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(c)(2)(iii). 
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transactions, which is why the transactional net margin method/comparable 
profits method is in practice the most used transfer pricing method in Russia, 
Finland and the USA.693 Another strength also is that, as the method is a one-
sided method (as is the case with the resale and cost plus methods), financial 
indicators or profit level indicators should be usually examined for transfer 
pricing purposes only for one of the parties to the controlled transaction.694 
 
However, the methods may not be applied unconditionally to intercompany 
transactions concerning transfers of intangibles in the business restructuring 
context. It must be first noted that these methods may not be usually applied 
to transactions involving non-routine, valuable and unique contributions by 
both of the related parties.695 As intangibles are often valuable and unique, it 
may be difficult to validate the applicability of the methods to transactions 
involving such intangibles. On the other hand, it is more common in business 
restructurings that only one of the related parties transfers the possibly 
valuable and unique intangibles to another related party in the course of the 
restructuring, and thus only one of the related parties makes such a valuable 
and unique contribution in the restructuring transactions. Therefore, from 
this perspective, these methods could be still applied to intangible asset 
transactions conducted in business restructurings, provided that the receiving 
related party does not make any additional unique contributions in the above-
mentioned manner.696 
 
However, a more noteworthy issue that may limit the applicability of both the 
transactional net margin method and the comparable profits method in 
business restructurings is that they provide more reliable results in controlled 
transactions, wherein intangibles are used and exploited (e.g. under licensing 
arrangements) — not transferred alone. For instance, it should be noted that 
the OECD has in its newest guidance specifically stated that the transactional 
net margin method is in general unreliable method for valuing directly 
intangible assets in transactions involving transfers of rights in intangibles,697 
and therefore it may be questioned whether the method may be applied to 
intercompany transfers of intangible property in business restructurings at all 
under Finnish law. A similar view is expressed in the Tax Code’s provisions 
                                                 
 
693 Lobanov 2014, p. 66; Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 84; Wittendorff 2010a, p. 737. 
694 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.69. However, nowadays the perspectives of each of the related 
parties to the transaction must be considered, when the transaction involves intangibles; see OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.112. 
695 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(2)(i) and Wittendorff 2010b, p. 329; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
2.65; Article 105.12 of the Tax Code. 
696 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.65–2.66; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(b)(2)(i); Article 105.12 of 
the Tax Code. 
697 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.141. 
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and the Russian legal literature, where it has been considered that the 
comparable profits method may be applied primarily to controlled 
transactions concerning the resale of goods, provision of 
services/performance of work and the manufacturing of goods.698 Therefore, 
the applicability of the method to business restructurings, which involve 
purely transfers of intellectual properties (or rights related thereto), may be 
regarded troublesome under Russian law.  
 
On the contrary, the Treasury Regulations and the U.S. legal literature have 
taken a broader approach in this regard. In addition to that the comparable 
profits method may be applied to controlled transactions, in which the 
intangibles are used and/or exploited, it may be applied to transfers of rights 
in intangible property alone under certain circumstances. For example, it has 
been even considered in the Treasury Regulations that, when rights in 
intangible property have been transferred by a U.S. company to a foreign 
subsidiary, the method may bring the most reliable measure of an arm’s length 
result in such cases.699 Hence, in contrast to Russian and Finnish law, the 
applicability of the comparable profits method may not be ruled out under U.S. 
law in business restructurings, which involve transfers of intangibles/rights in 
intangibles. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that even in that case the 
method may be applied only, if it provides the most reliable measure of an 
arm's length result in accordance with the best method rule.  
 
The second profit-based transfer pricing method regulated specifically under 
the Tax Code, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Treasury 
Regulations is the profit split method. As was the case with the transactional 
net margin method, the transactional profit split method may be applied 
pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines only, if enough 
comparables cannot be found for the use of traditional transactional methods 
and especially for the use of the CUP method.700 Similarly, according to the 
Tax Code, the profit split method may be applied to controlled transactions, if 
other regulated methods may not be applied or if the transaction involves the 
use of intangibles, which has a material impact on the level of profits (and 
comparable transactions cannot be found).701 It is acknowledged under both 
                                                 
 
698 See Article 105.12 of the Tax Code; Kaftannikov 2011, p. 42. 
699 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-5(e) (Example 4). In the example, a U.S. developer has developed a widget that is 
manufactured by a foreign subsidiary, which in turn sells the finished widgets to a U.S. subsidiary of the 
U.S. developer for distribution and marketing activities in the USA. The comparable profits method is 
regarded appropriate to examine whether the foreign manufacturer’s compensation (a yearly royalty) to 
the U.S. developer for the technology behind the widget is arm’s length. See also e.g. Wittendorff 2010b, 
pp. 328–332, where similar views have been expressed. 
700 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.148. 
701 Article 105.13 of the Tax Code. 
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Russian law and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines that the profit split 
method may be applied expressly to related party transaction involving 
transfers of intangible assets or rights in intangible assets (in Russia, transfers 
of intellectual property or rights related thereto),702 which must be naturally 
taken into account in business restructurings involving such transfers. The 
Treasury Regulations regulate correspondingly the profit split method as one 
of the transfer pricing methods that may be applied explicitly to transfers of 
intangible property,703 but they do not contain a similar priority order of 
transfer pricing methods, as discussed above. 
 
The profit split method examines whether the division of profits realized from 
a controlled transaction or business activity is arm’s length, i.e. conforms to 
what independent parties would have expected to realize from participating in 
such a transaction or business activity. In general, the method examines first 
the combined (operating) profits to be split from the controlled transaction for 
the related parties, after which the profits will be distributed among the parties 
in the same manner as it would be done between independent parties. It is of 
great importance to review the functions performed, risks assumed and assets 
used by each related party participated in the transaction. The method is 
understood to a great degree similarly under the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, the Tax Code and the Treasury Regulations.704  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Tax Code provide two 
approaches to the determination of the combined profit realized from a 
business activity and allocation thereof between related parties. The first 
approach is the contribution analysis where the combined profits (total profits 
earned by the related parties from the related transaction(s) in question) are 
divided between the related parties on the basis of “a reasonable 
approximation of the division of profits that independent enterprises would 
have expected to realize from engaging in comparable transactions.” If no data 
on comparables can be found, the division shall be made pursuant to the 
relative value of the functions performed, risks assumed and assets used by 
each party to the transaction.705 The second approach, the residual analysis, 
is divided into two stages. At first, each controlled party receives an arm’s 
length compensation for its routine contributions/performances in the 
controlled transaction(s) in question. In general, such compensations shall be 
determined by applying one of the traditional transactional methods or a 
                                                 
 
702 See e.g. Hellevig – Usov – Kabakov 2014, p. 234; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.148. 
703 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(a)(3), § 1.482-6. 
704 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.114, 2.122; Article 105.13 of the Tax Code; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
6(a)–(b). 
705 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.125, 2.130. Corresponding provisions are regulated in Article 
105.13 of the Tax Code. 
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transactional net margin method/comparable profits method. After the first 
stage, any residual profit (loss), which is possibly left, shall be allocated among 
the controlled parties in accordance with the analysis of relevant facts and 
conditions as provided in the first approach, the contribution analysis.706  
 
There are two different alternatives to apply the profit split method also 
pursuant to the Treasury Regulations. The first alternative, the comparable 
profit split method, evaluates whether there are comparable transactions 
between unrelated parties, and “a comparable profit split is derived from the 
combined operating profit of uncontrolled taxpayers whose transactions and 
activities are similar to those of the controlled taxpayers in the relevant 
business activity.”707 The second alternative, the residual profit split method, 
allocates the combined operating profit in a two-step process. First, the 
operating income is allocated to each related party in the related party 
transaction to provide “a market return for its routine contributions to the 
relevant business activity.” In the second step, the residual profit is divided 
among the related parties according to the relative value of their non-routine 
contributions, in this case, the contributions of intangible property, to the 
relevant business activity.708 Thus, these two forms of the profit split method 
are quite extensively comparable to the above-mentioned forms of profit split 
method, based either on the contribution analysis or the residual analysis, 
under the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Russian Tax Code.709 
 
One of the advantages of the profit split method is that it does not rely as 
closely on finding comparables for the controlled transaction as other 
methods, and therefore it may be used in situations where valuable and unique 
intangibles are present in the transactions and no exact or sufficient 
comparables can be found for the intangibles. In such situations, the allocation 
of profits may be based on the division of the functions between the controlled 
parties in question, taking into consideration the assets used and risks 
                                                 
 
706 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.127; Article 105.13 of the Tax Code. Both the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and the Tax Code contain also more specific provisions on how to determine ratios 
pursuant to which the combined profit will be allocated between the parties. The allocation may be based 
on, among other things, comparable transactions, assets employed and expenses occurred; see in more 
detail in OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.138–2.151 and Article 105.13 of the Tax Code. 
707 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(2)(i). 
708Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(A)–(B). The relative value of non-routine intangible property 
contributed by controlled parties may be measured, for example, by external market benchmarks or by 
the capitalized cost of developing the intangible property (less amortization), see more in Treas. Reg. § 
1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(B)(2). 
709 Small differences, which are more of technical nature, can nevertheless be found between the OECD’s 
and the Treasury Regulation’s approaches; see e.g. in Wittendorff 2010a, p. 756, Wittendorff 2010b, p. 
335 and Markham 2005, pp. 121–125. 
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borne.710 It also provides a reliable measure for determining the arm’s length 
compensation in situations where both parties of the controlled transaction 
contribute to the transaction with unique, non-routine intangibles. On the 
other hand, it has been viewed that the method may be difficult to apply in 
practice, as obtaining the required financial information from all the 
participating parties may not be an easy task. In addition, it may be 
challenging to measure the combined profits and costs for all the related 
parties in the controlled transaction(s).711 
 
From a business restructuring perspective, the profit split method may bring 
more reliable results especially in the related party transactions, which involve 
transfers of intangibles, as the method takes into account unique and valuable 
contributions, such as valuable intangibles of the parties. In particular, the 
method may be useful in business restructuring transactions, which concern 
the use of unique intangibles by both of the related parties, such as licensing 
arrangements concluded after amending the manufacturing or distribution 
activities of a group company. On the other hand, these kinds of transactions, 
where both parties make non-routine contributions with valuable intangibles 
to a business activity, are in nature more post-restructuring transactions than 
transactions performed in the course of a business restructuring, as usually in 
business restructurings the assets of a restructured entity are transferred in a 
controlled manner to one group company, as discussed earlier. Therefore, the 
method’s focus is more on intercompany transfers of commodities and 
services, where intangibles are used and exploited, than on actual transfers of 
intangible assets or rights in intangibles. This may cause difficulties in 
applying the method alone to transfers of intangible property occurring during 
a business restructuring.  
 
Nevertheless, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have in its newest 
provisions also stated that the method “can be utilized to determine the arm’s 
length conditions for a transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles where it 
is not possible to identify reliable comparable uncontrolled transactions for 
such transfers” and that the method “may have application in connection with 
the sale of full rights in intangibles,”712 which leads to that it could also be used 
in business restructurings, which involve separate transfers of intangibles or  
rights in intangibles between associated parties. Correspondingly, in the U.S. 
legal literature it has been commonly viewed that the method may also be 
applied to controlled transactions involving transfers of ownership of 
                                                 
 
710 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.115–2.117. 
711 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.115, 2.120; Grundel 2014, p. 121; Wittendorff 2010b, p. 335. 
712 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.148–6.149. 
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intangible property,713 and therefore its applicability should be considered also 
in U.S. business restructurings. 
 
It must, however, be observed that the OECD has in recent years paid more 
specific attention to the application of the profit split method. As part of its 
BEPS Project, the OECD has discussed and introduced several proposals for 
improvements in this regard.714 Pursuant to the OECD’s discussion draft on 
the revised guidance on profit splits, the application of the profit split method 
may be considered especially in situations where “it can offer a solution for 
cases where both parties to a transaction make unique and valuable 
contributions (e.g. contribute unique and valuable intangibles) to the 
transaction,” as reliable information on comparables may not necessarily exist 
in such situations. On the other hand, if one party to a related party transaction 
“performs only simple functions” (i.e. does not make unique and valuable 
contributions), the method may not be applied purely for the reason that close 
comparables cannot be found for the use of other methods.715 In general, the 
OECD is willing to limit the inappropriate use of the profit split method and is 
of the opinion that a more reliable arm’s length result may be usually achieved 
by making adjustments to the comparables available (although they might be 
imperfect) rather than applying the profit split method inappropriately.716  
 
This may result in that it may be more difficult to validate the use of the 
method in future also in business restructurings, if related parties could apply 
other transfer pricing methods by making appropriate adjustments to possible 
material differences between the controlled transaction occurred in the 
restructuring and comparable uncontrolled transaction(s). Nonetheless, it 
must be noted that when such adjustments cannot be made, and thus 
comparables found, the use of the profit split method may still be considered 
in the transfer pricing of intangibles; the OECD repeated in the discussion 
draft its view on the possibility of using the method in controlled transactions 
involving merely transfers of intangibles.717  
 
All in all, the following conclusions can be drawn from the aforementioned 
transfer pricing methods. All the target countries prefer the use of the 
CUP/CUT method in controlled transactions involving transfers of intangibles 
                                                 
 
713 Wittendorff 2010b, p. 333. 
714 See about the discussion with regard to the OECD’s intent to revise the guidance related to the profit 
split method in Panayj 2015, pp. 112–113.  
715 OECD Public Discussion Draft on Revised Guidance on Profit Splits, 6 and 14. See also OECD BEPS 
Actions 8–10, pp. 55–61. 
716 OECD Public Discussion Draft on Revised Guidance on Profit Splits, 14; OECD BEPS Actions 8–10, 
pp. 60–61. 
717 OECD Public Discussion Draft on Revised Guidance on Profit Splits, 18. 
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at least to some extent. Thus, the possible use of the CUP/CUT method must 
primarily be considered also in business restructurings.718 As intangible assets 
usually have unique features and characteristics, it may be prove to be difficult 
to find comparables for the controlled transactions involving transfers of 
them. In such situations, the potential applicability of other transfer pricing 
methods must be reviewed, especially if appropriate adjustments cannot be 
made to eliminate potential substantial differences between the controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions. Albeit the use other transactional methods (the 
resale price method and cost plus method) is not limited to transfers of 
tangibles assets under the Russian and Finnish transfer pricing rules — in 
contrast to the U.S. regulations — it is unlikely that they could bring the most 
appropriate results in terms of the arm’s length principle, when they are 
applied to transactions involving solely transfers of intangibles; they do not 
take into account in a sufficient manner the transfer pricing aspects of 
transfers of intangibles, particularly in the business restructuring context.  
 
Consequently, it is likely that the applicability of the profit-based transfer 
pricing methods must be examined quite often in business restructurings — in 
addition to the CUP/CUT method — if the restructurings involve transfers of 
intangibles. Although the transactional net margin method/the comparable 
profits method may be applied to transactions involving intangibles in general 
under the Tax Code and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the profit split 
method can be applied more effectively to transactions involving purely 
transfers of intangible assets, as it acknowledges the unique nature of 
intangibles and has been considered to be more suitable for direct valuation of 
intangibles. This is line also with the OECD’s latest guidance in relation to 
transfer pricing of intangibles, where it has been expressly stated that from all 
the discussed transfer pricing methods the CUP method and the profit split 
method most likely prove to be the most useful in matters involving transfers 
of intangible assets.719 In contrast to the Russian and the Finnish (OECD 
based) approaches, the comparable profits method may under the U.S. 
transfer pricing rules also be applied to the controlled transfers of rights in 
intangible property on certain occasions, which leads to that the applicability 
of both profit-based transfer pricing methods should also be considered in 
cross-border business restructurings under U.S. tax law. 
 
As the target countries also allow the use of such methods in determining 
arm’s length compensations for transfer of intangibles, Russia, Finland and 
the USA seem to follow the arm’s length principle in this respect.  However, in 
one respect, amendments to the existing transfer pricing rules and guidance 
                                                 
 
718 Russian practitioners are also of the same opinion, see Expert Interview 2012. Pursuant to the 
practitioners, the CUP method has turned out to be the most used method in practice. 
719 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.145. 
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could be considered de lege ferenda. As mentioned above, the application of 
the profit split method usually requires that both parties of a related party 
transaction make unique and valuable contributions (e.g. use unique and 
valuable intangibles).  Nevertheless, it has been confirmed in the above-
mentioned manner that the method can be used in transactions involving 
purely transfers of intangibles. As in such transactions only one party de facto 
makes unique contributions, i.e. transfers unique and valuable intangibles, it 
should be clarified in the transfer pricing rules, how the method should be 
applied particularly in such circumstances. The current situation may thus 
cause difficulties in applying the method alone to transfers of intangible 
property occurring during a business restructuring. 
 
4.3.4 INTANGIBLE ASSETS: OTHER VALUATION METHODS 
It is generally acknowledged that the regulated transfer pricing methods may 
not always provide sufficient tools for determining the arm’s length 
compensations for intercompany transfers of intangible assets, for instance, 
due to that reliable comparable uncontrolled transactions cannot be found for 
the related party transactions in question. On the other hand, it may also be 
the case that independent parties would in comparable transactions use other 
techniques to value intangibles than the aforesaid specific transfer pricing 
methods. National tax legislation may under certain circumstances therefore 
allow taxpayers to use also other valuation methods than expressly specified 
transfer pricing methods in the determination of the arm’s length 
compensation for intangible assets transferred between associated parties, if 
such transfer pricing methods cannot be applied to a particular case. This 
approach has been applied also by the Russian, Finnish and U.S. tax law. 
 
According to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the use of the so-called 
unspecified methods can be justified, if they provide the most appropriate 
result in terms of the arm’s length principle. The use of such methods must be 
validated in the transfer pricing documentation, and they cannot be used in 
substitution for the above-mentioned specified transfer pricing methods, if the 
latter methods could be applied to the related party transaction in question.720 
The use of other valuation methods in transactions involving transfers of 
intangibles has been discussed indirectly also in Chapter IX of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Pursuant to the guidelines,  
 
“[D]ifficulties can arise in the context of business restructuring where 
the valuation of an intangible or rights in an intangible at the time of the 
transaction is highly uncertain. In these cases, the question arises as to 
                                                 
 
720 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.9. 
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how arm’s length pricing should be determined. The question should be 
resolved, both by taxpayers and tax administrations, by reference to 
what independent enterprises would have done in comparable 
circumstances to take account of the valuation uncertainty in the 
pricing of the transaction. ---”721 
 
As independent parties would likely use other financial valuation methods 
than the specified transfer pricing methods in situations where transfer 
pricing methods do not provide a sufficient tool to estimate the value for a 
transfer of an intangible asset, such methods could also be used in business 
restructuring in order to determine the arm’s length price for the transfers of 
intangibles between associated parties. Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines contains more specific guidance on the application of other 
valuation techniques to intangibles transferred in controlled transactions, 
which has been recently also updated as part of the BEPS Project. The starting 
point is that, “in situations where reliable comparable uncontrolled 
transactions for a transfer of one or more intangibles cannot be identified, it 
may also be possible to use valuation techniques to estimate the arm’s length 
price for intangibles transferred between associated enterprises.” Such 
valuation techniques may be used as a part of one of the specific transfer 
pricing methods or independently.722 The valuation techniques must also be 
applied in a manner, which is consistent with the principles of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and ultimately with the arm’s length principle.723  
 
It is noteworthy to mention that the Finnish Tax Administration has 
confirmed the possibility of using other valuation methods than which are 
specifically regulated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which 
supports the view that such methods may also be used in the Finnish transfer 
pricing of intangibles.724 The Russian transfer pricing rules allow similarly the 
use of unspecified valuation methods. Pursuant to the Tax Code, if taxpayers 
may not use the transfer pricing methods specifically regulated in the Tax 
Code, other valuation techniques may be used in one-off transactions to 
estimate the arm’s length price. However, the determination of an arm’s length 
                                                 
 
721 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.62. See also the new paragraph in Chapter VI, paragraph 6.181, 
stating the same. Apart from that the guidance of Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines is 
applicable as such to business restructurings, Chapter IX contains specific references to Chapter VI; see 
e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.56, 9.62 and 9.63. 
722 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.153. 
723 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.154. 
724 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 37. The memorandum expressly refers 
to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in this respect, and therefore the OECD’s guidance is primarily 
to be followed, when other valuation techniques are used in determining the arm’s length compensation 
for intercompany transfers of intangibles. 
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price by using such unspecified techniques may be conducted only by an 
independent valuation appraiser.725 Therefore, if a business restructuring 
involves transfers of intellectual property between associated parties, and 
transfer pricing methods specified in the Tax Code cannot be used in this 
particular case, other valuation methods may be used to validate the pricing of 
the intellectual property provided that such a valuation is based on an 
independent valuation expert’s opinion. Despite this technical difference 
between the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Tax Code, both sources 
in practice require that other valuation methods cannot be used, if a reliable 
arm’s length result may be achieved by using regulated and specified transfer 
pricing methods.  
 
The legal basis for using other valuation methods than specified transfer 
pricing methods in U.S. intangible property transactions can be found in the 
Treasury Regulations. Pursuant to the regulations, unspecified methods may 
be used to examine whether the amount charged in a related party transaction 
involving transfers of intangibles is arm's length.726  When doing so, the 
principle of the arm’s length standard must be followed: “In establishing 
whether a controlled transaction achieved an arm's length result, an 
unspecified method should provide information on the prices or profits that 
the controlled taxpayer could have realized by choosing a realistic alternative 
to the controlled transaction. As with any method, an unspecified method will 
not be applied unless it provides the most reliable measure of an arm's length 
result under the principles of the best method rule.”727 From the above 
mentioned, it can be seen that the U.S. approach is to a great degree 
comparable with the provisions of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and 
the Tax Code. 
 
Generally, there are three kinds of valuation methods or techniques that are 
commonly used by independent parties in the financial reporting and 
generally in corporate finance to value intangibles. These are the income based 
methods, the cost based methods and the market based methods.728 It must 
be noted that all of these methods have been expressly recognized and 
regulated as applicable methods in the valuation activities of independent 
                                                 
 
725 Article 105.7 of the Tax Code. In this context, the Tax Code refers to the Act on Valuation Activities 
(135-FZ, Federal'nyj zakon ot 29 iyulya 1998 g. N 135-FZ "Ob otsenochnoj deyatel'nosti v Rossijskoj 
Federatsii"), which deals with the valuation activities of independent appraisers in more detail. The 
provisions of the act must be taken into account, when independent appraiser is used to value transfers 
of intellectual properties between related parties.  
726 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(a), § 1.482-4(d)(1).  
727 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(d)(1). 
728 See e.g. Wittendorff 2010b, p. 326; Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 322; Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, p. 165; 
Van Herksen – Levey – Fletcher 2008, p. 8. 
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appraisers under Russian law,729 and thus they may be applied to controlled 
transfers of intellectual properties in business restructurings as other 
valuation methods in addition to the regulated transfer pricing methods. On 
the other hand, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and the Finnish Tax 
Administration’s memorandum have explicitly mentioned only the income 
based methods,730 while the Treasury Regulations have not discussed the types 
of methods that could be regarded as unspecified methods, at all.731 
Nevertheless, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have stated that also 
other valuation techniques can be considered in the transfer pricing analysis 
of intangibles, provided that such techniques are applied in an appropriate 
manner in accordance with the guidelines’ principles.732 In addition, despite 
the lack of particular mentions in the legislated provisions and regulations, it 
has been confirmed broadly in the various sources of Finnish and U.S. tax law 
that all the three methods may be regarded as unspecified methods, which may 
be used in determining the arm’s length compensation for intangible assets 
transferred between related parties.733 
 
The income based methods evaluate the value of an intangible asset on the 
basis of future (net) profits, cash flow or other economic benefits the asset may 
generate during its lifetime. This means that the useful lifetime of the 
intangible asset and the future income generated by it over its lifetime must be 
                                                 
 
729 While the valuation activity is regulated under the Act on Valuation Activities, the valuation methods 
are regulated in the Resolution No 297 of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian 
Federation, see Prikaz Minehkonomrazvitiya Rossii ot 20.05.2015 N 297 “Ob utverzhdenii Federal'nogo 
standarta otsenki “Obshhie ponyatiya otsenki, podkhody i trebovaniya k provedeniyu otsenki (FSO N 1)” 
(hereinafter, Resolution 297 of the Ministry of Economic Development). 
730 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.153 and 6.157; Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 
1471/37/2007, p. 37. 
731 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(d)(1). 
732 “[I]t is not the intention of these [G]uidelines to endorse or reject one or more sets of valuation 
standards utilized by valuation or accounting professionals or to describe in detail or specifically endorse 
one or more specific valuation techniques or methods as being especially suitable for use in a transfer 
pricing analysis. However, where valuation techniques are applied in a manner that gives due regard to 
these [G]uidelines, to the specific facts of the case, to sound valuation principles and practices, and with 
appropriate consideration of the validity of the assumptions underlying the valuation and the 
consistency of those assumptions with the arm’s length principle, such techniques can be useful tools in 
a transfer pricing analysis where reliable comparable uncontrolled transactions are not available”; see 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.156. 
733 See e.g. decision KHO 2014:3 of the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court and the preliminary 
rulings practice of the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office in Laaksonen 2004, pp. 425–427 and Waal – 
Pykönen 2014, p. 558. See also Pankakoski 2015, pp. 286–290; Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 322; Linnanvirta 
– Rapo 2012, pp. 277–278; Laaksonen 2004, pp. 425–427;  Wittendorff 2010a, p. 658; Wittendorff 
2010b, pp. 326–327; Brauner 2008, p. 121; Boos 2003, pp. 75–87.  
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projected, and such future income must also be discounted to the present 
value.734 One application of the income based methods is the relief from 
royalty method, which determines the value of an intangible property by 
referring to the present value of royalty payments the owner of the asset saves 
by owning the intangible property.735 Another income based method is the 
excess earnings method, which determines the value of an intangible asset by 
reference to the present value of (future) earnings attributable to the 
intangible asset after excluding the part of earnings that are attributable to 
other assets of the company/business.736 The incremental cash flow method, 
on the other hand, values the intangible asset on the basis of comparing the 
cash flow of a business exploiting the intangible asset to the cash flow of a 
business operating without the corresponding intangible asset.737 In 
particular, the discounted cash flow method, which calculates the discounted 
value of projected cash flows derived from the exploitation of an intangible 
asset, is a good example of an often-used income based method.738 Such 
income based methods may be used to estimate especially the values of 
patents, trademarks or other intangibles, which generate cash flows.739 It 
should be noted that these kinds of intangibles are commonly transferred in 
business restructurings between associated parties. 
 
The cost based methods estimate the value of an intangible asset principally 
on the basis of the costs of creating the intangible asset. The cost based 
approach requires that the costs can be identified in a precise manner. The 
advantage of the cost based methods is that the required information on costs 
is generally readily available for the company or can be reproduced without 
difficulty. Trademarks, however, can be regarded as an exception, as it is 
usually difficult to obtain sufficient information on their development costs.740 
Nonetheless, it must be noted that it has been generally considered that the 
there is no clear correlation between the development costs of an intangible 
asset and its value, and therefore the cost based methods have been regarded 
as unreliable measures for determining the value for an intangible property in 
                                                 
 
734 Resolution 297 of the Ministry of Economic Development; Wittendorff 2010b, p. 326; Karjalainen – 
Raunio 2007, p. 167; Boos 2003, p. 81; Kozyrev – Makarov 2003, p. 139; Rimer 2014, p. 335. 
735 Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 323; Kozyrev – Makarov 2003, p. 146. 
736 Wittendorff 2010b, p. 327. 
737 Linnanvirta – Rapo 2012, p. 277. 
738 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.153, 6.157; Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 
1471/37/2007, p. 37. 
739 Kozyrev – Makarov 2003, p. 140. See more about other income based methods applicable to 
intangibles, such as the direct cash flow method, in Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 322–327 and Linnanvirta – 
Rapo 2012, pp. 277–278. 
740 Resolution 297 of the Ministry of Economic Development; Azgaldov – Karpova 2006, pp. 87–89; 
Rimer 2014, p. 335; Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, p. 166. 
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general and therefore also for transfer pricing purposes.741 The OECD has also 
shared this view, as it does not recommend the use transfer pricing methods 
that seek to determine the value of intangibles on the basis of the costs of 
developing such intangibles.742 Basically, the potential use of the cost based 
methods is limited to cases, where the intangible asset has recently been 
acquired/developed and the costs related thereto can be identified in a reliable 
manner.743 
 
Finally, the market based methods — also known as the market approach — 
determine the value of an intangible asset by reference to the values paid for 
the same or similar intangibles on the market between independent parties.744 
The market based methods conform thus to a large extent to the specified 
CUP/CUT methods regulated under the national transfer pricing rules and the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Consequently, the market approach 
encounters the same challenges as the corresponding transfer pricing 
methods: most importantly, proper comparable transactions must be 
established. If sufficiently comparable transactions cannot be found, even 
after making adjustments to eliminate possible differences, the market based 
methods do not provide useful help in estimating an arm’s length value for 
intangibles transferred between related parties. As the lack of comparables is 
often the reason why (transactional) transfer pricing methods may not be 
applied to transfers of intangible assets in the first place and other valuation 
techniques are considered, the market based methods are not likely that useful 
tools also in business restructurings, which involve controlled transfers of 
intangible assets. 
 
From the above mentioned, it can be stated that the income based methods 
are likely to provide the best arm’s length results in comparison with other 
unspecified methods, if regular transfer pricing methods cannot be applied in 
a particular case to intangibles transferred in the course of a business 
restructuring. As discussed, the relation between the costs and the value of an 
intangible asset is widely questioned, and the market approach does not bring 
sufficient results in situations where reliable comparable uncontrolled 
transactions cannot be found. Therefore, it is not a surprise that there exists 
widespread support for the primary use of the income based methods over 
other unspecified methods also pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
                                                 
 
741 Wittendorff 2010b, p. 326; Linnanvirta – Rapo 2012, p. 278; Boos 2003, pp. 75–78. 
742 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.142. 
743 Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, p. 166. 
744 Resolution 297 of the Ministry of Economic Development; Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 322; Boos 2003, 
pp. 78–81. 
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Guidelines and Finnish, Russian and U.S. law.745 For instance, it has been 
stated in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines that, in particular, the 
valuation methods that are based on the calculation of the discounted value of 
projected future income streams or cash flows, which are derived from the 
exploitation of the transferred intangible asset, may be “particularly useful” in 
cases where reliable comparables cannot be identified for the controlled 
transfer of intangible.746  
 
In the business restructuring context, this means that in cases where the 
regulated transfer pricing methods may not be applied to intangibles 
transferred between related parties, the applicability of the income based 
methods — especially methods based on the estimation of the discounted value 
of future cash flows or income streams — must be first considered before 
examining the applicability of any other unspecified methods.747 As it is 
unlikely that the cost based and market based methods would provide alone 
reliable measures for determining an arm’s length price for a transfer of 
intangibles, the combination of these methods could be considered merely in 
situations, in which the income approach cannot be applied solely or together 
with other income methods. As the existing situations in the target countries 
allow the use of such valuation methods that are also frequently used in similar 
transactions between independent parties, in particular the income method, 
the arm’s length principle is followed in this respect. 
 
4.3.5 GOING CONCERN 
When a business restructuring involves a transfer of a functioning, 
economically integrated business unit (i.e. going concern), it may be required 
                                                 
 
745 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.153–6.178; Pankakoski 2015, p. 287; Linnanvirta – Rapo 2012, 
pp. 277–278; Wittendorff 2010b, p. 326; Brauner 2008, p. 120; Ivanov – Baranov 2008, p. 348; Kozyrev 
– Makarov 2003, p. 139. The use of income based methods in direct valuation of intangibles for transfer 
pricing purposes has also been accepted recently in the preliminary rulings practice of the Finnish Large 
Taxpayers’ Office, see Waal – Pykönen 2014, p. 557. Also, the Russian practitioners have stated in an 
interview that they use more often the income based methods when determining the arm’s length prices 
for transfers of intellectual properties, see Expert Interview 2012. 
746 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.153, 6.157. The Finnish Tax Administration has also expressly 
mentioned as an example of valuation methods that could be used to value intangibles the methods, 
which calculate the discounted value of projected future cash flows; see Finnish Tax Administration: 
Transfer Pricing of Intangibles. 
747 Regardless of being the most appropriate method of the discussed three methods, it is not an easy 
task to apply the income based methods in practice, as, for instance, it may be difficult to project the cash 
flow and/or choose the correct discount rate. See more in e.g. Vinokurova 2015, p. 21; Ivanov – Baranov 
2008, p. 348; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.158–6.178; Brauner 2008, pp. 119–120. 
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that contemporaneous transfers of assets, risks, and/or functions executed 
between related parties in the course of the business restructuring shall be 
reviewed and valued under Finnish and U.S. law on an aggregate basis, as 
discussed earlier. This basically means that the determination of separate 
arm’s length compensations for each asset transfers occurring in the business 
restructuring would not be necessary in such situations, as only one transfer 
price shall be determined — the arm’s length compensation for the transfer of 
a business as a going concern.  
 
As with any other transfer pricing cases, the use of the specifically regulated 
transfer pricing methods, especially the CUP/CUT method, must also be 
considered as a starting point in business restructurings, which involve 
transfers of a going concern. However, as the valuation of the transfer of a 
going concern “should reflect all the valuable elements that would be 
remunerated between independent parties in comparable circumstances,”748 
the use of the specified transfer pricing methods may be difficult or they may 
provide unreliable results. Therefore, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
have suggested that the arm’s length compensation could be in such cases 
determined by using the same methods that independent parties would use in 
similar transactions, i.e. by using valuation methods that are commonly used 
in business acquisition deals between independent parties. As mentioned 
earlier, the OECD states that “valuation techniques that are used, in 
acquisition deals, between independent parties may prove useful to valuing 
the transfer of an ongoing concern between associated enterprises.”749  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines also provide an example, which 
elaborates the approach. In the example, the manufacturing activities of a 
group company are relocated to another group company in a different 
jurisdiction. In such a scenario, the former company transfers machinery, 
inventories, patents, manufacturing processes and know-how as well as key 
customer and commercial contracts to the latter company. In addition, several 
employees are relocated in connection with such transfers to the latter 
company. Such contemporaneous transfers could be regarded as a transfer of 
a going concern had it occurred between unrelated parties. Pursuant to the 
guidelines, “in order to determine the arm’s length remuneration, if any, of 
such a transfer between associated enterprises, it should be compared with a 
transfer of an ongoing concern between independent parties rather than with 
a transfer of isolated assets.”750 
 
                                                 
 
748 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68. 
749 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.69. 
750 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.70. 
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The principles and regulations of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines can 
and should be used in their present form (Chapter IX included) as a guide for 
the application of the arm’s length principle in Finland.751 Therefore, the 
above-discussed OECD’s approach — the use of valuation methods commonly 
used in acquisition deals between independent parties — should be taken as 
the starting point under Finnish law, when an arm’s length compensation is 
determined for a transfer of a going concern in a business restructuring. This 
view is supported by the fact that even before Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines was adopted, the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office took in 
its preliminary rulings practice a similar approach. The Finnish Large 
Taxpayers’ Office stated that business restructurings may be regarded as 
transfers of a going concern for transfer pricing purposes under certain 
circumstances. In such cases, the arm’s length compensation shall be 
determined solely for the transferred business unit, and there is no need to 
value e.g. intangibles, which belong to such a unit, separately. In the discussed 
business restructuring example, the market value of the transferred business 
was not determined by using transfer pricing methods, but on the basis of 
income generated by the transferred business. In practice, this meant that the 
Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office deducted from the group’s market value the 
balance sheet values of businesses (or parts of businesses) that were not 
transferred in the business restructuring from the restructured group 
company to another group company, and the remaining value was thus 
considered to be the current value of the transferred business. Also, other 
appropriate valuation methods could be applied to business restructurings 
concerning transfers of a going concern according to the Finnish Large 
Taxpayers’ Office.752   
 
In the legal literature, it has been viewed that the Finnish Tax Administration’s 
guidance on the valuation of assets in the estate and gift taxation753 may also 
serve as a guide in business restructurings, when a going concern is transferred 
between related parties.754 Pursuant to the guidance, the business assets are 
examined as a whole, and taxpayers should primarily use comparables, when 
determining the market value for such a bundle of assets.755 If sufficient 
comparables cannot be found, the value for the business shall be estimated on 
the basis of current net asset value and the yield value.756 If the yield value 
                                                 
 
751 See KHO 2013:36 and Finnish Tax Administration: Statement A177/200/2015. 
752 Laaksonen 2006, pp. 435–436. 
753 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum A182/200/2015. 
754 Juusela – Tuominen 2011, pp. 317–319. 
755 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum A182/200/2015, p. 31. 
756 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum A182/200/2015, pp. 31, 35. The net asset value is the 
difference between the company’s (business’) assets and liabilities. In this calculation, the assets’ market 
values shall be used. Primarily, the values used on the balance sheet are regarded as the market values. 
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exceeds the net asset value, the average of both the net asset value and the yield 
value must be used. On the contrary, if the net asset value exceeds the yield 
value, the net asset value forms the market value of the business (i.e. bundle 
of business assets). Nevertheless, also specific circumstances should be taken 
into consideration on a case-by-case basis, meaning that it may be necessary 
that one of the values is weighted under certain circumstances. Therefore, if, 
for example, the business relies heavily on different kinds of intangible assets, 
which are not recorded on the company’s balance sheet, the market value of 
the business may be solely the calculated yield value.757 
 
The Finnish Tax Administration also accepts the use of other valuation 
methods in its memorandum, given that the valuation can be based on broader 
facts of the case than what is dealt with in the memorandum. However, 
regardless of which valuation method is used in a particular case, the 
minimum value of a company/business shall always be deemed to be for tax 
purposes the value calculated on the basis of the net asset value.758 
 
Although the aforementioned memorandum regulates the valuation principles 
especially in the estate and gift taxation context, it represents the viewpoint of 
the Finnish Tax Administration in general. Consequently, as the Finnish Tax 
Administration provides in the discussed manner specific guidance with 
regard to the determination of the value for transfers of a business or complex 
of assets for tax purposes, it may be reasonable to follow the principles set out 
in the guidance also in other situations involving the valuation of a business, 
provided that such calculations would result in a reliable and appropriate 
result. Hence, the guidance should also be taken into consideration in business 
restructurings. Therefore, the arm’s length compensation for the transfer of a 
going concern occurred in the course of a business restructuring can be 
determined — and perhaps may be even required by the Finnish Tax 
Administration — on the basis of the current net asset value and the yield value 
as set out above, if it would bring the most reliable arm’s length result.  
 
On the other hand, if the circumstances of the business restructuring do not 
allow the use of the methods discussed in the memorandum and require that 
other factors must be taken into account, other valuation methods that are 
                                                 
 
However, if this is not the case, the values on the balance sheet are adjusted to correspond to their (real) 
market values. The yield value, on the other hand, is calculated primarily on the basis of the net profit 
calculations of the last three financial periods. Extraordinary items and year-end allocations are then 
eliminated from such net profits. Finally, the average of such calculations is discounted with a discount 
rate (usually with a rate of 15 percent). See more about calculating the net asset value and yield value in 
Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum A182/200/2015, pp. 32–35. 
757 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum A182/200/2015, pp. 35–36. 
758 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum A182/200/2015, p. 31. 
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generally used in the valuation of companies and/or businesses by 
independent parties may also be considered. This is due to the fact that the 
Finnish Tax Administration also accepts the use of other valuation methods in 
the above-discussed manner; in such situations, the calculated value must 
nevertheless ultimately equal at least to the net asset value of the business. The 
use of other valuation methods may also be supported by reference to the 
discussed provisions of Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
pursuant to which other valuation techniques that are used between unrelated 
parties may be of practical relevance.759 
 
Such other valuation methods that could be used in determining the value for 
transfers of a going concern have been discussed in the Finnish transfer 
pricing legal literature. These kinds of methods are the cash flow based, 
market based and net asset value based methods.760 They are commonly used 
by independent parties, for instance, in business acquisitions, and therefore 
they could also be applied to transfers of a going concern in the business 
restructuring context.  
 
The cash flow based method is in general considered the most appropriate and 
transparent method to determine the value for a going concern, and therefore 
it is also commonly used.761 It can be regarded as one variation of calculating 
the yield value of a business. The most used cash flow method is the discounted 
cash flow method. The method calculates the present value of the projected 
future cash flows. The analysis consists of projecting the future free cash flows, 
which are discounted to the present value by using an appropriate discount 
rate, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). One of the challenges of the 
discounted cash flow method is to project the future cash flows in a reliable 
manner, as it is uncertain, how cash flows are realized in future. The discount 
rate should take into consideration such issues as well as any other uncertainty 
factors in addition to the time value of money.762  
 
It should be noted that the Finnish Tax Administration has explicitly stated in 
public that one of the frequently used methods by independent parties to value 
a business in business acquisitions deals is the discounted cash flow method, 
application of which should be therefore primarily considered also in business 
restructurings to determine an arm’s length compensation for the transfer of 
a going concern. In such cases, it is also important that the arm’s length 
                                                 
 
759 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.68–9.69. 
760 Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 313–321. 
761 Kallunki – Niemelä 2007, pp. 109–110; Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 314. 
762 See Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 314–318, where the calculation process using the discounted cash flow 
method has also been discussed in a more detailed manner. Time value of money means in practice that 
money available today is worth more than the same amount received in future. 
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compensation shall be determined particularly by comparing the cash flows 
that the group company would have received by continuing its current 
business activities with the cash flows that the company is expected to gain 
after the restructuring.763 Also, the Finnish Tax Administration referred to the 
discounted cash flow method in the above-discussed memorandum as an 
example of other applicable valuation methods to value a business in estate 
and gift taxation.764 It must also be observed that the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Finland has also approved the use of the discounted cash flow method 
in its ruling regarding transfer pricing. Although the case concerned a 
controlled transfer of shares between related parties, the court was of the 
opinion that the discounted cash flow method may also be used for tax 
purposes, when a market value is determined for an unlisted company, given 
that sufficient grounds for the used parameters are presented.765  
 
Moreover, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines nowadays also state that “the 
guidance on the use of valuation techniques for transactions involving the 
transfer of intangibles or rights in intangibles” set out in Chapter VI should 
also be considered in the transfer pricing of transfers of a going concern.766 As 
discussed earlier, the OECD has in Chapter VI expressly mentioned the 
discounted cash flow method as one example of valuation techniques used by 
independent parties, which could be particularly useful in the determination 
of an arm’s length compensation.767 Now, Chapter IX thus explicitly refers to 
the potential use of the discounted cash flow method and similar income 
methods, when an arm’s length compensation is determined for a transfer of 
a going concern. Hence, taking into consideration the aforesaid observations, 
there is a strong indication of that the method could — or even should — be 
used in business restructurings in order to determine an arm’s length 
remuneration for a transfer of a going concern, provided that sufficient 
grounds for the use of the method are presented in the transfer pricing 
documentation.  
  
Although there can be found strong support for the application of the 
discounted cash flow method for transfer pricing purposes in business 
restructurings, it has been viewed in the legal literature that also other 
valuation methods could be used, as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
have not discussed in detail the potential valuation methods applicable to 
                                                 
 
763 Finnish Tax Administration: Transfer Pricing in Business Restructurings; see also Finnish Tax 
Administration: Client Event 2013, pp. 54–55. 
764 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum A182/200/2015, p. 31. 
765 KHO 2014:33. See also Penttilä 2015, pp. 133–135; Waal – Pykönen 2014, pp. 557–558. 
766 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.69. This reference was added to the paragraph in 2016, when 
the OECD made conforming amendments to Chapter IX as a result of the BEPS Project. 
767 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.153, 6.157. 
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transfers of a going concern in business restructurings.768 As mentioned, also 
the so-called market based methods are used in practice as business valuation 
methods, and therefore they could be potentially applied to transfers of a going 
concern in the business restructuring context. The market based methods 
compare the business to be valued to comparable businesses/companies that 
have been sold on the market. Another option is to find comparables for the 
group company in question from listed companies, as the financial reporting 
data of such companies, e.g. financial statements, is usually readily available. 
The comparable business sales or listed companies must resemble the 
business being valued in a sufficient manner. The market based business 
valuation methods in general use the comparables to calculate ratios of the 
selling price/market value to certain financial performance factors (such as 
revenue, gross margin and profit). Such ratios derived from comparables are 
then used to determine the value for the business in question.769  
 
It must be noted that the Finnish Tax Administration advised in the above-
discussed memorandum that taxpayers should primarily use comparables, 
when determining the market value for a business,770 which therefore 
indicates that the market based methods — in the transfer pricing context, 
primarily the CUP method — should be used as a starting point to value a going 
concern for tax purposes. However, finding sufficiently comparable business 
acquisitions is not an easy task. In addition, information on comparable listed 
companies may not be used effectively in the valuation of a business of an 
unlisted group company. Lastly, in comparison with the cash flow methods, 
the market based methods do not necessarily take into account sufficiently the 
risk factors of the business to be valued, which should be reflected in the 
market value of a business.771 Therefore, in the majority of the cases, it is likely 
that the discounted cash flow method would be a better option and would 
bring a more reliable arm’s length result than the market based method, when 
the value for a going concern is determined in business restructurings. 
 
The determination of the aforementioned net asset value has also been 
discussed in the legal literature as one possible option for the valuation of a 
business. However, the use of the net asset value is often limited to situations 
in which the business is closed down, not continued. As it does not take into 
account the future cash flow generated by the business, it does not usually 
provide a correct picture of the market value of a going concern. This is usually 
                                                 
 
768 Penttilä 2015, p. 135.  
769 Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 318–321. 
770 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum A182/200/2015, p. 31. 
771 Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 321. 
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the case in situations where intangible assets form the majority of the value of 
the business.772 
 
All in all, in the current legal state, the above-mentioned Finnish Tax 
Administration’s guidance on estate and gift taxation may serve as a starting 
point for determining an arm’s length compensation for transfers of a going 
concern in business restructurings. Primarily, the market based method 
should be used in the business valuation for tax purposes, which in the transfer 
pricing context means the CUP method. As it is likely that the method may not 
be used that commonly in the determination of a correct market value for a 
transfer of business, other valuation methods should be applied instead, 
provided that the end result equals, at least, to the net asset value.  
 
Of great practical relevance is especially the broadly applied discounted cash 
flow method, use of which has been specifically approved and preferred in 
transfer pricing by the Finnish Tax Administration, the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Finland and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
As a result, it is recommended that the use of the discounted cash flow method 
is considered carefully in each business restructuring case involving transfer 
of a going concern, especially if the lack of comparables and/or other factors 
restrict the valuation on the basis of the CUP method (as well as any other 
regulated transfer pricing methods) and the calculation principles set out in 
the Finnish Tax Administration’s guidance on estate and gift taxation. It is also 
likely that the Finnish tax authorities would prefer the use of this method, 
provided that the method is applied appropriately and specific attention is 
paid to the written justifications to validate the use of the method.773 The use 
of the discounted cash flow methods seems to be acceptable also from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle, as it is often used by independent 
parties in business acquisitions. 
 
Similar to the Finnish transfer pricing provisions, the Treasury Regulations do 
not contain specific sections dealing purely with the transfer pricing aspects of 
business restructurings and the determination of the arm’s length 
compensation for transfers of a going concern. This means that, as a starting 
point, the applicability of the specified transfer pricing methods, such as the 
CUT method, should be first considered. Nevertheless, as discussed above, 
such methods do not take into account sufficiently the specific features of 
transfers of a going concern, which leads to that it may be likely that the 
                                                 
 
772 Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 313, 321. The Finnish Tax Administration is also of this opinion; see Finnish 
Tax Administration Memorandum A182/200/2015, pp. 35–36. 
773 The latter requirement is derived from the above-discussed case of the Supreme Administrative Court 
of Finland, KHO 2014:33 as well as from the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (paragraph 2.9). 
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application of the specified methods would not result in the best arm’s length 
result in such cases.  
 
However, as was the case in Finland, the U.S. tax authorities have published 
guidance in other respects containing valuation principles that can be useful, 
when the arm’s length value is determined for transfers of a functioning 
business unit. The IRS has in recent years focused increasingly on the transfer 
pricing of cost sharing arrangements, and consequently it has published 
particular Treasury Regulations regulating methods for the determination of 
taxable income in connection with such arrangements.774 While the 
regulations expressly concern cost sharing arrangements, some of these 
methods could also be used in determining arm’s length compensations for 
transfers of a going concern (business) in the business restructuring context. 
As these regulations represent the IRS’s current viewpoint on compensations 
to be paid as ‘exit charges’, it has been widely regarded in the legal literature 
that the methods and principles discussed therein may also serve as a guidance 
in transfer pricing of business restructurings.775  
 
This approach is also supported by the fact that the IRS has itself viewed that 
that the scope of application of the cost sharing regulations must be 
interpreted broadly: it has stated that “controlled transactions reflecting 
similar economics, regardless of the type of transaction (such as transfer of 
intangibles or provision of services), should be valued in accordance with 
similar principles and methods,” which means that “the principles and 
methods for valuing platform and operating contributions under a CSA [=cost 
sharing arrangement] may also apply for purposes of determining the best 
method, which may be an unspecified method, for valuing similar 
contributions in connection with controlled transfers of intangibles or 
provisions of services.”776 As transfers of intangible assets play a significant 
role in business restructurings, the IRS could be willing to apply the principles 
of the cost sharing regulations from this perspective also to transfers of a going 
concern occurred in the business restructuring context. In this connection, 
especially the following three methods regulated in the Treasury Regulations 
have been regarded applicable to controlled transfers of a going concern: the 
income method, the acquisition price method and the market capitalization 
method.777 As these methods do not concentrate on estimating the value of 
                                                 
 
774 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7. 
775 See e.g. Trauman – Van den Bremer 2011, p. 27; Zollo 2011, p. 761; Amerkhail – Granwell 2009, pp. 
419–420; Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 253. 
776 Internal Revenue Bulletin 2012-12. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-4(g) and § 1.482-9(m)(3), which 
contain cross-references to the cost sharing regulations and thus support this view. 
777 Trauman – Van den Bremer 2011, p. 27; Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 253–254; Cordova – Mitra – 
Newman – Reams – Shanda – Shapiro 2012, pp. 55–58; Zollo 2011, p. 777. 
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separate intangibles, but rather the value of a whole business,778 they provide 
useful guidance on how to possibly determine the arm’s length value for 
transfers of a going concern also in business restructurings. 
 
The income method examines in general whether the amount charged in a 
platform contribution transaction is arm's length by reference to a controlled 
participant’s best realistic alternative to entering into a cost sharing 
arrangement.779 The method is applied in situations, in which only one of the 
controlled parties provides non-routine platform contributions.780 The 
method must yield results “consistent with measuring the value of a platform 
contribution by reference to the future income anticipated to be generated by 
the resulting cost shared intangibles.”781 The income method basically requires 
that the controlled party must be in the cost sharing arrangement at least in as 
good economic position as it would be had it chosen the best realistic 
alternative. Thus, the method requires that the arm’s length compensation 
must be such an amount that the expected income stream under the cost 
sharing arrangement equals the present value of the expected income stream 
under the best realistic alternative.782 The application of the income method 
involves the projection of the anticipated future income stream, which must 
be discounted at the appropriate rate to the present value.783 
 
When applying the income method in the business restructuring context, the 
restructured group company’s economic position both before and after the 
restructuring must be reviewed. The arm’s length compensation for the 
                                                 
 
778 Cordova – Mitra – Newman – Reams – Shanda – Shapiro 2012, pp. 56–57; Trauman – Van den 
Bremer 2011, p. 27. 
779 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(4)(i)(A). In a platform contribution transaction, each controlled participant 
is obligated to make arm's length payments to each controlled participant that provides a platform 
contribution, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(b)(1)(ii). A platform contribution is “any resource, capability, or 
right that a controlled participant has developed, maintained, or acquired externally to the intangible 
development activity (whether prior to or during the course of the CSA [=cost sharing arrangement]) 
that is reasonably anticipated to contribute to developing cost shared intangibles”, see Treas. Reg. § 
1.482-7(c)(1). 
780 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(4)(i)(D). 
781 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(1). 
782 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(4)(i). Pursuant to the regulations, the best realist alternative for the related 
party, which uses intangibles under a cost sharing arrangement, would be to license such intangibles 
from an independent party, which bears the entire risk of the development of intangibles. 
Correspondingly, the best realistic alternative for the related party developing the intangible asset under 
the cost sharing arrangement would be to bear all the risks with regard to the development of the 
intangibles and license the intangibles to independent parties; see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(4)(i)(A) and 
Cordova – Mitra – Newman – Reams – Shanda – Shapiro 2012, p. 57. 
783 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(4). 
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transfer of a business (going concern) could be in the above-discussed manner 
based on the present value of the expected income stream or profits associated 
with the business. In the determination of such an arm’s length compensation, 
taxpayers should also compare the present value of the expected profits 
associated with the business had it not been transferred in the restructuring to 
the present value of the expected profits associated with the business after the 
business restructuring.784 In that sense, the expected future income stream 
under both alternatives must be projected and discounted to the present value. 
The use of the income method in this manner could be justified by the fact that 
the income method has been generally regarded as a form of the discounted 
cash flow method, which is commonly used in business valuation between 
independent parties.785 For example, in the U.S. legal literature, the market 
value of a going concern is considered to be the value of the projected cash 
flows/profits, which are discounted to a present value using an appropriate 
discount rate,786 and therefore the aforementioned approach would be in line 
with what independent parties would have done under comparable conditions 
— and ultimately with the arm’s length principle.  
 
In this sense, the U.S. law approach is comparable with the approach taken by 
Finnish law. One difference, nonetheless, can be found; pursuant to the 
preamble of the cost sharing regulations, while the cash flow projections have 
been allowed under the Treasury Regulations, the IRS is of the opinion that, 
“for a number of practical and administrative reasons,” the application of the 
methods regulated for the cost sharing purposes should preferably be done on 
the basis of the discounted operating income rather than cash flows.787  
 
The application of the income method is dependent on the financial 
projections and the determination of an appropriate discount rate, which may 
not be an easy task. In order to apply the method in a reliable manner, it is 
required that several issues are addressed, such as the correct estimation of 
the stream of profits over the life of the asset and the impact of the riskiness of 
the stream on the applicable discount rate.788 Nevertheless, it should be 
observed that the IRS favors the use of the income method in practice, as it 
                                                 
 
784 Zollo 2011, p. 761, 769; Trauman – Van den Bremer 2011, p. 27; Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 253. 
785 Breen 2014, p. 1483; Cordova – Mitra – Newman – Reams – Shanda – Shapiro 2012, p. 56; Femia – 
Blair 2008, p. 199. 
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787 76 Fed. Reg. 80082, 80084. 
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considers it to reflect the controlled party’s realistic alternatives better than 
the other methods.789  
 
The acquisition price method, on the other hand, examines whether the 
amount charged in a platform contribution transaction is arm's length “by 
reference to the amount charged (the acquisition price) for the stock or asset 
purchase of an entire organization or portion thereof (the target) in an 
uncontrolled transaction.”790 In the examination, the method applies the 
earlier discussed CUT method, and it has been regarded generally as a specific 
form of the CUT method.791 The acquisition price method may be thus applied 
in situations where one of the related parties participating in a cost sharing 
arrangement with other group companies has immediately prior entering into 
such an arrangement acquired an unrelated company or business assets 
thereof. In that case, the original lump sum paid as an acquisition price in the 
(business) acquisition may provide a reliable measure of the arm’s length 
result in a platform contribution transaction. The arm’s length compensation 
under the method is determined on the basis of the so-called adjusted 
acquisition price, which is “the acquisition price of the target increased by the 
value of the target's liabilities on the date of the acquisition, other than 
liabilities not assumed in the case of an asset purchase, and decreased by the 
value of the target's tangible property on that date and by the value on that 
date of any other resources, capabilities, and rights not covered” by the 
platform contribution transaction(s). Thus, the acquisition price method is 
commonly used, when substantially all the acquired target’s non-routine 
contributions (basically intangibles) are used in the cost sharing arrangement 
and consequently covered by a platform contribution transaction.792  
 
The potential application of the acquisition price method to transfers of a 
going concern in the business restructuring context requires that sufficient 
comparable uncontrolled transactions, i.e. business acquisitions, can be found 
for the restructuring transaction involving transfer of a business. As it is likely 
that such comparables cannot easily be found due to the unique features of 
intangibles, which generally form the majority of the value of a business, the 
importance of making sufficient adjustments to ensure the comparability 
                                                 
 
789 IRS: Coordinated Issue Paper – Sec. 482 CSA Buy-In Adjustments (LMSB-04-0907-62) (27 
September 2007), Section IV. See also Madrian – Weise 2014, p. 790; Heriford – Keates – Lamoureux 
– Wright 2013, p. 207; Zollo 2011, pp. 761, 777. 
790 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(5)(i). 
791 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(5)(i); King 2009, p. 36. Alternatively, if the platform contribution 
transaction(s) in question concern services, the comparable uncontrolled services price method 
regulated in Treas. Reg. § 1.482-9(c) may be applied instead of the CUT method, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
7(g)(5)(i). The method is a variation of the CUT method used in service transactions. 
792 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(5)(i), § 1.482-7(g)(5)(iii) and § 1.482-7(g)(5)(iv). 
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cannot be overemphasized. Nevertheless, as the Treasury Regulations require 
that the related party transaction and the unrelated party business acquisition 
preceding the cost sharing arrangement must be contemporaneous (or 
otherwise the reliability of the method is reduced),793 the applicability of the 
method is further limited especially in business restructurings. It is a difficult 
task to find information on recently executed unrelated business acquisitions 
that would also be sufficiently comparable with the restructuring. However, 
when such information is available, for instance, if the restructured company 
has bought an independent company or a functioning business unit from an 
independent company immediately prior to the restructuring and it transfers 
the same going concern to another group company in the course of a business 
restructuring, the calculation principles stated above may be used as help in 
determining an arm’s length compensation for such a transfer of a going 
concern. Nonetheless, also in the legal literature, it has been viewed that the 
acquisition price method is remarkably limited in its applicability.794  
 
The market capitalization method resembles the acquisition price method and 
is applied to a large extent in a similar manner. The main difference is that, 
instead of referring to the acquisition price, the market capitalization method 
evaluates whether the amount charged in a platform contribution transaction 
is arm's length by reference to “the average market capitalization of a 
controlled participant (PCT Payee [=platform contribution transaction 
payee]), whose stock is regularly traded on an established securities 
market.”795 Pursuant to the method, the arm's length charge for a platform 
contribution transaction “covering resources, capabilities, and rights” of the 
platform contribution transaction payee “is equal to the adjusted average 
market capitalization.”796 The method is particularly applicable to situations 
where substantially all of a group company’s non-routine contributions are 
involved in the cost sharing arrangement and covered by platform 
contribution transactions.797 
                                                 
 
793 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(5)(iv). 
794 See e.g. King 2009, pp. 37, 41. 
795 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(6)(i). 
796 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(6)(ii). The average market capitalization is the “average of the daily market 
capitalizations of the PCT Payee [= platform contribution transaction payee] over a period of time 
beginning 60 days before the date of the PCT [=platform contribution transaction]” and ends on the date 
of the platform contribution transaction, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(6)(iii). The adjusted average 
market capitalization is calculated similar to the adjusted acquisition price under the acquisition price 
method, see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(6)(iv). 
797 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(6)(i). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g)(6)(v), where the factors reducing the 
reliability of the methods are discussed. Among other things, in situations where “a substantial portion 
of the PCT Payee’s assets consists of tangible property that cannot reliably be valued”, the reliability of 
the method is reduced. 
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In the business restructuring context, the above mentioned means that the 
value for a going concern (business) should be derived from the stock 
exchange value of a controlled business enterprise. The applicability of the 
market capitalization method basically means that the ownership of valuable 
intangibles of a group is centralized in one group company.798 In addition, the 
Treasury Regulations require that this controlled party is a listed company in 
the above-mentioned manner. Since these requirements are not nearly always 
met in business restructurings, the scope of applicability of the method is 
rather limited in restructurings. Consistent with the acquisition price method, 
it is generally considered that the market capitalization method may be 
applied in practice only on rare occasions.799 
 
In addition to the aforementioned three methods, the cost sharing regulations 
regulate also other methods applicable to cost sharing arrangements.800 
However, these methods do not take into account the value of a business as a 
whole to the same extent, and thus they have not been considered in the legal 
literature as methods possibly applicable to business restructurings. From the 
above-discussed three methods, the income method can be regarded as the 
most suitable method for determining an arm’s length compensation for a 
transfer of a going concern, as the scope of application of the other two 
methods is extremely limited. In addition, as discussed, the IRS prefers the 
use of the income method. The arm’s length compensation is under the income 
method based on the forthcoming income streams of a business, which are 
discounted to a present value using an appropriate discount rate. Hence, the 
method conforms to what independent parties would commonly do in similar 
situations, as the discounted cash flow method is in the aforesaid manner a 
commonly applied method in the business valuation. Therefore, also from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle, the use of the income method would 
be the best option. 
 
The U.S approach is to a great degree comparable with the Finnish approach. 
As it is likely that the traditional, specified transfer pricing methods (most 
importantly, the CUP/CUT method) do not address in a sufficient manner the 
specific features of transfers of a going concern, it should be evaluated, how 
independent parties would determine the value for the transfers of a going 
concern/business unit under similar conditions. The income based methods 
usually provide the best results in terms of the arm’s length principle, as — in 
                                                 
 
798 Madrian – Weise 2014, p. 787; King 2009, p. 37.  
799 King 2009, p. 41; Femia – Kirmil 2005, p. 13. 
800 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7(g) for the full list. 
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contrast to other alternative methods (such as market based methods801) — 
they are not dependent on finding sufficient comparables for transfers of a 
going concern, which may be a difficult task. As the income method under the 
Treasury Regulations is in principle a variation of the discounted cash flow 
method, which in turn is commonly used by independent parties, it provides 
an acceptable solution from the perspective of the arm’s length principle. 
Furthermore, as the discounted cash flow method is also frequently used in 
Finland together with other income based methods and expressly approved by 
the Finnish Tax Administration and the Supreme Administrative Court of 
Finland, U.S. and Finnish law are increasingly consistent with each other in 
this respect.802 
 
Hence, the use of the income method/discounted cash flow method should 
primarily be considered in business restructurings that involve transfers of a 
going concern. As the existing situations in Finland and the USA allow the use 
of such valuation methods that are often used in transactions between 
independent parties, the arm’s length principle is followed to a great degree in 
this regard. In the determination of an arm’s length compensation, it is 
important under both Finnish and U.S. law approaches to compare the present 
value of the expected profits/cash flows associated with the business had it not 
been transferred in the restructuring to the present value of the expected 
profits/cash flows associated with the business after the business 
restructuring. Nonetheless, the application of the method to business 
restructurings is not a straightforward task, as it involves the projection of 
future income streams/cash flows, and an appropriate discount rate must be 
determined in order to discount the income streams/cash flows to a present 
value. Therefore, the choice of the method as well as all the parameters and 
figures in its application must be validated in the transfer pricing 
documentation in a reliable and thorough manner, or otherwise the tax 
authorities may be willing to intervene in the arrangement. 
 
                                                 
 
801 The acquisition price method and the market capitalization method may be regarded as market based 
methods, as the application thereof relies on comparables, and they are considered specific forms of the 
CUT method, as stated above. 
802 As discussed, one small difference can be found in this approach: while the IRS has stated that the 
income method may be applied on the basis of projected cash flows, it prefers the projection of the 
discounted operating income rather than the former; see 76 Fed. Reg. 80082, 80084. 
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4.3.6 TERMINATION OR RENEGOTIATION OF EXISTING 
AGREEMENTS 
The termination or renegotiation of an existing arrangement in connection 
with a business restructuring must primarily be examined from the 
perspective of whether independent parties would have required a 
compensation for such a termination or renegotiation under similar 
circumstances. Such terminations or renegotiations must be reviewed on a 
case-by-case basis, and therefore there should be no assumption that they will 
always be compensated at arm’s length.803 As discussed, the question is topical 
under Finnish and U.S. tax law, while the terminations/renegotiations of 
existing arrangements likely fall outside the scope of application of the Russian 
transfer pricing rules.  
 
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines should be taken as the starting point 
under Finnish law, when evaluating the premature termination or 
renegotiation of an existing arrangement from the transfer pricing 
perspective. As mentioned earlier, the guidelines regulate conditions, which 
should be taken into account, when determining whether an arm’s length 
compensation shall be paid for the termination or renegotiation of an existing 
agreement. This guidance is also helpful, when an actual amount of the arm’s 
length indemnification is determined for such a termination or renegotiation 
of existing arrangements. Therefore, when it is concluded in the previously 
discussed manner that an arm’s length compensation must be paid for the 
premature termination or renegotiation of an agreement, national commercial 
law (including legislation and case law) may provide primarily helpful insights 
in this respect, as they may regulate, for example, indemnification rights to 
which the suffered related party may be entitled.804 Finnish legislation, case 
law and any other possible sources of law regulating contractual arrangements 
as well as specific business activities (if applicable) should be thus examined 
in order to achieve the arm’s length result in a given case.  
 
It was previously discussed that, pursuant to the general principles of Finnish 
contract law, long-term agreements expire either when an agreement is 
terminated or when a fixed term has ended. A long-term agreement, which is 
in nature a fixed-term agreement, cannot thus be terminated before the expiry 
of the term. On the other hand, agreements in force until further notice may 
be terminated after a certain period of notice. If a long-term agreement is 
terminated unlawfully, a suffered party is usually entitled to a compensation 
in accordance with the positive interest of the agreement. The positive interest 
means that the party, which is in breach of the agreement, must compensate 
                                                 
 
803 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.78. 
804 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.79–9.80. 
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the suffered party for the breach so that the latter party is put into a position, 
where it would have been had the party in breach complied with the 
agreement.805  
 
From this perspective, if an independent party would receive a compensation 
for the premature termination of an existing agreement pursuant to the 
positive interest, it is very likely that such a remuneration based on the positive 
interest of the agreement should also be paid in a business restructuring, 
which involves a similar premature termination of an existing agreement 
under similar conditions. In practice, this means that in a business 
restructuring it must be reviewed, whether an existing arrangement 
terminated/re-negotiated prematurely includes an indemnification clause, 
which would entitle the suffered party to a remuneration in accordance with 
the positive interest of the agreement in such situations; in case of absence of 
the indemnification clause, the starting point should thus be that the suffered 
party should be compensated at arm’s length pursuant to the positive interest, 
if independent parties would be entitled to such a compensation. If the 
agreement includes an indemnification clause, which entitles the suffered 
party only to a limited indemnification or no indemnification whatsoever in 
such cases, it must be examined whether such a clause is arm’s length, i.e. 
whether independent parties would restrict their right to compensation in 
such situations, as discussed earlier.806 If the clause is not arm’s length, it may 
be required that the compensation to be paid under the indemnification clause 
should be adjusted to be in line with the positive interest. In practice, the 
positive interest could mean that the suffered party could be entitled to, for 
example, expected profits that would have realized from the agreement had 
the agreement been in force pursuant to the contractual terms. This view can 
also be justified by the fact that, by applying this approach, related parties 
would basically apply the CUP method: the arm’s length compensation would 
in that case conform to what independent parties would have agreed under 
similar conditions. This would also mean that the arm’s length principle would 
ultimately be followed in such a situation. 
 
On the other hand, the aforesaid Finnish Act on Commercial Representatives 
and Salesmen forms an example of an act, which contains specific provisions 
on the premature termination of certain business relations and the 
compensation thereof. The act may in particular have an impact on business 
restructurings, which involve changes in the sales activities and functions of a 
multinational enterprise, and, as a result, existing sales agreements are 
unlawfully terminated. For example, pursuant to § 28 of the act, if a sales agent 
loses commissions due to the premature termination of a sales agency 
                                                 
 
805 Norros 2009, pp. 633–634, 644.  
806 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.79, 9.81–9.83. 
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agreement, it may under certain circumstances be entitled to a compensation, 
which equals up to one year’s agent commissions.807 Thus, by applying the 
approach based on the CUP method above, it may be required that related 
parties should in a business restructuring compensate a group company for 
the termination of an existing sales agency agreement in accordance with the 
principles of the Finnish Act on Commercial Representatives and Salesmen, if 
independent parties would apply the act in comparable situations.808 
 
The above-discussed indemnification requirements arising from Finnish 
contract and commercial law are just examples of how the terminations or 
renegotiations of existing agreements occurred in the business restructuring 
context could be indemnified at arm’s length in certain circumstances. The 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines require that the facts and circumstances of 
each case must always be examined.809 Therefore, for instance, the type of the 
agreement as well as the branch of industry may have an impact on whether 
and to what extent the termination or renegotiation of an existing 
arrangement should be compensated in a particular case. The most important 
factor to consider is how independent enterprises would indemnify (if at all) 
the termination/renegotiation in similar circumstances.810 
  
This approach must be taken as the starting point also in the USA. The arm’s 
length standard requires that if the results of the controlled transaction, in this 
case, terminations or renegotiations of existing arrangements, are in line with 
the results that would have been realized in a transaction between 
independent parties under the same circumstances, the controlled transaction 
meets the requirements of the arm’s length standard — and vice versa.811 As 
was the case in Finland, the U.S. transfer pricing provisions do not contain 
specific provisions on the determination of arm’s length remunerations for the 
premature terminations or renegotiations of existing arrangements, and 
therefore answers to the question must be sought from other sources. 
 
As discussed earlier, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, which 
have been enacted by the states broadly, provide basic contractual principles 
in commercial transactions, which can be used to validate claims for civil 
damages in situations where existing agreements have been terminated 
unlawfully. The Uniform Commercial Code contains provisions according to 
                                                 
 
807 See § 23, § 26 and § 28 of the Act on Commercial Representatives and Salesmen in more detail. 
808 See more about the determination of the so-called residual commission in Saarnilehto – Viljanen 
2006, pp. 387–396. 
809 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.78. 
810 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.78, 9.80, 9.92; Finnish Tax Administration: Transfer 
Pricing in Business Restructurings. 
811 See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1). 
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which the suffered party of a contractual arrangement concerning sale of 
goods is entitled to damages for the breach of a contract in different ways 
depending on the nature of the breach.812 For instance, the code includes 
provisions as to measuring the seller’s damages for non-acceptance or 
repudiation by the buyer. The general idea in that case is “to put the seller in 
as good a position as performance would have done.”813 In addition, the 
general provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, covering all parts of the 
code (not only the part related to the sales of goods), also states that ultimately 
“the remedies provided by [the Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally 
administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a 
position as if the other party had fully performed.”814  
 
From the above mentioned, it must be observed that U.S. contract law has thus 
a concept, which corresponds to the Finnish concept of positive interest of an 
agreement. The concept is called — in the already discussed manner — the 
expectation interest, and it basically means that a suffered party should be put 
into as good position as the party would be had the agreement been performed. 
The concept has been discussed in the legal literature and, more importantly, 
broadly recognized by the courts.815 
 
As it was already previously discussed, perhaps the most important source 
regulating the expectation interest is the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
(1981), as it provides more specific guidance with respect to applying it in 
practice. Notwithstanding the Restatement is not generally a legally binding 
source in U.S. law or enacted by states in their legislation, it has a persuasive 
authority, and therefore it is followed to a large extent by courts in their 
decision-making.816 According to the Restatement, expectation interest is a 
promisee’s “interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good 
a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed.”817 In a 
more detailed way, “the injured party has a right to damages based on his 
expectation interest as measured by (a) the loss in the value to him of the other 
party's performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus; (b) any other loss, 
including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less; (c) any 
cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.”818  
                                                 
 
812 See e.g. Articles 2-703 and 2-711 of the Uniform Commercial Code (2002). 
813 Article 2-708 of the Uniform Commercial Code (2002). 
814 Article 1-305 of the Uniform Commercial Code (2001). 
815 See e.g. Landgraf – Arnautovic 2015, pp. 321–322; Tongish v. Thomas, 840 P.2d 471 (Kan. 1992); 
Metro. Prop. & Cas. v. Harper, 168 Or. App. 358 (2000). 
816 As mentioned, courts have also cited to it in their rulings as it they would have cited to legal statutes 
or codes; see Gutman 2014, p. 118; Klass 2010, p. 46; Maggs 1998, p. 8.  
817 § 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). 
818 § 347 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981). 
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Based on the observations above, it can be stated that, as was the case under 
Finnish law, if independent parties could be entitled to a remuneration in 
accordance with the expectation interest for premature terminations or 
renegotiations of existing agreements, it may be required that a related party 
is under similar circumstances compensated similarly and put to as good 
position as it would be had the agreement been followed thoroughly and not 
terminated/renegotiated prematurely in the business restructuring. In 
practice, this could mean that the suffered party would be entitled to such 
expected profits arising from the agreement that would have realized had the 
agreement been in force in accordance with the contractual terms. This could 
also be required from the perspective of the CUT method. By taking the 
discussed approach, related parties would compensate the premature 
termination (or renegotiation) in a similar way had the termination concerned 
contractual agreement between independent parties, and thus the parties 
would comply with the CUT method and meet the requirements of the arm’s 
length standard.  
 
This approach requires that the contractual terms of the terminated 
arrangement must be reviewed in order to examine whether the agreement 
also allows paying such an indemnification to the suffered party at arm’s 
length. If the indemnification amount would be smaller than to what 
expectation interest would entitle the suffered party, such a deviation from the 
expectation interest should be validated in the transfer pricing documentation 
by referring to differences, for instance, in the circumstances of the case. 
Otherwise there might be a risk of that the tax authorities may not consider 
the indemnification arm’s length. 
 
For instance, distribution agreements are usually concluded in the USA for a 
term of one year. If a distribution agreement is terminated in accordance with 
one year’s notice, the agreement expires and the distributor is not entitled to 
a remuneration. However, if the distribution agreement is terminated 
immediately contrary to the termination clause, the distributor is usually 
entitled to a remuneration in the amount of foregone profits of one year 
pursuant to the termination and/or indemnification clauses of the 
agreement.819 If similar arrangements are terminated in the course of business 
restructurings under similar conditions, it is likely that a corresponding 
indemnification should be paid to the suffered related party to meet the 
requirements of the arm’s length standard under Section 482 of the IRC. 
 
It was earlier mentioned that commercial relationships have not been 
regulated in the USA as extensively as in Europe. For example, in contrast to 
                                                 
 
819 Zollo 2011, p. 771; Wright – Keates 2009, pp. 115–116. 
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the Finnish legislation, there does not exist federal legislation, which would 
similarly regulate indemnification rights of sales agents in case of unlawful 
terminations.820 That being said, U.S. law provides more detailed provisions 
for the determination of remunerations for the breach of commercial 
agreements in general, as can be seen from the aforementioned sources. 
Nevertheless, the arm’s length compensation in case of premature 
terminations or renegotiations of existing agreements is determined to a great 
degree in a similar manner under both U.S. and Finnish law. Hence, the 
question of whether a remuneration should be paid for the termination of an 
existing commercial agreement shall primarily be examined from the 
contractual terms of the specific agreement itself and by comparing such terms 
to contractual terms used commonly by independent parties in similar 
circumstances.821 The aforesaid regulations and the concepts — the 
expectation interest under U.S. law and the positive interest under Finnish law 
— may serve as guidance in business restructurings and should primarily be 
applied, if independent parties would be entitled to a compensation in 
accordance with such regulations and concepts in similar circumstances. As 
the discussed sources allow the use of this approach, also the arm’s length 
principle is followed efficiently in Finland and the USA. 
 
4.4 ARM’S LENGTH RANGE 
When comparable uncontrolled transactions have been found for the related 
party transaction occurred in a business restructuring, and the application of 
particular transfer pricing methods or other methods described above have 
provided information on arm’s length prices or margins (for instance, figures 
on gross margins), an arm’s length transfer price for the transfer of something 
of value occurred in the related party transaction(s) must be determined by 
using such results and information obtained from comparables. In general, the 
determination of an arm’s length compensation requires that an arm’s length 
range is formed on the basis of the results derived from comparable 
transactions, as usually the application of transfer pricing method produces 
several results, each of which could be acceptable from the perspective of the 
arm’s length principle. The compensation paid in a related party transaction 
should fall within the arm’s length range so that it could be considered arm’s 
length.822 
 
The concept of the arm’s length range is recognized under the laws of Russia, 
Finland and the USA, although the Finnish legislation does not deal with it 
                                                 
 
820 Wise 2010, pp. 4–5. 
821 Amerkhail – Granwell 2009, p. 417. 
822 Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 283; Hellevig – Usov – Kabakov 2014, p. 220; Kaftannikov 2011, p. 39; 
Wittendorff 2010a, p. 459. 
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specifically (in contrast to the Russian and U.S. legislation).823 The concept is 
also understood similarly in each of these countries: when an application of 
(transfer pricing) methods produces several results (i.e. figures), which could 
be acceptable in terms of the arm’s length principle, a compensation is 
considered arm’s length, if it falls within an arm’s length range derived from 
such results.824  
 
Pursuant to the U.S. and Finnish approach, as a starting point, all the figures 
in the arm’s length range provide an arm’s length result in a particular case, 
provided that comparables forming the range are in general reliable and highly 
comparable with the controlled transaction (necessary adjustments have been 
made to eliminate possible differences) as well as to the same extent 
comparable with each other. If the degree of comparability of some of the 
comparable transactions is less in comparison with the others, the range 
should be narrowed to eliminate such comparables from the range.825 
Furthermore, ordinarily — despite the exclusion of figures having a lesser 
degree of comparability — some comparability issues still remain and cannot 
appropriately be adjusted. Therefore, usually statistical tools should be 
adopted to increase the reliability of the arm’s length range and to narrow it 
correspondingly. The most common statistical method in that case is the so-
called interquartile range where the arm’s length range is limited to the range 
from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the results (figures) derived from the 
uncontrolled comparable transactions.826 As opposed to Finnish and U.S law, 
the determination of an arm’s length range under the Russian Tax Code is 
based directly on the interquartile range.827  
 
In business restructurings, the above mentioned means that the arm’s length 
compensation paid for transfers of something of value must fall within the 
arm’s length range derived from comparable transactions. In cases, where a 
business restructuring involves purely transfers of certain tangible/intangible 
assets, forming an arm’s length range in accordance with the principles above 
may be an easier task when compared to transfers of a going concern. Finding 
                                                 
 
823 The guidance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as well as the Finnish Tax Administration 
Memorandum 1471/37/2007, however, contain provisions, which discuss the arm’s length range and 
basically require the application of the arm’s length range also in Finland; see e.g. Finnish Tax 
Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 35.  
824 Article 105.8 of the Tax Code; Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 35–36; 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 3.55–3.60; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e). 
825 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 35; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
3.55–3.56; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e)(1), § 1.482-1(e)(2)(ii). 
826 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, pp. 35–36; OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, 3.56–3.57; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e)(2)(iii). 
827 Article 105.8 of the Tax Code. 
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two or more comparables for the latter may be a difficult — or even an 
impossible — task, and therefore usually adjustments to eliminate differences 
of comparables are usually required, before forming the arm’s length range. 
The interquartile range also naturally narrows the range, and in this way 
enhances the reliability of the arm’s length range. On the other hand, it must 
also be noted that the national sources acknowledge that the application of a 
transfer pricing method may on certain occasions produce only a single result, 
meaning that an arm’s length price or margin may only be a certain figure 
derived from one uncontrolled transaction.828 Nevertheless, the possibility 
that an arm’s length compensation could be based only on one comparable 
transaction is rather theoretical especially in business restructurings, as it 
requires the fulfilment of strict requirements: the comparable transaction 
must conform to the controlled transaction in its entirety so that all the 
possible material differences between the transactions have been identified 
and effects thereof have been eliminated by making appropriate 
adjustments.829 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
4.5.1 CURRENT SITUATION AND DE LEGE FERENDA VIEWS ON 
RUSSIAN, FINNISH AND U.S. TAX LAW 
The challenges of determining arm’s length compensations for transfers of 
something of value occurring in the course of a business restructuring 
culminate especially in two particular issues. First, it may be troublesome to 
find appropriate transfer pricing methods for determining arm’s length 
compensations for controlled transactions that involve purely transfers of 
intangibles or rights in intangible properties. Second, traditional regulated 
transfer pricing methods cannot effortlessly be applied also to transfers of a 
going concern.  
 
As discussed, intangible assets usually have unique features and 
characteristics, which leads to that it may prove to be difficult to find 
comparables for controlled transactions involving transfers of them. 
Therefore, regardless of that all the target countries prefer the use of the 
CUP/CUT method at least to some extent in controlled transactions 
concerning transfers of intangibles, it is likely that the applicability of the 
profit-based transfer pricing methods must more often be examined in 
                                                 
 
828 Finnish Tax Administration Memorandum 1471/37/2007, p. 35; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
3.55; Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e)(1). 
829 See e.g. Article 105.8 of the Tax Code and Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(e)(iii)(A). 
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business restructurings, if the restructurings involve transfers of intangibles. 
Although the transactional net margin method/the comparable profits 
method may in general be applied to transactions involving intangibles under 
the Tax Code and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the profit split 
method can more effectively be applied to transactions involving purely 
transfers of intangible assets; the latter acknowledges the unique nature of 
intangibles and has been considered to be more suitable for direct valuation of 
intangibles. In contrast to the Russian and the Finnish OECD based 
approaches, the comparable profits method may, under the U.S. transfer 
pricing rules, also be applied to the controlled transfers of rights in intangible 
property on certain occasions. This leads to that the applicability of both 
profit-based transfer pricing methods should always be considered in cross-
border business restructurings under U.S. tax law.  
 
However, amendments to the existing transfer pricing rules and guidance 
could be considered de lege ferenda at least in one respect. As the application 
of the profit split method usually requires that both parties of a related party 
transaction make unique and valuable contributions (e.g. use unique and 
valuable intangibles), it is unclear how the method should be applied to 
transactions involving purely transfers of intangibles. In such transactions 
only one party de facto makes unique contributions, i.e. transfers unique and 
valuable intangibles. Therefore, as the method has been considered to bring 
arm’s length results also in transactions involving merely transfers of 
intangibles, if the CUP/CUT method may not be applied, it should be clarified 
in the transfer pricing rules, how the method should be applied particularly in 
such circumstances.  
 
 
Notwithstanding that at least certain regulated transfer pricing methods may 
be applied to controlled transfers of intangible assets in the aforementioned 
manner, it is generally acknowledged that they may not always provide 
sufficient tools for determining arm’s length compensations. It could be the 
case that independent parties would in comparable situations use other 
techniques to value intangibles than the regulated transfer pricing methods. 
Fortunately, pursuant to the laws of the target countries, it is, under certain 
circumstances, also possible for taxpayers to use other valuation methods than 
the expressly specified transfer pricing methods. In this connection, especially 
the income based methods, such as the discounted cash flow method, are of 
great importance.  
 
The use of the unspecified methods very likely provides a reliable arm’s length 
result, as related parties would, in such cases, follow the same valuation 
principles that would be used by independent parties in comparable 
circumstances. The valuation uncertainty in the pricing of the transaction 
involving transfers of intangibles is thus taken into account in a similar 
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manner as it would be taken by unrelated parties. Hence, the arm’s length 
principle is also greatly followed, as both related and independent parties may 
use similar valuation methods. In particular, the income based methods, in 
which the valuation is based on the calculation of the discounted value of 
projected future income streams or cash flows and which are often used by 
independent parties, may be particularly useful in determining an arm’s length 
compensation for transfers of intangibles. 
 
Nonetheless, there are certain concerns about the use of such valuation 
techniques in practice from the perspective of efficiently complying with the 
arm’s length principle. For the sake of predictability and transparency of the 
tax treatment, it should be considered whether such methods and the 
application thereof in transfer pricing should be regulated directly in the 
national transfer pricing rules. Although the Russian Tax Code contains a 
mention of the possibility of using such methods, the provisions basically refer 
to a non-taxation related act, and more detailed provisions of the types of the 
methods are only covered by particular administrative regulations.  
 
Therefore, especially taking into account that the interpretation of Russian law 
should primarily be based on legal norms, such a relevant issue should be 
regulated directly in the Tax Code’s provisions. This means that, apart from 
the aforementioned need to include the possibility to consider transfers of 
intangibles generally as objects of transfer pricing (not only intellectual 
properties), it would be of great importance to regulate in the Tax Code de lege 
ferenda on how the arm’s length compensations should be determined for 
transfers of intangible property. Detailed guidance on the application of both 
the transfer pricing methods (in particular, the profit split method) and the 
discussed other valuation methods (especially, the income method) should 
also be provided. 
 
In Finland, the aforementioned concerns are primarily less problematic, as the 
principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are followed in this respect 
as such, resulting in that it is acceptable to use other valuation techniques in 
transfer pricing of intangibles. However, apart from references to income 
based valuation techniques used by independent parties, the OECD’s guidance 
lacks content in this regard. Therefore, while the OECD’s guidance on the 
regulated transfer pricing methods may be considered sufficient for the 
purpose of following it as such in the Finnish practice, the guidance on the 
application of other valuation techniques is very limited. As a consequence, it 
does not provide necessary tools for applying non-specified methods in 
practice.830  
                                                 
 
830 The OECD provides, however, certain observations on the use of the income methods, see OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.158–6.178. 
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Similarly, although the Treasury Regulations interpreting Section 482 of the 
IRC explicitly accept the use of unspecified methods, they have not discussed 
at all the types of methods that could be regarded as unspecified methods. This 
may cause unnecessary vagueness from the point of view of the arm’s length 
principle, taking into consideration that the Treasury Regulations usually aim 
to address all topical questions of transfer pricing. Hence, both the Finnish 
and the U.S. transfer pricing rules would, de lege ferenda, need to be amended 
so that the applicability of the aforementioned valuation techniques in the 
transfer pricing of intangibles is regulated in a clear manner, providing 
detailed guidance on the application of such methods in practice. 
 
Furthermore, it must also be observed that the application of the valuation 
techniques that are frequently used by independent parties is not an easy task. 
For instance, the income based methods require the prediction of future (net) 
profits, cash flows or other economic benefits that the intangible asset in 
question may generate during its lifetime. If the prediction is done in an 
unreliable manner, or the value is discounted to the present value by using an 
inaccurate discount rate, it may result in that an arm’s length result is not 
achieved in the given case. Therefore, such methods must always be applied 
and documented diligently in order to find the most appropriate arm’s length 
compensation for transfers of intangibles and to validate the pricing used in 
transactions. 
 
As with the controlled transfers of intangibles assets, the valuation of 
contemporaneous transfers of interrelated assets on an aggregate basis — i.e. 
as a going concern — may rise questions in business restructurings. The 
Finnish and U.S. transfer pricing rules do not contain explicit regulations as 
regards transfer pricing of a going concern in the business restructuring 
context. Hence, the use of the regulated transfer pricing methods should be 
considered as a starting point, although they are unlikely to provide the best 
arm’s length results in business valuation. The arm’s length principle, on the 
other hand, requires that if unrelated parties would use other valuation 
techniques in comparable situations, related parties should correspondingly 
use such techniques to achieve the arm’s length result in a given case. 
 
The OECD’s guidance is primarily followed in this respect in Finland, which 
has also been confirmed by the Finnish Tax Administration and the Supreme 
Administrative Court. While both the OECD and national sources generally 
refer to valuation techniques that independent parties would apply in 
comparable circumstances, i.e. in business acquisitions, they have not 
regulated such methods and the application thereof in detail. The OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines refer in this connection to the potential use of the 
unspecified methods used in the valuation of intangibles (i.e. income based 
methods, such as the discounted cash flow method); the Finnish sources have 
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also expressly mentioned the possibility to use the discounted cash flow 
method in transfer pricing of transfers of a going concern.  
 
From this perspective, it seems that at least the income based methods, in 
particular the discounted cash flow method, may be considered reliable 
methods in the determination of arm’s length compensations for transfers of 
a going concern, as they are also used by independent parties in similar 
situations. However, due to the lack of detailed guidance, it is unclear whether 
tax authorities set other requirements for their use in transfer pricing in 
practice. Furthermore, it is ambiguous, to what extent other valuation 
techniques used by independent parties in business valuations may be applied 
in business restructurings in Finland. Hence, although the existing situation 
allows the compliance with the arm’s length principle, further guidance to 
address the aforesaid concerns is required to bring more clarity to the 
question. 
 
Similarly, in the USA, the previously discussed methods used specifically in 
cost sharing arrangements may, by expansive interpretation allowed by the 
IRS, be used in determining the arm’s length value for transfers of a going 
concern. From the discussed methods, the income method can be regarded as 
the most suitable. In addition, as mentioned, the IRS also itself prefers the use 
of it. Under the income method, the arm’s length compensation is based on 
the forthcoming income streams of a business, which are discounted to a 
present value using an appropriate discount rate. Thus, in this sense, the U.S. 
approach conforms with the Finnish approach to a great degree, and the arm’s 
length principle is thus followed efficiently.  
 
Nevertheless, the same uncertainty factors that are present in Finnish transfer 
pricing in this respect come up with the transfer pricing of transfers of a going 
concern in the USA — and may be even more problematic there. As the detailed 
guidance for the application of the unspecified methods to controlled transfers 
of a going concern is missing, this may cause interpretive problems for 
taxpayers. In addition, the applicability of the discussed unspecified methods 
to business restructurings is based in the aforementioned sense on the broad 
interpretation of the said Treasury Regulations and the IRS’s viewpoint. The 
current approach may thus cause unnecessary uncertainty for the compliance 
with the arm’s length principle. Although the requirement to follow valuation 
methods that independent parties would use in comparable situations may 
arise already from the principle as such, amendments to the existing situation 
are needed. Hence, for the sake of clarity and transparency, the use of such 
methods — in particular, the income method — should be regulated de lege 
ferenda in the Treasury Regulations in a concrete and detailed manner, paying 
attention also to potential issues that may arise in the business restructuring 
context.   
 
241 
 
Despite that the current provisions in Finland and the USA may to some extent 
lack the clarifying content and guidance, taxpayers may nonetheless achieve 
the arm’s length result, at present, by invoking such regulations and guidance. 
As those sources provide, at least by interpretation, certain measures (such as 
the above-discussed income based methods) to value transfers of bundles of 
assets (going concerns) as a whole, and are also commonly applied by 
independent parties in similar situations, related parties may in the end be put 
in a similar position as independent parties. For instance, related parties may, 
in the situation under discussion, use the discounted cash flow method that is 
a frequently applied method in business valuation. Quite the contrary, as the 
existing Russian provisions do not provide similar tools for the aggregation of 
related party transaction in a corresponding manner, the requirements of the 
arm’s length principle are not necessarily met efficiently, if independent 
parties would in comparable situations value such asset transfers on an 
aggregate basis.  
 
Lastly, the determination of arm’s length compensations for premature 
terminations or renegotiations of agreements is not regulated in Finland and 
the USA in detail either. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines contain 
general conditions, which should be taken into account, when determining 
whether an arm’s length compensation should be paid for the termination or 
renegotiation of an existing agreement and — more importantly — how to 
determine such a compensation. Based on guidance, inter alia, national 
commercial law, case law and any other applicable sources of law regulating 
contractual arrangements, indemnification rights and specific business 
activities should be examined in this connection in Finland. This approach 
must be taken as the starting point also in the USA. Although similar express 
references to the principles of specific legislation and case law are missing 
from the Treasury Regulations, the arm’s length standard itself ultimately 
requires that the results of the controlled transaction — in this case, 
terminations or renegotiations of existing arrangements — should be in line 
with the results that would have been realized had the transaction occurred 
between independent parties.  
 
Despite the fact that the current provisions and guidance of the Finnish and 
U.S. transfer pricing rules may not be considered that detailed in this regard, 
they nevertheless make possible for companies to achieve the arm’s length 
result. The provisions and rules start with the assumption that the termination 
or renegotiation of an existing arrangement occurring in the course of a 
business restructuring must ultimately be examined from the perspective of 
whether independent parties would have required a compensation for such a 
termination or renegotiation under similar circumstances and, if so, on what 
terms. This means that the examination must in the end be done on a case-by-
case basis, and that there cannot be a presumption that a remuneration should 
always be paid. This approach fulfils the requirements of the arm’s length 
242 
 
principle efficiently, as independent parties would not require or be entitled to 
a remuneration in all cases, where existing arrangements are renegotiated or 
terminated.  
 
As the prevailing provisions and other guidance leave room for such a case-by-
case analysis and require that taxpayers should take into account the specifics 
of each given case, there is no need for, at least, major improvements to the 
existing rules in this respect. For instance, it may be an impossible task to 
provide an exhaustive and all-embracing transfer pricing guidance as regards 
the determination of arm’s length compensations for premature terminations 
or renegotiations of arrangements that could be applied in different scenarios 
consistently. As mentioned, the need for the compensation may vary on a case-
by-case basis, and especially the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines seem to 
take into account all different factors that may have impact in such cases.  
 
Nonetheless, as the current situation in the USA is based on the interpretation 
of the arm’s length standard, there is a need to have certain issues regulated 
de lege ferenda in the Treasure Regulations to avoid uncertainty. For the sake 
of clarity, the Treasury Regulations could have general regulations 
highlighting the importance of reviewing terminations and renegotiations of 
existing agreements in the transfer pricing analysis of related party 
transactions. Moreover, similar to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
general references to commercial law and other sources of law potentially 
regulating indemnification rights in this connection could be considered. 
 
4.5.2 ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ARM’S LENGTH 
PRINCIPLE  
Domestic transfer pricing rules often provide specific transfer pricing methods 
for the determination of arm’s length compensations that are directly or 
largely consistent with the transfer pricing methods of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines. As the guidelines provide broadly accepted measures that 
could be used in complying with the arm’s length principle,831 the approach 
can be justified as a starting point. However, while such regulated transfer 
pricing methods may in certain situations prove to be useful, they may not 
always provide the necessary tools for achieving the best possible arm’s length 
result. In order to follow the arm’s length principle efficiently, it is therefore of 
great importance that domestic transfer pricing rules do not rely solely on such 
transfer pricing methods. 
 
                                                 
 
831 See e.g. Calderón 2007, pp. 4–5; Lubic – Gelin – Ossard-Quintaine 2014, pp. 70–71. 
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The analysis of the target countries’ current approaches to the determination 
of arm’s length compensations in the business restructuring context raises a 
few specific questions from the perspective of complying with the arm’s length 
principle. While the arm’s length compensation may, quite easily, be 
determined for transfers of tangible assets in business restructurings by using 
the regulated transfer pricing methods, particularly transfers of intangible 
assets or a going concern require specific attention.  
 
In general, countries seem to prefer, in one way or another, the use of the 
CUP/CUT method.832 This approach can be validated also from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle, as its ultimate aim is to find 
transactions comparable to the related party transaction. If such comparables 
can be found, or reasonable adjustments to eliminate potential material 
differences made, it usually enables the best possible arm’s length result. 
Therefore, in order to comply with the arm’s length principle, the applicability 
of the method should be regulated in domestic transfer pricing rules and 
generally be considered first also in business restructurings, before reviewing 
other methods.  
 
However, on the basis of observations arising out of this study, the potential 
applicability of the CUP/CUT method seems to be very restricted in the 
business restructuring context. Apart from transfers of tangible assets (where 
also other traditional transfer pricing methods, such as the resale price and 
cost plus methods, seem to provide arm’s length results), it can poorly be 
applied to transfers of other forms of something of value. This is usually due 
to the fact that no comparables can be found and/or potential material 
differences eliminated to validate the use of the method. The inappropriate or 
incorrect application of the method would, in the end, be contrary to the arm’s 
length principle. 
 
As evidenced by this research, when an arm’s length compensation is 
determined for a transfer of intangibles, only few of the regulated transfer 
pricing methods seem to be suitable for direct valuation of intangibles. 
Intangible assets are often unique, resulting in that comparable transactions 
are hard or impossible to find, even if necessary adjustments are made to 
eliminate possible material differences. If the CUP/CUT method may not be 
applied, the profit-based transfer pricing methods are usually considered. In 
particular, the application of the profit split method may produce good arm’s 
length results.  
 
                                                 
 
832 Article 105.7 of the Tax Code; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.3, 6.137 and 6.146; Treas. Reg. § 
1.482-1(c)(2)(i). 
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One of the main advantages of the profit split method is that it does not rely 
on finding exact comparables for the controlled transaction in comparison 
with other methods. Thus, it may be used in transactions that involve unique 
intangibles, although no exact or sufficient comparables can be found for such 
intangibles. As companies may, in this way, tackle the challenges that may 
arise from the application of other transfer pricing methods, it is important 
that domestic transfer pricing rules acknowledge the possibility to use the 
method. Otherwise, the arm’s length principle may not necessarily be followed 
efficiently — in the worst-case scenario, such transfer pricing rules can be 
considered inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. 
 
Although, of the regulated transfer pricing methods, the profit split method 
thus seems to be the most appropriate option to value transfers of intangibles, 
its application may cause uncertainty in certain circumstances. It may be 
questioned whether the method can bring the best arm’s length result in such 
related party transactions where solely intangibles or rights in intangibles are 
transferred between controlled parties.  
 
As discussed, the application of the profit split method generally requires that 
both parties of a related party transaction make unique and valuable 
contributions (e.g. use unique and valuable intangibles). Especially in business 
restructurings, this question is of great relevance. While such transactions, 
where both parties make unique and valuable contributions, may be 
conducted in business restructurings after the execution of the restructuring 
(e.g. licensing arrangements), the transfers of intangibles that occur during a 
business restructuring usually involve that only one party, the restructured 
entity, makes unique contributions, i.e. transfers unique and valuable 
intangibles. Consequently, it should be clarified in domestic transfer pricing 
rules, how the method should particularly be applied in such circumstances. It 
seems that domestic rules remain usually silent in this respect, as was the case 
in the target countries, which is problematic from the point of view of the arm’s 
length principle. In business restructurings, this may result in obscurity on 
how the method should be applied to such transfers of intangible properties 
that occur during a business restructuring. Such unclarity should be avoided 
to ensure the compliance with the arm’s length principle. 
 
Moreover, on the basis of the above mentioned, it is alarming that the arm’s 
length principle may not always be complied with efficiently — or at all — by 
applying the regulated transfer pricing methods. Such methods are specifically 
regulated in domestic transfer pricing rules and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for the purpose of providing necessary tools for the determination 
of arm’s length compensations. The lack of or unclear content may lead to that 
such methods are not helpful in the determination of the arm’s length 
compensations to the extent required. In consequence, this may, in the worst-
case scenario, jeopardize the compliance with the arm’s length principle. 
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From the perspective of the arm’s length principle, it is thus important that 
also other valuation methods and techniques than specifically regulated 
transfer pricing methods may be used in the determination of arm’s length 
compensations, especially, for transfers of intangibles. Such a possibility could 
be based, inter alia, on domestic transfer pricing provisions (as in Russia and 
the USA) or directly on the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (as in Finland).  
 
The use of unspecified methods is likely to produce a reliable arm’s length 
result, if the same valuation principles would be used by independent parties 
in similar circumstances. The valuation uncertainty arising out of the pricing 
of the transaction involving transfers of intangibles is thus taken into account 
in a similar manner as it would be taken by unrelated parties. Hence, the arm’s 
length principle may also be followed efficiently, as both related and 
independent parties may, ultimately, use similar valuation methods. 
Particularly, the income based methods, in which the valuation is based on the 
calculation of the discounted value of projected future income streams or cash 
flows, may be useful in determining arm’s length compensations for transfers 
of intangibles. As such methods are often used by independent parties, it is 
likely that by using them the arm’s length principle is followed efficiently, 
provided that any of the regulated transfer pricing methods may not be applied 
in a given case.  
 
Nevertheless, certain problematic issues arise out of the application of such 
methods in transfer pricing. First, while domestic transfer pricing sources may 
acknowledge the possibility of using such valuation techniques, the guidance 
on the application thereof is very limited. For instance, the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines mention only income based methods as an example of 
valuation techniques that could be considered in the valuation of intangibles 
in related party transactions. In the U.S. Treasury Regulations, the types of 
methods that could be regarded as unspecified methods are not discussed at 
all.833 As a result, necessary tools for applying such non-specified methods in 
practice are not usually provided in a sufficient manner. This causes 
unnecessary vagueness from the point of view of the arm’s length principle, 
when also taking into account the extent to which the regulated transfer 
pricing methods are usually dealt with in transfer pricing rules.  
 
Second, while such other valuation techniques may be used in corporate 
finance to determine the fair value of intangible properties generally, the fair 
value standard and the arm’s length standard are ultimately two distinct 
                                                 
 
833 Similar thoughts have been expressed in Brauner 2008, pp. 120–122. 
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valuation standards. The standards have different objectives and premises.834 
Therefore, such principal differences should be taken into account, when other 
valuation methods than the regulated transfer pricing methods are applied in 
the transfer pricing context. It may be required that appropriate modifications 
are made to such methods before applying them in the determination of arm’s 
length compensations.835 In the current situation, such issues have not usually 
been dealt with in domestic transfer pricing rules, which may be troublesome 
from the perspective of the arm’s length principle; for ensuring the efficient 
compliance with the principle, certain measures need to be taken. 
 
Third, it must be observed that the application of the unspecified valuation 
techniques is not, in the end, an easy task even if the aforementioned 
observations have been acknowledged in transfer pricing rules. For instance, 
the income based methods require the prediction of future (net) profits, cash 
flows or other economic benefits the intangible asset in question may generate 
during its lifetime. If the prediction is done in an unreliable manner or the 
value is discounted to the present value by using an inaccurate discount rate, 
it may lead to an arm’s length result not being achieved in the given case. 
Therefore, such methods must be applied diligently in order to find the most 
appropriate arm’s length compensation for transfers of intangibles and to 
validate the pricing used in the transaction. Even then, it may be uncertain 
whether tax authorities consider the determined value arm’s length. 
 
The second question that is of great relevance in transfer pricing of business 
restructurings in this respect relates to transfers of a going concern. As 
mentioned, specific domestic legislation rarely regulates directly the 
possibility of considering business restructurings as transfers of a going 
concern for transfer pricing purposes. In some countries, like Finland, the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may in practice be used as such; 
alternatively, domestic transfer pricing rules may allow the aggregation of 
related party transactions to the extent that also transfers of a going concern 
may be examined in business restructurings on an aggregate basis (e.g. the 
approach in the USA). As domestic transfer pricing rules do not primarily 
contain explicit regulations as regards transfer pricing of a going concern in 
the business restructuring context, the use of the regulated transfer pricing 
methods should primarily be considered.  
 
                                                 
 
834 The arm’s length value is determined on a pre-tax basis, while the valuation techniques used to value 
the fair value may be determined on a post-tax basis. Furthermore, the arm’s length principle is applied 
to an actual transaction, while this is not necessarily the case when the fair value is determined; see 
Wittendorff 2010b, pp. 325–326. 
835 As the arm’s length principle requires a two-sided valuation, this should be taken as a starting point, 
when such valuation techniques are applied, see e.g. Lagarden 2014 pp. 340–341. 
247 
 
Based on experiences of the examined target countries, the regulated transfer 
pricing methods do not provide the necessary tools for the determination of 
the arm’s length compensation for a transfer of a going concern. As transfers 
of a going concern may comprise several contemporaneous transfers of 
different kinds of assets, risks and functions, it is unlikely that comparables 
can be found for such a transfer to validate the use of the CUP/CUT method. 
In addition, the other regulated transfer pricing methods do not necessarily 
take into account all the valuable elements that may be involved in a transfer 
of a functioning business unit. It is likely that independent parties would, in 
such situations, use specific business valuation methods that analyze all the 
separate transfers of something of value as a whole. Therefore, from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle, the application of such methods 
should also be considered in determining transfer prices for transfers of a 
going concern. 
 
The aforementioned approach has also been adopted in some countries. The 
Finnish transfer pricing sources as well as the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines generally refer to valuation techniques that independent parties 
would apply in comparable circumstances, i.e. in business acquisitions. In 
particular, this approach allows related parties to use income based methods, 
especially the discounted cash flow method, that is generally used in business 
valuation by independent parties. From this perspective, it thus seems that at 
least the income based methods, and in particular the discounted cash flow 
method, may be considered reliable methods in the determination of arm’s 
length compensations for transfers of a going concern, at least so far as they 
would also be used by unrelated parties in similar situations. However, certain 
concerns also arise out of this approach in the current situation. 
 
First, it is extremely problematic from the perspective of the arm’s length 
principle, if the possibility of using such valuation methods is solely based on 
a broad interpretation of existing transfer pricing rules.836 The efficient 
application of the arm’s length principle requires that such a possibility is 
regulated more directly, preferably, in the main domestic transfer pricing 
sources. If transfer pricing rules just remain silent in this respect, the unclarity 
and uncertainty of the tax treatment may result in that the arm’s length 
principle is not efficiently followed. 
 
Second, although transfer pricing regulations would acknowledge the 
possibility of using some unspecified methods, they usually lack content in 
terms of the application of such methods specifically to transfers of a going 
concern. Transfer pricing rules may, for instance, just contain a general 
reference to valuation techniques used in business and intangible asset 
                                                 
 
836 As is the case in the USA. 
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valuation that could be useful in this respect (the approach in Finland). If the 
detailed guidance for the application of the unspecified methods to controlled 
transfers of a going concern is missing in (domestic) transfer pricing rules, this 
may cause interpretive problems for taxpayers. It may be ambiguous, for 
example, what are the “unspecified methods”, should certain methods be 
preferred over other methods and how such methods should be applied in the 
transfer pricing context for the purpose of achieving the best arm’s length 
result. 
 
Thus, while companies may, by invoking national transfer pricing regulations 
and guidance, be able to value transfers of bundles of assets (a going concern) 
as a whole and therefore apply other valuation methods than the regulated 
transfer pricing methods, it is not always crystal clear whether and how 
companies may achieve the arm’s length result by using them. In consequence, 
the arm’s length principle may not necessarily be followed efficiently. For the 
sake of clarity and transparency, the use of such methods in transfer pricing 
should be regulated in a detailed and consistent manner.  
 
Third, the same uncertainty factors that relate to determining arm’s length 
compensations for transfers of intangible assets are also topical in this context. 
As such valuation methods and techniques — such as the discounted cash flow 
method — are initially developed for different kind of use (e.g. determining 
fair value in corporate finance), principal differences should be taken into 
account, when other valuation methods than the regulated transfer pricing 
methods are applied in the transfer pricing context. Using such methods in 
transfer pricing, without making any modifications, may result in that a 
compensation paid in a controlled party transaction is not necessarily 
consistent with the arm’s length principle.  
 
Furthermore, the application of income based methods to business 
restructurings is never a straightforward task, as it involves the projection of 
future income streams/cash flows, and an appropriate discount rate must be 
determined in order to discount the income streams/cash flows to a present 
value. Therefore, the choice of the method as well as all the parameters and 
assumptions related to its application must carefully be reviewed in order to 
achieve the arm’s length result. If the prediction of income/cash flow is done 
in an unreliable manner or the value is discounted to the present value by 
using an inaccurate discount rate, the end result may be incompatible with the 
arm’s length standard. 
 
Lastly, when the determination of arm’s length compensations for premature 
terminations or renegotiations of agreements is based on the examination of 
whether independent parties would have required a compensation for such a 
termination or renegotiation (and on what terms), the arm’s length principle 
seems to be followed efficiently. As independent parties may not always 
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require or be entitled to such a compensation or indemnification, the 
examination should be done, in the end, on a case-by-case basis. If transfer 
pricing rules leave room for case-by-case analysis and require that taxpayers 
should take into account the specifics of each given case, such rules also likely 
comply with the arm’s length principle. 
 
4.5.3 OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES — A STANDARD TO BE 
FOLLOWED UNIVERSALLY? 
As was the case with the question of objects of transfer pricing in business 
restructurings, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines seem to provide, at first 
sight, necessary guidance for complying with the arm’s length principle when 
determining compensations for such objects. Apart from containing specific 
provisions in this regard, Chapter IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing comprises 
several references to other chapters of the guidelines, containing specific 
guidance on the application of the regulated transfer pricing methods as well 
as information on other valuation techniques.837 Taking into consideration the 
importance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in international tax 
law,838 it should be reviewed whether the guidelines provide adequate and 
efficient tools for determining arm’s length compensations for transfers of 
something of value in the context of business restructurings. Especially of 
great interest is to examine whether the existing guidance should, in a 
consistent manner, be adopted to domestic transfer pricing legislation and 
regulations. 
 
As discussed above, arm’s length prices may be determined for transfers of 
something of value by specific transfer pricing methods and/or by other 
unspecified valuation techniques. The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
acknowledge both options in the aforementioned manner. They regulate 
specific transfer pricing methods that take into account the features of 
different kinds of related party transactions (e.g. whether services are provided 
or tangible assets/intangibles are transferred). In addition, they deal with the 
possibility of using other valuation methods and techniques than the regulated 
transfer pricing methods. Such other methods may be used instead of using 
the regulated transfer pricing methods, if they provide the most appropriate 
and reliable result in terms of the arm’s length principle in a given case.839 As 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines acknowledge in this sense both 
approaches, and specifically allow the use of other valuation methods for the 
                                                 
 
837 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.53, 9.56 and 9.68–9.69. 
838 See e.g. Calderón 2007, pp. 4–5. 
839 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.9. 
250 
 
purpose of achieving the best arm’s length result, the guidelines primarily 
seem to have an efficient approach to complying with the arm’s length 
principle. 
 
Also, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines prefer the use of the CUP 
method.840 As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the CUP method 
usually brings the best arm’s length result, if comparables can be found for the 
related party transaction in question. In order to comply with the arm’s length 
principle, the transfer pricing rules should thus regulate the potential use of 
the method. As the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have this covered, and 
the application of the method should hence be considered first also in business 
restructurings, the guidelines seem to provide an arm’s length approach to 
business restructurings also in this respect. 
 
Furthermore, the OECD’s approach seems to be in line with the arm’s length 
principle, when the determination of arm’s length compensations for transfers 
of something of value in the business restructuring context is preliminarily 
examined. The application of certain transfer pricing methods provided in the 
guidelines — the CUP, resale price or cost plus methods — usually allow 
companies to determine arm’s length prices for transfers of goods, machinery, 
inventory or other tangible assets occurring in business restructurings.841 
Moreover, the OECD regards the CUP and profit split methods as well as other 
valuation techniques as suitable methods for the determination of the arm’s 
length compensations for transfers of intangibles.842 As discussed above, the 
profit split method does not rely on finding comparables as much as the other 
regulated methods, which is why its use might also be more practical. In cases, 
where the method cannot be applied, other unspecified valuation techniques 
should be considered in determining arm’s length compensations, as such 
methods would likely be applied in transactions between unrelated parties. 
Thus, from this perspective, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ approach 
seem to lead to good results in terms of the arm’s length principle, when 
transfer prices are determined for transfers of tangible and/or intangible 
assets in the business restructuring context.  
 
Correspondingly, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines recommend 
considering the use of unspecified valuation techniques, such as the valuation 
methods used in acquisition deals by independent parties, when determining 
the arm’s length compensation for a transfer of a going concern. This approach 
allows the use of the income based methods that are based on the calculation 
                                                 
 
840 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2.3, 6.137 and 6.146. 
841 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.52. 
842 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.145. 
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of the discounted value of future income streams or cash flows,843 which have 
been regarded as appropriate measures for determining arm’s length 
compensations for transfers of a going concern. Finally, the guidelines also 
recognize the possibility of examining the premature terminations or 
renegotiations of existing arrangements on a case-by-case basis (i.e. whether 
an indemnification needs to be paid and, if so, on what terms),844 which seems 
to be the best approach from the perspective of the arm’s length principle. 
 
Hence, on the aforementioned grounds, the guidelines seem to provide 
efficient tools for complying with the arm’s length principle, when 
compensations are determined for typical transfers of assets/something of 
value that occur in business restructurings. Could the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines thus be considered as an international transfer pricing standard 
that could and should be adopted to domestic transfer pricing rules in this 
regard?  
 
It seems that at least few issues, nevertheless, speak against such a view. First, 
the question regarding the application of the profit split method in the 
determination of arm’s length compensations for transfers of intangible assets 
is still to some extent ambiguous. Regardless of that the profit split method 
can be applied to transactions involving purely transfers of intangible assets 
pursuant to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,845 it is somewhat unclear 
how the method should be applied in such situations in practice. As the 
application of the profit split method primarily requires that both parties to a 
related party transaction make unique and valuable contributions (e.g. use 
unique and valuable intangibles), it is unclear how the method should be 
applied to transactions involving solely transfers of intangibles or rights in 
intangibles. While such transactions, where both parties make unique and 
valuable contributions, may be conducted in business restructurings after the 
execution of the restructuring (e.g. licensing arrangements), the transfers of 
intangibles that occur during a business restructuring usually involve that only 
one party, the restructured entity, makes unique contributions, i.e. transfers 
unique intangibles. Consequently, it should be clarified in the guidelines, how 
the method should be applied particularly in such circumstances. 
 
However, as discussed, the OECD is currently updating the guidance in 
relation to the application of the profit split method. Pursuant to the OECD’s 
discussion draft on the revised guidance on profit splits, the application of the 
profit split method is still emphasized in transactions where both parties make 
unique and valuable contributions (e.g. contribute unique and valuable 
                                                 
 
843 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.153, 9.68–9.69. 
844 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.75–9.97. 
845 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.145, 6.148–6.149. 
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intangibles) to the related party transaction.846 The OECD seems to be willing 
to limit the inappropriate use of the profit split method in transactions where 
only one related party makes such contributions.  
 
The OECD is of the opinion that a more reliable arm’s length result in such 
cases may be usually achieved by making adjustments to the available 
comparables (although they might be imperfect) rather than applying the 
profit split method inappropriately.847 Nevertheless, when such adjustments 
cannot be made, and thus appropriate comparables cannot be found, the use 
of the profit split method may still be considered in the transfer pricing of 
intangibles; the OECD has repeated its view on the possibility of using the 
method in controlled transactions involving merely transfers of intangibles.848 
This causes unclarity, as the OECD has not provided any concrete guidance on 
the use of the method in the latter situations, although it is willing to limit the 
use of it in the above-mentioned manner. Hence, the question seems to remain 
unanswered even after the proposed amendments.  
 
Second, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines currently provide insufficient 
guidance with regard to the use of other valuation techniques in the 
determination of arm’s length compensations for transfers of intangible 
assets. Although the guidelines regard other valuation techniques as useful 
tools where reliable comparables cannot be found for the controlled transfer 
of intangible assets,849 and in this sense follow the arm’s length principle, the 
regulated guidance lacks the necessary content for their successful application 
in practice. This can result in that the arm’s length principle may not 
ultimately be followed efficiently. Certain areas of concern are, however, 
provided for the use of income based methods based on the discounted value 
of projected cash flows. It is stated, inter alia, that when applying such 
methods, specific attention must be paid on the accuracy of financial 
projections and on the choice of appropriate discount rate, as even small 
changes in the taken assumptions or the applied discount rate may result in 
large differences in the value of the intangible asset.850 Nevertheless, such 
                                                 
 
846 OECD Public Discussion Draft on Revised Guidance on Profit Splits, 6 and 14. See also OECD BEPS 
Actions 8–10, pp. 55–61. 
847 OECD Public Discussion Draft on Revised Guidance on Profit Splits, 14; OECD BEPS Actions 8–10, 
pp. 60–61. 
848 OECD Public Discussion Draft on Revised Guidance on Profit Splits, 18. 
849 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.153. 
850 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.158–6.178. It should, however, be noted that the guidelines 
have introduced certain measures in relation to the valuation of the so-called hard-to-value intangibles, 
which should be mentioned in this connection. If a related party transaction involves transfers of 
intangibles for which no reliable comparables exist at the time of their transfer, and the projections of 
future cash flows or income that is expected to be derived from such intangibles is highly uncertain at 
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observations just highlight the difficulty of using income based methods in a 
correct manner, and a more detailed guidance on their use in transfer pricing 
is entirely missing. 
 
Moreover, the guidelines seem to provide quite extensive restrictions for the 
use of such unspecified valuation methods. The valuation techniques must be 
used in a manner that is in line with the arm’s length principle and other 
guidance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. However, except for 
general references to other chapters of the guidelines, no additional guidance 
for the satisfaction of this requirement is provided. 851 In addition, the 
guidelines state that the valuation assumptions used in accounting may lead 
to a result that is not acceptable in transfer pricing, being thus also 
inconsistent with the arm’s length principle. Pursuant to the guidelines, 
“caution should therefore be exercised in accepting valuations performed for 
accounting purposes as necessarily reflecting arm’s length prices or values for 
transfer pricing purposes without a thorough examination of the underlying 
assumptions.”852 Finally, the guidelines even state that “it is not the intention 
of these Guidelines to set out a comprehensive summary of the valuation 
techniques utilised by valuation professionals.”853  
 
While providing a broad and exhaustive presentation of potential valuation 
techniques that could be used in transfer pricing of intangibles may be an 
impossible task, a more concrete guidance on the application thereof in 
transfer pricing is ultimately needed. The existing provisions require that the 
special circumstances and nature of transfer pricing need to be taken into 
consideration in the application of such methods, which is justified from the 
perspective of the arm’s length principle. However, the content of the 
guidelines in this regard is vague and insufficient, resulting in that it is 
uncertain when and how the arm’s length result, that is consistent with the 
principles of the guidelines, may be achieved by using such valuation 
techniques. It is unclear, for instance, what kinds of modifications are required 
to be made to such methods before applying them in the transfer pricing 
                                                 
 
the time of the transfer, such intangibles may be considered hard-to-value intangibles. If there are 
differences between the values of such intangibles when the projections are made (ex ante) and when 
the actual outcomes of the transaction are known (ex post), tax authorities may be entitled to make 
adjustments to the ex ante pricing, if the projections were based on unreliable information and events 
and risks that caused the different outcome should have been foreseen at the time of projections; see 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.186–6.195. Nevertheless, this guidance is not helpful when the 
valuation of such intangibles is determined during a business restructuring, which ultimately is the key 
question in this research.  
851 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.154. 
852 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.155. 
853 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.156. 
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context, i.e. in the determination of arm’s length compensations. In the 
current situation, as such issues have not been dealt with sufficiently, this is 
troublesome also from the perspective of the arm’s length principle. For the 
sake of ensuring the efficient compliance with the principle, certain measures 
thus need to be taken.  
 
Third, it can also be questioned whether the OECD provides sufficient 
guidance on the determination of the arm’s length compensations for transfers 
of a going concern in the business restructuring context. Although the OECD 
defines the concept in a definite manner and allows the use of valuation 
techniques in such transfers, it does not regulate clearly when the examination 
of contemporaneous transfers of assets, risks and functions should be 
analyzed on an aggregate basis. As discussed, it mentions that “the 
determination of the arm’s length compensation for a transfer of an ongoing 
concern does not necessarily amount to the sum of the separate valuation” and 
that “valuation of those [contemporaneous] transfers on an aggregate basis 
may be necessary.”854 Therefore, it is uncertain when the arm’s length 
compensation may be determined for transfers of a going concern on an 
aggregate basis. 
 
Furthermore, when the arm’s length valuation needs to be done on an 
aggregate basis, the guidelines have not regulated valuation techniques and 
the application thereof in a sufficient manner. The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines refer in general to valuation techniques that independent parties 
would apply in comparable circumstances, i.e. in acquisition deals. Also, the 
potential use of the unspecified methods used in the valuation of intangibles 
is considered in this connection.855 Although this approach allows the use of 
income based methods, in particular the discounted cash flow method and its 
variations, which have been considered appropriate also from the perspective 
of the arm’s length principle, the application of such methods in the transfer 
pricing context remains ambiguous. In addition, by referring to the valuation 
techniques used in the valuation of intangibles, the same aforementioned 
concerns become topical in transfers of a going concern. Hence, in the current 
situation, the OECD’s guidance is too vague and does not provide concrete 
tools for determining arm’s length compensations for transfers of a going 
concern in a predictable and reliable manner. The lacking guidance in this 
respect is contrary to the aims of the arm’s length principle. 
 
On the basis of the above mentioned, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
cannot, in their present form, be used efficiently in the determination of arm’s 
length compensations for transfers of something of value occurring in the 
                                                 
 
854 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.69. 
855 Ibid. 
255 
 
business restructuring context. This also means that the guidelines cannot 
currently be used as the guiding international transfer pricing standard that 
should be adopted consistently to domestic transfer pricing legislation and 
regulations, when the arm’s length compensations are determined for such 
transfers. The aforesaid concerns need to be addressed and solved de lege 
ferenda by introducing necessary amendments and/or updates to the current 
guidance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines; this also enables 
complying with the arm’s length principle more efficiently. 
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5 ELIMINATION OF UNCERTAINTIES 
RELATING TO TRANSFER PRICING  
5.1 GENERAL REMARKS 
Several uncertainty factors relate to the transfer pricing of business 
restructurings. For example, it is no entirely clear to what extent transfers of 
intangible assets fall within the scope of application of national transfer 
pricing regulations. On the other hand, the determination of arm’s length 
compensations for certain transfers of something of value, such as, intangibles 
or a going concern, may be difficult due to their unique characteristics and the 
lack of comparable uncontrolled transactions. If the tax authorities consider 
that the arm’s length principle has not been followed in a related party 
transaction conducted in the course of a business restructuring, the transfer 
price used in the transaction will be adjusted. In such cases, an amount, which 
would have accrued had the related parties used such terms and conditions 
that independent parties would have used under similar conditions, shall be 
added to the taxable income of a related party.856  
 
In addition to transfer pricing adjustments, specific penalties may be imposed 
on such tax underpayments. Pursuant to the Tax Code, if controlled parties 
have applied prices contrary to the arm’s length principle, a penalty of 40 % of 
underpaid taxes shall be imposed on a taxpayer.857 According to the Finnish 
transfer pricing provisions, in case a taxpayer has submitted deliberately or 
negligently tax returns, which contain essentially wrong information, a penalty 
of up to 30 % of the increase of the taxable income may be imposed.858 
Similarly, the IRS may impose a penalty of up to 40 % of the underpayment of 
tax, when a transfer price is deemed not to be arm’s length.859 In addition, a 
failure to comply with the regulated transfer pricing documentation 
requirements may similarly result in additional penalties under Russian and 
                                                 
 
856 See Article 105.3 of the Tax Code, § 31 of the AAP, Section 482 of the IRC and Treas. Reg. § 1.482-
1(a). 
857 Article 129.3 of the Tax Code. A lower penalty of 20 % of the amount of underpaid taxes is applied for 
the financial years 2014–2016. It is unclear whether the penalty requires negligence; see Kaftannikov 
2011, p. 47. If the taxpayer submits to the FTS transfer pricing documentation in the manner required 
by the Tax Code, it may be exempt from such penalty, see Article 129.3 of the Tax Code.   
858 § 32 of the AAP.  
859 See Section 6662(e) and 6662(h) of the IRC and Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6. The penalties may be either 
transactional penalties or net adjustment penalties. On the other hand, reasonable cause and good faith 
as well as sufficient documentation may protect the taxpayer from the penalties based on the 
underpayment of taxes, see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(b)(3) and § 1.6662-6(d). 
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Finnish law, while U.S. law does not regulate a specific penalty for the failure 
to maintain a transfer pricing documentation.860 
 
Therefore, when the arm’s length principle has not been followed in business 
restructuring transactions, it may result in surprisingly severe financial 
consequences for the parties. It should also be noted that the taxpayer has in 
practice the burden of proof under U.S. law,861 meaning that the taxpayer must 
ultimately show that its transfer prices are arm’s length in order to avoid 
penalties. While the burden of proof rests in Finland and Russian primarily 
with the tax authorities,862 taxpayers should nevertheless seek to minimize the 
possibilities of authorities to challenge the pricing of related party 
transactions. By acting diligently companies may improve their positions in 
possible future disputes with tax authorities or even manage to avoid them. 
Consequently, a few examples of means that could be used to eliminate such 
uncertainties related to transfer pricing in business restructurings and 
ultimately to prevent potential tax authority interventions are discussed in the 
following.  
 
5.2 ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENTS 
In an advance pricing agreement (APA) process, i.e. the APA process, a 
taxpayer negotiates and agrees with tax authorities in advance on transfer 
pricing questions in relation to a particular related party transaction. In an 
APA, it may be agreed, for instance, which transfer pricing method should be 
applied to the related party transaction and what type of documentation is 
required from the taxpayer in order to fulfill with the requirements of the arm’s 
length principle.863 Since the APA process makes possible that the tax 
authorities’ prior approval of binding authority may be received on certain 
occasions, the process may be used to eliminate uncertainties arising out of 
certain transfer pricing questions in business restructurings. 
 
In Russia, the conclusion of APAs with the tax authorities was not possible 
until the adoption of the newest transfer pricing provisions. Nowadays, the 
Tax Code’s provisions concerning the conclusion of APAs can be regarded 
progressive due to their particularity. According to the provisions, only the 
                                                 
 
860 Article 129.4 of the Tax Code; § 32 of the AAP. In Finland, only the so-called large taxpayers are 
obliged by the transfer pricing documentation requirements; see § 14 a of the AAP. In the USA, the well-
maintained transfer pricing documentation, however, protects the taxpayer against possible transfer 
pricing penalties imposed by the IRS, see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d). 
861 See e.g. Levey – Wrappe – Chung 2006, pp. 5–6. 
862 Article 105.3 of the Tax Code; Mäkelä 2014, pp. 299–300.  
863 Kukkonen – Walden 2010, p. 223. 
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largest taxpayers may conclude APAs, meaning that small and medium-sized 
enterprises may not apply for an APA at all.864 A taxpayer willing to conclude 
an APA must prepare independently an APA application and ancillary 
documents related thereto, after which it must submit them to the tax 
authority, which in this case is the FTS. The FTS must give a decision about 
the application within six months, although the authorities have the right to 
extend the evaluation period up to nine months. Once the application is 
approved and an APA is granted, the tax authorities undertake to comply with 
the provisions of the APA as regards the determination of an arm’s length 
compensation and the choice of transfer pricing method(s) in the related party 
transaction(s) in question. Both parties must comply with the provisions of the 
APA, even if the transfer pricing legislation would change after the conclusion 
of the APA.865 Taxpayers must pay a relatively high state duty of RUB 2 million, 
when they apply for an APA. It should be noted that the state duty is not 
returned even when the FTS decides not to conclude an APA with the 
taxpayer.866  
 
It is noteworthy to observe that pursuant to a letter issued by the FTS, in the 
conclusion of APAs, the principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
are followed.867 Similar to the guidelines, the Tax Code allows different type of 
APAs: Unilateral APAs are agreements concluded only between the taxpayer 
in question and the FTS. Bilateral or multilateral APAs, on the other hand, 
involve also the participation of tax authorities of other state(s), when the 
controlled transaction has cross-border implications. The bilateral or 
multilateral APAs can only be concluded with the states with which Russia has 
                                                 
 
864 A company can be regarded as a large taxpayer on a regional level, if, inter alia, its total annual 
revenue is between RUB 2 billion and RUB 20 billion and certain other requirements are met. The 
threshold for considering companies as large taxpayers on a federal level is even higher, see more in the 
following Minfin’s and FTS’s letters and resolutions: Prikaz FNS Rossii ot 26.10.2016 N MMV-7-2/582@ 
"O vnesenii izmenenij v prikaz FNS Rossii ot 16.05.2007 N MM-3-06/308@", Prikaz Ministerstva 
finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 11 iyulya 2005 g. N 85n ”Ob utverzhdenii Osobennostej postanovki na 
uchet krupnejshikh nalogoplatel'shhikov”, Prikaz Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby ot 24 aprelya 2012 g. N 
MMV-7-2/274@ ”O vnesenii izmenenij v prikaz FNS Rossii ot 16.05.2007 N MM-3-06/308@” and 
Prikaz Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby ot 16 maya 2007 g. N MM-3-06/308@ ”O vnesenii izmenenij v 
prikaz MNS Rossii ot 16.04.2004 N SАEH-3-30/290@” (s izmeneniyami i dopolneniyami). The FTS 
publishes frequently news on its website at http://www.nalog.ru in relation to concluding APAs, and it 
has disclosed, for instance, that it has concluded APAs with such major Russian companies as Rosneft, 
Gazprom, Lukoil and Aeroflot. 
865 Articles 105.19–105.25 of the Tax Code. 
866 Article 333.33 of the Tax Code; Olofinskaya 2014, p. 72. 
867 Pis'mo Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby Rossii ot 12.01.2012 N OА-4-13/85@ ”O zaklyuchenii 
soglashenij o tsenoobrazovanii dlya tselej nalogooblozheniya.” 
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existing double taxation treaties.868 Especially the use of bilateral/multilateral 
APAs is recommended in cross-border business restructurings in order to 
avoid double taxation.869 Nonetheless, although the Tax Code regulates such a 
possibility, the Minfin has not yet published guidance in relation to concluding 
such agreements with foreign tax authorities. As the Tax Code’s provisions 
particularly require that taxpayers must follow the procedure regulated by the 
Minfin in this respect,870 due to the fact that such guidance does not yet exist, 
it seems that bilateral or multilateral APAs cannot currently be concluded at 
all under Russian law.871 
 
Regardless of the unclarity with regard to bilateral/multilateral APAs, 
unilateral APAs may nevertheless bring positive results in terms of 
predictability of tax treatment,872 especially if business restructurings lack 
transnational characteristics. Once the contract has been signed, the 
restructured company may avoid uncertainty associated with, for example, the 
arm’s length pricing of intangibles. The FTS has the right to revoke or cancel 
the APA only if the taxpayer fails to comply with its provisions; otherwise, it is 
obliged to follow it.873 In addition, APAs in general reduce costs and time of 
both taxpayers and the tax authorities by preventing potential litigations and 
time-consuming transfer pricing examinations.874 
 
On the other hand, there are also many disadvantages relating to APAs, which 
may limit its usefulness in eliminating uncertainties especially in business 
restructurings in Russia. First, as discussed, only the so-called large taxpayers 
may conclude APAs in Russia, and thus small and medium-sized enterprises 
may not even apply for an APA. As business restructurings may be topical, for 
instance, for medium-sized multinational enterprises as well, this approach is 
troublesome. Second, the process relating to concluding APAs is very likely 
slow as the authorities have the right to consider the issue up to nine months 
— and in practice even more, as a taxpayer and the FTS must usually have 
                                                 
 
868 Article 105.20 of the Tax Code. 
869 In general, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines also prefer the use of bilateral or multilateral APAs 
to reduce the risk of double taxation; see e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 4.134 and 4.140–4.141. 
870 Article 105.20 of the Tax Code. 
871 However, the Minfin has started the process to prepare the required guidance for concluding 
bilateral/multilateral APAs already in 2015; see e.g. the Minfin’s news from 21 August 2015 at 
https://www.nalog.ru/rn77/taxation/transfer_pricing/5689967/. The Minfin published a discussion 
draft of the order on the procedure allowing the conclusion of multilateral APAs on 17 March 2017. Yet, 
the project has not still been completed.   
872 See about enhancing the predictability in general in Kaftannikov 2011, p. 48 and Olofinskaya 2014, 
pp. 72–73. 
873 Article 105.24 of the Tax Code. 
874 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 4.155. 
260 
 
some necessary preliminary discussions before the taxpayer may submit an 
application.875 Third, the state duty of RUB 2 million can be considered costly, 
especially as it will not be returned even in cases where an APA application is 
not approved. Therefore, the APAs may not necessarily save time or reduce 
costs under the current regulations. Fourth, as the Tax Code’s provisions 
regarding APAs are fairly new, a predictable practice has not yet been 
established.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, the unclarity with regard to the possibility of 
concluding bilateral or multilateral APAs at the moment may in its entirety 
restrict the use of APAs as an efficient remedy to address uncertainties 
associated with cross-border business restructurings in particular. If purely a 
unilateral APA is concluded, tax authorities of other jurisdictions may disagree 
with it and consider it to be contrary to the arm’s length principle. In that case, 
taxpayers may not, for instance, achieve the increased level of certainty as to 
the tax treatment of business restructuring transactions they are aiming for, 
and, at worst, it may lead to double taxation, if the foreign tax administration 
refuses to follow its terms. In general, the bilateral or multilateral APAs are 
preferred over unilateral APAs for these reasons.876  
 
Contrary to the Russian legislation, the Finnish tax legislation does not deal 
with the APA process specifically, nor can there be found any national formal 
guidance with respect to concluding APAs. Although specific regulations are 
missing in this regard, Finnish law contains an instrument similar to a 
unilateral APA, which could be used to eliminate uncertainties arising out of 
certain transfer pricing questions in business restructurings. The Finnish 
Central Tax Board and tax offices, including the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ 
Office, may give preliminary rulings on various taxation issues, such as income 
taxation.877 As the Finnish Central Tax Board may not give rulings on valuation 
matters, taxpayers may apply for preliminary rulings, which concern issues 
related to transfer pricing, primarily from tax offices and the Finnish Large 
Taxpayers’ Office.878 As discussed earlier, the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office 
has previously expressly dealt with the transfer pricing aspects of business 
restructurings.879  
 
As was the case with unilateral APAs, by applying for a preliminary ruling, a 
taxpayer may receive in advance a ruling on the tax treatment of issues relating 
                                                 
 
875 Kaftannikov 2011, p. 48. 
876 See e.g. OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 4.156. 
877 See Chapter 8 of the AAP.  
878 This view has been expressed, inter alia, in the preliminary works; see HE 46/1996 vp, p. 14. See also 
e.g. Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, p. 220. 
879 Laaksonen 2006, pp. 428–437. 
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to income taxation, such as the transfer pricing of a related party transaction. 
Thus, it may in a similar manner receive information, for instance, on the 
transfer pricing methods applicable to such related party transactions. When 
a taxpayer applies for a ruling, it must identify in the application the main 
question for which the ruling is applied for and disclose all relevant facts 
related to the question. The ruling, which has gained legal force, is binding on 
the Finnish Tax Administration, if the taxpayer demands the Tax 
Administration to follow the ruling.880 Thus, preliminary rulings have the 
same strengths as the unilateral APAs may, at least on certain occasions, have: 
predictability of the tax treatment of intragroup transactions and the time-
saving factor. Unlike the APA process in Russia, the possibility of applying for 
a preliminary ruling is not limited only to large taxpayers in Finland, and the 
application fee can be considered low.881  
 
On the other hand, it has been viewed in the legal literature that the decision-
making of tax authorities in relation to preliminary rulings does not contain a 
similar dialogue between a taxpayer and tax authorities, which the APA 
process may have at its best; thus, the result may not be as advantageous as it 
could be for the taxpayer had there been discussions and negotiations with tax 
authorities during the process.882 In addition, as preliminary rulings 
correspond to a large extent to unilateral APAs, they may have the same 
disadvantages as the latter may have. Therefore, especially the risk of double 
taxation is present also in preliminary rulings: as cross-border characteristics, 
such as co-operation between national tax authorities of different 
jurisdictions, are missing from preliminary rulings, there are no guarantees 
that foreign tax authorities would recognize and follow the terms and 
conditions of a preliminary ruling.  
 
Unlike Russian law, the conclusion of bilateral/multilateral APAs is in some 
cases possible under Finnish law, provided that Finland has concluded a tax 
treaty with the foreign state(s) in question and the treaty contains a provision 
corresponding to Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which 
regulates a mutual agreement procedure.883 Although the national sources of 
law remain silent with regard to bilateral/multilateral APA processes (and 
APAs in general), two international sources applicable in Finland provide 
                                                 
 
880 § 85 of the AAP. 
881 The maximum application fee for the preliminary rulings in tax offices is EUR 2,290 (in 2017); see 
more about the costs at https://www.vero.fi/fi-FI/Syventavat_veroohjeet/Asiakkaan_ 
oikeudet_ja_velvollisuudet/Verohallinnon_maksulliset_palvelut/Hinnasto_Verohallinnon_maksullis
ista_pal. 
882 Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, p. 220; Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 344–345.  
883 Finnish Tax Administration: APAs; Jaakkola et al. 2012, p. 340; Laaksonen 2013, p. 209.  See Article 
25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention for more precise provisions on mutual agreement procedure. 
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interpretive help in this: (i) the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines; and (ii) the 
communication of the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee on the work of the EU Joint 
Transfer Pricing Forum in the field of dispute avoidance and resolution 
procedures and on Guidelines for Advance Pricing Agreements within the 
EU884. Annex II to Chapter IV of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
(Guidelines for conducting Advance Pricing Arrangements under the Mutual 
Agreement Procedure (MAP APAs)) contains guidance specifically applicable 
to bilateral/multilateral APA processes. The latter, on the other hand, contains 
EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum’s guidelines for APAs in the EU (hereinafter 
the “EU JTPF APA Guidelines”), which cover all kinds of APA processes in a 
detailed way. Although the sources are not binding on the EU member states, 
they provide useful and advisable guidance, which can be followed in 
bilateral/multilateral APA processes also in Finland in the above-mentioned 
manner.885  
 
For instance, pursuant to the EU JTPF APA Guidelines, the APA process 
should have four stages: (a) Pre-filing stage/informal application; (b) Formal 
application; (c) Evaluation and negotiation of the APA; and (d) Formal 
agreement.886 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ aforementioned Annex 
II contains similar guidance,887 and thus both sources highlight the 
importance of co-operation and negotiations between tax authorities and the 
taxpayer during the process. The preference of the use of bilateral/multilateral 
APAs over unilateral APAs is also present, as the former can be used as an 
effective tool to tackle the double taxation,888 because the 
bilateral/multilateral APAs should be binding on all tax authorities involved 
— also the Finnish Tax Administration.889  
 
It seems that bilateral/multilateral APAs may provide effective results in terms 
of eliminating uncertainties relating to transfer pricing of cross-border 
                                                 
 
884 COM (2007) 71. 
885 The EU JTPF APA Guidelines “constitute a worthwhile blueprint for APA processes across the EU”, 
see paragraph 37 of the communication of the Commission COM (2007) 71. The Finnish Tax 
Administration has expressly referred to these sources in its public statement, see Finnish Tax 
Administration: APAs. 
886 EU JTPF APA Guidelines, 20. See more about the different stages in paragraphs 20–47 of the EU 
JTPF APA Guidelines. 
887 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Annex II to Chapter IV, 28–67. 
888 EU JTPF APA Guidelines, 6; paragraph 17 of the communication of the Commission COM (2007) 71; 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Annex II to Chapter IV, 5 and 11; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
4.156 and 4.173. 
889 EU JTPF APA Guidelines, Appendix E; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Annex II to Chapter IV, 
67–68; Finnish Tax Administration: APAs. 
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business restructuring under Finnish law. This requires that the group 
companies involved in the business restructuring are located in jurisdictions 
with which Finland has a double tax treaty according to which it is possible to 
engage in a mutual agreement procedure. In comparison with the above-
discussed preliminary rulings, bilateral or multilateral APAs entitle (and 
require) taxpayers to be more active in the APA process and to negotiate on 
the terms and conditions of the APA, which in turn may produce more positive 
results for both parties and especially for taxpayers. More importantly, the risk 
of double taxation is also lower when compared to preliminary rulings. 
Regardless of possible disadvantages the multilateral or bilateral APAs may 
also have — for instance, the APA examination may require extensive 
documentation, which also contains sensitive information about the 
business890 and the negotiation process with tax authorities of different 
jurisdictions may be lengthy and not always result in an agreement891  — the 
benefits are usually greater (i.e. the elimination of possible uncertainties 
relating to a business restructuring). In this respect, the current legal situation 
in Finland deviates remarkably from the legal situation in Russia, where the 
conclusion of bilateral or multilateral APAs is not currently possible, and thus 
the potential uncertainties arising out of cross-border business transactions 
may not be eliminated effectively by using APAs.  
 
The USA has a long history of APA processes, as the conclusion of APAs was 
made possible already in 1991.892 The APA process is nowadays regulated 
under Revenue Procedure 2015-41 (Rev. Proc. 2015-41), which contains 
detailed guidance on each steps of the APA process as well as on the 
administration of the executed APAs.893 The process conforms to a large extent 
to the APA processes in Russia and Finland: The APA process starts with 
informal discussions with the authority (pre-filing conference), after which an 
official APA request must be filed. If the APA request is accepted, the tax 
authorities will request from the taxpayer meetings and additional material 
before the finalization and signing of the APA.894 Contrary to Russian and 
Finnish law, all kinds of APAs are accepted under U.S. law, i.e. unilateral, 
bilateral and multilateral APAs. Nonetheless, as was the case with the current 
situation in Finland, also the Revenue Procedure prefers clearly bilateral and 
multilateral APAs over unilateral APAs, and the latter may be applied for only 
                                                 
 
890 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 4.165–4.168.  
891 Finnish Tax Administration: APAs; OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 4.169. 
892 Madrian – Weise 2014, p. 813; Markham 2005, p. 236. 
893 Furthermore, Rev. Proc. 2015-40, which deals with the procedures for requesting competent 
authority assistance under tax treaties, is useful in situations where the APA process involves tax 
authorities of other countries; see Section 5 of the Rev. Proc. 2015-41. 
894 See Sections 3–5 of the Rev. Proc. 2015-41. 
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on justified grounds.895 An executed APA is binding upon the taxpayer and the 
IRS, meaning that the IRS will not contest the application of the covered 
method(s) to the covered issue(s) of the APA, if the taxpayer complies with the 
terms and conditions of the APA.896   
 
Benefits of concluding APAs, such as the certainty of the tax treatment, co-
operation factor as well as the time and cost savings, have also been recognized 
in the U.S. legal literature.897 In the business restructuring context, in 
particular the bilateral or multilateral APAs could be thus helpful in the 
elimination of uncertainties, such as the transfer pricing treatment of transfers 
of certain intangibles or a going concern. This naturally requires that 
(bilateral) tax treaties, to which the USA is a signatory, make the use of such 
APAs possible. By the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral APAs, a 
multinational enterprise would be able to plan its transfer pricing strategy 
related to the business restructuring with more certainty and efficiency, as the 
IRS and foreign tax authorities would be bound by the terms and conditions 
of the APA (e.g. the applicable transfer pricing method). A unilateral APA does 
not bring the same benefits, most importantly, the increased level of certainty 
with regard to the tax treatment of business restructuring transactions; tax 
authorities of other countries may disagree with its terms and conditions, 
which may ultimately lead to double taxation. 
 
As discussed above, the disadvantages of using APAs in general — such as the 
potentially lengthy APA process and the disclosure of confidential material898 
— may make the use of bilateral or multilateral APAs less attractive also in the 
USA, but in business restructurings the benefits are usually greater than such 
disadvantages (i.e. the elimination of possible uncertainties relating to the 
valuation of unique intangibles transferred in the business restructuring). 
Nevertheless, it is still noteworthy to mention that the APA request fees can be 
considered remarkably high in the USA: the user fee for a totally new APA 
request is USD 60,000 and the fee for the so-called ‘small case APAs’ is USD 
30,000.899 Consequently, the use of APAs in business restructurings of low 
commercial value may not likely be reasonable. 
                                                 
 
895 Sections 1.04 and 2.02 of the Rev. Proc. 2015-41. Such grounds may be, for instance, that an APA 
process is not possible with a foreign state pursuant to a tax treaty.  
896 Section 6.01–6.02 of the Rev. Proc. 2015-41. 
897 Levey – Wrappe – Chung 2006, pp. 106–108; Madrian – Weise 2014, p. 822; Markham 2005, pp. 
246–262. 
898 See about disadvantages in the U.S. legal literature e.g. in Madrian – Weise 2014, p. 822; Markham 
2005, pp. 262–283. 
899 Section 3.03–3.04 of the Appendix of Rev. Proc. 2015-41. One of the requirements for the small case 
APA treatment is that the controlled group has sales revenues of less than USD 500 million “in each of 
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All in all, the current legal situation in Finland and the USA enables the 
conclusion of unilateral or bilateral/multilateral APAs, which may be used as 
an effective tool to eliminate uncertainties related to the transfer pricing issues 
arising out of business restructurings, depending on the circumstances of the 
restructuring. As the unilateral APAs are not binding on foreign tax authorities 
in a similar manner and the Minfin has not yet published guidance with regard 
to concluding bilateral/multilateral APAs, APAs may not currently be used 
efficiently in cross-border business restructurings in Russia. 
 
5.3 COMPLIANCE WITH DOCUMENTATION AND 
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
The importance of transfer pricing documentation cannot be underestimated. 
By documenting related party transactions in a comprehensive and thorough 
way, a taxpayer may demonstrate that the transfer prices used in controlled 
transactions and other transfer pricing issues related thereto (e.g. the choice 
of the transfer pricing methods) are in line with the arm’s length principle, and 
thus the taxpayer may increase the chances of avoiding disputes and conflicts 
with tax authorities. Therefore, the fulfilment of transfer pricing 
documentation requirements may help companies to eliminate possible 
uncertainties related to transfer pricing issues also in business restructurings. 
Moreover, the relevance of documenting the transfer pricing decisions in 
particular in the business restructuring context has also been acknowledged 
by the OECD.900 In the following, the documentation and reporting 
requirements of the Russian, Finnish and U.S. transfer pricing rules are 
discussed in more detail. 
 
In general, national legislation usually regulates the requirements as regards 
transfer pricing documentation. Before examining the national provisions in 
this respect, the OECD’s newest guidance in relation to transfer pricing 
documentation requirements should be reviewed, as the national sources are 
keen to follow the guidelines to a large extent. The OECD’s BEPS Project 
introduced in 2015 several updates to Chapter V of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, which replaced the earlier guidance on the transfer pricing 
documentation for the purposes of enhancing the transparency of tax 
administration.901 One of the most important amendments was the so-called 
three-tiered approach to transfer pricing documentation. The three-tiered 
                                                 
 
its most recent three back years”; see in more detail in Section 3.04 of the Appendix of Rev. Proc. 2015-
41. 
900 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.32–9.33. 
901 See OECD: BEPS Action 13, p. 9. 
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structure of transfer pricing documentation consists of “(i) a master file 
containing standardised information relevant for all MNE group members; (ii) 
a local file referring specifically to material transactions of the local taxpayer; 
and (iii) a Country-by-Country Report containing certain information relating 
to the global allocation of the MNE’s income and taxes paid together with 
certain indicators of the location of economic activity within the MNE 
group.”902 
 
A master file should contain the following information about the multinational 
enterprise: an organizational structure, a description of the multinational 
enterprise’s businesses, a description of intangibles, a description of financial 
activities as well as a description of financial and tax positions.903 On the other 
hand, the following information, among other things, should be included in a 
local file: a description of the management structure of the local entity, a local 
organization chart, a description of the business and business strategy pursued 
by the local entity, a description of the material controlled transactions, the 
amount of intra-group payments and receipts for each category of controlled 
transactions involving the local entity, a detailed comparability and functional 
analysis of the taxpayer and relevant associated enterprises with respect to 
each documented category of controlled transactions, an indication of the 
most appropriate transfer pricing method and a copy of existing unilateral and 
bilateral/multilateral APAs and other tax rulings to which the local tax 
jurisdiction is not a party.904 It should especially be observed that the master 
file should include information on important business restructuring 
transactions occurred during the financial year, and the local file should 
contain a detailed description on whether the local company has been involved 
in or affected by business restructurings (and the aspects of such transactions 
should be explained).905 The OECD suggests that the local file be should be 
finalized “no later than the due date for the filing of the tax return for the fiscal 
year in question.” The master file should finalized by the due date of the tax 
return for the parent company of the group.906  
 
The Country-by-Country Report provides information on a multinational 
enterprise’s allocation of income, taxes and business activities on a tax 
jurisdiction-by-tax jurisdiction basis. The report should contain, inter alia, tax 
jurisdiction specific information about revenues, profit or loss before taxes, 
income tax paid and accrued in the current year, stated capital, accumulated 
                                                 
 
902 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 5.16.  
903 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 5.18–5.21 and Annex I to Chapter V. 
904 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 5.22–5.23 and Annex II to Chapter V. 
905 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Annex I and II to Chapter V. See also OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, 9.32 
906 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 5.30–5.31. 
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earnings, number of employees, tangibles assets other than cash or cash 
equivalents and main business activities.907 It must be noted that the Country-
by-Country Report obligation applies only to multinational groups of 
companies with consolidated group revenue of at least EUR 750 million in the 
immediately preceding fiscal year.908 As a main rule, tax jurisdictions should 
require the Country-by-Country Reports from an ultimate parent entity of the 
group909, which is resident in their country, after which this information 
should be exchanged on an automatic basis with other tax jurisdictions, in 
which the group operates.910 
 
In Russia, the current transfer pricing provisions of the Tax Code also deal 
with the transfer pricing documentation and reporting requirements. 
According to the Tax Code, a taxpayer must maintain a documentation with 
which the taxpayer may justify the pricing applied in its controlled 
transactions.911 The documentation should include information, inter alia, 
about the activities of parties that participate in controlled transaction(s); a 
list of related parties with which controlled transactions are entered into; a 
description of the controlled transactions (including, inter alia, the terms and 
conditions of the transactions and the method applied in the determination of 
prices); a functional analysis; the reasons for the application of certain transfer 
pricing methods; the sources of information; and a description of the 
calculation of the arm’s length range. Taxpayers should also provide any other 
information, which has affected the pricing of the related party transactions. 
The documentation has to be finalized by the end of May of the following year 
at the latest, as the FTS has the right to request the taxpayers to present the 
transfer pricing documentation as of June 1 of the calendar year, which follows 
the year in which the related party transaction was conducted. The 
documentation must be presented within 30 working days of the FTS’s 
request.912 
                                                 
 
907 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, Annex III to Chapter V. 
908 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 5.53. 
909 An ultimate parent company is basically the entity that is required to prepare consolidated financial 
statements pursuant to the accounting principles and law; the concept is defined more precisely in 
Article 1.6 of the OECD’s model legislation related to Country-by-Country Reporting, see Annex IV to 
Chapter V of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Country-by-Country Reporting Implementation 
Package). 
910 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 5.58 and 5.60. 
911 Article 105.15 of the Tax Code. 
912 Ibid. The FTS has also published more specific guidance on preparing and filing transfer pricing 
documents for tax control purposes, which should be followed by taxpayers; see the FTS’s letter Pis'mo 
Federal'noj nalogovoj sluzhby Rossii ot 30.08.2012 N OА-4-13/14433@ ”O podgotovke i predstavlenii 
dokumentatsii v tselyakh nalogovogo kontrolya.” See also the Minfin’s letter according to which local tax 
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In addition to the general transfer pricing documentation requirements, the 
Tax Code also regulates a specific reporting requirement, pursuant to which 
taxpayers are required to report to the FTS all the related party transactions 
occurred in the calendar year. The notification must contain information, inter 
alia, about each controlled transaction (the amount of income derived and 
expenses incurred), the subject of the transaction, the parties to the 
transaction as well as the relevant terms and conditions. The notification must 
be submitted by 20 May of the calendar year, which follows the year in which 
the related party transaction was conducted.913 The notification can be deemed 
to be closely associated with the general transfer pricing documentation 
requirement. As the tax authorities will automatically receive information 
about commercially important transactions through the mandatory reporting 
process, on the basis of the notifications they can decide what transactions 
should be examined in a more precise manner in the form of tax audits and of 
which controlled transactions they should therefore demand the taxpayer to 
present transfer pricing documentation.  
 
The current Russian legislation deviates in terms of content from the newest 
documentation and reporting principles set out in the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, as the existing law in principle requires only a local file — which 
also is not completely consistent with the OECD’s concept — to be maintained. 
However, it should be noted that the Russian transfer pricing documentation 
and reporting requirements are likely to be revised soon to be to a great extent 
comparable with the provisions of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The 
Minfin published on 6 September 2016 a new legislative project, according to 
which the aforementioned three-tiered approach to transfer pricing 
documentation and reporting would also be adopted to the Tax Code.914 
Pursuant to the proposed draft legislation, the members of the large 
multinational groups of companies would be obliged to maintain a transfer 
pricing documentation consisting of a master file, a local file and a Country-
by-Country Report. Although Russia is not a member state of the OECD, the 
proposed provisions correspond in terms of the content to the above-discussed 
documentation requirements of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. A 
master and local file should be presented to the tax authorities, if required by 
them, within three months of the date of such request, and no earlier than 15 
months from the date on which the financial year ended. Country-by-Country 
                                                 
 
offices are also entitled to demand transfer pricing documentation from taxpayers, when conducting tax 
audits, Pis’mo Ministerstva finansov Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 24.02.12 N 03-01-18/1-13. 
913 Article 105.16 of the Tax Code. 
914 Project 02/04/10-15/00041254 (O vnesenii izmenenij v chast' pervuyu Nalogovogo kodeksa 
Rossijskoj Federatsii (v svyazi s realizatsiej mezhdunarodnogo avtomaticheskogo obmena informatsiej 
o finansovykh schetakh i dokumentatsiej po mezhdunarodnym gruppam kompanij)). 
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Reports, on the other hand, should be provided automatically either by the 
parent company, if resident in Russia, or secondarily by a Russian company, 
which is a member of the group of companies, within 12 months from the date 
on which the financial year ended.915 
 
However, a few differences can also be found between the proposed legislation 
and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. The three-tier documentation and 
reporting requirements would apply only to taxpayers in Russia, if they belong 
to a multinational group of companies with the total revenue of at least RUB 
50 billion (pursuant to the consolidated financial statements for the previous 
financial year).916 In addition, it seems that the prevailing documentation and 
reporting requirements discussed above and the proposed provisions would 
coexist after enacting the latter. As the existing documentation requirements 
(which could be described as local file requirements) differ in terms of content 
from the proposed local file requirements at least in some respects (the latter 
concentrate more on cross-border transactions), this would basically mean 
that Russia would de facto adopt a four-tier approach to transfer pricing 
documentation and reporting. The proposed legislation was originally planned 
to be applied to financial years starting from 1 January 2017, but the legislative 
project is still pending.917   
 
The Finnish transfer pricing documentation requirements are regulated in § 
14 a – § 14 e of the AAP. Finnish law has a specific threshold for the liability to 
prepare and maintain transfer pricing documentation. Small and medium-
sized enterprises are not required to prepare transfer pricing documentation: 
such enterprises are taxpayers, which employ less than 250 people; which have 
a turnover of EUR 50 million or less, or total balance sheet is EUR 43 million 
or less; and the criteria of small and medium-sized enterprises as enumerated 
in the Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC918 are applicable to the 
enterprise. According to the general transfer pricing documentation and 
reporting requirements, a taxpayer that meets the aforementioned conditions 
is liable for preparing a report, in which all related party transactions (with the 
meaning of § 31 of the AAP) conducted during the calendar year have been 
disclosed. However, it must be noted that the transfer pricing documentation 
requirement is limited only to controlled transactions conducted between a 
                                                 
 
915 Proposed Articles 105.16-1–105.16-6 of the Tax Code. 
916 Proposed Article 105.16-3 of the Tax Code. 
917 The status of the project was reviewed last time on 10 July 2017. See the project details at 
http://regulation.gov.ru/projects#npa=41254. 
918 EU Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the definition of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises 2003/361/EC. 
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Finnish company and a foreign group company or between a foreign entity and 
a permanent establishment located in Finland.919 
 
The more detailed provisions dealing with the content of the transfer pricing 
documentation were recently amended to implement the OECD’s BEPS 
Project (or more specifically, Action 13 of the BEPS project) and the recently-
revised Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative 
cooperation in the field of taxation, which deals with the country-by-country 
reporting within the EU.920 As a result, the Finnish transfer pricing 
documentation and reporting requirements are now in line with the newest 
documentation principles of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Pursuant 
to the new documentation requirements, the transfer pricing documentation 
must contain information about the group of companies and the taxpayer, 
corresponding in terms of the content to a master file and a local file under the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.921 However, the taxpayer is not required to 
provide information about the group (i.e. a master file), if the aggregate 
amount of controlled transactions conducted between the taxpayer and each 
related party does not exceed EUR 500,000 during the tax year.922 The 
transfer pricing documentation — a master file and a local file — should be 
submitted to the Finnish tax authorities within 60 days from their request. 
Nonetheless, a taxpayer is never required to submit the documentation earlier 
than six months after the end of the financial year.923 
 
Furthermore, the new provisions also introduce the Country-by-Country 
reporting requirement, which conforms in terms of content to the OECD’s 
principles. Similar to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the Country-by-
Country reporting obligation is applied only to multinational group of 
companies with the consolidated group revenue of at least EUR 750 million in 
the immediately preceding financial year. Furthermore, primarily the ultimate 
parent company of the group resident in Finland, and secondarily — under 
certain circumstances — another group company resident in Finland, is 
obliged to submit the report to the Finnish Tax Administration. The report 
                                                 
 
919 § 14 a of the AAP. 
920 The Council Directive 2016/881/EU of 25 May 2016 amended Directive 2011/16/EU as regards 
mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation. 
921 § 14 b of the AAP. The consistency has also been confirmed in the preliminary works, see HE 142/2016 
vp, pp. 3, 7–8. 
922 § 14 b of the AAP. In addition, a taxpayer is exempt of providing certain information usually included 
in a local file, if the aggregate amount of controlled transactions conducted between the taxpayer and a 
related party does not exceed EUR 500,000 during the tax year; see § 14 b of the AAP for more 
information. 
923 § 14 c of the AAP. 
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must be submitted within 12 months after the end of the financial year in 
question.924  
 
In conclusion, Finnish law corresponds on a large scale to the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines and the proposed Tax Code’s regulations in terms of 
transfer pricing documentation and reporting requirements. However, as seen 
above, there exist also certain deviations: The discussed thresholds are applied 
to the documentation requirement, which results in that not all taxpayers are 
required to maintain a documentation or include certain information in their 
documentation. In addition, the Finnish legislation does not obligate every 
taxpayer to report annually on controlled transactions in a similar manner as 
the Russian legislation does. 
 
The U.S. transfer pricing documentation requirements are regulated in the 
Treasury Regulations. Pursuant to the regulations, in order to avoid a transfer 
pricing penalty, a taxpayer must maintain “sufficient documentation to 
establish that the taxpayer reasonably concluded that, given the available data 
and the applicable pricing methods, the method (and its application of that 
method) provided the most reliable measure of an arm's length result under 
the principles of the best method rule.” The documentation must be 
‘contemporaneous’, as it must be prepared in connection with the annual 
income tax return, the deadline for the preparation being the date on which 
the tax return must be submitted at the latest.925 Similar, sufficient 
documentation must also be maintained to justify the use of unspecified 
method(s).926 The transfer pricing documentation must be submitted to the 
IRS within 30 days of the IRS’s request.927 
 
The transfer pricing documentation should comprise the so-called principal 
documents and background documents. The principal documents should 
describe the basic transfer pricing analysis conducted by the taxpayer and 
consist of, inter alia, the following information: an overview of the taxpayer's 
business; a description of the taxpayer's organizational structure; any 
documentation explicitly required by the regulations under Section 482 of the 
IRC; a description of the method selected and an explanation of why that 
method was selected; a description of the alternative methods that were 
considered and an explanation of why they were not selected; a description of 
the controlled transactions and any internal data used to analyze those 
transactions; a description of the comparables that were used, how 
comparability was evaluated, and what adjustments were made; an 
                                                 
 
924 § 14 d of the AAP. Also, an authorized group company may be liable for submitting the report. 
925 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2). 
926 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(3). 
927 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii)(A) and § 1.6662-6(d)(3)(iii)(A). 
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explanation of the economic analysis and projections relied upon in 
developing the method; and a general index of the principal and background 
documents and a description of the recordkeeping system used for cataloging 
and accessing those documents.928 
 
The background documents, on the other hand, are documents, which will 
support all the possible “assumptions, conclusions, and positions contained in 
principal documents.”929 These kinds of documents may be, for example, sales 
journals, cash receipts, profit and loss statements, pricing documents and 
transfer pricing filings prepared for foreign authorities.930 The background 
documents are not required to be submitted to the IRS, when only the 
principal documents have been requested; when a specific request for 
background documents is made, they must also be provided in the above-
mentioned manner within 30 days of such a request.931 
 
In addition to the actual transfer pricing documentation to be provided on the 
request of the IRS, a U.S. taxpayer must annually report controlled 
transactions conducted with foreign related parties (including information 
about the amount and the nature of such transactions) to the IRS. The 
information must be submitted by using specific forms.932 Despite the fact that 
such information is not provided on the basis of the Treasury Regulations 
under Section 482, the information may play an important role, when the IRS 
considers when to request transfer pricing documentation from a taxpayer for 
audit purposes.933  
 
Although the above-discussed U.S. transfer pricing provisions are not based 
on the newest documentation and reporting principles of the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, the documentation requirements are to a large extent in 
line with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines and thus as well with the 
Finnish transfer pricing documentation requirements and the proposed 
Russian provisions.934 Similar to Russian law, the U.S. rules also require 
annual reporting on controlled transactions; however, the reporting 
requirement concerns only controlled transaction with foreign related parties, 
while the Russian rules require that all related party transactions are reported 
to the tax authorities.  
                                                 
 
928 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii)(B) and § 1.6662-6(d)(3)(iii)(B). 
929 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii)(C) and § 1.6662-6(d)(3)(iii)(C). 
930 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii)(C) and § 1.6038A-3(c); Hill 2011, p. 639. 
931 Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii)(C). 
932 Treas. Reg. § 1.6038-2(a) and § 1.6038-2(a). These forms are Form 5471 and Form 5472. 
933 Stuffer – Hiller 2009, p. 10. 
934 It has also been viewed in the legal literature that, for instance, the master file requirements of the 
OECD are comparable with the U.S. requirements, see Levey – Gerdes – Mansfield 2016, p. 404. 
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On the other hand, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have nevertheless 
had a direct impact on the U.S. transfer pricing documentation and reporting 
requirements in one respect. On 29 June 2016, the IRS issued new Treasury 
Regulations935, which introduced the annual Country-by-Country reporting 
requirement. Pursuant to the regulations, an ultimate parent company of a 
U.S. multinational enterprise group must prepare an annual Country-by-
Country Report, provided that the annual revenue of the group for the 
immediately preceding financial year was at least USD 850,000,000 (which 
equals to EUR 750,000,000).936 The Country-by-Country report should 
contain, inter alia, tax jurisdiction specific information about revenues, profit 
or loss before income tax, income tax paid and accrued in the current year, 
stated capital, accumulated earnings, number of employees and net book value 
of tangible assets other than cash or cash equivalents.937 From this perspective, 
the regulations are comparable with the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ 
corresponding provisions.938 The regulations apply to taxable years that begin 
on or after 30 June 2016.939 The report must be provided in connection with 
the ultimate parent company's annual income tax return, following the 
deadlines for filing the return.940  
 
Notwithstanding that there might be slight differences between the current 
documentation and reporting requirements of Russia, Finland and the USA, 
they aim to serve the same purpose: the examination and verification of 
whether the pricing and/or other terms and conditions of related party 
transactions comply with the arm’s length principle. For instance, the OECD 
has stated that the transfer pricing documentation has three objectives: to 
ensure that taxpayers consider the transfer pricing requirements 
appropriately in establishing prices and other terms and conditions of 
controlled transactions; to provide tax authorities with necessary information 
for the transfer pricing risk assessment purposes; and to provide the tax 
authorities also with useful information, which could be used in conducting 
transfer pricing audits.941  
 
                                                 
 
935 Treas. Reg. § 1.6038-4. 
936 Treas. Reg. § 1.6038-4(a) and § 1.6038-4(h); 81 Fed. Reg. 42487. 
937 Treas. Reg. § 1.6038-4(d). 
938 See also Levey – Gerdes – Mansfield 2016, pp. 404–405. The purpose of the Treasury Regulations 
has also been to adopt as extensive reporting burden as described in the OECD BEPS Action 13; see 81 
Fed. Reg. 42482, 42485, 42486. 
939 Treas. Reg. § 1.6038-4(k). 
940 Treas. Reg. § 1.6038-4(f). 
941 OECD BEPS Action 13, pp. 12–14. 
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Taking into account the above said, a thorough transfer pricing documentation 
may serve as a useful tool to prevent potential transfer pricing disputes with 
tax authorities also in business restructurings. When a taxpayer has 
documented the decision-making and its positions with regard to the choices 
made in the business restructuring transactions — for instance, the 
determination of arm’s length compensations for certain asset transfers, 
including the choice of the most appropriate transfer pricing method(s) and 
the decisions made in the comparability analysis — it may demonstrate that 
that it has followed the arm’s length principle, or at least it has diligently and 
in good faith tried to follow it. This could lead to that the tax authorities would 
be less anxious to interfere in the business restructuring transactions as they 
would had the taxpayer neglected to maintain transfer pricing documentation. 
For instance, the Finnish Tax Administration has expressly underlined the 
importance of transfer pricing documentation in business restructurings.942 
On the other hand, maintaining a comprehensive and detailed transfer pricing 
documentation is not an easy task and may require a lot of resources and 
time,943 and therefore achieving more certainty of the tax treatment has its 
own price. However, documentation requirements as well and costs and 
burdens related thereto should not nevertheless be disproportionate to the 
circumstances of the case.944 
 
5.4 SELF-INITIATED ADJUSTMENTS 
After concluding a related party transaction, it may be possible that a taxpayer 
finds out that the transaction results in prices or margins, which actually fall 
outside the arm’s length range. In such situations, a taxpayer may be willing 
to adjust its income tax base so that it would reflect the income, which would 
have been earned had the correct pricing applied in the transaction initially.945 
These kinds of self-initiated transfer pricing adjustments can thus be used as 
a remedy to avoid possible transfer pricing disputes with tax authorities 
arising from non-compliance with the arm’s length principle.946 While in some 
countries the national legislation may specifically regulate the possibility of 
such adjustments, in other countries the issue have not been addressed at all. 
 
Pursuant to the Russian Tax Code, a taxpayer may make self-initiated 
adjustments to its tax base in order to comply with the arm’s length principle, 
                                                 
 
942 See Finnish Tax Administration: Transfer Pricing in Business Restructurings. 
943 Markham 2005, pp. 162, 170. 
944 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 5.28. 
945 Snyder 2005, p. 20; Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, pp. 238–239. 
946 The self-initiated adjustment is in some sources known as compensatory adjustment, see e.g. OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 4.38–4.39; Lucas Mas 2009, pp. 209–210. 
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if the prices originally applied in a related party transaction do not conform to 
arm’s length prices.947 The amendments can be done at the end of the calendar 
year, and the details of such self-initiated amendments must be disclosed in 
the income tax return concerning the financial year.948 It is important to note 
that the Russian provisions do not allow downward adjustments, but only 
upward tax base adjustments, i.e. adjustments that result in an increase of the 
taxable income.949 
 
The Finnish legislation lacks particular provisions on self-initiated transfer 
pricing adjustments. The preliminary works of the AAP have addressed the 
questions indirectly. According to the preliminary works, a taxpayer should 
follow its transfer prices already during the tax year, as it is not possible in 
Finland to amend taxable income downward on a tax return.950 This approach 
suggests that the self-initiated transfer pricing amendments can be done at 
least during the tax year, if a taxpayer has noticed before the end of the tax 
year that the pricing applied in a certain related party transaction has not been 
in line with the market price. This possibility has been recognized also in the 
legal literature where it has been stated that the pricing could be in that case 
corrected already in the accounts for the accounting period.951  
 
Nevertheless, it has also been viewed in the legal literature that, in addition to 
the amendments made during the tax year, self-initiated amendments could 
be made after the completion of the financial statements on a tax return, after 
submitting the income tax return but before the end of the tax-assessment 
season, and even after the end date of the tax-assessment season (i.e. 31 
October of each year) by applying specifically for a tax amendment/correction. 
These kinds of adjustments make possible also downward adjustments of tax 
bases.952 This position is based on § 55 of the AAP and the tax practice related 
thereto, according to which a correction can be made for the benefit of a 
taxpayer on its request within five years of the beginning of the year following 
                                                 
 
947 Article 105.3 of the Tax Code. 
948 Article 105.3 of the Tax Code. The FTS has also published letters, in which it deals with self-initiated 
adjustments in more detail, see Pis'mo FNS Rossii ot 11.03.2015 N ED-4-13/3833@ "Ob osushhestvlenii 
nalogoplatel'shhikami samostoyatel'nykh korrektirovok v sootvetstvii s punktom 6 stat'i 105.3 NK RF”,  
Pis'mo FNS Rossii ot 21.04.2014 N GD-4-3/7582@ “O poryadke otrazheniya v nalogovoj deklaratsii 
samostoyatel'noj korrektirovki nalogovoj bazy po nalogu na pribyl' organizatsij” and Pis'mo FNS Rossii 
ot 14.03.2013 N ED-4-3/4303@ “O primenenii polozhenij punkta 6 stat'i 105.3 Nalogovogo kodeksa 
Rossijskoj Federatsii v chasti samostoyatel'noj korrektirovki nalogovoj bazy po NDPI i summy ehtogo 
naloga.” 
949 Article 105.3 of the Tax Code. 
950 HE 107/2006 vp, p. 19. 
951 Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, pp. 238–239, 243.  
952 Karjalainen – Raunio 2007, pp. 243–244; Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 386–387. 
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the tax assessment year, regardless of the tax consequences of such a 
correction. However, if tax authorities have already requested from a taxpayer 
a clarification or other information with regard to transfer pricing of a certain 
controlled transaction, the taxpayer may not anymore — after such a request 
— amend the pricing of the transaction (or demand a correction) in order to 
comply with the arm’s length principle.953 Notwithstanding this, rather 
obvious, limitation, by applying this interpretation in business restructurings, 
a multinational company could have a remarkably broader right to make self-
initiated transfer pricing amendments in comparison with the Russian 
provisions, provided that also other tax provisions (such as, the provisions 
prohibiting tax evasion) have been complied with.   
 
In the USA, Section 482 of the IRC regulates the IRS’s right to make transfer 
pricing adjustments (to distribute, apportion or allocate income in order to 
prevent evasion of taxes etc.), but does not expressly authorize a taxpayer to 
similar actions.954 However, the Treasury Regulations have discussed the so-
called taxpayer’s use of Section 482 of the IRC, which deals with the issue to 
a certain extent. Pursuant to the regulations, “if necessary to reflect an arm's 
length result, a controlled taxpayer may report on a timely filed U.S. income 
tax return (including extensions) the results of its controlled transactions 
based upon prices different from those actually charged.”955 This sentence can 
be interpreted to allow a taxpayer to make necessary transfer pricing 
adjustments, if the original pricing of a controlled transaction has not been in 
line with the arm’s length standard.  
 
However, after a tax return has been filed within the reporting period, the 
adjustment right is limited only to upward adjustments resulting in the 
increase of taxable income. According to the Treasury Regulations, a taxpayer 
may not apply the provision of Section 482 “at will”; this means that “no 
untimely or amended returns will be permitted to decrease taxable income 
based on allocations or other adjustments with respect to controlled 
transactions.”956 Despite the criticism, the validity of the regulation has also 
been upheld in the decision of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.957 
 
The U.S. provisions thus restrict the taxpayer’s right to make voluntarily both 
downward and upward transfer pricing adjustments to situations where the 
income tax return has not been filed yet, provided that the adjustments are 
                                                 
 
953 Jaakkola et al. 2012, pp. 386–387. 
954 See also Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(2). 
955 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(a)(3). 
956 Ibid. 
957 See Intersport Fashions West Inc. v. U.S., 109 A.F.T.R. 2d 2012-927 (Fed. Cl. 2012). See about the 
criticism in Herrington – Lowell 2013, pp. 253–257 and Ryan – Kotarba 2012, pp. 1–3. 
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necessary in order to comply with the arm’s length standard and the new 
results of the related party transactions will be reported in the income tax 
return. Nevertheless, as the Russian tax provisions do not allow downward 
adjustments in any case, and all adjustments must be reported in the annual 
income tax return at the latest, U.S. taxpayers have a broader right to make 
transfer pricing adjustments in this sense. On the other hand, the Finnish 
approach to taxpayers’ self-initiated transfer pricing adjustments may go even 
further, if the above-discussed broader interpretation is applied.  
 
In any case, taxpayers’ self-initiated transfer pricing adjustments may lead to 
that potential transfer pricing disputes with tax authorities are avoided, for 
example, in situations where a taxpayer notices the failure of applying arm’s 
length prices in its controlled transactions before filing the annual income tax 
return. For instance, a taxpayer may receive information on comparable 
transactions or other similar information affecting the pricing of a related 
party transaction that was not available at the time of the transaction and, in 
light of the newest information, it appears that the original pricing of the 
transaction is not arm’s length. Nevertheless, in comparison with APA 
processes and/or maintaining a comprehensive transfer pricing 
documentation, self-initiated transfer pricing adjustments cannot be used as 
effectively to eliminate uncertainties arising from transfer pricing issues in 
business restructurings. As voluntary adjustments can be used only as post-
transaction tools, they are not particularly helpful when a multinational 
company examines, inter alia, to what extent a business restructuring should 
fall within national transfer pricing regulations and what (transfer pricing) 
methods should be used in determining the arm’s length prices for transfers 
of certain assets in business restructuring transactions. 
 
5.5 ECONOMIC RATIONALE AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES 
As discussed, by restructuring its business models a group may achieve 
considerable tax savings. Therefore, a question of whether a multinational 
enterprise may amend its business models mainly — or solely — for tax saving 
purposes is also important. The conditions for amending business models are 
not usually regulated directly by national legislation, and hence the issue may 
be to some extent unclear. However, it has been generally viewed that a group 
must primarily have commercial or business-related reasons for business 
restructurings.958 If business restructuring transactions lack economic 
rationale, tax authorities could be willing to intervene in such transactions and 
                                                 
 
958 See e.g. Engblom et al. 2010, p. 547. 
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even ignore the forms of the transactions.959 Thus, this section deals with 
general anti-abuse and anti-avoidance rules, which could also be applied in the 
business restructuring context and which therefore should be ultimately 
followed by related parties. While the compliance with such rules does not help 
to eliminate uncertainties in relation to, inter alia, determination of arm’s 
length compensations for certain asset transfers conducted in the 
restructuring or the choice of the transfer pricing methods, it reduces the risk 
of that the national tax authorities would be willing to challenge the transfer 
pricing terms and conditions of the controlled transactions performed in the 
course of the business restructuring — or even the whole restructuring — as 
discussed briefly in Section 3.7.960 
 
According to the OECD’s guidance, the fact that the reason behind business 
restructuring is to obtain tax advantages and tax benefits does not constitute 
a breach of the arm’s length principle as such. It may be economically 
reasonable for related parties to restructure business models for the sake of 
achieving tax benefits. In addition, tax authorities cannot decide on behalf of 
multinational companies where their business activities may take place.961 
Thus, according to the OECD, the tax authorities may not challenge the 
transactions performed in the context of business restructurings solely on the 
basis of that a company receives tax benefits as a result of business 
restructuring or that tax considerations have been a crucial factor when the 
restructuring decision was made. 
 
Nevertheless, pursuant to the provisions of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, tax authorities may have the right to interfere in related party 
transactions in business restructurings in certain exceptional cases. Chapter 
IX of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines states that tax authorities may not 
disregard part or all of the business restructuring or replace it with alternative 
transactions, unless the exceptional circumstances regulated in paragraph 
1.122 are met.962 According to paragraph 1.122 of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines,  
 
                                                 
 
959 Kroppen – Silva 2011, pp. 27–28. 
960 It should be noted that the arm’s length principle, which has been discussed in more detail in the 
previous sections, can also be regarded as an anti-avoidance provision; the difference between the 
provisions and doctrines to be dealt with in this section and the arm’s length principle is that the former 
rules may give tax authorities the right to disregard and recharacterize whole transactions, while the 
latter usually authorizes the authorities to challenge the terms and conditions of transactions (as is the 
case, e.g. in Finland). 
961 See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.34 and 9.38; Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
962 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.35. 
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“the transaction as accurately delineated may be disregarded, and if 
appropriate, replaced by an alternative transaction, where the 
arrangements made in relation to the transaction, viewed in their 
totality, differ from those which would have been adopted by 
independent enterprises behaving in a commercially rational manner 
in comparable circumstances, thereby preventing determination of a 
price that would be acceptable to both of the parties taking into account 
their respective perspectives and the options realistically available to 
each of them at the time of entering into the transaction.” 
 
Thus, the most important question in examining the applicability of such non-
recognition provision is whether the business restructuring transaction(s) in 
question has the commercial rationality, which would exist in transactions 
between unrelated parties under similar conditions. If such commercial 
rationality is missing, i.e. unrelated parties would not enter into such 
arrangements under comparable economic circumstances, tax administration 
may disregard the related party transactions conducted in the course of a 
business restructuring.963 When the commercial rationality of the business 
restructuring is examined, it is in general more appropriate to review the 
rationality of all controlled transactions as a whole. Only in cases, where 
related party transactions are not economically interrelated, such transactions 
should be analyzed separately. Furthermore, the restructuring must make 
commercially sense to all participating related parties, taking into 
consideration, inter alia, other realistically available options. 964 
 
When taking into account that there are no specific regulations concerning 
business restructurings in the Finnish legislation, these OECD’s provisions 
should be considered, when examining whether Finnish law sets any 
restrictions or requirements for amending multinational companies’ business 
models. On the other hand, the Finnish tax legislation also contains general 
anti-avoidance provisions, which could be applied to business restructurings. 
Therefore, in addition to the OECD’s aforementioned guidance, the general 
anti-abuse and anti-avoidance rules followed in Finland set the requirements 
for, inter alia, whether business restructurings may be executed solely for the 
purpose of achieving tax benefits.  
 
§ 28 of the AAP regulates unlawful avoidance of taxes and is the most 
important anti-avoidance rule in Finland,965 and its applicability to transfer 
                                                 
 
963 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.123–1.124, 9.35–9.38. 
964 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.36–9.37. See also OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 9.27–9.31. 
965 The main provision regulating transfer pricing, § 31 of the AAP, can also be considered an anti-
avoidance rule, as it gives the tax authorities right to interfere in related party transactions, which 
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pricing questions has been lately discussed quite widely in Finnish courts and 
legal literature. Pursuant to § 28.1 of the AAP, if the legal form of condition or 
action does not conform to the actual nature or intention of the matter, the 
taxation of the matter must be executed in a way as if the real form would have 
been used in the case. In addition, if the purchase price, other consideration 
or performance time in a purchase or other agreement or other action has been 
taken obviously for the purpose of avoiding payable taxes, taxable income and 
assets may be assessed. According to § 28.2 of the AAP, if it is obvious that the 
taxation should be executed in accordance with § 28.1, the taxpayer should be 
given the opportunity to clarify the matter. If the taxpayer does not give 
explanation of that the legal form of condition or action corresponds to the 
actual nature or intention of the matter or that the action has not been taken 
obviously for the purpose of avoiding payable taxes, the taxation shall be 
executed in accordance with the said rules. 
 
In the business restructuring context, § 28 of the AAP means that if the tax 
authorities question the legal form of the transactions performed in the course 
of business restructurings (or the whole restructuring) by showing evidences 
of that there are obvious reasons for challenging the transaction, the taxpayer 
must present clarifications which show that legal form conforms to the actual 
nature of the transactions or that the obvious reason behind the transactions 
was not the avoidance of payable taxes. The requirement of obviousness means 
in practice that the taxpayer must show in the latter scenario that there has 
been at least partly other acceptable justifications for the transaction than tax-
related reasons.966 This could be done by showing commercial justifications 
for performing such transactions or any other non-tax related justifications, 
which could be partly behind the restructurings.  
 
The decision practice of the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ Office shows that the 
companies have usually justified their business restructurings with arguments 
relating to commercial or business rationale.967 In addition, in the legal 
literature it has been stated that § 28 of the AAP may be applied to business 
restructurings, if they clearly lack commercial rationale and the main purpose 
for executing the business restructuring is the avoidance of payable taxes.968 
However, such a conclusion cannot be made that in the absence of commercial 
reasons or justifications business restructurings will always fall within the 
scope of § 28 of the AAP. As discussed above, the provision does not as such 
require that business restructurings should be justified only by commercial 
                                                 
 
conditions are not in line with the arm’s length principle. See also § 52h of the Act on the Taxation of 
Business Profits and Income from Professional Activities. 
966 Ryynänen 2001, p. 276. See also footnote 156 on the same page. 
967 Laaksonen 2006, p. 429. 
968 Juusela – Tuominen 2011, p. 315; Laaksonen 2006, p. 429. 
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reasons; taxpayers also can provide any other explanations, which show that 
the obvious purpose of the transaction was not the tax avoidance of payable 
taxes.969 On the other hand, by demonstrating that there are 
business/commercial grounds for such transactions, it is usually the easiest 
way for the taxpayers to show that the legal form of the arrangement 
corresponds to the real intention of the matter and that the transactions have 
not been performed solely for the purpose of avoiding payable taxes, but there 
have been also other acceptable justifications for the transaction.  
 
Regardless of the nature of the grounds (commercial or other acceptable 
grounds) presented by taxpayers, the business restructuring may hence result 
in that the taxpayers achieve tax benefits. In other words, taxpayers have the 
right to seek tax benefits allowed by law, which are not contrary to the 
legislator’s intention, provided that the aforementioned requirements of § 28 
of the AAP are also met.970 Therefore, if the business restructuring is obviously 
targeted at avoiding payable taxes and/or the legal form of the actions does 
not correspond to the real content of the actions, it is more than likely that the 
tax authorities are willing to challenge the business restructuring pursuant to 
§ 28 of the AAP. On the contrary, business restructurings may be executed for 
the purpose of receiving tax benefits, if the transaction is performed within the 
limits of § 28 of the AAP. The decision practice of the Finnish Large Taxpayers’ 
Office also supports this view, as business restructurings have been accepted 
in its decisions even if restructurings have brought tax benefits for the 
companies involved.971 Moreover, it should be observed that tax authorities 
have in practice only exceptionally challenged business restructurings on the 
basis of § 28 of the AAP.972 This is not a surprise as the threshold for the 
application of § 28 of the AAP is high.973  
 
The legal state in Finland seems to be largely, but not entirely, in line with the 
OECD’s approach. The national provisions gives the tax authorities the right 
to examine, whether the legal form and the actual content of transactions in 
the course of business restructurings correspond to each other. The 
transactions may be disregarded and replaced, if the forms of transactions are 
not consistent with their real content. In addition, by showing economic 
rationale taxpayers can usually avoid speculations and suspicions of unlawful 
tax avoidance in business restructurings. However, Finnish law does not 
require specifically commercial rationality, unlike the OECD; taxpayers can 
also show other acceptable (non-tax related) reasons for the transaction, 
                                                 
 
969 Ryynänen 2001, p. 276; Isomaa-Myllymäki 2014, p. 471.  
970 See also Knuutinen 2014a, p. 172. 
971 Laaksonen 2006, p. 429. 
972 Juusela – Tuominen 2011, p. 315. 
973 Ryynänen 2001, p. 276. 
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which have at least partly affected the transaction. In addition, both sources 
recognize that taxation may be a factor that affects the business restructuring 
decision, and taxpayers may always try to achieve tax benefits that are 
permitted by law. Finally, under both sources of law, the form or 
characterization of a transaction may be disregarded only in exceptional cases.  
 
Nevertheless, there can also be seen one larger difference between the 
approaches of Finnish law and the OECD’s guidance. The authorization to 
non-recognize and disregard the form of related parties’ actions and 
arrangements is regulated in Finnish law by a specific anti-avoidance 
provision, which is not a transfer pricing provision by nature (§ 28 vs. § 31 of 
the AAP), while the OECD’s corresponding rules are located in its transfer 
pricing guidelines and the OECD Model Tax Convention. In practice, this 
means that the Finnish transfer pricing provision, § 31 of the AAP, cannot be 
interpreted in a way which would allow to disregard the entire legal form of a 
related party transaction; the provision only gives the tax authorities the right 
to make transfer pricing adjustments. Tax authorities must apply § 28 of the 
AAP, if they are willing to contest the form or characterization of a transaction. 
As the threshold for applying § 28 of the AAP is high, it can be applied to 
business restructurings only rarely. The tax authorities have tried to interpret 
§ 31 in a way, which would allow them to challenge the legal forms of 
transactions by only applying § 31 of the AAP, but the courts have in their 
decisions overruled tax authorities’ actions.974  
 
Unlike many other countries, the Russian tax legislation does not contain a 
general anti-avoidance rule. Hence, the Russian legislation does not directly 
give the Russian tax authorities the right to disregard or non-recognize legal 
forms of transactions or actions for tax purposes. However, it should be noted 
that a concept of tax evasion975 has been nevertheless regulated in the Russian 
                                                 
 
974 See decision KHO 2014:119 and Isomaa-Myllymäki 2014, pp. 469–483, which deals with the said 
case. The recharacterization of transactions under § 28 and 31 of the AAP has also been discussed in the 
legal literature quite extensively in recent years. For instance, Helminen has stated that the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines cannot be interpreted in a way, which would expand the right to 
recharacterize transactions contrary to what is permitted by national provisions of law, and therefore the 
recharacterization is possible only under § 28 of the AAP, see Helminen 2014a, p. 93. See also Lehtonen 
2014, pp. 183–194 and Juusela 2014, pp. 55–62, where the same opinion has been expressed. Knuutinen 
has discussed the concepts of form and content in Finnish tax law, which may be useful in this situation; 
see Knuutinen 2006, pp. 789–808. It should be noted that this study does not deal in detail with the 
question of acceptable tax planning versus prohibited tax evasion. See more about this in, for example, 
Tikka 1972, pp. 26–33.  
975 In Russian uklonenie ot uplaty nalogov. The concept has also been discussed e.g. in the Russian 
Federation’s outline for tax policy in 2013–2015 “Osnovnye napravleniya nalogovoj politiki Rossijskoj 
Federatsii na 2013 god i na planovyj period 2014 i 2015 godov”, p. 46. 
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Criminal Code. Articles 198 and 199 of the Russian Criminal Code regulate the 
tax evasion as unlawful tax avoidance conducted by means of non-submission 
of the tax notification or other documents required by the Russian tax 
legislation. The provisions do not include as such an authorization for tax 
authorities to challenge the terms and conditions of actions of taxpayers; they 
only deal with the tax avoidance in situations where a taxpayer has not 
submitted notifications and other documents required by tax law 
provisions.976 As Articles 198 and 199 are also located in the Russian Criminal 
Code, they are purely criminal provisions,977 whereas the Finnish provision (§ 
28 of the AAP) is located in the Finnish tax legislation and lacks criminal 
content. Consequently, as the aforementioned Russian provisions are very 
restricted and are not in nature anti-avoidance rules, they are not comparable 
with the provisions of Finnish law and the OECD’s guidance. 
 
The question of whether controlled parties may execute a business 
restructuring in Russia solely for the purpose of achieving tax benefits or 
whether there are certain regulated restrictions for executing business 
restructurings in practice must be thus examined from other sources of law. 
Regardless of that the Tax Code is lacking in content in this regard, the Russian 
tax authorities have been eager to intervene in arrangements in which the form 
of the transaction does not correspond to the real economic substance.  The 
authorities’ actions may be first based on certain provisions of the Russian 
Civil Code. A transaction, which has been performed only for the purpose of 
that it would seem that a transaction has been executed, without any intention 
to create actual legal relation and liabilities, is void. In addition, a sham 
transaction, which is a transaction executed in order to hide another 
transaction, is void. In case of a sham transaction, the transaction in question 
must be deemed to be actually a transaction, which the parties in reality had 
in mind taking into account the substance of the transaction, and legal 
provisions must be applied to the transaction accordingly.978  
 
                                                 
 
976 Article 199, which concerns the tax evasion by legal persons, regulates that certain amount of unpaid 
taxes and neglect of duties with regard to tax notifications and documentation may trigger criminal 
liability. The underpayment of taxes, which exceeds RUB 2,000,000 over a period of three financial 
years, given that the unpaid sum is more than 10 % of total taxes due, already triggers criminal liability 
for companies. In addition, criminal liability arises always from the underpayment of taxes, which 
exceeds RUB 6,000,000. More about the application of Articles 198 and 199 in Lopashenko 2006, pp. 
617–630.   
977 Article 199 of the Russian Criminal Code has also been discussed in the legal literature usually from 
the criminal law perspective, see e.g. publication Аleksandrov, Igor': Uklonenie ot uplaty nalogov. 
Osnovy kriminalisticheskoj kharakteristiki. Litres 2015. 
978 Article 170 of the Civil Code. 
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In the legal literature, these provisions have been considered to provide the 
tax authorities with efficient means to intervene in taxpayers’ aggressive tax 
planning.979 However, they do not provide direct answers to the question 
whether business or economic rationale is at least to a certain extent required 
for executing business restructurings or whether restructuring can solely be 
performed for tax minimizing purposes. On the other hand, the FTS may on 
the basis of these provisions challenge the legal form of actions performed in 
the course of a business restructuring, if the controlled parties’ real intention 
derives from the legal form. Thus, these provisions correspond to § 28 of the 
AAP at least partly. 
 
More importantly, the FTS may justify their possible actions and interventions 
in business restructurings by referring to the decision of the plenary session of 
the Supreme Commercial Court of the Russian Federation No. 53, dated 12 
October 2006980. In the decision, the Supreme Commercial Court introduced 
first time the principle of unjustified tax benefit (in Russian 
neobosnovannaya nalogovaya vygoda). According to the decision, the tax 
authorities may investigate taxpayers’ transactions, if they are not in line with 
reasonable economic purposes, but rather bring unjustified tax benefit to 
taxpayers.  
 
The Supreme Commercial Court's ruling was based on an assumption that a 
taxpayer always behaves in good faith. If the taxpayer receives bona fide tax 
benefits, the benefits are not unjustified. A tax benefit is understood as the 
decrease of taxpayer’s tax liabilities and it may result, for instance, from the 
reduction of the tax base. The tax authorities may however override this 
presumption and consider the taxpayer’s tax benefits unjustified, if they are 
able to show that the forms of the taxpayer's transactions do not correspond 
to their actual content or that the transactions do not serve any reasonable 
economic or business purposes indicated by the taxpayer.981 It should be noted 
that, if a transaction’s sole purpose is the achievement of tax benefits, it may 
never be regarded as a reasonable economic consideration that could validate 
the legality of the taxpayer’s transaction.982 
                                                 
 
979 Evdokimov – Konnov 2011, p. 631. 
980 Postanovlenie Plenuma Vysshego Аrbitrazhnogo suda Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 12 oktyabrya 2006 
goda N 53 "Ob otsenke arbitrazhnymi sudami obosnovannosti polucheniya nalogoplatel'shhikom 
nalogovoj vygody.” 
981 The court discussed examples of conditions, which may constitute an evidence of unjustified tax 
benefits. For instance, the impossibility to realistically execute the transactions in question (for example, 
due to the lack of resources of the company) may indicate that the achieved tax benefits are unjustified. 
982 Postanovlenie Plenuma Vysshego Аrbitrazhnogo suda Rossijskoj Federatsii ot 12 oktyabrya 2006 
goda N 53 "Ob otsenke arbitrazhnymi sudami obosnovannosti polucheniya nalogoplatel'shhikom 
nalogovoj vygody”. 
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It has been criticized in the legal literature that the principle and the concepts 
introduced by the Supreme Commercial Court have not yet been codified into 
the Tax Code.983 Nonetheless, the principle of unjustified tax benefits has been 
adopted by the courts in several cases and has thus become binding law in 
practice.984 In consequence, by applying the principle of unjustified tax 
benefits, the Russian tax authorities have the right to intervene also in related 
party transactions, such as business restructurings, if the real substance of the 
alleged transaction deviates from the recorded form/characterization or if 
there are no reasonable economic justifications for the transaction and the 
taxpayer consequently receives unjustified tax benefits.  
 
All in all, the provisions of the Russian Civil Code give the authorities the right 
to disregard transactions, forms of which do not correspond to their real 
content. This has also been confirmed in the aforementioned tax law related 
decision of the Russian Supreme Commercial Court. Moreover, the principle 
of unjustified tax benefits introduced in the said decision entitles the tax 
authorities to challenge also transactions, which lack reasonable 
economic/business rationale and at the same time bring taxpayers unjustified 
tax benefits. In this respect, Russian law sets even a bit more strict 
requirements for executing business restructurings than Finnish law: Under § 
28 of the AAP, the taxpayer needs to show that the business restructuring 
transaction was executed partly for other reasons than taxation issues, and 
such reasons are not limited to only business justifications. Russian law, on 
the other hand, accepts in principle only business-related justifications. 
Nevertheless, Russian law does not deviate much from the Finnish provisions 
in this regard, especially when companies have in practice relied mainly on 
economic grounds also in Finland, when they have decided on business 
restructurings.  
 
Does U.S. law authorize the tax authorities to interfere in related party 
transactions performed in the course of business restructurings and disregard 
                                                 
 
983 See e.g. Budylin 2008, p. 75. However, it should be observed that the principle of unjustified tax 
benefits is planned to be regulated in the Tax Code in the foreseeable future. Draft law No. 529775-6 was 
presented to the State Duma in 2015. According to the draft law, new Article 54.1 of the Tax Code would 
prohibit transactions, which aim at the underpayment of taxes, if the transactions have been performed 
only for the tax avoidance purposes. See more about the legislative project in the preliminary work 
Zakonoproekt N 529775-6 "O vnesenii izmenenij v chasti pervuyu i vtoruyu Nalogovogo kodeksa 
Rossijskoj Federatsii ob ustanovlenii predelov osushhestvleniya prav i ispolneniya obyazannostej 
nalogoplatel'shhikom)", pp. 1–3. The draft law is currently being discussed in the State Duma, and, if 
approved, it may come into force shortly after the act has been signed by the President of Russia.    
984 See e.g. Opredelenie Vysshego Аrbitrazhnogo Suda RF ot 11 yanvarya 2009 g. N 16307/08 and 
Postanovlenie FАS Vostochno-Sibirskogo okruga ot 12.12.2013 g. N А78-2777/2013. 
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them similarly? First, there are several provisions in the US legislation, which 
could be characterized as anti-avoidance provisions. For example, the IRC has 
a provision, according to which the tax authorities may deny a deduction, 
credit or allowance, if a corporation acquires property and “the principal 
purpose for which such acquisition was made is evasion or avoidance of 
Federal income tax by securing the benefit” of such deduction, credit or 
allowance, which the corporation would not otherwise enjoy. In principle, such 
provision could also be applied to business restructurings.985  
 
However, the main source of U.S. law with regard to anti-avoidance rules has 
been and still is the US case law and the judicial doctrines developed therein. 
Many important rules, which give the authorities the right to challenge 
transactions, have been introduced by the courts.  Gregory v. Helvering986, 
the landmark case in U.S. tax law, introduced the business purpose doctrine. 
The business purpose doctrine can be summarized as follows: A taxpayer 
should usually have a business purpose or reason for performing a transaction. 
Such business purpose cannot be solely the avoidance of taxes or achieving tax 
benefits. This means that even though a taxpayer meets all the requirements 
of a certain tax provision, it may not always be entitled to tax benefits resulting 
from the said tax provision, if the transaction otherwise lacks business 
purpose. In that case, the tax authorities may disregard or recharacterize the 
transaction for tax purposes. The business purpose requirement may be 
explicitly stated in a provision of a tax statute. On the other hand, if the 
business purpose requirement has not been codified, the courts may invoke 
the business purpose requirement by applying the business purpose doctrine 
in conjunction with other anti-avoidance provisions or doctrines.987  
 
As the business purpose requirement is not extensively legislated in tax law 
provisions or regulations, the business purpose doctrine is often applied in 
practice together with other anti-avoidance rules, one of them being the 
economic substance doctrine.988 The economic substance doctrine has been 
extensively used by courts to disallow tax benefits achieved by taxpayers in 
transactions where the purpose of receiving tax benefits has been strongly 
present. According to the doctrine, courts or tax authorities have the right to 
deny tax benefits, which a taxpayer could receive in a transaction had the IRC’s 
or other tax provisions literally been followed, if the transaction lacks the 
                                                 
 
985 Zollo 2011, p. 764. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b). 
986 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
987 Ibid; Varma – West 2010, p. 828; Tooma 2008, pp. 45–46. 
988 Faber 2010, p. 331. The courts have not always been able to make a clear distinction between the 
business purpose doctrine and the economic substance doctrine. The existence of business purpose has 
been often examined, when courts have investigated whether the transaction in question has economic 
substance.    
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economic substance and the result of the transaction is thus against the 
legislator’s intention. In order to investigate the presence of the economic 
substance, the courts have traditionally examined, whether (i) the transaction 
in question has led to objectively reasonable changes in the taxpayer’s 
economic position (other than which have resulted from the received tax 
benefits) and has thus objective economic substance; and whether (ii) the 
taxpayer has subjectively any other business purposes for the transaction than 
tax related. Some courts have demanded that the transaction in question must 
meet both requirements in order to avoid the courts’/authorities’ interference 
in the transaction by relying on the economic substance doctrine; some courts 
have required that only either (i) or (ii) has to be present in the transaction. 
The former approach is called the conjunctive test989 and the latter the 
disjunctive test990. Finally, some of the courts991 have used both requirements, 
objective economic substance and taxpayer’s subjective business purpose, as 
factors useful to consider, when examining a transaction’s lawfulness.992 The 
economic substance doctrine has been recently codified in Section 7701(o) of 
the IRC. According to the new provision,  
 
“in the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doctrine 
is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic 
substance only if— 
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from 
Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, 
and 
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal 
income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.”993 
 
The IRC has thus adopted the so-called conjunctive test, as “the term 
‘economic substance doctrine’ means the common law doctrine under which 
tax benefits ---- with respect to a transaction are not allowable if the 
transaction does not have economic substance or lacks a business purpose.”994 
It has been viewed in the legal literature that the codification of the economic 
substance doctrine does not bring much change in the authorities’ or courts’ 
behavior and practices, and the authorities are after the codification at least as 
eager as before to apply the doctrine to transactions that particularly have 
                                                 
 
989 The conjunctive test has been applied by courts in e.g. Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893 (6th 
Cir. 1993) and United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001). 
990 The disjunctive test has been applied by courts in e.g. Rice’s Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner, 752 
F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985) and Horn v. Commissioner, 968 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
991 See e.g. Keeler v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 1212 (10th Cir. 2001). 
992 See e.g. Silverman – Lerner – Kidder 2006, p. 426; Zollo 2011, p. 765; Varma – West 2010, p. 828. 
993 Section 7701(o)(1) of the IRC. 
994 Section 7701(o)(5)(A) of the IRC. 
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effect on a taxpayer’s income taxation.995 The economic substance doctrine is 
also present in the Treasury Regulations interpreting Section 482 of the IRC. 
The Treasury Regulations allow the IRS to disregard and recharacterize 
transactions, which do not conform to their economic substance.996 Therefore, 
the economic substance doctrine must be taken into account specifically in 
transfer pricing questions and thus when planning the transfer pricing of a 
business restructuring. 
 
In addition, there some other judicial doctrines of U.S. tax law, which may be 
relevant, when reviewing the framework for conducting business 
restructurings. The so-called substance-over-form doctrine, which was first 
time applied in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 997 allows the tax 
authorities to disregard transactions and deny tax benefits, if the forms of 
transactions have not been conformed to the actual content or substance of the 
matter.998 The substance-over-form doctrine thus resembles the economic 
substance doctrine and the business purpose doctrine discussed above; the 
latter doctrines can actually be considered variations of the substance-over-
form doctrine, and they are often applied together.999 The step transaction 
doctrine, on the other hand, means that separate steps of an arrangement may 
be regarded as one transaction for taxation purposes, if a taxpayer achieves tax 
benefits that it would not have otherwise achieved and the arrangement was 
divided into separate steps merely to receive the tax benefits.1000 In addition, 
the IRS may in general invoke the sham transaction doctrine, when it wants 
to intervene in taxpayers’ transactions. The definition of the sham doctrine is 
ambiguous, but the main content is that courts may disregard transactions, if 
there has not in reality been a transaction, a transaction lacks economic 
substance, a transaction lacks business purpose or there has existed a variation 
of the said circumstances. The common characteristic is that a court or the 
IRS, by referring to these conditions, treats a transaction as a sham transaction 
and thus disregards the transaction for taxation purposes.1001  
 
It should be noted that courts or tax authorities may invoke at the same time 
different aforementioned doctrines, and the doctrines may be overlapping 
                                                 
 
995 Glickman – Calhoun 2010, p. 659. 
996 Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B). See also the IRS’s notice 2014-58 “Additional Guidance Under the 
Codified Economic Substance Doctrine and Related Penalties.” 
997 Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). 
998 Varma – West 2010, p. 829. 
999 Tooma 2008, pp. 48–49. 
1000 See Varma – West 2010, pp. 832–833, which also discusses three different tests that the authorities 
and courts have applied in examining whether a taxpayer’s steps should be treated as one transaction. 
1001 Graber 2000, p. 362; Postlewaite 2005, p. 142. 
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with other doctrines in some situations.1002 On the other hand, it is not 
relevant, whether the tax authorities apply a particular doctrine to a 
transaction over other similar doctrines or whether they use the term “sham 
transaction doctrine” instead of using the term “substance-over-form 
doctrine”.  As discussed above, the doctrines have basically the same meaning 
and content: a taxpayer may not achieve (unjustified) tax benefits and the 
taxpayer’s transaction may be disregarded for tax purposes, if there have not 
been sound business purposes or reasons for the transaction, the transaction 
lacks economic substance or the form of the transaction otherwise has not 
conformed to the real content.  
 
Overall, the IRS may rely on various anti-avoidance provisions and doctrines, 
both legislated and judicial, also in business restructurings, if it suspects that 
the transactions performed in the course of a business restructuring do not 
comply with the requirements of U.S. tax law in the discussed manner. It has 
also been viewed in the legal literature that the mentioned anti-avoidance 
doctrines can particularly be topical in business restructurings.1003 It is 
therefore noteworthy to pay attention to the reasons, with which a business 
restructuring and especially the transfer pricing of the transactions performed 
in the course of the restructuring are justified, or otherwise there might be a 
risk of that the IRS is willing to disregard or recharacterize the whole 
restructuring or the transactions performed therein for tax purposes.  
 
In this respect, U.S. tax law is largely in line with the approaches taken by 
Finnish and Russian law. As mentioned earlier, Russian law sets a bit more 
severe requirements for conducting business restructurings than Finnish law. 
Russian law basically requires reasonable economic justifications for 
conducting transactions in general and therefore also in the business 
restructuring context, while pursuant to Finnish law a taxpayer must justify 
transactions by referring generally to other reasons than taxation related. 
Notwithstanding that such reasons do not need to be business-related, usually 
taxpayers have relied on such in practice. As discussed, the anti-avoidance 
doctrines and provisions of U.S. law require similarly in many cases economic 
substance or business purpose, and ultimately transactions cannot be 
conducted purely for the purpose of avoiding taxes/achieving tax benefits 
contrary to the legislator’s intention, as was the case also in Russia and 
Finland. Furthermore, while some of the doctrines lack uniform definitions 
and have not been applied by the courts or authorities in a consistent way, it is 
clear that taxpayers may not use in business restructuring transactions legal 
forms, which do not conform to their real content, and therefore U.S. law 
conforms to a large degree to Russian and Finnish law also in this regard.  
                                                 
 
1002 Varma – West 2010, p. 827; Tooma 2008, p. 40. 
1003 Amerkhail – Granwell 2009, pp. 437–438; Varma – West 2010, pp. 764–765, 772. 
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As a conclusion, it can be stated that Russian, Finnish and U.S. law allow 
companies to organize their business models quite broadly in various ways 
even though the executed business restructuring would lead to some tax 
benefits and the taxable income in the jurisdiction would decrease. Tax 
authorities may not dictate, where taxpayers may locate their assets and 
activities. However, the national tax-avoidance provisions and doctrines set 
restrictions in terms of how such restructurings may be executed. The 
transactions performed in the business restructuring context must always 
conform to their real substance, and taxpayers may not implement business 
restructurings solely for the purpose of avoiding taxes or achieving tax benefits 
that would be contrary to the legislator’s intent. Usually taxpayer must show 
business- or economic-related purposes, reasons and/or justifications for the 
business restructuring, or otherwise there might be a risk of that national tax 
authorities would be willing to disregard or recharacterize transactions 
conducted in the restructuring for tax purposes or even contest the purpose of 
the whole business restructuring. Hence, also other anti-avoidance rules than 
the arm’s length principle must be complied with, when planning the transfer 
pricing of business restructurings, as this also may in turn reduce the 
probability of transfer pricing disputes with the tax authorities.1004 
  
                                                 
 
1004 It should be observed that this section did not discuss exhaustively the means of national tax 
authorities to disregard and recharacterize related party transactions in business restructurings. The 
purpose of this section was to purely demonstrate that, when taxpayers plan the transfer pricing of 
business restructuring and execute the business restructuring, also other potentially applicable tax law 
provisions must be followed. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 RUSSIAN, FINNISH AND U.S. TAX LAW 
APPROACHES TO BUSINESS RESTRUCTURINGS 
AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE ARM’S LENGTH 
PRINCIPLE 
A business restructuring is often associated with a new business strategy 
adopted by a group of companies. In such cases, it is important for the 
multinational enterprise in question to be able to predict the potential tax 
treatment and tax consequences of the business restructuring in order to 
ensure the rationality of the restructuring also from a tax law perspective. 
From the point of view of transfer pricing, this means that the tax law 
provisions, case law and other applicable sources of law should preferably 
provide taxpayers with appropriate information and means for such a 
decision-making.  
 
Regardless of fundamental differences in the legal and judicial systems, the 
current transfer pricing rules of Russian, Finnish and U.S. tax law correspond 
to each other and to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ provisions to a 
great degree. Nonetheless, certain questions that are of great importance and 
relevance at present in transfer pricing — in particular, the transfer pricing of 
business restructurings — have not been yet addressed to a sufficient extent by 
national laws. Consequently, the importance of Chapter IX of the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines cannot be overemphasized especially in countries, 
where its guidance is followed in practice by tax authorities and courts. 
  
As discussed, the Russian Tax Code’s new rules are widely based on the 
OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines, although Russia is not an OECD member 
state and the FTS and Russian courts are not obliged to follow the guidelines. 
Therefore, while the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may provide 
interpretive help in situations where the Tax Code’s transfer pricing rules are 
ambiguous and difficult to apply in practice, there is no certainty of that the 
tax authorities would interpret the unclear provisions in accordance with the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Moreover, the guidelines cannot be used 
in the interpretation of the Tax Code’s provisions in a way, which would lead 
to that the wording, content or scope of a provision would ultimately be 
broadened against the legislator’s intent. Although the transfer pricing rules 
regulated in the Tax Code are quite widely consistent with the OECD’s transfer 
pricing rules, they also have their own peculiarities, which result in that on 
certain occasions the transfer pricing treatment may differ from the Western 
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practice quite extensively. Business restructurings form a good example in this 
respect.  
 
As a result of the narrow scope of application of the Russian transfer pricing 
rules and the lack of clarifying interpretations of legally binding nature in this 
respect, it seems that only transfers of tangible property and intellectual 
properties fall within the scope of the Russian transfer pricing rules in the 
business restructuring context. This leads to that transfers of other assets of 
commercial value as well as premature terminations or renegotiations of 
agreements likely fall outside the scope of the Russian transfer pricing rules. 
This approach is troublesome especially from the perspective of the arm’s 
length principle and is contrary to the approach taken by the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines.  
 
For instance, it is self-evident that also goodwill or other intangibles that are 
not legally protected by particular national regulations and/or recorded on a 
company’s balance sheet may have commercial value, which could be 
compensated in transactions between independent parties. Intellectual 
properties are not the only intangibles that may have commercial value. 
However, as the Tax Code’s transfer pricing regulations are not, in the 
aforesaid manner, applied to intangibles in general, they do not become 
objects of transfer pricing in business restructurings and ultimately do not 
have to be compensated at arm’s length — which is also inconsistent with the 
arm’s length principle.  
 
Furthermore, no legal support can be found from the Tax Code and other 
sources of Russian tax law for the view that interrelated assets and functions 
transferred in the course of a business restructuring could be identified and 
valued on an aggregate basis, when a functioning business unit (i.e. going 
concern) is transferred. Therefore, all transfers of something of value occurred 
in a business restructuring should always be examined on an asset-by-asset 
basis.  
 
The lack of legal support for treating a transfer of a functioning business unit 
on an aggregate basis causes problems in terms of the arm’s length principle. 
It is likely that on certain occasions, for instance in business acquisitions, 
independent parties would analyze and remunerate simultaneous transfers of 
assets and functions as a whole. The traditional approach based on separate 
valuations of transferred items does not take into consideration all the 
peculiarities involved in transfers of a going concern, and therefore the end 
result may deviate largely from what independent parties would have ended 
up with in comparable circumstances. Thus, the arm’s length principle is not 
efficiently complied with also in this respect. 
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In addition, although transfers of risks as well as premature renegotiations or 
terminations of agreements should be taken into account at least to some 
extent in the transfer pricing analysis of business restructurings, they may not 
currently be objects of transfer pricing in Russia at all. As the latter should be 
compensated at arm’s length on a case-by-case basis in some situations, 
Russian law deviates from the arm’s length standard also in this regard.  
 
In consequence, the compliance with the arm’s length principle, which should 
be the guiding principle also behind the Russian national transfer pricing 
provisions, is not realized effectively in business restructurings in Russia. As 
the above-discussed transaction types are not subject to transfer pricing, 
related parties and unrelated parties are not in the end treated equally for tax 
purposes in all circumstances. There thus exists an urgent need for 
amendments de lege ferenda to the existing transfer pricing rules in Russia in 
this respect. It would be important to revise/update the prevailing transfer 
pricing provisions and other applicable regulations in Russia to be in line with 
the aims of the arm’s length principle, i.e. to include the possibility to consider 
transfers of intangibles and a going concern as well as premature terminations 
or renegotiations of existing agreement as objects of transfer pricing, if they 
would be compensated in transactions between independent parties in 
comparable situations. In addition, it would be of great importance also to 
determine in the legislation, how the concept of intangible property should be 
understood in the transfer pricing context.  
 
In contrast to the Russian transfer pricing rules, the Finnish transfer pricing 
regulations have not restricted the applicability of the transfer pricing rules 
merely to certain types of controlled transactions. Hence, in addition to 
transfers of tangible assets, transfers of intangible assets generally fall within 
the scope of the national transfer pricing rules, which must be noted also in 
business restructurings. In particular, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ 
impact on the interpretation of the Finnish transfer pricing rules is significant, 
and therefore its guidance cannot be ignored, when national transfer pricing 
provisions are interpreted and applied in practice. This means that the concept 
of intangible asset must also be understood broadly under the Finnish transfer 
pricing rules.  
 
Thus, transfers of, inter alia, intellectual property, know-how and other 
intangibles that may be separated from other possible asset transfers occurred 
in a business restructuring and that have commercial value, which would be 
compensated in transactions between independent parties, should primarily 
be compensated at arm’s length also in business restructurings. However, it is 
not always self-evident, what other assets may be regarded as intangible assets 
subject to transfer pricing in this sense, and therefore the question must be 
explored on a case-by-case basis. Such intangibles do not need to be legally 
protected by particular national regulations or recorded on a company’s 
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balance sheet, but a more decisive factor is whether unrelated parties would 
compensate transfers of such assets in corresponding conditions. Therefore, 
this approach also seems to be in line with the arm’s length principle. 
 
Similarly, pursuant to the U.S. regulations, apart from transfers of tangible 
assets, transfers of intangibles fall in general within the scope of the 
application of the arm’s length principle. If a business restructuring involves 
transfers of intangible property expressly listed in Section 936(h)(3)(B) of the 
IRC and the related Treasury Regulations, such transfers will primarily fall 
within the scope of application of the U.S. transfer pricing rules. Such 
intangible properties include, among other things, the aforesaid intellectual 
properties and know-how, but also other assets that can be regarded as “other 
similar items” in accordance with the Treasury Regulations. Hence, it should 
be diligently examined in business restructurings on a transaction-by-
transaction basis whether such “other similar [intangible] items” are 
transferred between related parties and especially whether independent 
parties would compensate transfers of such assets in similar 
circumstances.1005  
 
Although intangible assets generally fall within the scope of the Finnish and 
U.S. transfer pricing rules, the broad concept of intangible property in transfer 
pricing is not entirely clear and straightforward in Finland and the USA. 
Consequently, the question of to what extent intangibles fall within the scope 
of the transfer pricing rules in business restructurings may cause interpretive 
problems in cases where it is not self-evident whether certain items or assets 
should be regarded as intangible assets and thus taken into account in the 
transfer pricing analysis of a business restructuring. As this kind of unclarity 
is against the aim of the arm’s length principle, it should be considered 
whether such ambiguity could be addressed somehow in the national sources 
of transfer pricing to improve the certainty of the transfer pricing treatment of 
such (intangible) items. However, as in the current situation, the 
determination of all asset types falling within the scope of the concept of 
intangible assets is likely to be impossible, the existing transfer pricing rules 
are largely efficient in terms of the arm’s length principle. In order to improve 
the compliance with the arm’s length principle, the current rules could be 
amended de lege ferenda to address the aforementioned ambiguous 
                                                 
 
1005 However, the concept of “other similar items” under U.S. law may prove to be troublesome in certain 
cases, as it can be seen from the question with respect to transfer pricing of goodwill and going concern 
value. Therefore, although the above-mentioned approach (examination of whether independent parties 
would compensate transfers of such intangible assets) can be applied in the USA to a great extent, it 
cannot currently be applied unconditionally, and there exist de lege ferenda need for clarifying 
amendments to the existing law at least in terms of controlled transfers of goodwill and going concern 
value. 
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situations, only if certain measures could be found, without unnecessarily 
limiting the scope of the concept of intangible assets.  
 
In addition to the above stated, certain intangible assets that are not separable, 
i.e. are not capable of being separated from other assets or an entity, may also 
be objects of transfer pricing in business restructurings pursuant to Finnish 
and U.S. law. Such intangibles should be considered to fall within the scope of 
the Finnish and U.S. transfer pricing rules, at least as a starting point, if they 
have economic value that would be compensated in transactions between 
independent parties. Especially the discussed goodwill and going concern 
value are these kinds of assets, which clearly have commercial value that would 
be compensated between unrelated parties but which also cannot be 
transferred separately from a complex of assets/business unit. Although, to 
some extent, there still exists unclarity as regards whether transfers of 
goodwill/going concern value can be treated as intangible property for the 
purpose of Section 482 of the IRC and corresponding Treasury Regulations, 
the newest regulations can be interpreted to allow such a conclusion.1006  
 
Transfers of the aforementioned kind of intangibles may become objects of 
transfer pricing in the business restructuring context as part of a going 
concern. This is due to the fact that business restructurings may — and should 
— be regarded as transfers of a going concern for transfer pricing purposes 
pursuant to the Finnish and U.S. rules, when interrelated assets, functions and 
risks together form a functioning business unit that is transferred in the course 
of a restructuring, and the aggregation of such transactions would lead to the 
best result from the perspective of the arm’s length principle. As previously 
discussed, in such cases, the assets/something of value belonging to such a 
business unit do not need to be separated from each other and correspondingly 
valued separately, as the business restructuring will be examined on an 
aggregate basis and an arm’s length compensation would be determined only 
for the transferred going concern.  
 
Apart from that it may at times be required to consider a business 
restructuring as a transfer of a going concern in order to achieve the most 
reliable arm’s length result, the Finnish and the U.S. transfer pricing 
regulations may also demand that an appropriate arm’s length remuneration 
should be paid under certain circumstances for the premature termination or 
renegotiation of existing arrangements, and thus the current legal situation 
deviates from the Russian situation also in this regard. On the other hand, 
transfers of risks — and possible associated profit potential — may not as such 
be objects of transfer pricing in business restructurings also in Finland and the 
                                                 
 
1006 While in Finland, transfers of goodwill fall within the scope of the Finnish transfer pricing rules 
already on the basis of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. 
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USA, but the allocation of risks will affect the transfer pricing analysis of 
business restructuring transactions through the functional and risk analyses. 
In this respect, all the three target countries conform to each other. 
 
Overall, when the applicability of the transfer pricing rules is considered, 
business restructurings fall more effectively within the scope of application of 
the national transfer pricing rules and regulations in Finland and the USA than 
in Russia. Although certain partial issues still remain ambiguous (in 
particular, the transfer pricing treatment of goodwill and going concern value 
in the USA), the assets/something of value that are typically transferred in 
business restructurings fall greatly within the scope of the national transfer 
pricing rules of Finland and the USA. Consequently, the compliance with the 
arm’s length principle is thus required and followed effectively in business 
restructurings. If independent parties would compensate certain transfers of 
assets/something of value or would remunerate the premature terminations 
of agreements in comparable circumstances, such transfers or terminations 
are also subject to transfer pricing in business restructurings between related 
parties and should ultimately be compensated at arm’s length.  
 
The difference between the current situations in Finland and the USA, on the 
one hand, and the situation in Russia, on the other hand, can primarily be 
explained with reference to the different hierarchy of legal sources and judicial 
systems. As discussed, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines’ impact on the 
interpretation of the Finnish transfer pricing rules is significant, and therefore 
its extensive guidance cannot be ignored, when national provisions and 
specifically the arm’s length principle are applied in practice. Also other 
sources may be used in the interpretation of the legislated transfer pricing 
rules in the above-mentioned sense more extensively in Finland than in 
Russia. Similarly, the administrative sources — especially the Treasury 
Regulations — interpret the IRC’s narrow provisions almost exhaustively, and 
they must be followed in practice by the IRS and taxpayers. The USA also has 
a long tradition in transfer pricing and is considered as one of the pioneer 
countries in terms of developing transfer pricing law. Therefore, it is not a 
surprise that U.S. tax law provides a wide range of regulations covering many 
aspects of different transfer pricing phenomena, which also are helpful in 
analyzing business restructurings.  
 
Russia, on the contrary, has fairly new tax legislation, and the Tax Code’s 
newest transfer pricing provisions that came into force on 1 January 2012 are 
its first attempt to have transfer pricing rules similar to the Western practice. 
Although the provisions are extensive, they are not exhaustive, and 
peculiarities still exist in the above-discussed manner in comparison with, for 
instance, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. As other legal sources are 
basically of a clarifying and non-binding nature (except for the decisions of the 
highest courts that may be legally binding in practice), the current provisions 
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would thus need to be  improved de lege ferenda to be more in line with the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in terms of the compliance with the arm’s 
length principle. 
 
When the extent of the business restructuring has been determined in a given 
case — i.e. it has been identified, what assets/something of value subject to 
transfer pricing are separately transferred in the course of the restructuring or 
whether the restructuring may be regarded as a transfer of a going concern — 
another important and complex question arises: how to determine the arm’s 
length compensations for such transfers occurring in the business 
restructuring? None of the target countries have legislated specifically on the 
determination of arm’s length compensations in the business restructuring 
context. Therefore, as a starting point, the general transfer pricing methods 
regulated by the national sources and/or the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines should primarily be applied to transfers of something of value 
conducted in the business restructuring context. Except for business 
restructurings involving solely transfers of tangible assets, the determination 
of an arm’s length compensation is a troublesome question. 
 
All the target countries prefer the use of the CUP/CUT method in controlled 
transactions involving transfers of intangibles at least to some extent. Thus, 
the possible use of the CUP/CUT method must primarily be considered also in 
business restructurings. As intangible assets usually have unique features and 
characteristics, it may be prove to be difficult to find comparables for the 
controlled transactions involving transfers of them. In such situations, the 
potential applicability of other regulated transfer pricing methods must be 
reviewed, especially if appropriate adjustments cannot be made to eliminate 
potential substantial differences between the controlled transaction and 
comparable uncontrolled transactions. Hence, it is likely that the applicability 
of the profit-based transfer pricing methods must quite often also be examined 
in business restructurings, if the restructurings involve transfers of 
intangibles.  
 
Although the transactional net margin method/the comparable profits 
method may in general be applied to transactions involving intangibles under 
Russian, Finnish and U.S. law, the profit split method may be more efficient 
in connection with transactions involving purely transfers of intangible assets. 
It acknowledges the unique nature of intangibles and has been considered to 
be more suitable for direct valuation of intangibles; in addition, it does not rely 
on finding exact comparables. This has also been highlighted in the OECD’s 
latest guidance in relation to transfer pricing of intangibles.1007  
                                                 
 
1007 In contrast to the Russian and the Finnish (OECD based) approaches, the comparable profits method 
may under the U.S. transfer pricing rules also be applied to the controlled transfers of rights in intangible 
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However, as the application of the profit split method usually requires that 
both parties of a related party transaction make unique and valuable 
contributions (e.g. use unique and valuable intangibles), it is unclear how the 
method should be applied to transactions involving purely transfers of 
intangibles. In such transactions only one party de facto makes unique 
contributions, i.e. transfers unique and valuable intangibles. The domestic 
rules have paid no attention to this question. Therefore, as the method has 
been considered to bring arm’s length results also in transactions involving 
merely transfers of intangibles, if the CUP/CUT method may not be applied, it 
should be clarified in the domestic transfer pricing rules de lege ferenda, how 
the method should be applied particularly in such circumstances.  
 
Furthermore, the aforementioned regulated transfer pricing methods may not 
always provide sufficient tools for determining arm’s length compensations for 
intercompany transfers of intangible assets, for instance, due to reliable 
comparable uncontrolled transactions not being able to be found for the 
related party transaction in question, or the regulated transfer methods not 
being otherwise suitable at all in a given case. 
 
Fortunately, all the target countries allow taxpayers to use also other valuation 
methods and techniques than specifically regulated transfer pricing methods, 
provided that such methods bring the most reliable arm’s length results in 
such situations. Of great importance are especially the income based methods, 
such as the discounted cash flow method, as they are commonly used in 
practice in the direct valuation of intangibles in transactions between 
independent parties, and therefore they will more likely provide a more 
reliable arm’s length result in comparison with the regulated transfer pricing 
methods or other unspecified methods (cost and market based methods). Such 
an approach is consequently consistent with the arm’s length principle. As 
related parties would in such cases follow the same valuation principles that 
would be used by independent parties in comparable circumstances, the 
factors relating to the valuation and pricing of the transaction and the 
intangible in question are thus taken into account in a similar manner as it 
would be taken by unrelated parties.  
 
However, the domestic transfer pricing rules as well as the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines seem to lack content in terms of applying such unspecified 
methods in practice. Although the Russian Tax Code contains a mention of the 
possibility of using such methods, the provisions basically refer to a non-
taxation related act, and more detailed provisions of the types of the methods 
                                                 
 
property in certain circumstances, which leads to that the applicability of both profit-based transfer 
pricing methods should always be considered in cross-border business restructurings under U.S. tax law. 
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are only covered by particular administrative regulations. While the OECD’s 
guidance on the regulated transfer pricing methods may be considered 
sufficient for the purpose of following it as such in practice in Finland, the 
guidance on the application of other valuation techniques is very limited. The 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines mention only income based methods as an 
example of such valuation techniques that could be considered in the valuation 
of intangibles in related party transactions.  
 
As a consequence, the guidelines do not provide necessary tools for applying 
non-specified methods in practice. Similarly, although the Treasury 
Regulations interpreting Section 482 of the IRC accept explicitly the use of 
unspecified methods, they have not discussed the types of methods that could 
be regarded as unspecified methods at all. This may cause unnecessary 
uncertainty from the point of view of the arm’s length principle, taking into 
consideration that the Treasury Regulations usually aim to address all topical 
questions of transfer pricing.  
 
Hence, there are certain needs for amending the existing Russian, Finnish and 
U.S. transfer pricing rules de lege ferenda. The applicability of the 
aforementioned valuation techniques to the determination of transfer prices 
for transfers of intangibles should be regulated in a clear manner, providing 
detailed guidance on the application of such methods in practice. It must also 
be observed that while such valuation techniques may be used in corporate 
finance to determine the fair value of intangible properties or assets generally, 
the fair value standard and the arm’s length standard are ultimately distinct 
valuation standards.1008 Therefore, such principal differences should be taken 
into account, when other valuation methods than the regulated transfer 
pricing methods are applied in the transfer pricing context. If certain 
modifications should be made to such methods before applying them in the 
determination of arm’s length compensations, this should also be dealt with 
directly in the domestic transfer pricing rules for the purpose of ensuring the 
efficient compliance with the arm’s length principle. 
 
Furthermore, it must also be observed that the application of such valuation 
techniques is not, in the end, an easy task. For instance, the income based 
methods require the prediction of future (net) profits, cash flows or other 
economic benefits the intangible asset in question may generate during its 
lifetime. If the prediction is done in an unreliable manner or the value is 
discounted to the present value by using an inaccurate discount rate, the end 
result (i.e. the determined value for the transferred intangible asset) may be 
inconsistent with the arm’s length principle.  
 
                                                 
 
1008 See Wittendorff 2010b, pp. 325–326. 
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Another — even more complex — valuation issue arises from transfers of a 
going concern in the business restructuring context. As there are no particular 
provisions in Finnish and U.S tax law as regards the determination of an arm’s 
length remuneration for transfers of a functioning business unit, the 
application of the regulated transfer pricing methods — especially the 
CUP/CUT method — must primarily be considered in this connection. 
However, the use of the traditional transfer pricing methods may be difficult 
or even provide unreliable results in such situations, as the valuation of the 
transfer of a going concern should reflect all the valuable features and 
elements that would be compensated between unrelated parties in comparable 
circumstances. Also, it is likely that independent parties would use other kinds 
of methods than methods similar to the regulated transfer pricing methods. 
 
On the other hand, both Finnish and U.S. tax law regulations and 
administrative sources contain guidance, which can be helpful in determining 
the arm’s length compensation for a transfer of a going concern. Especially the 
income based methods, in particular the discounted cash flow method and its 
variations, have been widely approved and considered reliable and 
appropriate methods in determining the value for a going concern. They are 
not, inter alia, dependent on finding sufficient comparables. As these kinds of 
valuation techniques are also generally applied in practice by independent 
parties in business valuation, they will likely provide the best results in terms 
of the arm’s length principle also in transactions between related parties.  
 
Nevertheless, while both the OECD and Finnish transfer pricing sources refer 
in general to valuation techniques that independent parties would apply in 
comparable circumstances, i.e. in business acquisitions, they have not 
regulated such methods and the application thereof in detail. For instance, 
although both sources have expressly mentioned the possibility of using the 
discounted cash flow method in transfer pricing of transfers of a going 
concern, more detailed guidance on its use in the transfer pricing context is 
missing. Similarly, in the USA, the income method used specifically in cost 
sharing arrangements may, by expansive interpretation allowed by the IRS, be 
used in determining the arm’s length value for transfers of a going concern. As 
the applicability of the method to business restructurings is based on the broad 
interpretation of the Treasury Regulations, detailed guidance on the 
application of the method to controlled transfers of a going concern in the 
business restructuring context is lacking. The current approaches in Finland 
and the USA may thus cause unnecessary uncertainty for the compliance with 
the arm’s length principle. Hence, for the sake of clarity and transparency, the 
use of such methods — in particular, the discounted cash flow/income method 
— should be regulated de lege ferenda in the domestic transfer pricing rules in 
a concrete and detailed manner, paying attention also to potential issues that 
may arise in the business restructuring context. As with transfers of 
intangibles, if certain modifications should be made to such valuation 
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techniques before applying them in the transfer pricing context, this should 
also be dealt with directly in the transfer pricing rules for the purpose of 
ensuring the efficient compliance with the arm’s length principle. 
 
Nonetheless, the application of such methods to business restructurings is not 
an easy and straightforward task, as it often involves the projection of future 
income streams/cash flows and the determination of an appropriate discount 
rate. Therefore, similar to the valuation techniques used in the determination 
of an arm’s length compensations for transfers of intangibles, the choice of the 
valuation method as well as all the parameters and figures related to its 
application must be chosen diligently in order to achieve a result consistent 
with the arm’s length principle. 
 
Contrary to the Russian transfer pricing rules, also the premature termination 
or renegotiation of an existing arrangement in connection with a business 
restructuring may be subject to transfer pricing in Finland and the USA. The 
arm’s length compensation in case of premature terminations or 
renegotiations of existing agreements is determined to a great degree in a 
similar manner under both U.S. and Finnish law; the question of whether a 
remuneration should be paid for the termination of an existing commercial 
agreement should primarily be examined from the contractual terms of the 
specific agreement itself by comparing such terms to contractual terms used 
commonly by independent parties in similar situations (e.g. the field of 
business). National provisions and principles — such as, the principle of 
expectation interest under U.S. law and the positive interest under Finnish law 
— may serve as a guidance and should primarily be applied, if independent 
parties would be entitled to a compensation in accordance with such 
provisions and principles in similar circumstances. Nonetheless, as the 
current approach in the USA is broadly based on the interpretation of the 
arm’s length standard, for the sake of clarity, the Treasury Regulations could 
de lege ferenda have general regulations highlighting the importance of 
reviewing terminations and renegotiations of existing agreements in the 
transfer pricing analysis of related party transactions comprising general 
references to commercial law and other sources of law potentially regulating 
indemnification rights in this connection. 
 
As previously discussed, several uncertainty factors relate to the transfer 
pricing of business restructurings. It is not entirely clear, inter alia, to what 
extent transfers of intangible assets fall within the scope of application of the 
national transfer pricing regulations, what the most appropriate transfer 
pricing method (regulated or other valuation technique) in a given case is, and 
how to apply the chosen method in practice (comprising of but not limited to 
the choice of the correct comparables, figures and parameters). In particular, 
the determination of arm’s length compensations for transfers of intangibles 
and a going concern is a difficult task.  
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Russia has been planning to join the OECD already for several years. When — 
and if — it finally becomes a member of the OECD, it will be in a similar 
position as Finland, the USA and other OECD member states; the national 
authorities and courts could be more willing to follow the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines at least to some extent in practice, although the guidance is 
not binding upon the member states. Furthermore, already in 2013, it has been 
stated that the OECD’s BEPS Project may possibly bring amendments to the 
Russian transfer pricing provisions, especially by defining more precisely the 
intellectual property rights/intangibles falling within the scope of transfer 
pricing rules.1009  
 
Although this has not happened yet, it is expected that sooner or later the 
Russian government and the Minfin will react to the prevailing ambiguity of 
the transfer pricing rules particularly in terms of transfers of intangibles. As 
the current situation concerning the transfer pricing aspects of business 
restructurings in Russia is somewhat unclear, and taking into account the 
overall eagerness of tax authorities to intervene in transfer pricing of 
transactions between related parties, one possible solution is to take advantage 
of APAs, which can be concluded between taxpayers and authorities before 
executing certain transactions in the course of business restructurings. 
 
The conclusion of APAs may definitely bring benefits to taxpayers — the most 
important being the fact that once an APA has been concluded, the tax 
authorities must follow it. Nonetheless, the use of APAs is not uncomplicated 
in Russia, and they may not bring solutions in all cases. This is because only 
the so-called large taxpayers may conclude APAs in Russia, the state duty can 
be considered high and — most importantly — the use of bilateral/multilateral 
APAs is not yet possible. As the unilateral APAs are not binding on foreign tax 
authorities in a similar manner as the multilateral APAs, they may not 
currently be used effectively in cross-border business restructurings. Quite the 
contrary, the current legal situation in Finland and the USA enables the 
conclusion of both unilateral and bilateral/multilateral APAs, and therefore 
APAs may be used as an effective tool to eliminate at least some uncertainties 
and ambiguities related to the transfer pricing issues arising out of business 
restructurings, depending on the circumstances of the restructuring.  
 
In addition to APAs, especially the compliance with the general transfer 
pricing documentation and reporting requirements may enable taxpayers to 
tackle some uncertainty factors in relation to transfer pricing in the business 
restructuring context. Notwithstanding that there might be slight differences 
between the current documentation and reporting requirements of Russia, 
                                                 
 
1009 Stroykova 2013, p. 11. 
303 
 
Finland and the USA, they aim to serve the same purpose: the examination 
and verification of whether the pricing and/or other terms and conditions of 
related party transactions are arm’s length. By documenting related party 
transactions in a comprehensive and thorough way, a taxpayer may 
demonstrate that the transfer prices used in business restructuring 
transactions and other transfer pricing issues related thereto (e.g. the choice 
of the transfer pricing methods) are in line with the arm’s length principle, and 
eventually the taxpayer may increase the chances of avoiding disputes and 
conflicts with tax authorities  
 
Moreover, taxpayers’ self-initiated transfer pricing adjustments may lead to 
potential transfer pricing disputes with tax authorities being avoided, for 
example, in situations where a taxpayer notices the failure of applying arm’s 
length prices in its controlled transactions before filing the annual income tax 
return. As they can in principle be used only as post-transaction tools in 
Russia, Finland and the USA, in comparison with APA processes and/or 
maintaining a comprehensive transfer pricing documentation, they cannot be 
used as effectively to eliminate uncertainties arising from transfer pricing 
issues in business restructurings. 
 
Apart from analyzing whether related parties have complied with the arm’s 
length principle in the course of business restructurings, the anti-avoidance 
rules prohibiting unjustified tax benefits must be borne in mind in the 
decision-making with regard to business restructurings. It may ultimately be 
reasonable to demonstrate that the group is not seeking to reduce its payable 
income taxes or avoid taxes contrary to the legislator’s intention. This may — 
or is required to — be done by showing the economic- and business-related 
purposes and reasons behind the business restructuring, as previously 
discussed.  
 
In particular, this is of great importance at present in Russia, as transfers of 
intangibles do not generally fall within the scope of the Russian transfer 
pricing regulations. If, for example, intangible assets that are not considered 
intellectual properties are transferred between related parties in the course of 
a business restructuring, the arm’s length principle does not necessarily need 
to be applied pursuant to the current transfer pricing rules. However, this does 
not mean that such assets could be transferred considerably overpriced or 
underpriced, as it is very likely that the FTS would be willing to challenge such 
transactions by invoking the principle of unjustified tax benefits. Hence, the 
anti-avoidance rules and principles must also be followed in business 
restructurings. When a taxpayer successfully shows reasonable justifications 
for the business restructuring transactions, e.g. in the transfer pricing 
documentation, the likelihood of potential conflicts with tax authorities may 
be reduced.  
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Such an approach must also be followed in Finland and the USA. Specifically 
in Finland, the compliance with the anti-tax avoidance rules is currently a 
topical question, as the Council of the EU published quite recently, on 12 July 
2016, a directive on laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market.1010 Pursuant to the 
directive, the EU member states must take certain measures against tax 
avoidance, comprising of, inter alia, adopting tax law provisions with regard 
to exit taxation and anti-abuse in general. Such provisions must be applied 
already as of 1 January 2019. It should be observed that the directive was 
adopted as a consequence of the OECD’s BEPS Project in order to implement 
within the EU, more efficiently and with a certain degree of uniformity, rules 
for preventing base erosion and profit shifting risks introduced by the OECD.  
 
6.2 OECD’S PRESENT APPROACH AND ROLE IN 
DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING 
STANDARD 
As previously mentioned, the OECD finished its principal work in relation to 
the BEPS Project at the end of 2015, resulting in the new consolidated version 
of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines being published in 2017. Although 
the OECD did not revisit the actual guidance provided in Chapter IX with 
regard to transfer pricing of business restructurings, conforming amendments 
to Chapter IX were necessary in order to avoid inconsistencies between the 
other revised chapters and Chapter IX. Nevertheless, there still exist 
uncertainties and ambiguity in certain transfer pricing questions arising from 
business restructurings, which may lead to that the arm’s length principle 
cannot always be complied with efficiently.  
 
As OECD’s guidance covers the typical objects of transfer pricing in business 
restructurings and enables business restructurings to be regarded as transfers 
of a going concern for the purpose of achieving the best arm’s length result, it 
is principally consistent with the arm’s length principle. Furthermore, the 
OECD’s approach seems to be in line with the arm’s length principle, when the 
determination of arm’s length compensations for transfers of something of 
value in the business restructuring context is preliminarily examined. The 
regulated transfer pricing methods as well as other valuation techniques may 
be used in determining arm’s length compensations for the purpose of 
achieving the best arm’s length result.   
 
                                                 
 
1010 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 on laying down rules against tax avoidance 
practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market. 
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In particular, the use of the broad concept of intangible assets in the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines makes it possible that all such intangible assets 
that would be compensated in transactions between independent parties 
should correspondingly fall within the scope of application of domestic 
transfer pricing rules — and thus be subject to the arm’s length principle — in 
business restructurings. In the current situation, as is it extremely unlikely 
that all intangible asset types could be defined exhaustively in domestic 
transfer pricing rules, the mentioned approach brought good results in terms 
of the arm’s length principle in Finland. However, while such an approach 
seems to be the best option to achieve an arm’s length result in the current 
legal situation in Finland, it is less acceptable to have such unclarity in an 
international standard that would be followed broadly by the OECD member 
states and even by non-member states.1011  
 
As the concept is left open to interpretation, the uncertainty in relation to 
transfer pricing of intangible assets increases in cases where it is unclear 
whether an item should be regarded as an intangible asset and, if so, whether 
a transfer thereof would be compensated in transactions between independent 
parties. This makes the compliance with the arm’s length principle more 
uncertain and unpredictable — which is against the aim of the principle. A 
vague interpretation may benefit tax authorities, entitling them to interpret 
the concept for their benefit. Moreover, the risk of double taxation 
increases.1012 The question of how to define intangibles in a more concrete 
manner to avoid the aforementioned uncertainty factors and issues, covering 
nevertheless all potential items of value that would be compensated in 
transactions between independent parties, remains to be answered in the 
guidelines. 
 
Furthermore, the determination of arm’s length compensations for transfers 
of intangibles is not dealt with in a sufficient manner. As the profit split 
method primarily requires that both parties to a related party transaction 
make unique and valuable contributions (e.g. use unique and valuable 
intangibles), it is unclear how the method should be applied to transactions 
involving solely transfers of intangibles or rights in intangibles. As in business 
restructurings, usually only one party makes unique contributions, i.e. 
transfers unique intangibles, it should be clarified in the guidelines, how the 
method should be applied particularly in such circumstances. Second, 
although the guidelines regard other valuation techniques as useful tools for 
the determination of arm’s length compensations where reliable comparables 
                                                 
 
1011 See about the OECD’s remarkability in practice in e.g. Lubic – Gelin – Ossard-Quintaine 2014, pp. 
70–71. 
1012 Markham 2015, pp. 684, 686–687. 
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cannot be found for the controlled transfer of intangible assets,1013 and in this 
sense follow the arm’s length principle, the regulated guidance lacks the 
necessary content for their successful application in practice. The valuation 
techniques must be used in a manner that is in line with the arm’s length 
principle and other guidance of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines,1014 but 
no clarifying guidance for the satisfaction of this requirement is provided.  
 
The guidelines also state that the valuation assumptions used in accounting 
may lead to a result that is not acceptable in transfer pricing,1015 resulting in 
that the special circumstances and nature of transfer pricing need to be taken 
into consideration in the application of such methods. However, the content 
of the guidelines in this regard is vague and insufficient, which leads to it being 
uncertain when and how the arm’s length result, that is consistent with the 
principles of the guidelines, may be achieved by using such valuation 
techniques. 
 
In addition, the OECD provides insufficient guidance on conditions on which 
business restructurings should be regarded as transfers of a going concern for 
transfer pricing purposes. Although the OECD defines the concept in a definite 
manner, it does not regulate clearly when the examination of 
contemporaneous transfers of assets, risks and functions should be analyzed 
on an aggregate basis. In addition, the guidelines do not currently take a clear 
stand on whether it prefers the approach based on the examination of 
contemporaneous transfers of assets/something of value as a whole over the 
approach based on separate analyses of related party transaction occurring in 
a business restructuring.  
 
Furthermore, when the arm’s length valuation needs to be done on an 
aggregate basis, the guidelines have not regulated valuation techniques and 
the application thereof in a sufficient manner. The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines refer in general to valuation techniques that independent parties 
would apply in comparable circumstances, i.e. in acquisition deals, as well as 
to the potential use of the unspecified methods used in the valuation of 
intangibles. Regardless of that this approach allows the use of income based 
methods, in particular the discounted cash flow method and its variations, the 
application of such methods in the transfer pricing context remains 
ambiguous. Hence, similarly to transfers of intangibles, the OECD’s guidance 
is too vague and does not provide concrete tools for determining arm’s length 
compensations for transfers of a going concern in a predictable and reliable 
                                                 
 
1013 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.153. 
1014 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.154. 
1015 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 6.155. 
307 
 
manner. The lacking guidance in this respect is, ultimately, contrary to the 
aims of the arm’s length principle. 
 
Hence, on the aforementioned grounds, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
cannot, in their present form, be adopted effectively to domestic transfer 
pricing legislation and regulations, when transfer pricing aspects of business 
restructurings are considered. However, although the OECD already finished 
its principal work in relation to the BEPS Project, it has nevertheless continued 
publishing further guidance as regards certain specific questions in 2017 and 
is expected to continue publishing such in the forthcoming years. For instance, 
the guidance in relation to the use of the profit split method is currently being 
amended in the discussed manner.1016 It would be important that the OECD 
could continue publishing further guidance to address the prevailing 
uncertainties in transfer pricing in general and particularly to address the 
concerns with regard to transfers of intangibles and a going concern.  
 
In the current situation, one solution to tackle the challenges in relation to 
cross-border transfer pricing questions, such as business restructurings, could 
be the universal implementation of the OECD’s guidance by national 
legislators and authorities, provided that the above-mentioned concerns are 
sufficiently addressed by introducing amendments and/or updates to the 
guidelines. The role of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in developing 
international tax law cannot be disregarded. The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines generally offer a significant set of rules as regards transfer pricing, 
and the OECD is continuously developing and adopting new guidance. If the 
OECD’s work would effectively, and in a consistent way, be followed globally 
and incorporated into national legislations or other legally binding national 
sources of countries (both OECD and non-OECD), the transfer pricing 
treatment of particular questions, or at least the rules and factors affecting the 
treatment thereof, could be assessed more effectively beforehand. Due to the 
fact that the guidelines are widely accepted, also countries that are not OECD 
member states follow to a great extent the guidelines when they enact domestic 
transfer pricing rules.1017 In this connection, the OECD’s BEPS Project 
provides a good example of the important work the OECD is doing to address 
new tax and transfer pricing questions arising from the changes in business 
life and new forms of business activities. 
 
It should be noted that, due to differences in the judicial systems, hierarchy of 
laws and/or other peculiarities in the national legal systems, international 
guidance — such as the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines — may not always 
be applied and followed uniformly in different countries. Taxation is in the end 
                                                 
 
1016 See e.g. OECD Public Discussion Draft on Revised Guidance on Profit Splits. 
1017 Calderón 2007, pp. 4–5; Lubic – Gelin – Ossard-Quintaine 2014, pp. 70–71. 
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strongly a national issue. Therefore, in addition to providing general guidance 
for the application of transfer pricing principles and rules to specific questions 
globally, it is important to provide a framework and tools for the co-operation 
of national tax authorities to resolve cross-border questions. In the transfer 
pricing context, of great importance is also to provide sufficient regulations 
allowing the conclusion of bilateral and/or multilateral APAs. As seen above, 
such APAs achieve the best result in terms of resolving complex and 
ambiguous cross-border transfer pricing questions in a legally binding way 
before entering into transactions. As the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
have provided specific guidance and tools for adopting domestic transfer 
pricing rules for concluding bilateral/multilateral APAs, it is reasonable to 
follow the guidelines also in this respect.1018 
 
6.3 ARM’S LENGTH PRINCIPLE’S FUTURE?  
As evidenced by this study, the compliance with the arm’s length principle may 
not be achieved easily and efficiently in certain transfer pricing questions. 
Business restructurings form a good example of complex cross-border tax 
questions, where it is not self-evident that the arm’s length result can be 
achieved in a reliable manner — or at all. On the other hand, not every aspect 
and feature of transfer pricing can be covered by domestic or international 
transfer pricing rules or standards. For example, although the OECD has in 
recent years paid a great deal of attention to various transfer pricing questions, 
the compliance with the arm’s length principle is not realized efficiently even 
in its newest guidance. Hence, it can even be considered whether the best 
results from the point of view of the arm’s length principle may be achieved by 
constantly amending the existing transfer pricing rules. 
 
In the legal literature, it has even been considered that the OECD’s latest 
amendments, in particular in relation to intangibles, lead to inconsistency 
with the arm’s length principle. The OECD’s broad concept of intangible assets 
introduced by the BEPS Project has been regarded to cause uncertainty to the 
transfer pricing of intangibles, instead of limiting it.1019 It has been stated that 
“progress on the revised guidance on the definition of intangibles is being 
prevented by the inability of transfer pricing to provide an anti-avoidance or 
protectionist tool within the confines of the arm’s length principle.”1020 
Furthermore, it has been viewed that the increased use of intangibles has 
                                                 
 
1018 See Chapter IV of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. See also OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
Annex I and II to Chapter IV. The former provides for tax authorities’ use specific memoranda that can 
be used in drafting bilateral agreements. See also BEPS Actions 14–15. 
1019 Markham 2015, p. 687. 
1020 This view of John Henshall was expressed in Markham 2015, p. 686. 
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decreased the role of transfer pricing and the arm’s length principle as anti-
avoidance tools, mainly due to their high reliance of comparables. This may 
also lead to that the arm’s length principle may not be used to counter tax 
avoidance, but it may even make tax avoidance easier.1021 As this study reveals, 
certain problems in relation to the compliance with the arm’s length principle 
in the transfer pricing of intangibles — as well as a going concern — are also 
present in business restructurings. From this perspective, the arm’s length 
principle is imperfectly followed. 
 
Consequently, a question arises whether there exist plausible alternatives to 
the arm’s length principle and transfer pricing in the current situation. As this 
question is beyond the scope of this research, only some preliminary remarks 
on potential alternatives, without prioritizing one over another and providing 
an exhaustive analysis, are discussed briefly in the following. Furthermore, as 
this question ultimately requires a more elaborate study, future research could 
be suggested in this connection on whether certain alternatives could replace 
the arm’s length principle in transfer pricing of business restructurings and 
other complex transactions involving transfers of intangibles in a post-BEPS 
world. This could comprise a comparison between the arm’s length principle 
as regulated in the OECD’s latest work and the possible alternative(s) 
suggested to it in the current situation.1022 
 
Global formulary apportionment has been brought out most often when 
alternatives to the arm’s length principle have been discussed. Under global 
formulary apportionment, a multinational enterprise allocates the 
consolidated profits of the group to local companies operating in different 
jurisdictions by using a specific formula.1023 One of the advantages of the 
global formulary apportionment is that no comparable uncontrolled 
transactions need to be found for intangibles, which is usually an extremely 
difficult task in transfer pricing. This is because no related party transactions 
are reviewed in this approach for the purpose of income allocation. Hence, it 
eliminates the majority of the problems arising out of the arm’s length 
principle.1024 The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines acknowledges the 
existence of the concept of global formulary apportionment. However, the 
guidelines itself do not consider it as a realistic alternative to the arm’s length 
principle. The main concern is that the implementation of the system based on 
global formulary apportionment in a way that the risk of double taxation is 
                                                 
 
1021 T’ng 2016, pp. 421–422. 
1022 Although the use of the arm’s length principle and potential alternatives thereto especially in the 
context of transfer pricing of intangibles have often been discussed in the legal literature, no 
comprehensive studies have yet been conducted on this topic in a post-BEPS situation. 
1023 Markham 2005, p. 134. 
1024 Markham 2005, pp. 134–136. 
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prevented and single taxation is ensured is, in the end, particularly difficult. 
Also, global formulary apportionment is considered infeasible and costly to 
maintain.1025 
 
Another alternative to transfer pricing and the arm’s length principle that is, 
at least to some extent, based on the global formulary apportionment is the 
EU’s common consolidated corporate tax base (hereinafter the “CCCTB”) 
initiative. In October 2016, the Commission published two directive proposals 
with the aim of establishing the CCCTB within the EU.1026 In this two-step 
approach, the first directive would introduce rules for determining a common 
corporate tax base in the EU’s internal market, while the second directive 
would set out certain rules for consolidation of the taxable profits of a group 
and, more importantly, allocating the consolidated taxable profits to the group 
companies pursuant to a specific apportionment formula.1027 The advantages 
of this initiative are, inter alia, that the reliance on comparables is removed 
and the transfer pricing manipulation is thus also eliminated. On the other 
hand, the project has been criticized, for example, for excluding the intangibles 
from the apportionment formula, which may ultimately decrease the accuracy 
of the allocation of the consolidated taxable income.1028 
 
One further solution to the current situation concerning the arm’s length 
principle could also be the combination of the approaches of the arm’s length 
principle and the formulary apportionment, i.e. adopting a hybrid regime. It 
has been proposed that the formulary apportionment could be used in the 
context of the arm’s length principle, when the transfer pricing methods could 
not be used due to the lack of comparables. In this way, the arm’s length 
principle would not be replaced in its entirety, but it would be supplemented 
by the formulary apportionment, for instance, in transactions involving 
transfers of non-routine intangibles.1029 Another advantage would be that no 
fundamental changes would be required in the basic structure of the existing 
international tax regime.1030 
 
                                                 
 
1025 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.19, 1.21–1.22, 1.24 and 1.27. About other concerns, see OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1.23–1.31. See more detailed analysis of the global formulary apportionment 
in a pre-BEPS world in Markham 2005, pp. 133–157. See also Brauner 2008, pp. 159–164, where the 
formula based regime is regarded as the future of transfer pricing. 
1026 EU Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Corporate Tax Base, 25 October 2016 
(COM (2016) 685 final) and EU Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 25 October 2016 (COM (2016) 683 final). 
1027 Ibid. 
1028 T’ng 2016, pp. 423–425. 
1029 Avi-Yonah 2010, pp. 16–17; Markham 2005, p. 157. 
1030 Avi-Yonah – Benshalom 2011, p. 397.  
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Moreover, the stretching of the boundaries of the arm’s length principle itself 
has been discussed as one option in this connection. In this approach, the 
arm’s length principle should not be considered as a narrow and inflexible 
instrument, but it could be interpreted more broadly, allowing measures that 
are barely within the traditional boundaries of the arm’s length principle. The 
arm’s length principle could be considered as an evolving principle that is 
continuously developed to better reflect economic reality and circumstances, 
in which business activities are carried on.1031  For instance, the profit split 
method has been regarded as one concrete example of situations where the 
boundaries of the arm’s length principle have been broadened, as the 
application of the method does not rely on finding exact comparables and uses 
more internal data.1032  
 
It has also been viewed that the arm’s length principle has evolved from its 
origins, where it was understood as a pure legal fiction used to business 
income allocation between group companies, to reflect the economic reality of 
the transactions better. In this view, for instance, increasingly more attention 
in the transfer pricing analysis of transactions is paid to the commercial 
rationality of the transactions, instead of purely relying on the contractual 
arrangements as such. The BEPS Project has thus, in this sense, developed the 
arm’s length principle further or provided a new interpretation of it.1033 When 
the principle is in this way considered a flexible and evolving instrument, it 
may in the current situation still be a solid and reliable transfer pricing 
standard, when compared to, for example, the global formulary 
apportionment.1034 
 
On the other hand, when the scope of the arm’s length principle is evolved and 
developed further, it may in some situations lead to the weakening of the 
principle. For instance, more advanced transfer pricing documentation and 
reporting requirements that entitle tax authorities to obtain information about 
intangibles, supply chains and value drivers may ultimately result in a 
formulary apportionment of income, if tax authorities make assumptions or 
misinterpretations on the basis of such information.1035   
 
In contrast to the above mentioned, also more radical proposals have been 
suggested in the legal literature. For example, it has been proposed to adopt 
destination-based corporate tax regimes instead of the conventional source- 
or residence-based corporate tax regimes, as in the former, the arm’s length 
                                                 
 
1031 Petruzzi 2016, p. 27; Koomen 2015, p. 242. 
1032 Koomen 2015, pp. 242–243. 
1033 Petruzzi 2016, pp. 21–23 and 27–28; Heggmair 2017, pp. 264–265. 
1034 Petruzzi 2016, pp. 28–30. 
1035 Kaeser – Bremer 2016, pp. 201–202. 
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principle’s general inability to solve problems in relation to profit allocation in 
some cases is avoided.1036 However, as the arm’s length principle has, as an 
international standard, largely been embedded to the existing double treaties, 
making such deviations from the principle may be an enormous and time-
consuming task.1037 
 
All in all, the potential alternatives to the arm’s length principle may, in the 
aforementioned manner, be discussed from very different points of view. The 
above mentioned provides examples of different approaches already discussed 
to some extent in the legal literature, and the purpose was not to provide an 
all-embracing description of all the possible options. As, in the current legal 
state, there remain unsolved issues from the perspective of the arm’s length 
principle in general and particularly in the transfer pricing of transfers 
involving intangibles and a going concern, further research in this context is 
needed.  
                                                 
 
1036 T’ng 2016, pp. 431–433. 
1037 Petruzzi 2016, p. 28. 
